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ÒNo revolution of the masses can triumph without the support of a portion of the 









                                                
1 Adapted from a quote in Lieuwen 1961, 134 from D.E.H Russell, Rebellion, Revolution, and Armed Forces: A 
Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with special Emphasis on Cuba and South Africa, ed. Charles Tilly and 




Why have attempts to repeal presidential term limits succeeded in some African 
countries and failed in others? What measures and pressures were required to 
demand and enforce presidential term limits compliance? The lack of precise and 
effective strategy to enforce term limits compliance seems to expose term limits to 
incipient repeals by incumbent presidents in Africa. 
My field observation in various African democracies shows that the parliament, the 
judiciary, democracy movements and the international community, though 
occasionally influential, have not played a decisive role in enforcing term limits 
compliance in Africa. Their roles rather appear to be dependent on elite dissidence, 
resistance, sponsorship and sometimes manipulation. My fieldwork in Zambia, 
Nigeria and Malawi reveals the critical influence and role of political elites in 
mobilizing and converging pressures to demand and enforce compliance. These cases 
further find that a compliance outcome becomes possible if individual political elites 
choose to resist any incumbent president seeking to repeal term limits. The ability of 
dissenting elites to provide an alternative platform for the convergence of other 
pressures raise the cost of repression for presidents and force them to compliance.  
Since othe pressures achor around elite dissidence, the position of some political 
elites either for or against the removal of term limits explains why some presidents 
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Chapter 1: General Introduction 
 
1.1 Problem Statement 
The tendency to repeal presidential term limits by some incumbent presidents 
appears to pose a significant challenge to the consolidation process of democracy in 
Africa. As definition, presidential term limit is the constitutional imposition of limits 
on the number of years and tenures allowed for an individual candidate to hold 
presidential office or power (Dulani 2011). It presupposes a maximum allowance of 
two terms, each of which may not exceed five years (or seven years at the most), and 
are thought to apply to the office of the president (Shinn 2009). Multiparty 
presidential systems of democracy have accepted presidential term limits as a 
fundamental mechanism for ensuring political transition (Beetham 2004; Cheeseman 
201; Linz 1996; Armstrong 2010). Thus, presidential term limits remain a powerful 
predictor of democratic power transition and a vital component of democracy. 
Although studies have covered the benefits of presidential term limits in a multiparty 
democracy, little research has examined the effective ways of enforcing presidential 
term limits, especially in African.  
Between 1999 and 2014, twelve incumbent presidents in Africa abandoned or 
successfully repealed term limits to remain longer in power. At the same time, thirty-
four national debates in various African new democracies within the same period 
concerned the removal of presidential term limits, representing the highest number of 




Figure 1: Presidential Term Limits Experience. Post-Cold War African democracies are 




Why have attempts to repeal presidential term limits succeeded in some 
African countries and failed in others? What measures or pressures2 are required to 
demand and enforce presidential term limits compliance? To what extent have the 
validity and effectiveness of these pressures in enforcing compliance been examined 
and rated by political science as it concerns African post-Cold War democracies?  
This study seeks to contribute to the literature on democratization by 
examining how pressures from political elites play a role in enforcing presidential 
terms limits compliance in African democracies. I am aware that approaching this 
research from political elite perspective might seem somewhat puzzling, given that 
other variables attract central position in our modern understanding of democratic 
politics than the elite role in enforcing presidential term limits compliance. There are 
further theoretical, normative, and practical implications to understanding how 
presidential terms limits are effectively enforced in furtherance to democracy 
consolidation. The conventional wisdom in the practice of democracy and 
presidentialism suggests that a seating president would voluntarily step aside after 
serving his/her constitutionally allowed tenures without engaging in the politics of 
repealing term limits to extend his/her tenures. However, this has not been the case in 
                                                
2 I shall refer to pressures in this study as an external impact that influences the outcome or result of an 
action. The external impact is often independent of the outcome while the outcome is dependent on the 
impact, without which, the outcome may have been different. For this study, elite political dissidence 




many African democracies where seating presidents have either ignored term limits 
or successfully removed term limits to extend their mandates beyond their 
constitutional terms as figure 1 above shows.  
The present research does not set out to introduce a new theory of democracy. Rather, 
it aims to re-introduce a debate on the role of political elites in enforcing presidential 
term limits compliance in post-Cold War African democracies. It does this by 
examining the capacity of individual political elites to resist power entrenchment 
through elite activism, aimed at galvanizing, mobilizing, sponsoring and bundling 
pressures to enforce presidential term limits compliance in some African 
democracies. By addressing this seeming deficiency in the study of the politics of 
presidential term limits, this research further diversifies the focus on a search for 
ways and strategies to enforce presidential term limits in Africa.  
Some writers have attempted to investigate the processes that yielded to 
certain presidential term limits outcomes in Africa. These few studies have focused 
on the role of institutions (Armstrong 2010; Maltz 2007; Vencovsky 2007; Posner 
and Young 2007), and Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) (Dulani 2011) in 
enforcing compliance. The visible impacts of institutions and some CSOs in some 
industrialized Western democracies tend to influence the focus on institutional and 
CSOs role (Khembo 2004). Institutions of democracy in stable and medium income 
democracies saliently regulate power alternation and leadership recruitment as a 
norm. Though Posner and Young (2007) emphasize the institutional strength in 
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enforcing term limits compliance in Nigeria in 2006, institutions in many post-Cold 
War democracies, referred to as the bottom billion by Collier (2008) seem to be 
weak, compromised, or amenable, in effectively and reliably enforcing presidential 
term limits compliance. As Posner and Young (2007) emphasize,  
constitutions and formal institutions exist only on paper and do not shape the 
conduct of individual actors, especially those in power. Otherwise, voluntary 
relinquishment of power by some incumbent presidents in the face of 
impelling formal rules telling them that their time was up directly challenges 
the caricature of Africa as a place where abstract constitutions and formal 
institutions exist only on paper (2007).  
With such an indictment on institutions, the enforcement of presidential term limits 
compliance in Africa, where incumbent presidents possess massive executive powers, 
requires new and realistic strategies even if they often contradict democratic 
calculations. Research that focuses on the role of individual political elites in 
mobilizing and bundling pressures to demand and enforce term limits compliance 
seems to sustain such a paradox. It also calls for a rethinking on the processes that 
shape democratic prospects in the countries referred to as Ôthe bottom billionÕ by Paul 
Collier. As shall be further explored in the case studies, neither democratic 
institutions nor democracy movements could have enforced presidential term limits 




Post-Cold War Democracy and Presidential Term Limits is Africa 
The introduction of presidential term limits was one of the outcomes of the 
various negotiations that preceded the post-Cold War transition elections in Africa. 
With constitutional support for presidential term limits, which were often ratified in 
most African countries through a referendum, presidential term limits not only 
assumed a democratic principle, but were also expected to become both a Ôprocess 
and a practiceÕ in new African democracies.3 The constitution legitimizes term limits 
(years and tenures) as a democratic principle to regulate power and leadership 
transition within the context of democratic elections. Shinn (2009) argues that term 
limits for a countryÕs most important political leader are an essential component of 
building democracy. Their importance adds value to the process, practice and 
constitutive feature of liberal democracy (ibid). Numerous studies show that 
presidential term limits are one of the most consistent predictors of power transition 
(Beetham 2004; Linz 1996; Cheeseman 2010). Presidential term limits are also 
important in sustaining open-seat contests that ensure power alternation. However, 
                                                
3 Understood in this way, I refer to term limits as the outcome of the process and practice of instituting 
and creating a legal framework to impose limits on the number of years and tenures with regards to the 
office of the president and some other electoral positions in a presidential system of government. In 
Nigeria for instance, the office of the thirty-six State Governors and seven hundred and seventy-six 




this was not to be the case in African democratic experiment, where the process and 
practice of presidential term limits have become problematic. 
As shall be discussed in chapter two of this work, about 90% of African 
countries did not have the opportunity to experience presidential term limits until the 
end of the Cold War. Two reasons accounted for this. First, the newly independent 
African states adopted a parliamentary system of government and therefore had no 
need for term limits, as was the practice in most imperialist countries.4 Secondly, in 
many other newly independent states, the departing colonial administrations hurriedly 
handpicked their successors without setting adequate processes into motion for power 
transition (Bayart 2009). In some other new independent states, warlords replaced 
colonial administrations after long and protracted rebellions and wars. In all cases, 
whatever type of regime that replaced the colonial administration ruled without 
interruption. Death of the president and coup de etat therefore became two important 
factors that ensured power alternation in Africa (Armstrong 2010; Vencovsky 2007). 
                                                
4 With the exception of France, other colonising countries in Africa at the time, like England and 
Belgium, practiced parliamentary systems of government and therefore left behind constitutions that 
supported parliamentary system of government before the independence of these countries. The rush to 
switch over to a presidential system by most Africa countries was new and apparently supported by 




However, the process and practice changed in the early 1990s as many 
African states responded to the post-Cold War democratic shock. With about thirty 
reigning dictators and life-presidents ready to open up for, and at the same time 
participate in the multi-party democratic elections, the issue of presidential term 
limits became crucial. In a majority of the democratizing states, the adoption of term 
limits for a countryÕs most important political leader was unanimous and hitch-free. 
By 2004, thirty-eight countries had constitutionally adopted presidential term limits, 
with the aim of making presidential term limits a major practice in African new 
democracies. Afrobarometer notes that the adoption of term limits increased the 
popularity and prospects of democracy after the Cold War in Africa (Afrobarometer 
2010-2012). A survey of public opinion in thirty-four African countries indicates that 
about three in every five Africans want their presidents to serve no more than two 
terms in office (Ibid.). Except Algeria where the support for the removal of term 
limits was strong, the support for presidential term limits in other countries surveyed 
in Africa yielded an average of 70%. As shown in figure 2 below, most Africans 




Figure 2: AfrobarometerÕs data on Public Opinion of Presidential term Limits in post-Cold War 
African democracies (Round 5, 2010-2012). Compiled by Emily Hamilton/ The Monkey Cage. 
The post-Cold War democratic experiment took off with only six countries 
having presidential term limits in Africa. However, within the period between 1990 
and 2012, fifty-four of sixty-four adopted or amended constitutions formally 
stipulated term limits for the office of the president. Unfortunately, despite the 
legalization and formalization of presidential term limits by various constitutions, 
many presidents continued to resist them by either constitutionally extending their 
mandates to third terms or life-presidency, or totally ignoring the term limits. In all 
the cases of repeal in Africa, the result appears to be a setback in democracy 
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consolidation as it blocks political reforms, leads to a syndrome of power in 
perpetuity (Shinn 2009), and sometimes to democracy reversal.5  
The benefits of term limits notwithstanding, some scholars like Baker (2002), 
Weissert and Halperin (2007), and Elhauge (1997) doubt the so-called benefits and 
value of presidential term limits for democracy. These opt for the removal of any sort 
of imposition of limits on the number of years and tenures for the presidential office 
since term limits impair the effectiveness of the executive. As noted above, various 
stakeholders in the democratization process readily supported and accepted 
presidential term limits in Africa after the Cold War not only because of their benefits 
for democracy consolidation but also to rupture African democratic process and 
practice from its immediate past of power entrenchment and monopolization of 
political power by the few. Power alternation, smooth transition, open-seat contests, 
political competition, rule of law and political level playing ground were advanced as 
strong reasons for the adoption of term limits after the Cold War to break-off from 
long dictatorship and era of life-presidency and power entrenchment.6 New African 
democracies supported and adopted presidential terms limits to ensure the possibility 
                                                
5 Refer to the democratic reversal in Burkina Faso, authoritarian consolidation in Cameroon, Uganda, 
Togo, Gabon, and the democratic confusion in Burundi. 
6 Though various scholars like Linz, Beetham, and Cheeseman have extensively discussed the benefits 
of term limits, Professor Falola re-emphasized the benefits of term limits for post-Cold War African 
democratic experiment. (In authorÕs interview with Falola. Pilzen, Czech Republic. May 2013). 
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of policy change and help institutionalize the democratic process (Shinn 2009; 
Armstrong 2010; Reidl 2015). 
Unfortunately, the euphoria that greeted the post-Cold War democratization 
and the adoption of presidential term limits in Africa did not last long as some 
transition presidents strongly resisted term limits. Some new democracies began to 
witness undue political tension within ten years of democratization, as many 
incumbent presidents introduced debates to repeal presidential term limits to either 
stay longer in power or acquire the status of life presidents. Between 1998 and 2015, 
thirty-four of the thirty-eight African countries that adopted presidential term limits 
during their transition held national debates to consider removing presidential term 
limits provisions from their constitutions.7  While thirteen out of the thirty-four 
national debates resulted in a successful repeal outcome or total neglect of term 
limits8, only four resulted in a failed attempt.9 Currently, two national debates 
                                                
7 AuthorÕs update of AfrobarometerÕs data on presidential term limits national debates in post-Cold 
War African democracies (2010-2012). 
8 Burundi and Eritrea operate a constitution with presidential term limits stipulation. However, leaders 
in these two countries tend to ignore the term limits and seek for more presidential terms. I have 
included these two countries on the list of successful repeals, since presidential term limits seem no 
longer to work in these countries anymore.  
9 Zambia, Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal are so far the only countries that resisted the attempts of their 
incumbent presidents to repeal their presidential term limits.  
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concerning the removal of presidential term limits are ongoing in Rwanda and 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), while one is deadlocked, causing a 
democratic reversal in Burkina Faso. 
With tthirteen successful repeals (including three neglected presidential term 
limits prescriptions) and two on-going presidential terms limits debates,10 presidential 
term limits as a democratic principle and an accepted system of leadership alternation 
appear to face significant challenges in African presidential systems. The threat 
appears to be greater, as the removal of presidential term limits destroys the 
enthusiasm that embraced the post-Cold War democratic experiment in Africa that 
specifically adopted term limits to curb presidential powers after years of 
dictatorship, life-presidency, and power entrenchment. For most African 
democracies, presidential term limits appear to have become a burden and a 
frustrating institution, both for incumbent presidents and for the entire population. 
The political tension and undemocratic actions associated with the amendment 
process of repealing or enforcing term limits confirm this burden.11 Despite the 
argument that some presidents and heads of governments both in Africa and 
elsewhere can effectively serve the populace in a third or fourth terms, cases abound 
where continued stay in power have led to a syndrome of power in perpetuity and 
                                                
10 Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda are currently embroiled in presidential term limits 
debates and politics.  
11 I shall explore this point further in the case studies. 
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very low democratic growth (Shinn 2009) as in Cameroon, Togo, Gabon and 
Uganda.12  
Thus, looking back at the post-Cold War democratization in Africa, what 
appears to be a real problem after twenty-five years of democratic experiment on the 
continent is the lack of precise strategy to enforce presidential term limits. Based on 
the number of countries that have either successfully repealed presidential term limits 
or ignored them, the on-going national debates to do the same in Rwanda and DRC, 
and the attraction to entrench and retain power by incumbent presidents, this study 
appears urgent in setting the stage for a sincere debate on the dynamics of enforcing 




                                                
12 Some writers like Shinn (2009) and Armstrong (2010) have referred to the perpetual occupation of 
the office of the president by one person as a setback for change and fresh ideas, and an opportunity 
for creating structures that sustain increased corrupt practices. Further, attempts by some incumbent 
presidents to remove term limits and hang on to power have resulted in conflicts and political disorder 
as in Burundi, democratic reversal as in Burkina Faso, and authoritarian stability as in Cameroon, 




1.2 Focus and Significance of Study  
In proffering answer to why some presidents succeeded while others failed in 
removing or ignoring term limits in Africa, this research assumes that the degree of 
respect for presidential term limits in Africa depends largely on the degree of 
pressures applied on a particular incumbent president. Various pressures pique in the 
politics and process of enforcing term limits compliance. However, field research in 
various African new democracies for this study reveal that the position of individual 
political elites either for or against the removal of term limits explain why some 
presidents succeeded and others failed in repealing term limits in Africa. This 
research focuses on the role and ability of political elites in producing, mobilizing, 
and bundling pressures to demand and enforce term limits compliance in Africa. The 
study covers the period between 1989 and 2015 and coincides with the Silver Jubilee 
of post-Cold War democratic experiment in Africa. 
About thirty-five elected presidents who were confronted with the reality of 
constitutional term limits between 1998 and 2014 received strong calls from their 
supporters to find a way of staying longer in power (Shinn 2009). While some of 
these presidents13 apparently resisted the calls and refrained from seeking to amend 
their constitutions for a longer term by announcing their willingness to abide by their 
                                                
13 I refer here to Kerekou of Benin, Antonio Monteiro of Cape Verde, Jerry Rawlings of Ghana, Daniel 
Arap Moi of Kenya, Alpha Konare of Mali, Joaquim Chissano of Mozambique, Miguel Trovoada of 
Sao Tome and Principe, France-Albert Rene of Seychelles, and Benjamin Mkapa of Tanzania. 
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RepublicÕs constitutions others repealed or ignored the constitutional term limits. 
Democracy observers are yet not unanimous in their search for reasons why some of 
these presidents chose not to seek for a third or longer terms. For Posner and Young 
(2007), these leaders seemingly restrained because:  
¥ of palpable fear that suggests the leaders lacked the votes required to amend 
the constitution;  
¥ the leaders were afraid of the concerted elite opposition that they would face; 
¥ they were concerned of a possible defeat in a third election; 
¥ they consciously wanted to abide by the constitution believing that abiding by 
the constitution was the right thing to do.  
Whatever the rationale might have been, many scholars including the author 
argue that willingly stepping aside was not necessarily the most preferred choice of 
these presidents, since only less than 10% of presidents has voluntarily relinquished 
power in Africa without some pressures (Posner and Young 2007; Shinn 2009; 
Armstrong 2010; Vencovsky 2007; Dulani 2011). Some incumbent presidents 
seemed to have agreed to relinquish power because the constitutional prohibition of 
extending their mandates raised the cost of staying in power beyond a level they were 
willing to bear.14 
                                                
14 I shall elaborate on this point further in Chapter One of this study. 
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Secondly, elite political resistance was already forming in some African countries 
to confront any attempt by some presidents who attempted to amend their republicÕs 
constitution to extend their stay in power. For instance, Presidents Jerry Rawlings of 
Ghana, Arap Moi of Kenya, Kerekou of Benin and Chissano of Mozambique made 
initial moves to extend their mandates, but changed their minds when it became clear 
that powerful elite coalitions were ready to confront them (Posner and Young 2007; 
Armstrong 2010; Shinn 2009). Arap Moi, Kerekou, and Jerry Rawlings complied 
with constitutional term limits under duress (ibid). Incumbent presidents who chose 
to step down since 1990 in Africa represent less than 30% of presidents who 
confronted term limits or ignored them. About 70% of incumbent presidents 
succeeded in changing their constitutions to gain more terms. This is indicative that 
many African presidents possess enormous powers to shape outcomes to suit their 
preferences, even when those preferences conflict with the democratic process, 
practice, and the formal legal limitations on their powers (Posner and Young 2007). 
Thus, presidential term limits have faced challenges in African democracies 
because the presidential system as a political configuration accords much power to 
the president and enables incumbent presidents to entrench state power (Villalon 
2005). Further, many incumbent presidents appear to have stepped on political toes, 
and thus are concerned about their existence outside office (Maltz 2007). In order to 
avoid political vendettas from perceived political foes and mass anger, many 
incumbent presidents deployed various means to retain power either by directly 
repealing presidential term limits to remain longer in power, or by manipulating the 
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democratic and electoral process to install a stooge as a successor (Sardanis 2014; 
Armstrong 2010).  
In some African democracies, the tendency to hold on to power has derailed the 
democratic consolidation process as in Togo, Gabon, Cameroon and Burundi, and in 
some cases, reversed democratic gains as in Burkina Faso. A study has therefore 
become necessary on the strategy to demand and enforce presidential term limits 
compliance as a constitutive feature of liberal democracy in Africa, without harming 
the state. The number of national debates and the actual neglect or removal of 
presidential term limits in thirteen African countries within the last twenty-five years 
underscores the importance and necessity of this study.  
My intention is to examine political elite interaction with other perspectives, 
especially, the institutional and democracy promotion theories to formulate a new 
model of interaction for elite role in enforcing term limits compliance. In addition to 
my focus on political elites, I shall investigate some existing theories (institutional, 
Civil society and democracy promotion) of democracy consolidation to examine the 
effectiveness or otherwise of these perspectives in enforcing term limits compliance. 
Using three case studies (Nigeria, Zambia ans Malawi), I shall design a model of 
interaction between political elites and other theories of democracy in mobilizing and 





1.3 Research Approach and Methodology 
1.3.1 Thesis Question 
I have selected one main thesis question and four sub-thesis questions to guide 
this research. The following serves as the main thesis question: 
In what ways do political actors mobilize to demand and enforce presidential term 
limits compliance, especially in African countries?  
The four sub-thesis questions that shall support the analysis and conclusion of 
the study are: What factors influence the political choices and behaviors of individual 
political elites to mobilize and bundle pressures against the removal of presidential 
term limits in African countries? Could other sectoral pressures sufficiently and 
independently enforce term limits compliance without the involvement of key 
individual political elites? Could individual political actors have achieved a 
compliance outcome without linking and allying with other institutional or extra-
institutional sectors? To which extent have African democracies experienced 
systematic and procedural power alternation without certain pressures produced and 
sustained by a section of the political elites? 
I shall test the assumptions of this study by examining and comparing the 
different roles played by some individual political elites with other social forces and 
institutions in enforcing presidential term limits compliance in Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Malawi. In testing the assumptions of this study through field research, I seek to 
discover the origin and sources of the Ôwhistle blowersÕ who brought the third term 
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controversies to the public domain. I shall also investigate the forces that mobilized 
against the repealing of term limits in the selected case studies, as well as the sources 
that financed the efforts and pressures against repeal attempts. 
In various case studies chosen for this study, many sectors became involved in 
the movements for and against the removal of term limits. These include some 
institutional and extra-institutional sectors like the parliament, judiciary, international 
donor agencies, and CSOs (the church, the media, political activist groups, womenÕs 
organizations, and lawyersÕ associations In testing the validity of my thesis, I will 
investigate the sources of mobilization and funding of these sectors, including the 
funding for protests, protest materials, and media debates.  
The involvement of the judiciary and the parliament in generating pressures 
against the removal of presidential term limits in new democracies has been 
controversial and inconsistent. I shall investigate the capacity of these institutions to 
ascertain their level of involvement in producing independent pressures in the 
selected case studies. I shall pay special attention to the channels of parliamentary 
and judicial lobby, especially, the origin of court cases that arose during the third-
term debates, and the linkage between judicial officers, MPs, and individual political 
elites. The interaction between individual political elites and these institutions shall 
become a major factor in determining and assessing elite role in mobilizing and 
bundling pressures to demand and enforce compliance. 
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Some scholars and political analysts have emphasized the use and strength of 
money in African politics (Villalon 2005; Simon 2005; Rakner 2004; Posner and 
Young 2007; Armstrong 2010; Chabal and Daloz 1999). Some writers have equally 
acknowledged economic wealth among individual political elites as capable of both 
strengthening and derailing democracy (Villalon 2005; Iwu 2008). Though the 
possession of such economic wealth is limited to few in African countries (Villalon 
2005), an examination of how economic wealth influenced elite role in demanding 
and enforcing term limits compliance shall help confirm or disprove such 
assumptions. For instance, how did the dissenting political elites secure funds to 
sustain pressure against incumbent presidents in the selected case studies?  
My investigation into how the dissenting political elites were able to mobilize 
funds to finance their activism against incumbent presidents shall expose the roles of 
foreign donors in the cases under investigation. I shapp pay particular attention to the 
origin and destination of international funding and the ways in which dissenting 
political elites attracted funds to sustain their pressure.  
Alternative platforms for resistance and activism are important for generating 
political pressures in demanding and enforcing compliance. While such platforms are 
necessary for mobilizing other sectors, they also provide alternative political voice 
and leadership for mass followership. Many political and civil platforms emerged 
during the third-term debates in various case studies. An examination of the processes 
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that led to the founding and eventual funding of these platforms shall be revealing in 
probing the importance of money in discussiong term limits politics in Africa.  
In seeking explanation to why some presidents succeed in removing term 
limits and other fail, I emphasize political elite activism, which leads to the 
mobilization of other sectors and the bundling of pressures that often result in 
compliance outcome. I will consider elite activism, the mobilization of various 
sectors, and the eventual enforcement of presidential term limits compliance as 
process and outcome. I will further assert that compliance outcome (which is the 
outcome of the process) is central to jump-starting the process of technical 
stabilization of democracy (referred in this study as impact) as shall be explained in 
the case studies. In order to merge the process, outcome, and impact, I shall examine 
the initial condition or independent variables of power entrenchment, intimidation, 
and the high possibility for presidential term limits repeal in African democracies. I 
shall further juxtapose the independent variables with the intervening causal process 
or causal mechanism, which are mainly political elite dissidence and resistance. I 
shall examine elite defection, intimidation, institutional linkage, and the compliance 
outcome, which are the dependent variables and direct consequences of attempts to 
repeal presidential term limits and elite resistance to demand and enforce compliance. 
I shall highlight the importance of interaction between political elites and other 
sectors/institutions, including elite capacity to generate and bundle pressures capable 
of achieving a compliant outcome.  
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Lastly, I shall analyze the impact of the compliant outcome on the technical 
prospects of democracy in the selected case studies. I shall apply the analytic 
indicators of open-seat contests, power or party alternation, level of parliamentary 
independence, electoral competition, rule of law, and mass participation in election in 
probing the significance of compliant outcome in the selected cases. 
 
1.3.2 Hypothesis 
In response to the thesis question(s), I argue in this study that the process of 
repealing presidential term limits is less likely to succeed without the active 
involvement, support, and connivance of key individual political elites. Political elites 
are likely to mobilize to enforce presidential term limits compliance when their 
vested interests15 depend on the survival and expansion of the democratic space. 
Contrary to some opinions (Wezel 2009), I argue that some individual 
political elites have the capacity to produce and apply pressure on incumbent regimes 
as political insiders (OÕDonnel et al. 1986; Higley & Burton 2006). The formation of 
internal pressure groups by individual political actors has the capacity to rupture 
political loyalty and cohesion. Elite political activism, resistance, and opposition can 
pressure incumbent regimes to make strategic mistakes that create room for 
                                                
15 Vested interest is referred here as a strong, personal interest in something where the actor expects to 
get some advantage from. With reference to refusal to support the removal of term limits, vested 
interests could range from economic and ethnic interests to political ambition.  
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alternative platforms and defection, which ultimately are essential for mobilizing and 
bundling pressures to enforce compliance. 
I argue that attempts to enforce presidential term limits compliance in African 
democracies shall remain difficult if individual political elites do not lead or 
sufficiently get involved in the process of mobilizing other pressures to demand 
compliance. For an enforced compliant outcome to occur the active support and 
involvement of key individual political elites (both internal and external) is necessary 
to create an alternative platform for convergence, in mobilizing resistance and in 
bundling pressures to counter repeal attempts.  
Institutional pressure, international/donor/economic pressure and civil 
society/mass movement pressure could produce and exert (combined) pressures on 
incumbent presidents to respect term limits. However, no one single pressure seems 
to galvanize and exert enough and independent pressure to fully demand and enforce 
term limits compliance in any African democracy without elite push and active 
involvement. Ethnic diversity, poverty, seeming political unawareness, and 
international/foreign policy interests appear to make it difficult for any single 
pressure to exert effective pressure without elite role and involvement. An interaction 
between political elites and other pressures, aimed at galvanizing and bundling these 
other pressures appears to be the most effective way to demand and enforce 
compliance. Through the selected case studies, I shall detail how political elites 
produce, mobilize and bundle pressures to enforce presidential term limits 
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compliance through their interaction with other sectors. The three case studies enable 
me to examine and analyze how some African presidents on the one hand attempt to 
remove presidential term limits to extend their tenures in office, and how some 
individual political elites on the other hand, mobilize and bundle political pressures to 
demand and enforce terms limit compliance.  
I shall pay special attention to political elite dissidence, defection, resistance, 
and activism as the driving force in producing, galvanizing, mobilizing and bundling 
pressures on recalcitrant incumbent presidents. I consider elite dissidence, defection, 
activism and resistance as central, not only in rupturing executive and party loyalty, 
but also in creating alternative platforms for the convergence of other pressures. As 
shall be detailed in the case studies, these alternative platforms appear to be necessary 
in shaping public opinion, setting agendas, and providing alternative information on 
term limit debates. One important factor that demand thorough exposition in the case 
studies is the interaction between elite political dissidents and various other sectors in 
mobilizing funds, attracting political sympathy, and seeking institutional protection. 
However, as I shall further detail in the case studies, the political elite role in 
demanding and enforcing compliance does not solely lie in their dissidence, 
resistance, defection, and activism. More significantly, it lies in their ability to sustain 
interaction with and provide leadership for other sectors, manage the pressures 
mobilized, and strategically bundle these pressures to produce compliant outcomes. 
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The case studies shall detail how pressures arising from elite activism 
substantially raise the cost of repression for the incumbent presidents intent on 
repealing presidential terms limits. Some African incumbent presidents commonly 
and easily manipulate the constitution of their countries to elongate their tenures if 
key individual political elites decide to play along and tactically withdraw from 
galvanizing and mobilizing pressures to demand compliance. Where incumbent 
presidents enjoy such elite support, prominent individual political elites engage in the 
Ôdirty jobÕ of defending the repealing initiative by promoting the amendment project 
among the populace, the international community, and key institutions as recently 
was the case in Burundi. Further, in majority of the repealing attempts in Africa, the 
final voting and decision to approve or reject tenure elongation bills ended at the 
parliament. The parliament as a terminus ad quem16 makes MPs very attractive to 
political sponsors and ÔgodfathersÕ during presidential term limits amendment 
controversies. The possibility of voters rebelling and succeeding to stop incumbent 
presidents from repealing terms limit therefore remains minimal, since the masses are 
strategically omitted or isolated from the whole process and politics of presidential 
term limits repeal in Africa.  
By strategically limiting mass participation in the process of repealing term 
limits by some incumbent presidents, term limits politics became essentially political 
elite driven in African. Thus, because of their position in the whole politics of term 
                                                
16 Terminus ad quem is a Latin phrase meaning Ôfinal destination.Õ  
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limits, an attempt to repeal or remove presidential term limits appears unlikely to 
succeed if individual political actors consciously choose to resist it, or if 
circumstances force them not to comply17. In either way, their resistance has the 
capacity to splinter the party and dissipate political loyalty in the regime and may 
further alter party balance of power in the legislature, which mostly is the final 
destination of the struggle to confirm or reject the amendment bill for repeals.  
As the case studies shall reveal, a certain amount of pressure was both 
necessary and sufficient in ensuring compliance in some African democracies that 
have allowed power to alternate. Without neglecting the role of other pressures such 
as institutional, structural, contextual, and exogenous pressures in enforcing 
presidential term limits compliance, these pressures are less likely to independently 
yield or enforce compliance without active elite involvement. Without prejudice to 
other pressures, examining political elite activism as a central mobilizing force, and 
its interaction with other pressures might advance some useful information for the re-
evaluation of democratic processes and the implementation of term limits in African 
democracies. It might further generate new facts for operators and observers of 
democracy, including, the (I)NGOs, government agencies, political parties, 
international organizations, and democratic activists in re-examining the processes 
and interactions needed to demand and enforce presidential term limits compliance. 
                                                
17 I refer to the short-changing of their interest or political elites, and the inability of the regime to 




Research on term limits so far has not led to the construction of any workable 
strategy or model to enforce presidential term limits compliance in new democracies, 
especially in Africa. The aim is not to work out a universally ideal strategy or model 
of enforcing term limits, but to attempt to construct a strategy that could guarantee 
term limits, taking into consideration its context, political culture and level of 
political awareness among the populace and various levels of social forces in Africa.  
The first issue concerns an apparent lack of interest in democracy literature 
concerning presidential term limits, which I consider as an Ôendangered specieÕ in 
African democracies. The canon of literature on democracy has been slow to examine 
the interaction of multiple actors in the process of enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance in new democracies. Secondly, I identify a lack of interest in the role of 
political elite in examining the compliant outcomes of presidential term limits politics 
in Africa. The aim therefore is to revive interest in the political elite role, especially 
within the framework of presidential term limits politics and compliance in Africa.  
However, I choose to approach political elite perspective distinctly from an 
elite theory that emphasizes elite monopolization of the political process and as 
agents of domination as put forward by some writers (Pareto & Finer 1969; Mill 
1958; Bayert 1993, Chabal & Daloz 1999; Fatton 1992). I propose to re-introduce the 
political elite model for the implementation of term limits by first distancing this 
study from the sociological understanding of elite in understanding and explaining 
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political elite behavior concerning presidential term limits politics. Sociological 
understanding of elite theory proves to be misleading and of a limited value for 
understanding and explaining the interaction of some political elites with other 
stakeholders in the process of demanding and enforcing term limits.18 
Lastly, while some writers have attempted to investigate the processes that 
yielded certain presidential term limits outcomes in Africa, none has considered these 
findings from a political elite perspective. This research is an attempt to address both 
deficiencies by attempting to bring presidential term limits politics into focus and by 
re-introducing the political elite model in the study of outcomes of presidential term 
limits controversies in Africa. I have chosen to examine political elite dissidence, 
activism, resistance, and their causal effects on the general outcome of presidential 
term limits controversies in the selected case studies. 
 
1.3.4 Application of Chosen Research Methodologies  
I employ case study, qualitative, and quantitative methods in this research. I 
am aware that the qualitative and case study research methods are not identical. 
However, qualitative research method mostly seeks to construct representations based 
on in-depth, detailed knowledge of cases (Ragin 1994).  I adopt a qualitative method 
                                                
18 Later in this chapter, I shall attempt at conceptualizing political elite as shall be used in this study. 
The meaning shall center around political elite as fellow stakeholders in the democratic process. 
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in this study to explain and analyze interactive processes and events that shaped the 
outcome of presidential term limits debates in the chosen case studies. I further apply 
primary and secondary methods in collecting data for the entire study.  
This study considers the case study as an appropriate method to investigate 
the causal link between political elites and the outcome of presidential term limits in 
the selected case studies. The three main case studies for this research are Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi. I examine the role of individual political elites in enforcing 
compliance on incumbent presidents in these three countries. I use the case study as a 
research method to investigate particular processes that led to elite dissidence and 
activism. Using the method comparatively, I demonstrate different levels of elite 
interaction with other sectors and the motivational factors for elite resistance. The 
case study framework provides a comparative analysis of the causal relationship 
between individual political groups, organizations, movements, and events to the 
outcomes in the selected cases. Using the comparative case study method, I aim at 
providing a varied and detailed account of the data I collected during my research.  
According to Neuman (2006), case study as a method emphasizes an analytic 
approach. In my analysis of the particular geographic units of each case, I employ the 
case study method to examine how specific the configuration of parts of these 
contexts influenced the process, agency, and outcomes of each case. Through the case 
study method, I attempt to connect the micro level, or the actions of individual 
political elites, to the macro level, or the social structures and processes that led to the 
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outcomes examined in this study. Walton argues that the, "The logic of case study is 
to demonstrate a causal argument and explanation about how general social forces 
shape and produce results in particular settingsÓ (Walton 1992). In this regard, I pose 
questions regarding the boundaries and defining characteristics of each case to 
generate new thinking, to confirm, or to modify an existing approach to the role of 
the elites in mobilizing and bundling pressure to demand and enforce term limits 
compliance.   
I adopt primary and secondary research method in this study for data 
collection. For primary data, my research drew data collected through field research, 
namely, semi-structured interviews in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. The primary 
interview participants were political elites, especially those politicians and political 
sponsors that took an active part in the politics of the constitutional amendment 
debates in the three case studies. Others interviewed include MPs, judicial officers, 
church elites, NGOs, democracy experts, party members, and heads of the electoral 
commissions, where applicable.  
A total of fifty-one interviews were conducted for this study with a field 
research that lasted for an average of four months in each of the cases studied. In each 
of the cases, a short attachment in one of the national universities (University of 
Nigeria Nssuka, University of Zambia Lussaka and Univeristy of Malawi, Zomba) 




In my secondary data collection, I relied on local, national, and international 
news agencies and media, including expert documentations, publications, and 
analysis of the presidential term limits debates in the chosen case studies. I also used 
statements, addresses, and interviews of key actors during the crisis. I examined the 
processes and proceedings of the parliament, and the voting pattern of the MPs, 
where debates and voting at the National Assembly were instrumental in the 
attempted removal of presidential term limits as was the case in Malawi. Since the 
judiciary is a major stakeholder in the politics of term limits, I examined third-term 
related reports from panels of enquiry and court proceedings as a major source of 
secondary, especially in the Nigerian and Malawian cases. 
 
1.3.4 Selection of Case Studies 
I have used several criteria to guide my selection of case studies for this 
research. Firstly, I selected cases of presidential term limits controversies that took 
place in a post-Cold War democratic setting in Africa. They involve cases of an 
elected regime attempting to amend constitutionally recognized presidential term 
limits. Secondly, I selected cases with elite political dissidence, resistance, or a 
section of individual political elites mobilizing other social forces in an attempt to 
demand and enforce compliance. There are also cases where incumbent regimes 
embarked on the constitutional amendment process and successfully repealed 
presidential term limits practically without meeting resistance or counter-mobilization 
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from individual political elites. Presidential term limits controversies that ended in 
repealing or enforcement outcomes qualify for this study.  
In selecting the case studies, I considered similarity very important. The three 
cases: Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi share the same outcome of Ôfully enforced 
compliance.Õ They operated a strong presidential system at the time of presidential 
term limits politics. While Nigeria had two legislative houses, Zambia and Malawi 
operated their presidential systems with one parliament each. In all three cases, the 
presidential term limits debates ended in the parliament without going further to a 
referendum, as was the case in Senegal.19 These similarities allow for generalization 
and a cross-case comparison. The three cases not only fall into HuntingtonÕs third 
democratic wave (1991), but also figure as post-Cold War democracies representing 
the latest conjecture in democratization (Berg-Schlosser 2009).  
While Nigeria had experienced three former republics of multiparty 
democracy, repeated elections, power alternation, and military dictatorships before its 
latest transition in 1998, Zambia and Malawi had experienced only one-party system 
and one long-reigning leader since independence. The seeming similarities and 
differences in the three case studies therefore allow for decent variation and reduction 
                                                
19 Senegal has been the only country where the process of removing presidential term limits went 
beyond the parliament and ended in a referendum. The outcome falls into forced compliance. 
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of the risk of selective observation.20 The investigation of three presidential terms 
limits controversies of fully enforced compliance rather than a combination of cases 
of varied outcomes is a standard method in case studies (Neuman 2006). However, 
the research findings may reflect the risk of Ôlimited generalization,Õ or the lack of 
comparisons to opposite outcomes of presidential term limits controversies. To avoid 
the risk of limited generalization I will make a limited reference to some other cases 
without strictly expanding the case studies. 
The first case study discusses the ÒThird-Term AgendaÓ of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria. The controversial third-term debate ended on May 16, 
2006 with a fully enforced compliance.   
The second case is a presidential tenure elongation bid involving Frederick 
Chiluba of Zambia in 2001. The presidential term limits controversy saw many 
political actors leave the ruling party. The president recanted his third-term bid when 
he noticed an imminent defeat of his third-term ambition by a strong political elite 
resistance led by party internals.   
In May 2000, a section of the ruling party internals loyal to the Malawian 
President Bakili Muluzi introduced the process of amending the Malawian 
constitution to allow the incumbent president to stand for more presidential terms. In 
                                                
20 Cf. NeumanÕs (2006) description of selective observation as Òmade in a way that it reinforces pre-
existing thinking, rather than observing in a general, neutral and balanced manner.Ó  
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June 2003, the Ôpresidential open termÕ project of President Muluzi was defeated in a 
hotly contested parliamentary vote in which the ruling party had the majority 
advantage. The proposed constitutional amendment failed by three votes when 
several ministers suddenly withdrew their support on the eve of voting on the 
amendment bill. The sudden withdrawal of support by prominent party internals 
blocked the two-third majority required to pass the bill. 
To balance my findings, I shall investigate two other sets of cases: 
1. I shall investigate Uganda, Namibia, and Cameroon as examples of post-Cold 
War democracies where incumbent presidents successfully repealed 
presidential term limits. 
2. I shall also investigate Ghana and Kenya as examples of partially enforced21 
presidential term limits compliance in African post-Cold War democratic 
experiment.  
My aim in of investigating two extra sets of cases, which fall outside the selected case 
studies for this research, is to make room for wider comparison and to limit the risk 
of limited generalization. 
The analysis of the selected case studies for this research aims to provide 
answers to the questions that directly emanate from the guiding hypothesis. The case 
                                                
21 These represent cases where incumbent presidents set out to repeal term limits, but later withdrew 
having seen the likely failure of the project.  
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studies shall enable me analyze and understand the various strategies that political 
elites employ to resist attempts by incumbent presidents to foist third-term or life 
presidency on their countries. Since the aim of presidential term limits in any 
presidency is to enable power transition without compromising the state, I shall use 
the case studies to expose how individual political elites apply pressure on incumbent 
presidents to vacate office without harming the state or truncating the democratic 
process. In examining the case studies further, I shall seek to probe whether political 
elite activism and the compliant outcome help a particular democracy to consolidate 
further, and therefore avoid SchedlerÕs (1996) slow democratic death and RaknerÕs 
(2004) hybrid democracy.  
 
1.4 The Structure of this Study  
This study is divided into nine chapters, with chapter 1 serving as the 
introduction of this research, which is rather general. The general introduction 
presents the problem statement, focus of study, the methodology and definition of 
two key terms that shall form the basis of discussion in this study. 
Chapter 2 presents different opinions concerning the politics of presidential 
term limits, benefits of presidential term limits for multiparty presidentialism and the 
view of some scholars on the merits and demerits of term limits for democracy. This 
chapter further examines the frequency of assault on presidential term limits both 
globally and in Africa. The chapter concludes by presenting the factors that cause the 
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repealing of presidential term limits to appear undemocratic. I will base the main 
arguments in this chapter on the outcome of presidential term limits politics in 
various African democracies. 
I argue in this chapter that the removal of presidential term limits reduces a 
multiparty presidentialism to a routine practice that lacks certain democratic 
substance and essence. Following Schedler (1998) and Rakner (2004) I shall maintain 
that the removal of presidential term limits exposes a democratic process to a more 
subtle process of slow death, where elected officials progressively weaken integral 
elements of democratic rule, and expose a nascent democracy to regression and 
hybridity. I will refer to some cases that demonstrate the successful repealing of 
presidential term limits in African and show that some incumbent presidents 
successfully remove presidential term limits thereby undermining electoral 
competition and contestation, eroding checks on executive authority, and placing 
constraints on political participation. By so doing, these incumbent presidents use the 
state apparatus to personalize state power, leaving the masses with little options in the 
process of selecting or electing their leaders.  
I shall further use Linz (1996) analysis of the difference between pro- and 
contra tempore presidencies to demonstrate the harm caused by the removal of term 
limits in post-Cold War African democracies. I shall use data from first and 
consequent elections in some post-Cold War African democracies to further show 
that the average turnout rates in elections of democracies with contra tempore 
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presidencies steadily went down after the removal of presidential term limits. I shall 
demonstrate that with such democratic setbacks, the repeal of presidential term limits 
endangers democratic consolidation and plunges the democratic process into 
SchedlerÕs democratic slow death by using democracy to extend and consolidate 
authoritarianism and dictatorship. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the perspectives that are supposed to enable the 
enforceability of presidential term limits. The chapter attempts to answer the 
questions: how can a system enforce presidential term limits compliance? What 
pressures converge to enforce presidential term limits, and who galvanizes and 
mobilizes these pressures? I shall present elite and institutional perspectives as two 
dominant theories in this study. While I prioritize political elite theory, I will 
reappraise institutional theory using the example of democratic institutions that either 
served as channels of activism or protection by political elites in their attempt to 
galvanize and mobilize pressures to demand compliance. I will give attention to other 
perspectives inherent in the debate including the international community and CSOs 
in order to ascertain the extent to which these sectors contributed to the bundled 
pressures that enforced compliance in the case studies. 
Following Villalon and Simon (2005), I shall treat political institutions as 
instruments of manipulation by political elites who Ôuse and co-optÕ political 
institutions as means and tools to achieve desired ends. In this regard, institutions in 
new democracies become instruments of political elites seeking protection or political 
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sentiments in the process of repealing or enforcing compliance. Since political elite 
activism, dissidence, and resistance are important in mobilizing other pressures to 
demand compliance, I shall show how elite action raises the cost of repression for 
incumbent presidents, as well as pressures them into compliance. Since the power to 
amend any constitution for the repealing of presidential term limits resides with the 
parliament, I shall consider a split and rupture in a parliamentary loyalty very 
necessary in blocking any amendment process. The role and creativity of individual 
political actors to resist a regimeÕs attempt to entrench power creates such an 
opportunity to rupture parliamentary balance of power.  
Chapter 4 introduces the first case study of this research. The first case study 
attempts to establish that the political activism of individual political elites in Nigeria 
was responsible for mobilizing and bundling the pressures that enforced compliance 
on President Olusegun Obasanjo in 2006. ObasanjoÕs attempt to amend the 
constitution to extend his presidential term met stiff resistance among some political 
elites, especially within the ruling PeopleÕs Democratic Party (PDP). The dissenting 
political elites in PDP, led by the vice-president Atiku Abubakar and Governor Orji 
Kalu of Abia State, formed a broad coalition of internal party members that mobilized 
other external political elites and various institutional and non-institutional sectors 
like parliament, the media, CSOs, and the masses to raise the cost of repression for 
Obasanjo. With their dissidence and political resistance, individual political party 
actors internally ruptured political cohesion within the ruling party. They decimated 
ObasanjoÕs executive loyalty, created an alternative political platform for activism, 
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and used the parliament as a center for resistance to apply pressure on President 
Obasanjo. This coalition of elite political activists pressured and prevented Obasanjo 
from consolidating power in 2006, forcing him to retire.  
The defeat of ObasanjoÕs constitutional amendment bill was necessary to 
avoid slow democratic death by allowing a multiparty system to thrive in Nigeria. 
More so, the compliant outcome in the Nigerian case enabled Nigeria to experience 
the unprecedented transfer of power from one elected regime to another elected 
regime, a feat never achieved in Nigeria since her independence in 1960. The 
compliant further enabled Nigeria to qualify for BeethamÕs two-election test and 
HuntingtonÕs two election-turnovers, necessary for the qualification of new 
democracies as consolidating. Nigeria has subsequently held three elections since 
2006, with power alternating two times within this period, both at the intra and extra 
party levels.  
Chapter 5 introduces the Zambian case where President Chiluba failed to 
secure a bill to amend the RepublicÕs constitution to extend his tenure in 2001. A 
strong elite opposition led by Mark Chona undermined President ChilubaÕs attempt to 
secure a third term. Mark Chona created neutral platform ÔOASISÕ to effectively 
organize a strong resistance against Chiluba. OASIS became instrumental in 
mobilizing a groundswell of public and international opinion against Chiluba, 
inducing an internal elite dissidence and causing a deep split in the ruling party, 
Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD). Fifteen senior members of the ruling 
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MMD publicly opposed the amendment of the constitution, while fifty-nine ruling 
MMDÕs MPs, twenty-one opposition MPs, several cabinet members, and the 
republicÕs vice-president signed a document to publicly pledge to block any effort to 
allow President Chiluba run for a third term. Chiluba backed down in the face of elite 
opposition. 
Chapter 6 presents the third and final case study of this research which 
investigates the politics of presidential term limits in Malawi and the pressures that 
converged to enforce compliance on President Bakili Muluzi in 2002. Unlike the first 
two case studies, I use the Malawian case to focus on the ways in which various 
political elite alliances, including church elites, conspired to deny President Muluzi 
the opportunity to entrench power. In order to provide a background of Malawian 
politics, I first examine the combination of factors that caused the swift and smooth 
replacement of the thirty-year dictatorship of Hastings Banda through multi-party 
elections in 1994. Since the process of transition has a direct effect on the post-
transitional politics of a given new democracy, I further analyze how the dynamics of 
MalawiÕs ÔmodelÕ transition gave rise to and shaped the presidential term limits 
controversy. 22  I will also analyze how those forces that shaped the Malawian 
                                                
22 Many scholars and observers quickly termed Malawi a model democracy following its smooth 
transition to democracy in 1994. Perhaps the successful elections of 1994 formed the basis of this 
judgment, which failed to confirm whether the new democracy observed or implemented other 




democratic transition later rallied in 2002 to save the democratic process from 
relapsing to SchedlerÕs Òslow democratic deathÓ. Though some may argue that the 
contending elite alliance did not set out to salvage democracy, but to fight for 
personal interests, the outcome of the presidential term limits controversy remains 
important for democracy observers since the Malawian democracy itself gained 
directly from the outcome of the controversy and the said elite alliance.  
This case study also notes that many international donors who played 
significant roles during the transitional period were reluctant to be visibly involved in 
the presidential term limits controversy, obviously to avoid the appearance of 
meddling in local politics (Brown 2004). However, the local resistance and 
mobilization marshaled by individual political and church elites appear to have 
created an avenue for the role of donor aid,23 which bundled with political and church 
elites to produce a compliant outcome in Malawi. 
Chapter 7 focuses on the cross-sectional comparison and convergence in the 
politics of enforcing presidential terms limit compliance in post-Cold War African 
democracies. Chapters three, four, and five present cases that form the main argument 
for this study viz, Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi. These represent African countries 
where attempts to repeal presidential term limits by incumbent presidents were 
resisted by individual political elites emphasize the centrality of individual political 
elites in the mobilizing and bundling of pressures that produced complaint outcome in 
                                                
23 I shall come back to this point in the following sections of this case study. 
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those countries. The present chapter makes a general comparison of the various 
sectors through which individual political actors generated and bundled pressures. I 
aim in this chapter to demonstrate the extent to which some sectors not only provided 
a platform for activism, but also became objects of manipulation by individual 
political actors in the process of both removing and enforcing term limits.  
I further analyze how individual political elites sought linkage with various 
sectors as a means for protection and platforms for resistance. Through these 
analyses, I intend to show that what could mistakenly be referred to, as institutional 
pressure, might actually have been elitist influence and mobilization through the 
institutions. In further discussing the role of the elite and other sectors and 
institutions, I shall compare the impact of one on the other. I will demonstrate the 
level of roles played by individual political elites, the institutions, the international 
donor community, and the CSOs in producing and bundling the pressures that 
enforced compliance in the case studies.  
In guiding my analysis in this chapter, I shall employ the interrogative 
approach to examine how incumbent presidents in Africa voluntarily allowed power 
to alternate without formal or informal pressure to enforce compliance on them. The 
interrogative approach aims to ascertain how far presidential term limits would 
survive in some African countries without political activism from individual political 
elites. One important factor I intend to achieve through interrogative approach in this 
chapter is to address whether some other sectors like democratic institutions and the 
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CSOs could effectively and sufficiently enforce presidential term limits compliance 
in Africa without agential (political elite) push. The chapter shall further probe 
through cross-case analysis whether individual political elites on their own could 
effectively and sufficiently enforce presidential term limits compliance without 
linking and allying with other institutional or extra-institutional sectors.  
Using cross-sectional analysis and interrogative approach, I shall quantify the 
value of pressures exerted by the parliament, judiciary, the international community 
and CSOs in enforcing compliance on incumbent presidents in the studied cases. A 
comparative analysis of these pressures shall determine the place of elite activism and 
resistance in enforcing compliance. It shall further determine if elite pressure was 
responsible in achieving both full and partial presidential term limits compliance in 
some other African democracies. Lastly, the analysis shall assist the study expose to 
which extent the judiciary, parliament, CSOs benefitted from political elite 
mobilization and activism during the presidential term limits debates in the selected 
cases.  
In Chapter 8, I shall explain why elite activism appears to be responsible for 
full term limits enforcement in the case studies, and why elite inaction appears to 
have produced a different outcome in other cases introduced in this chapter. I shall 
detail the factors that motivate political elite actions and inactions to support or resist 
attempts by incumbent presidents to remove presidential term limits.  Since it is 
impossible to investigate all political elites involved in the term limits controversies, I 
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shall emphasize the actions and inactions of some individual dissenting political elites 
who appeared to have influenced the outcomes of the cases under study. In a detailed 
manner, I shall analyze some of the factors that appeared to have influenced 
particular political elites to mobilize collective and sectoral pressures to demand and 
enforce compliance in the selected cases. The aim is to explain why a section of 
political elites choose to play along with some incumbent presidents in repealing 
presidential term limits and why a section of political elites sometimes choose to 
resist attempts by incumbent presidents to repeal presidential term limits. An 
important factor that I seek to address in this chapter is why attempts to repeal 
presidential term limits succeed in some countries and fail in others.  
Chapter 9 serves as the concluding chapter of my study and presents the 
synthesis and findings of the entire research. I shall integrate the entire study and 
develop a synthesis of case-specific findings to offer a general, elite-focused 
explanation of presidential term limits politics and their implementation in Africa.  
To conclude the study, which set out to discuss the role of particular political 
elites in enforcing presidential term limits compliance in African democracies, I re-
appraise the hypothesis and research questions that guided the entire study. The aim 
is to discover the extent to which these have corresponded with case-specific findings 
and observations made in my research. 
My hypothesis claims that the process of repealing presidential term limits is 
less likely to succeed without the active involvement, support, and connivance of key 
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political elites, both internal bust also external. These political elites are likely to 
mobilize to demand and enforce presidential term limits compliance when their 
political interests depend on the survival and expansion of the democratic space. My 
conclusion intends to show that contrary to some opinions in the democratic 
literature, some political elites have the capacity to mobilize and apply pressures that 
are capable of producing compliant outcome. Through activism, resistance and 
defection, political actors rupture political loyalty and cohesion, force incumbent 
regimes to make strategic mistakes (OÕDonnel et al 1986; Higley & Burton 2006), 
and finally create room for alternative platforms and defection that ultimately become 
essential for mobilizing and bundling pressures to enforce compliance. 
 
1.5 Conceptualization and Definition of Key Terms for this Study 
In this part, I attempt to conceptualize and define the terms that are central to 
this study. Two key concepts that require definition are Ôpolitical elitesÕ and Ôterm 
limits complianceÕ (including full and partial compliance and enforcement). I shall 
borrow from leading scholars on various fields to support the definition, and 
challenge some scholars whose definitions are contrary to the usage of these terms in 






1.5.1 The Meaning of Political Elite  
I argue in this study that political elites as political actors can create the 
needed alternative platform to mobilize and bundle pressures to enforce presidential 
term limits compliance. The political elite approach builds upon the assumption that 
political elites play direct and significant roles in the development and maintenance 
of democracy because of their political agency and their capacity for political 
entrepreneurship. Shepsle (2010) describes the political entrepreneur as someone who 
sees, recognizes, and engages a prospective cooperation dividend that is currently 
unused or enjoyed. For Shepsle, Òprospective cooperation dividendÓ is a latent 
interest that when manifest, would benefit from the fruits of collective support and 
action. For the price of votes, political position, material benefits, or personal 
satisfaction, the entrepreneur will bear the cost of organizing and mobilizing a group 
for action.24  
I regard the specific political actors who stepped out and mobilized actions 
against the removal of presidential term limits as the primary cause of the outcomes 
of presidential term limits politics in the cases under study. I also argue that the 
combined activism of particular political elites prevented the incumbent presidents 
from removing presidential term limits in the case studies. Yet who are the political 
elites? I will redefine the concept for the purpose of this study. 
                                                
24 I shall elaborate on the agency and entrepreneurship of some political elites both in the case studies 
and in some analytical sections of Chapter Six. 
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The use of the term ÔeliteÕ in various literatures connotes an adverse inference 
to a sociological stratum. In this sense, political elite or rather the ÔeliteÕ referred to a 
distinct sociological group intent on dominating and suppressing other classes in the 
society (Pareto & Finer 1969; Mill 1958). Relying on Mill, Pareto and Finer, some 
scholars like Chabal and Daloz (1999), Calderisi (2006), Fatton (1992) and Bayart 
(1993) have maintained the sociological tradition by analyzing African politics and 
their elites as patrimonial, rent seeking, and oppressive. 
I will use the term Ôpolitical elitesÕ differently, referring to them as specific 
political actors and stakeholders who participate at various levels in the political and 
democratic life of their countries. In this study, I refer primarily to specific political 
actors, as opposed to a group or a social stratum. Borrowing from Villalon et al 
(2005), I make a strict distinction between political elites as particular political actors 
and other elites from a Òsociological tradition whose dominance and monopoly over 
the political process has attracted negative remarks for the concept as Ôanti and 
counter democratic agents.ÕÓ  
Based on the position such political actors occupy, I assert that their political 
choices, calculations, attitudes, and behaviors have the strength to influence and 
affect political outcomes in their respective democratic experiments. As Iwu (2008, 
2009) and Villalon (2005) note, political elites have both the capacity to sustain and 
diminish the democratic process. I will focus primarily on how their choices, 
attitudes, and behaviors affect term limits compliance.  
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Pareto & Finer (1969) mainly emphasize the negative aspects of elites as a 
social group. Understanding elites as a privileged social group, Pareto and Finer 
define these exclusively as a Òsocial group that resort to the continuous game of 
entrenching and preserving itself in power.Ó  Pareto and Finer claim that elites use 
their hegemonic status to dominate and subordinate other groups within society. As a 
hegemonic entity, this cohesive group abhors changes to its hegemonic status and 
prioritizes the adhering and maintenance of the social order that suits its privileged 
status (Villaln et al, 2005).  
Though I cannot avoid a comparison to Pareto and Finer's definition of 
political elites in this study, particularly with regard to vested interests, I do not 
intend to present elites as a homogeneous and sociological group. Rather, I shall 
approach political elites as specific political actors, co-partners, and stakeholders in 
the democratic process. I shall avoid using the concept set by the tradition of Pareto 
and Finer (1969), which refers to elites as a Òdistinct social group, quite similar in 
outlook, that sets out to monopolize and dominate the political processÓ (Villalon et 
al 2005). 
In their discussion of African politics and societies, Calderisi (2006), Fatton 
(1992), Bayart (1993), Chabal, and Daloz (1999), extended the eliteÕs sociological 
perspective, emphasizing that only those processes of social classification shape the 
post-Cold War political and democratic experiments in sub-Saharan Africa. In their 
text Disorder Works, Chabal and Daloz (1999) describe the political and democratic 
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processes in Africa as patrimonial instruments available for the elites to attain and 
realize their personal interests. Though some incumbent presidents seem to confirm 
this view by stoutly entrenching state power, the claim remains an obvious 
generalization since many political elites in Africa have created and provided stable 
platforms for democracy to thrive. Nelson Mandela of South Africa relinquished 
power after his first presidential term. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Arap Moi of 
Kenya allowed power to alternate after their two-term mandates, though some 
scholars have argued that certain pressures were responsible for their decision to step 
down (Armstrong 2010; Shinn 2009). 
Still building on the old tradition of elites as sociological strata, some authors 
describe African political elites as thugs who seek power to dominate and subordinate 
the masses. While Calderisi (2006) refers to some African leaders as Òthugs on 
power,Ó Ayitey (2006) addresses them as ÒcheetahsÓ that take pleasure in sucking the 
blood of their subjects. Their arguments correspond with the view of some other 
scholars that many incumbent presidents have become Òsit-tight leadersÓ who 
entrench and monopolize state power to protect vested interests (Bayert 1993, Chabal 
& Daloz 1999; Fatton 1992). In their effort to entrench and consolidate power, such 
political leaders subordinate their people, parasitically feeding on them. These leaders 
appear prepared to throw their societies into conflict instead of relinquishing power 
(Collier 2005; Falana 2015).  
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There is a credible evidence to support this argument with over thirty dictators 
and post-Cold War presidents like Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, Blaise Compoare of 
Burkina Faso, and Nkurunziza of Burundi, who were prepared to engulf their 
countries in violent conflicts rather than let power alternate. The successful repeal or 
neglect of presidential term limits in twelve post-Cold War African democracies 
equally supports this view. However, Nelson Mandela and Thabo Mbeki of South of 
Africa, Jerry Rawlings and John Kuffour of Ghana, as well as Chissano of 
Mozambique, have let power alternate at the expiration of their tenures. This is also 
true of the successive presidents of Botswana, Benin, Cape Verde, Mali, Sao Tome, 
Tanzania, and Mauritius and various specific political elites who contributed to the 
democratic growth of their countries by collectively and individually mounting 
pressure on leaders to enforce presidential term limits compliance. Though quite a 
number did not succeed in enforcing presidential term limits compliance, some 
recorded significant successes as shall be demonstrated in the case studies.  
In the cases under study, I shall focus on individual political elites whose 
political activism, dissidence, and resistance succeeded in mobilizing and bundling 
pressures to enforce compliance in their countries. I shall examine the factors that 
influenced and motivated these elite actions to demand compliance to see how these 
factors are applicable elsewhere in enforcing term limits compliance. I will continue 
to focus on how a coalition of political elite pressure groups was able to link with 
institutional and extra-institutional forces to produce and apply pressures to demand 
and enforce term limits compliance in some African democracies.  
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Following Villalon et al (2005), I will restrict the coverage and meaning of 
political elites to those particular political actors described and understood in this 
study as Òco-democratic operators and fellow stakeholders in the democratic 
process.Ó I do not intend to address the controversy of how the sociological school 
understands the term ÔeliteÕ as a Òcertain privileged section of the society, ultimately 
engaged in the project of supremacy and suppression of other groups in the societyÓ 
(Pareto & Finer 1969; Mill 1958). I will focus rather on political elites as an isolated 
set of political actors, capable of free and conscious choices, who possess the capacity 
to exhibit political attitudes and behaviors consistent with vested political, economic, 
national, and common interests.  
I will base the criteria that qualify an actor as political elite on political and 
public positions. Following Burton, Gunther, and Higley (1992), political elites shall 
include those occupying various positions as representatives of the people, who, 
because of their positions and commitments, possess the political and economic 
capacity to influence outcomes in the politics of their various countries. In the 
presidential system of democracy, these include the presidents, vice presidents, 
governors, legislators and other elected representatives of the populace. By virtue of 
positions they occupy, these actors have the alleged capacity and power to affect 
national political outcomes (Burton, Gunther and Higley 1992). In order to 
accommodate further variations, I shall expand the meaning of political elites to 
include other actors, who though as non-partisan or political insiders, command 
substantial resources, societal standing, and large political followership to influence 
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national political outcomes. These include leaders of major ethnic groups, religious 
bodies, and heads of judiciary, electoral commissions, and civil society organizations. 
To that extent, I will not restrict the definition of political elites to CollierÕs 
characterization of elites as Òpolitical ins,Ó or key politicians in government coalitions 
and opposition (1999). I shall also include some Òpolitical outs,Ó or influential figures 
referred to in countries like Nigeria as Ôpolitical sponsorsÕ or Ôpolitical godfathers.Õ 
 
1.5.2 The Meaning of Presidential Terms Limit Compliance and 
Enforcement 
Research so far indicates that scholars bother less with the enforcement of 
term limits compliance. This seems to arise from the assumption that since term 
limits appear to be given in a multiparty presidential system, the rule of the 
democratic game must be sacrosanct. Many scholars therefore seem to focus on other 
democratic components and processes. This assumption may have resulted in 
minimal academic attention toward the meaning of term limits compliance and 
enforcement. The minimal scholarly discussion on term limits compliance and 
enforcement therefore appear to be inconclusive on the definition of what constitutes 
full compliance or full enforcement of presidential term limits.  
Armstrong (2010) identifies two categories: Òfull (free) compliance and full 
enforcement.Ó He argues that full compliance occurs when presidents willingly retire 
without embarking on the project of constitutional amendments to repeal presidential 
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term limits. For Armstrong, this involves all situations where a president retires 
Ôwillingly.Õ It is irrelevant if the president has explored the possibility of repealing 
presidential term limits or has ascertained the success or failure of a potential repeal. 
Secondly, Armstrong considers full compliance as a situation where an incumbent 
president generates rumors to seek tenure extension, but either decides not to 
challenge presidential term limits in the parliament or decides to withdraw anticipated 
failure.  
For Armstrong, the two above processes represent a full compliance since 
legislative voting or referendum did not take place. This was the case with Jerry 
Rawlings of Ghana and Arap Moi of Kenya, who after generating rumors, decided to 
withdraw their intention to amend the constitution for tenure extension because of a 
potential failure of the amendment. While I agree with ArmstrongÕs first 
categorization as compliance, I disagree with him on the second category. Further, 
Armstrong defines Òfull enforcementÓ as those cases in which a president promotes 
the idea to repeal term limits by generating rumors to seek a tenure extension, while 







Figure 3: Presidential Term Limits Compliance and Enforcement in Africa 1990-2013 
 
Source: prepared by the author from research and existing work by Vencovsky 2007; Dulani 
2011; Posner and Young 2007; and Maltz 2007. 
As examples of partial enforcement, I shall consider Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and 
Arap Moi of Kenya.' In the case of Kenya, President Arap Moi decided to retire when 
he noticed that elite mobilization against him was strong in both his party and the 
parliament. Moi feared imminent defeat and therefore retired. In the Ghanaian case, 
D.F. Annan blocked President RawlingÕs third term ambition by mobilizing political 



















intention for a third term after generating rumors and national debates on the issue 
(Armstrong 2010).  
I disagree with Armstrong that the cases of Ghana and Kenya were full (free) 
compliance, because Jerry Rawlings and Arap Moi sought tenure extension. They had 
established working committees for the project of term limit repeals, allowing debates 
to take place. They only announced their retirement when they feared imminent 
defeat.  
Based on the above sets of descriptions, I will use the following descriptions to guide 
this study: 
I shall define presidential term limits compliance as full and free when an 
incumbent president refuses to entertain or sponsor debates to repeal presidential term 
limits personally or by proxy. Stepping down is a given without doubts and 
speculation, even if loyalists demand a continuous stay in power, as was often the 
case in the United States. An incumbent regime without fear or favor should set all 
motions in progress for the emergence of a successor at the end of his/her 
constitutional mandates without any attempt to suggest a prolongation of tenure.  
I shall define fully enforced compliance in the case of external pressures that 
cause the retirement of an incumbent president who ordinarily and legally should 
have willingly retired at the expiration of the constitutional mandate for a presidential 
term. Examples of external pressures are parliamentary voting; or the rejection of the 
presidentÕs attempt to repeal presidential term limits by a court of law; or a public 
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referendum rejecting presidential attempts to extend a mandate, as took place in 
Senegal in 2012.  The question of who applies or supplies the pressures that enforce 
compliance is irrelevant at this point.  
Lastly, a successful repeal or removal of term limits takes place when an 
incumbent president and his or her allies secure a legislative victory, a court mandate, 
or a successful referendum to repeal presidential term limits. Across Africa, fourteen 
countries have successfully repealed presidential term limits, mostly by legislative 
action. Four attempts have been unsuccessful, three by legislative action, and one by 
public referendum. In the cases under study, legislative action stopped two attempts 
to repeal presidential term limits, indicating a fully enforced compliance, while one 
repealing attempt was failed at the floor of the legislative house prior to voting also 










Chapter 2:  Presidential Term Limits  
 
2 Introduction 
Electoral democracy prescribes systems of changing leadership without 
harming the state.25 Unlike the parliamentary system of government, presidential 
systems have prescribed a different rule to limit the allotted number of years and term 
a particular president holds the presidential office. Most presidencies constitutionally 
allow a maximum of two terms, after which an open-seat contest would ensure power 
or party alternation. Although some scholars and democracy observers have 
questioned the usefulness of limiting the number and terms of political offices, term 
limits serve as a universal principle of liberal and electoral democracy in a 
presidential system. Unfortunately, the desire for life-term positions of power 
motivates many incumbent presidents in African post-Cold War democracies to 
repeal presidential term limits in their countries. The attempted or successful removal 
of presidential term limits by incumbent regimes constitutes the central politics of 
presidential term limits controversy and debates.  
                                                
25 Refer to the benefits of open-seat contests for the technical consolidation of democracy, as discussed 
in 2.2 of this chapter. 
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Many post-Cold War democracies have faced the challenges of incumbent 
presidents either amending their constitutions to acquire the status of life president26 
or of incumbent presidents temporarily elongating their tenures (Posner and Young 
2007; Malt 2007; Vencovsky 2007). Between 1999 and 2012, the removal of 
presidential term limits became common while 'third term'27 became a popular 
political concept in many post-Cold War democracies. The trend has also occurred 
frequently on the global level, with six out of ten post-Cold War democracies holding 
national debates to repeal presidential terms limit (Dulani 2011). However, this 
chapter shall focus on the position and enforceability of presidential term limits in 
African democracies.  
I shall divide the present chapter into four parts. In the first part, I will present 
different opinions concerning the politics of presidential term limits. In the second 
part, I will discuss the benefits of presidential term limits for the consolidation of 
democracy. In the third part, I will examine the frequency of assault on presidential 
term limits. Finally, I will discuss the factors that cause the repealing of presidential 
                                                
26 Four African countries with the status of life-presidency are Gabon, Cameroon, Uganda, Burkina 
Faso, and Togo. 
27 ÔThird termÕ is common jargon referring to the changing of a constitution to accommodate longer 




term limits to appear undemocratic while basing the main arguments of this study on 
the outcome of presidential term limits politics in various African countries.  
 
2.1 Understanding Presidential Term Limits 
By definition, presidential term limits constitutionally impose limits on the 
number of years and tenures that a particular person holds the presidential office 
(Dulani 2011). The constitution legitimizes term limits (years and tenures) as a 
democratic principle to regulate power and leadership transition within the context of 
democratic elections. 
To repeal presidential term limits, the constitution must undergo an amendment 
process, usually through parliamentary debates, votes, or a referendum. 28  The 
repealing of presidential term limits occurs when the incumbent president runs for 
more presidential terms after serving out his constitutional tenure. The removal of 
presidential term limits could occur in two distinct ways, which Maltz identifies as 
ÔsoftÕ or ÔhardÕ contravention (Maltz 2007).  
Soft contravention refers to the adjustment or amendment of presidential term 
limits to allow an incumbent president to stand for a third or fourth election.  An 
                                                
28 The use of a referendum in halting presidential term limits within the post-Cold War African 
democratic experiment occurred only once in 2008 in Senegal, when Abdul WadeÕs attempt to amend 
the Senegalese constitution for a third-term mandate was defeated in a referendum. 
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incumbent president will alter a constitution to dictate a personally prescribed limit to 
the number of presidential terms the president will serve. For instance, instead of two 
terms of four years, the amendment may prescribe for three or four terms of four or 
five years. In all cases of term limits repeal or neglect in Africa, the incumbent 
president benefitted from post-facto constitutional amendments. In 1999, President 
Sam Nujoma altered the constitutional two-term limits in Namibia to grant himself a 
third term before willingly retiring in 2004.  
On the other hand, hard contravention refers to a process whereby the 
incumbent executive completely expunges presidential term limits from the 
constitution. In this regard, the limits on the number of terms an incumbent president 
may wish to run for re-election are absent.29 About ten African countries have 
successfully expunged presidential term limits from their constitution, thereby 
creating a space for incumbent presidents to function as life presidents. Uganda, 
Cameroon, Gabon, and Togo are examples of hard contraventions of the post-Cold 
War African democratic experiment. The repealing of presidential term limits 
appeared to draw little or no attention without elite resistance or opposition as was the 
case in Gabon, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Uganda, and Namibia where the repealing 
of term limits passed unnoticed. Conversely, the repealing of presidential term limits 
                                                
29 Gabon, Uganda, and Cameroon operate hard contravention of presidential term limits having 
successfully repealed and expunged presidential term limits from their constitutions.  
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was resisted by some political elites in Malawi, Nigeria, and Senegal, leading to 
controversy and political crisis.  
Incumbent presidents in new democracies appear to draw from a minimal but 
strong elite support-base both for their survival and for a larger share of political 
benefits. Electorally mature systems with proportional representation, like that of the 
Netherlands, Belgium, and the United Kingdom (UK), compel the formation of 
coalitions without altering the principle of the minimum winning coalition, even with 
some moderately left-oriented parties. Presidential systems with term limits boast of a 
high proportion of support from the population. However, presidential systems 
without term limits seem to receive support from a big proportion of political elites 
and a rather small proportion of the population, when compared to more inclusive 
presidential systems with term limits.  































































































Source: Updated by author from data provided by Dulani 2011; Vencovsky 2007; Paul and 
Young 2007 
* Burundi and Eritrea have existing presidential term limits, but incumbent presidents 
ignore them to run for longer term in presidential elections. 
* Seychelles has a three term limits. 
* Senegal remains the only country where an attempt to repeal term limits was defeated 
by a referendum. 
The politics of presidential term limits, and the process of repealing or 
enforcing them in African democracies, seem therefore, to correspond to elite politics 
and an elite struggle. As I will demonstrate in the following case studies, the process 
of enforcing presidential term limits compliance in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi 
called elite activism into action. This activism led to mobilization and resistance in 
other sectors, ultimately resulting in compliance outcomes. If presidential term limits 
are necessary for democratic consolidation, consolidation research should place an 
urgent focus on the politics of presidential term limits and the benefits of elite efforts 







2.2 Presidential Term Limits: Benefits for Democratic Consolidation 
The oldest fable of term limits dates back to Athens and Rome in the 4th 
century B.C. In Athens, Cincinnatus willingly ceded power at a time when power was 
personalized, taken, or lost depending on the strength or weakness of the army. 
However, the concept did not originate as presently referred to in this study. 
However, the adoption, operation, and enforcement of term limits have forestalled the 
monopolization and abuse of political and public power. LivyÕs (1960) account of 
Cincinnatus30 is the oldest historical account of term limits. Though no known 
literature acknowledges Cincinnatus as a popular leader, his reputation paints him as 
a virtuous and humble leader who knew when to ascend to and relinquish power 
(Livy 1960).  
The legacy of Cincinnatus has been regularly invoked as the basis of 
presidential term limits (Maltz 2007; Armstrong 2011). In 1796, George Washington 
informally imposed presidential term limits on himself and the United States 
presidency by willingly refusing to contest an election for a third time in office. As an 
political actor, George Washington introduced the enforcement of presidential term 
limits compliance in the modern era. Several years after George Washington, 
Franklin Roosevelt acted in breach of the rule of presidential term limits by 
contesting and winning the United States presidency with a record of four elections. 
                                                
30 Cincinnatus, as explained in LivyÕs account, is a Roman emperor who ceded dictatorial power upon 
fulfilling his perceived public duty. This serves as the oldest account of term limits. 
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Franklin RooseveltÕs breach instigated the necessity to restore and formally 
institutionalize presidential term limits in the United States in order to avoid repeat 
occurrences. RooseveltÕs challenge, toward American democracy, presidential term 
limits, and the principle of leadership alternation influenced political leaders in the 
United States to embed presidential term limits constitutionally. RooseveltÕs action 
thus influenced the codification of presidential term limits in 1951 as the Twenty-
Second Amendment to the United States Constitution (Maltz 2007; Posner and 
Young 2007).  
Emulating the United States, some South American political stakeholders 
sought the institutionalization of presidential term limits in their countries. Argentina 
and Mexico followed suit by constitutionally codifying presidential term limits 
(Maltz 2007). With constitutional protection, presidential term limits emerged as an 
important democratic principle (ibid.).  
The post-Cold War democracies that opted for a presidential system adopted term 
limits to spur democratic power alternation, political competition, democratic growth, 
and to forestall a relapse to dictatorship and power entrenchment. New democracies 
adopted presidential term limits for the merits and acceptability of term limits as a 
democratic principle,6 agreeing with Collier (2008) that democracy is universal.  In 
Africa, Latin America, and Eastern Europe, the adoption of presidential term limits 
                                                
6 AuthorÕs interview with Professor Oyejishile of the Philosophy Department, University of Ibadan, 
Nigeria (Pilsen 15 May 2014) 
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emerged as an innovation following constitutional negotiations during the transitions 
from one-party and military authoritarian regimes to post-Cold War multiparty 
democracies. Still, the implementation of term limits has been problematic in most 
post-Cold War democracies. Though presidential term limits appear to be a 
permanent feature of democracy, some countries continue to debate their importance 
(Harbeson ed. 2009; Posner and Young 2007; Maltz 2007).  
Before making any further argument for the implementation of presidential 
term limits, I will first examine the usefulness of presidential term limits. Do 
presidential term limits add any value to democracy? How beneficial are presidential 
term limits for the consolidation process of democracy? Can a given presidential 
democratic system do without term limits?  
Though scholars like Baker (2002), Elhauge (1997), Weissert and Halperin 
(2007) strongly disagree with the merits of term limits for democracy,7 arguments in 
favor of the benefits of term limits determine the urgency of their implementation and 
their enforcement, especially in post-Cold War African democracies. Bakar (2002) 
argues that term limits do not produce or create democracies. He maintains that 
presidential term limits are undemocratic and not necessary for power alternation. He 
further argues that if democratic accountability is strong enough, the electorate should 
have the capacity to vote an unwanted president or party out of office at the next 
                                                




election (2002). BakerÕs argument presents a challenge to defenders of presidential 
term limits. Why should the masses forego a candidate whom they trust even if he is 
an incumbent? If the incumbent leader is the best among all the candidates vying for 
the presidential office, should term limits serve as an excuse to deny the electorate the 
right to re-elect the incumbent? 
Elhauge (1997), Weissert, and Halperin (2007)) have discussed the merits and 
demerits of term limits in the United States legislature and presidential system, 
questioning the usefulness of term limits for state and national officers in developed 
countries. With reference to the legislature, Elhauge, Weissert, and Halperin raise the 
obvious question of whether unlimited terms of offices confer a special capacity on 
the quality of a legislature. They investigate the capacity of some legislatures to 
propose and defend bills in the legislature, arguing that neither limited nor unlimited 
terms make for a more efficient legislature. They further argue that career politicians 
(though with cognate experience) do not appear to be more effective for the 
legislative institution than other MPs. Though I direct my research focus toward the 
benefits of term limits in the context of presidentialism, the above arguments 
introduce some significant skepticism concerning the usefulness of presidential term 
limits for democratic consolidation. Should we consider presidential term limits 
necessary for power alternation? After all, parliamentarian systems as practiced in 
England, the Netherlands, Germany, and many other countries do not depend on term 
limits for power alternation. This argument undermines the importance of presidential 
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term limits as the guaranteed approach to ensure power alternation, since 
parliamentary systems function effectively and adequately without term limits. 
Despite the above arguments against presidential term limits, I agree with the 
conclusion shared by scholars like Linz (1999), Beetham (1994), Cheeseman (2010), 
Bratton (1998), and Schedler (1998) that presidential term limits are beneficial for 
electoral democracy in the context of presidentialism. According to Linz (1999), 
imposing constitutional limits on presidential terms demarcates democracy from 
autocracy. Linz further qualifies and distinguishes between authoritarian and 
democratic politics, arguing that democrats rule with an expiration date, while 
autocrats do not rule with an expiration date. Linz refers to democracies as pro 
tempore governments, arguing that it is a common expectation that democratic 
governance has a time limit. Democracy must, therefore, contrast itself from an 
authoritarian government, which depends on the usurpation and entrenchment of state 
power and its conversion to personal power (ibid). In other words, if a certain 
democratic process loses the feature of pro tempore feature, that particular 
democratic process may run the risk of losing its democratic distinction. By operating 
contra tempore, a presidential democratic system without term limits runs the risk of 
alienating the populace in the long-term democratic process. Presidential systems 
without term limits further alienate the populace by denying it basic democratic rights 
to participate effectively in the democratic process of electing, alternating, or holding 
their leaders accountable.  
  
69 
Linz (1998) further maintains that the development of a democratic system 
and government equates the ceding of individual power to government institutions 
where the rule of law guides the practice and exercise of such powers. The ceding, 
transfer, alternation, and transmission of power are thus critical events in the practice 
of democracy (Armstrong 2010; Bratton 1998; Schedler 1998; Beetham, 1994; 
Cheeseman 2010). Since these represent the technical value of democracy, 
presidential term limits become essential to guarantee the technical consolidation of 
any given democracy. Substantial consolidation of democracy includes freedom of 
speech and association, human rights, and rule of law. Yet these become difficult to 
achieve without initially ensuring the technical consolidation of the ceding, 
transferring, alternating and transmitting of power as guaranteed by presidential term 
limits. The removal of presidential term limits directly and indirectly contradicts 
these principles and undermines democratic consolidation by working against the 
basic and accepted democratic features of electoral competition, power alternation, 
and political participation.31  The removal of presidential term limits negatively 
influences the consolidation process of democracy by potentially exposing a certain 
                                                
31 Professor Oyejishile was emphatic on the range of benefits missed by a particular democracy lacking 
presidential term limits. He argues that repression, oppression, and abuse of human rights have 
correlation with regimes that have no expiration dates, maintaining that in democracy, as in every other 




democracy to autocratic regression, democratic slow death, and democratic hybridity 
(Schedler 1998; Ranker 2007). 
Schumpeter (1942) defined democracy as a method that respects the 
institutional arrangements aimed at political power and decision-making authority, 
acquired by individuals and political organizations through the competitive struggle 
for popular vote. Building on SchumpeterÕs understanding of democracy, Dahl (1971) 
identifies seven key components that are essential for democratic growth. These 
include control over governmental decisions about policy constitutionally vested in 
elected officials; frequent free and fair elections; universal adult suffrage; the right to 
run for public office; freedom of expression; access to alternative sources of 
information,32 and freedom of association.33  
Following Dahl, Schedler (1998) argues that deepening democracy involves 
ÒÉthe challenge of making democracies secure, of extending their life expectancy 
beyond the short term, of making them immune against the threat of authoritarian 
regression and of building dams against eventual Ôreverse waves.ÕÓ With term limits 
and open-seat contestation, electoral democracy significantly guarantees the 
possibility of alternating governments without risking the state. These key basic 
descriptions of democracy consolidation, as Schedler further argues, demonstrate the 
                                                
32 A government and its agencies should not monopolize information sources in a democracy. 
33 Freedom of association in a democracy confers rights on individuals and groups to form and join 
associations as both party and interest groups. 
  
71 
importance of contestation, competition, power alternation, and participation, which 
are hardly possible without term limits. Hurwitz (2003) concurs with Schedler by 
emphasizing the same principles as imperative for democratic growth and sustenance. 
He argues that president contra tempore contradicts the basic features of democracy, 
as enumerated above. 
Why and how does the removal of presidential term limits harm the 
development of a certain democracy? As Dahl (1971) and Bratton (1998) argue, the 
consolidation of the democratic process particularly involves the collective 
acceptance of rules to guarantee political contestation, power alternation, and political 
participation. Free and fair elections provide citizens with the chance to choose their 
leaders among a pool of contestants, but the removal of presidential term limits 
particularly weakens the capacity of elections to help democracy consolidate.34 In the 
case of a president contra tempore, elections become a mere process of confirming 
the incumbent government, lacking quantitative, qualitative, and meaningful features 
in engineering the democratic process (Bratton 1998).35 Furthermore, various scholars 
have emphasized open-seat contest as an important dividend of presidential term 
                                                
34 Some scholars and analysts do not agree on the role that elections play in the consolidation of 
democracy. 
35 Between 1999 and 2013, the thirteen incumbent presidents who contested elections for a longer 
tenure after successfully repealing presidential term limits went ahead to win the next elections in their 
various countries. The elections they organized intended to confirm their positions in power. 
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limits (Beetham 2004; Cheeseman 2010). Consolidated democratic authoritarians and 
operators of one-party systems hold organized elections that continue to produce the 
same set of leaders after each election. Though these elections seemingly carry the 
semblance of democratic elections, open-seat contest remain absent since power 
holders continue to run undefeated for elections, leaving little room for alternation. 
The removal of presidential term limits weakens the potency of the democratic and 
electoral process to guarantee open-seat contests and ensure leadership alternation. 
By the late 1990s and the beginning of the 2000s, some incumbent presidents 
in post-Cold War African democracies were nearing the end of their final tenures in 
office. The public expected these incumbent presidents to announce their retirements 
willingly and, therefore, allow elections to choose their successors. Instead, many 
incumbent transition presidents chose to repeal terms limit to guarantee their 
continued stay in power. Extended debates ensued, including the long and extended 
parliamentary and legal processes that delayed elections in many countries. Burkina 
Faso and Togo postponed elections more than twice. Zambia, Nigeria, and Senegal 
have all witnessed deadlocked polls because elections were rushed and poorly 
organized only after seating presidents failed to secure tenure elongation (Harbeson 
ed. 2009).36 More than half of the thirty-four African countries that sponsored debates 
against presidential term limits delayed elections once or postponed them for at least 
                                                




three months.37 In Cameroon, Gabon, and Togo, for instance, where the removal of 
presidential term limits was successful, the incumbent president convened elections 
only at their convenience, thereby distorting the quantitative flow of the electoral 
process.38  
In comparison with those countries where term limits compliance were 
successfully enforced and where term limits routinely apply, subsequent elections 
(fourth and fifth elections) occurred in timely fashion, with prompt electoral acts.39 In 
countries with a president contra tempore, elections have no definite dates and are at 
the discretion of the president.  By 2012, one hundred and nine presidential elections 
have occurred in Africa since the post-Cold War democratic movement on the 
continent. 40  While sixty-four of the elections took place promptly, forty-four 
                                                
37 The original source of this information stems from Michael Bratton (1998), which I updated. 
38 Many Cameroonians interviewed in the Netherlands by the author seemed unaware or uncertain 
about when or whether the next election would take place. The majority of those interviewed showed 
little optimism concerning elections in Cameroon, since elections generally do not bring any change in 
the political leadership of Cameroon. 
39 Confer the EU Election Observation Report for the Nigerian General Elections in 2011. The author 
compared the regularity of elections in countries where presidential term limits are repealed with the 
regularity of elections in four countries where term limits were successfully enforced. The examination 
shows more regularity in the quantity of elections in the later than the former. 
40 The author has updated the data provided by Michael Bratton (1998) and Dulani (2011) to include 
recent presidential elections until 2014.  
  
74 
experienced delay.41 Thirty-eight of these delayed elections occurred in countries 
whose incumbent presidents successfully repealed presidential term limits. The 
removal of presidential term limits appears to support the entrenchment of state 
power and the monopolization of the decision-making process by seating presidents, 
which adversely affects the quantity of elections as the above analysis shows.  
The removal of presidential term limits also affects the quality of democracy 
and elections. For instance, democratic consolidation takes place when elections are 
competitive, transparent, free, and fair (Schumpeter 1942; Dahl 1974; Schedler 1998; 
Hurwitz 2003). Lack of competition, transparency, and fairness in the electoral 
process reduces the electoral process to a routine maintenance of power by an 
incumbent president and his party (Smith 1996). Use of the electoral process as a 
mere means to ratify the maintenance of power by a ruling party or incumbent 
president does not confirm democratic consolidation (Linz & Stepan 1996; Beetham 
1994; Armstrong 2010). Bratton judges the quality of elections by the ways in which 
they are free, fair, and adhere to accepted rules (Bratton 1998). How obtainable are 
free and fair elections in countries that have repealed term limits? Does the quality of 
elections decline in comparison with earlier elections after the removal of presidential 
term limits? 
Bratton provides a model of comparison by insisting that a particular 
countryÕs recent history should offer an adequate basis for analysis and comparison. 
                                                
41 Same as 16 
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In all the elections held after the removal of presidential term limits in the thirteen 
repealed or neglected African cases, the quality and performance fell in each 
subsequent election with an average of sixty percent.42 Though post-Cold War 
African democracies generally experienced fewer elections that met internationally 
acceptable standards (Bratton 1998; Harbeson 2009), the situation has worsened after 
the removal of term limits.43  
For instance, between 1990 and 1998, the quality of elections averaged 55.5% 
when term limits operated in Gabon, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon, but 
experienced a reduction to an average of 28.4% after the removal of term limits 
between 2000 and 2012 in the same countries.44 Having entrenched and monopolized 
state power with every institution under firm executive control, incumbent presidents 
stipulated electoral formulas that suited them and ensured electoral success. At the 
same time, the incumbents made electoral hurdles stringent for few electoral 
                                                
42 A field observation of elections held in Gabon, Togo and Cameroon after the removal of term limits 
show a downward decline in electoral competition, level playing ground and mass participation.  
43 As evidenced in various Election Observation Results, issues of political competition, one-party 
dominance and patronage and intimidation induced electoral outcomes have been progressively 
consistent, especially in presidential and parliamentary elections in countries where without terms 
limits. Cameroon, Gabon and Togo justify this assertion. 
44 AuthorÕs update of BrattonÕs analysis of second election to include elections after the removal of 
term limits in some post-Cold War democracies in Africa. 
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challengers, sometimes with outright and illegal disqualification of intending 
opponents (Bratton 1998). For instance, with the successful removal of presidential 
term limits in Cameroon in 2008, Paul Biya enacted electoral laws that stripped the 
electoral commission of Cameroon of the powers to announce election results. Biya 
placed such powers under the presidency, leaving the electoral commission only with 
powers to conduct elections.  
Such electoral laws as in Cameroon weaken the potency and quality of the 
electoral process by making every opponent a potential loser. Reserving the 
declaration of election results for the presidency seems a direct contradiction of 
democracy and the electoral process. It is unlikely that an incumbent president would 
declare an opponent a winner of an electoral competition in which he is a contestant. 
It is a reduction of the election to an end itself, instead of to a process in a democracy. 
Iwu (2007, 2008) argues that the reduction of an election to an end has been 
responsible for the Ôdo or dieÕ attitude towards elections in many post-Cold War 
African democracies. The lack of term limits for a presidency weakens the potency of 
the electoral process to serve as a referendum to hold an incumbent president or party 
accountable. The electoral process serves as a mere spectacle to give some credibility 
to the regime. 
On the institutional level, the removal of presidential term limits hampers the 
growth and development of political parties. By allowing the incumbent president to 
stand for election at each poll, a political party loses its potency to rejuvenate (Shinn 
  
77 
2009). It cannot mature without a continuous experience of internal party democratic 
experience. Since in this way, the removal of term limits not only encourages 
monopolization of power, it also reduces partyÕs capacity for growth. When 
constitutional amendments allow a particular president to remain in power for life, the 
political party becomes vulnerable to the personal interests of the incumbent 
president. Insistent on survival, the president keeps those who are ready to do his 
bidding, while disposing those opposed to his whims, all to the detriment of the party.  
In most post-Cold War African democracies, the president functions as the leader of 
his political party. Thus, any president who succeeds in removing presidential term 
limits continues to function as the leader of the party as long as he or she remains in 
power. This reduces the opportunity to ÔreshuffleÕ at the party level, stifling the 
implementation of fresh ideas and ideals into the party system. In Uganda, the ruling 
party has failed to transform from a mere movement to a political party. The original 
ideas that created the Ugandan movement still persist, while Yorim Musseveni, who 
has been president and party leader for over thirty years, systematically monopolizes 
control over the movement. 
Perhaps, one crucial danger associated with the removal of term limits is 
timing. About eighty percent of all debates launched to repeal presidential term limits 
begin between eight and ten years after democratic transition (Beetham 1994; 
Armstrong 2010). In other words, incumbent presidents nursing third term or life-
presidency ambitions begin the process of challenging term limits between eight to 
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ten years after transition elections. The period of eight to ten years falls precisely 
within a time zone that Beetham describes as the Ôdemocratic consolidation period.Õ 
During this crucial period, a democracy alternates power following a successful third 
election in an open-seat contest. Within presidential systems that operate term limits, 
a particular regime cedes power voluntarily to a successor at the end of a second 
tenure in office. Any miscalculation at this period either by constitutional amendment 
to allow a third-term, life presidency, or an inconclusive election induces a high risk 
of democratic reversal, slow death, or hybridity (Schedler 1998; Rakner et al 2007; 
Diamond et. al 2015). Elections conducted after the removal of presidential term 
limits have often tended to lose their capacity to strengthen such a democracy.  
Cameroon, Burkina Faso, Togo, Gabon, and Uganda have all repealed 
presidential term limits. Though they all conduct regular elections, they remain 
caught in the democratic grey zone that does not adequately allow them to move 
forward toward technical democratic consolidation. Tampering with the period and 
processes that guarantee minimum technical consolidation paradigms has dislocated 
the democratic process and prevented those democracies from gaining momentum. 
Tampering with the consolidation process by engaging in the project of removing 
presidential term limits at the period allocated for consolidation exposes certain 
presidential systems to democratic slow death, reversal and hybridity. Many African 
democracies have initiated the process of slow democratic death, while some operate 
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hybrid democracy by observing skeletal elements of democracy, such as routine 
elections to legitimize their power.45  
What makes presidential term limits attractive and necessary for democracy? 
What difference does it make if a particular presidential system continues to produce 
or confirm the same president in every election? Armstrong (2010) argues that 
significant shifts in the institutional structures of politics and philosophy of 
governance always precede regime change. Linz (1996) argues that the adoption of an 
institutional order to control and govern the length of tenures stipulated for office 
holders reforms the transition from an authoritarian system to a democratic and 
competitive system. This reform marks the distinction between authoritarian and 
democratic systems. In other words, a presidential democratic system without term 
limits would operate as an authoritarian regime.  
This is why the adoption of presidential term limits became central to the 
constitutional negotiations that preceded the transitions from one-party, authoritarian 
regimes to multiparty democracies of the 1990s in Latin America, Eastern Europe, 
and Africa (Dulani 2011). The implementation of presidential term limits reflected a 
driving principle to move away from authoritarian regime systems and impose limits 
                                                
45 I shall return to this topic in Chapter-Nine.  
  
80 
on the number of terms or tenures a president may hold presidential office or power 
(Linz 1996; Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2010).46  
To strengthen the importance of term limits in the presidential system, some 
scholars have qualified or made distinctions between the two types of approach to 
governance and power. LinzÕs (1996) distinction of pro-tempore and contra-tempore 
is crucial here.47 Unlike authoritarianism, Linz argues that people expect democratic 
governments to be chronologically limited. Authoritarianism depends on the 
usurpation of state power and accrual of personal power while democracy depends on 
power consensus, which is crucial for power devolution. Therefore, the repealing of 
term limits in a presidential system may transform a particular regime into civilian 
authoritarianism. A particular democracy identifies more with authoritarianism and 
less with multiparty, competitive democracy when it assumes the features of an 
authoritarian regime, or loses the features of pro tempore and acquires the features of 
contra tempore multi-party democracy. Linz argues further that by losing the features 
of pro tempore, a particular democracy runs the risk of alienating the institutions and 
                                                
46 Professors Falola and Oyeshile concur with Linz in an interview with the author that term limits 
became necessary in order to dispense with many dictators who succeeded in entrenching state power 
by blocking all avenues to democratically allow power alternate (Pilzen, 15 May 2014). 
47 Linz makes a distinction between authoritarian and democratic politics arguing that autocrats rule 
without an end date while democrats rule with an end date. He uses the concepts of pro- and contra 
tempore to make a clear distinction between democratic an authoritarian regimes.  
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the populace in the democratic process whose duty it is to regulate and allocate power 
by electoral consensus (ibid.). SchedlerÕs slow death or RaknerÕs hybridity are 
inevitable outcomes when a democratic process lacking presidential term limits loses 
the elements that distinguish it from an authoritarian regime. Without the distinction 
between pro-tempore and contra-tempore, the two systems would appear to be the 
same and operate the same way. The effortless constitutional adoption of presidential 
term limits by post-Cold War African democracies at the transition period suggest the 
move away from a system that entrenched power toward a new culture and tradition 
of checks and balances, electoral consensus, and power alternation through the 
democratic process. 
 
2.3 Constitution -Making and Presidential Term Limits in Africa. 
The making of constitutions in Africa became popular after World War II. The 
emergence of constitutional committees in various countries, mostly comprising of 
colonial officers and few independence agitators, proceeded the dismantling of 
colonial regimes. The making of independent constitutions gave rise to independent 
states in Africa, beginning with Ghana in 1967. Though independence constitutions 
and elections preceded the inauguration of more than half of new African states, only 
a few constitutions noted term limits since most new independent states adopted a 
parliamentary system of government. Presidents in most newly independent states, 
particularly the British former colonies, were ceremonial and appointed by the Queen 
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of England as a representative of the Queen. The adoption of a parliamentary system 
in line with colonial governments may explain the scarcity of term limits in this 
period. The incursion of the military into politics through coup dÕtat, one-party 
system, life presidency, and Cold War geopolitics may have restrained the making of 
constitutions that stipulated term limits until after the Cold War. Between 1960 and 
1989, power alternation as figure four below shows depended more on military 
coup/assassination and violent means than on peaceful democratic means through 
election.  
Figure 4: Power Transition 1960-2010. 
 
Source: Monique Theron, African Trends and Transformation 
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Constitutional transition of government did not become a veritable means of power 
alternation in Africa until 1989, following the post-Cold War democratic shock as 
figure four shows. 
Between 1960 and 1990, only seven presidential elections occurred in African 
presidential systems in which more than one candidate took part (Nigeria, 1979, 
1983, Senegal 1978, 1983, 1988, Somalia 1968, Tanzania 1962). In these seven 
elections, only one resulted in power alternation across parties when Abdirashid Ali 
Shermarke defeated Aden Abdullah Osman of Somalia in 1968. The re-introduction 
of multiparty democracy and the adoption of presidential term limits by many 
countries in the 1990s resulted in a substantial increase in the quality and quantity of 
competitive elections on the continent and elsewhere among new democracies. 
According to Bratton (1998), foundational and second elections recorded a 
competitive average level of seventy percent with a competitive margin of eighty-five 
percent in Africa alone.  





 Source, updated by the author from Dulani (2011) 
In most cases, run-off elections decided presidential victories, indicating the 
high competitiveness of the foundational and second elections (Bratton 1998). The 
removal of presidential term limits, which often came after the second elections, 
reduced political competition and enabled incumbent presidents to win elections with 
ÒlandslidesÓ and wide margins.48 For instance, the first and second elections in 1994 
and 2001 in Cameroon were competitive. Paul Biya struggled to beat his opponent 
                                                
48 ÒLandslide victoryÓ has since become common jargon used to describe election victories by 
incumbent presidents and parties. 
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Nee John Fodi in 2001 with an average vote of sixty-four percent.49 After the removal 
of presidential term limits in 2008, Paul Biya won the subsequent election with an 
average vote of ninety-two percent in, a clear departure from previous elections that 
indicated a decline in competition and complete power entrenchment.  
The removal of presidential term limits stifles political pluralism and further 
quickens the process of transforming a polity into a one-party state. The fate of 
democratic processes in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and Uganda 
confirms the destructive nature of a presidential system without term limits. While 
these states seem to operate on the surface as multiparty democracies by organizing 
routine elections, in practice they operate as one-party states. After the removal of 
presidential term limits in above-mentioned states, the incumbent presidents won all 
subsequent elections with the ruling parties controlling over ninety-two percent of the 
legislative seats 50 against an average of 65.3% and 70.1% in the first and second 
elections consecutively (Bratton 1998). This represents a sharp decline in political 
                                                
49 Allegedly, the announcement of the presidential election results in 1999 experienced a dealy in order 
to manipulate results to favor Paul Biya. The delay and eventual declaration of Biya as the winner 
resulted in wide protests by university students, followed by violence against students and protesters. 
50 For the purpose of this study, the author updated Michael BrattonÕs (1998) work on competition and 
political pluralism in ten African countries to include the level of competition and political pluralism 
after the successful removal of presidential terms. 
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participation and electoral competition, seemingly induced by the repealing of 
presidential term limits.  
The importation of the principle of contra tempore into democracies negates 
the importance of political competition, stifles mass participation, and complicates 
the achievement of power alternation (Beetham 1994). Thus, political competition 
and the institutionalization of presidential limits have been responsible for thirty-four 
presidential alternations between 1990 and 2014 across Africa.51 Although, the bulk 
of the alternation has occurred at the intra-party level, nine occurred at the inter-party 
level signalling a march towards BeethamÕs two-election-test and HuntingtonÕs two- 
turnover test52 on democracy consolidation. The satisfaction of this minimal electoral 
condition is crucial for democratic consolidation (Huntington 1992; Beetham 1994). 
If the tendency to repeal presidential term limits by incumbent presidents continues 
unchallenged, there is a high likelihood that many new democracies may have to wait 
too long to experience the two-election test or two-turnover test. The provision of 
presidential term limits aims to make incumbent presidents face the reality of 
                                                
51 I have furthered BeethamÕs research to 2012 by investigating the number of power alternations at the 
inter and intra party levels.  
52 ÔTwo-turnover testÕ and Ôtwo-election testÕ are terms used by Beetham and Huntington, respectively, 
to analyze the level of consolidation of a given democracy. When a certain democracy has been able to 
hold two elections in which power alternated or transferred to another party or individual, then 
consolidation is then in progress. 
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stepping down at the expiration of their terms in order to stimulate the tradition of 
democratic competition and leadership alternation both at the intra- and inter-party 
levels. Thus the incessant attack on presidential term limits and their successful repeal 
in some new democracies impede the fundamental enriching components of the 
democratic process and work against democratic consolidation.  
Further emphasizing the importance of genuine elections for democracy, Sen 
(1999) argues that leaders who do not worry about a re-election deliver minimally on 
democracy dividends. With well-researched data, Sen argues that in functional 
democracies where elections are regular and respected, disasters seldom occur in 
comparison to regimes that do not face the challenges of genuine elections or re-
elections, as is the case in authoritarian regimes. Authoritarian rulers tend to consider 
themselves immune from calamities because of their exalted and secured positions. 
They tend to lack the incentive for appropriate and necessary measures to avert 
calamities, especially if they do not face the reality of elections and re-elections.  
That no famine has ever occurred in functioning democracies of the 
industrialized West (Northern America and Western Europe), or in the functioning 
democracies of the developing world, like Botswana and India, is instructive. It 
equally confirms the importance of facing the reality of genuine re-election, which 
the repealing of term limits contradicts. Sen remarks that the absence of genuine 
threat for re-elections appears to contribute to regime neglect of important public 
policies in one-party states or military regimes. Since, in functional democracies, the 
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reality of genuine elections determines the fate of particular governments, leaders 
tend to take the responsibility of solving more common problems than leaders who 
face scarce opposition or genuine elections. When regimes repeal term limits, they 
assume the posture of authoritarian regimes, stifling opposition politics and 
democratic pluralism; elections become a rubber stamp to confirm the same regime in 
power. Without opposition politics or strong opponents, incumbent regimes are sure 
of winning in every election. As a consequence, democracy dividends in the form of 
development, accountability, people-oriented policies, human rights, and freedoms 
blend into the background. 
As some scholars have noted, regular elections do not qualify a polity for 
democracy without the guarantee of competition contestation, alternation, and a 
power shift (Linz 1996; Bratton 1998). The intent of elections is to guarantee the 
alternation of power or leadership.   Without it, a particular democracy is not 
consolidating (Beetham 1994; Huntington 1992; Stepan 1996; Linz 1996). Beetham 
and Huntington argue that for a democracy to consolidate, two elections would have 
taken place with likely leadership or power alternation. Incumbent presidents immune 
the democratic process from the experience of two-election tests and turnovers by 
repealing term limits within eight to ten years of democratic experiment. Where a 
particular democracy experiences no turnovers, the chances of SchedlerÕs regression 
and RaknerÕs hybridity remain high. Therefore, a presidential term limitless 
democracy cannot fit into or qualify for BeethamÕs two-election tests or HuntingtonÕs 
two turnover tests.  
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A successful two-election-test and two-turnover test devoid of electoral 
illegitimacy may signal a march towards consolidation and an acceptance of 
democratic principles and the rule of the game by democratic stakeholders (Linz 
1996). It may also indicate that a given democracy is Ôstuck in a countryÕs political 
systemÕ (Dahl 1972). Engaging in debates to repeal presidential term limits within a 
timeframe allocated for democratic consolidation minimizes democratic consolidation 
and removes a particular democracy from the consolidation process. For instance, 
Zambia, Malawi, and Nigeria moved from Ônot freeÕ to Ôpartially freeÕ after their first 
and second elections, but quickly returned to Ônot freeÕ during the debates to remove 
presidential term limits (Freedom House 2001; 2004; 2007). As soon as the attempt to 
repeal presidential terms limit was defeated, these countries quickly returned to 
'partially free' (ibid.). 
According to Linz, "democracy begins to deepen when all, including people 
with authority, accept democracy as the only game in town and jointly agree to its 
rules, and entails that presidents respect institutional rules of the game and bow out at 
the expiration of their tenures, no matter how popular they think they are" (1996). By 
implication, a particular democracy consolidates when its operators accept LinzÕs 
injunction and allow the process to pass BeethamÕs two-election test and 
HuntingtonÕs two -turnover test. Democracy begins to consolidate when political 
elites and those who possess authority begin to accept the rule of the game as a given, 
neutral, independent and autonomous (Linz & Stepan 1998; Armstrong 2010).  
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Democracy entails the level diffusion of power among a greater number of 
actors both within and outside the government (Schedler 1998; Ihonvbere 2001). The 
removal of presidential term limits contradicts the principle of diffusion of power by 
enabling the entrenchment and monopolization of political power by one person or a 
small group. The consolidation of democracy can only occur when the ruling or 
political elites cooperate with other stakeholders to accept the responsibility of term 
limits enforcement on erring and ambitious presidents who attempt to monopolize 
state power and sustain a syndrome of power in perpetuity (Shinn 2009). The 
possibility of alternating leadership remains dim in some post-Cold War democracies 
because the removal of presidential term limits blocks open-seat contest and genuine 
political competition, both consequences of a contra-tempore presidency. Shinn 
(2009) rightly observes that the removal of presidential term limits creates and 
sustains the syndrome of power in perpetuity since most presidents, including those 
who successfully repealed term limits showed no sign of relinquishing power as table 








Table 2: Fifteen longest serving African Presidents. 
 
Source: Brad Cibane, AfricaÕs Elected Monarchs: Presidential Term Limits and Democracy 
in Africa, (June 2013) 
For instance, in all the thirteen countries that repealed or neglected presidential term 
limits, incumbent presidents won all subsequent elections. 53  While power and 
                                                
53 Incumbent presidents won all elections held after the removal or repealing of presidential term limits 
in Togo, Cameroon, Gabon, Uganda, Namibia, Burkina Faso, Guinea, Chad, and Angola. 
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leadership have alternated at intra- and inter-party levels in some African states, this 
experience remains scarce among countries with limited chances for open-seat 
contests 54 . Open-seat contests are necessary for an easy alternation of power 
(Cheeseman 2010), though Bakar (2002), argues that power may still alternate 
without presidential term limits if the electorate decides to vote an undesirable 
incumbent president or party out of power.  
Unfortunately, experience in some post-Cold War democracies shows that 
incumbency factors make it difficult to defeat a seating president or party in Africa 
(Posner and Young 2008; Maltz 2007; Vencovsky 2007; Dulani 2011). The removal 
of term limits frustrates the hope of unseating an incumbent president. 55  The 
difficulty in defeating an incumbent president in Africa underscores the importance of 
the open-seat contest, which the removal of presidential term limits contradicts. 
According to Cheeseman (2010), presidential term limits provide and ensure a 
measure of political competition for elections in the level playing ground guaranteed 
by open-seat electoral competition. The enforcement of presidential term limits 
                                                
54 Open-seat competition refers to an electoral contest where fresh candidates lacking any incumbency 
advantage compete on ÔsupposedlyÕ equal ground for a political office in an electoral process after an 
incumbent has served out his or her tenure. 
55 Incumbency factors like patronage, presidential control of democratic institutions and the media, as 
well as access to state resources make it difficult to defeat incumbent presidents in Africa. Refer also 
to Dulani 2010; Posner and Young 2007; OÕDonnell 1998; Bratton 1998; and Smith 1996. 
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guarantees open-seat contests, which in turn guarantees power transition and provides 
the possibility of injecting fresh ideas into governance.  
In a multiparty presidential system, open-seat contests offer the electorate a 
variety of fresh candidates to choose from, unlike the monopoly of a one party system 
without term limits. Open-seat contests have guaranteed nine party turnovers and 
alternation in Africa since the end of the Cold War (Cheeseman 2010). Open-seat 
contests have also guaranteed twenty-five leadership alternations within the same 
period in Africa.56 Unlimited presidential term limits devoid of open-seat contests 
would have made these alternations impossible. For Cheeseman, once a country 
passes the two-turnover test by experiencing two transfers of power between parties, 
the state has made a sustained limp into democratic consolidation. Even though term 
limits do not produce or create democracies (Bakar 2002), presidential term limits 
strengthen democracy by providing the environment and facilitating the process in 
which democracy is more likely to materialize and consolidate. 
The open-seat contest which presidential term limits guarantee creates the 
possibility that widens the democratic space and opens the democratic process up to 
accountability, good governance, fiscal responsibility, and credible electoral contest. 
In a pro-tempore presidency, open-seat contests grant the populace the opportunity to 
select their leaders. Because the chances are high that leaders will also be rotated, 
                                                
56  The authorÕs examined post-Cold War elections to ascertain current election turnovers and 
leadership alternations in the post-Cold War, African democratic experiment 
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(Schedler 1998; Linz 1996; Bratton 1998), the pro-tempore presidency prevents 
leadership redundancy (Vencovsky 2007; Posner & Young 2008; Cheeseman 
2010).57 Enforcing term limits and ensuring open-seat contest help a particular 
democracy avoid the undesired pain of languishing under a life-president as in the 
cases of Cameroon, Gabon, Togo, Uganda and Zimbabwe. 
 
2.4 Frequency of Removal of Presidential Terms Limit in New 
Democracies. 
Despite their benefits to democratic consolidation, term limits have continued 
to come under attack by many incumbent regimes in most new democracies across 
the world. Dulani (2010) notes that attempts by a section or agencies of government 
to remove presidential term limits have been constant for the last thirty years in some 
developed and new democracies. Attempts to remove presidential term limits are 
global and, therefore, raise sufficient doubts about the usefulness and survival of 
presidential term limits as a key feature of democracy.  
Data show that the U.S. has witnessed the highest number of sponsored 
motions to repeal presidential term limits with about thirty attempts at the U.S. House 
of Representatives (Basham 2012). Jose Serrano, a member representing New York 
                                                
57 In NigeriaÕs political jargon, open-seat contest offers an opportunity to ÒoffloadÓ undesired leaders 
whom they describe as coming to power Òby chance.Ó 
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in the House of Representatives, sponsored the first motion in 1975 when he sought 
the attention of the House of Representatives to repeal the 22nd amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. Serrano has re-introduced the same motion in the House on two 
yearly basis since 1975. Though the motion never got to the voting stage in the 
House58, several other members of the House of Representatives, including Steny 
Hoyer of Maryland and Mitch McConnell have, on several occasions, sponsored the 
same motion, requesting the House to strike out presidential term limits in the U.S. 
constitution. Seemingly supporting the removal of presidential term limits, Bill 
Clinton argued in 1999, "that the institution of presidential term limits should not 
hinder incumbent presidents if they chose to serve their countries for longer terms" 
(Huff Politics, 11 August 2011). However, he added a caveat, stating that presidents 
needed a break after two terms before they could come back to re-contest if they so 
desired to (ibid.). 
Although attempts to repeal presidential terms limit have occurred in other 
continents, this research concentrates on the high proportion of attempts to remove 
presidential term limits in African democracies. In other post-Cold War democracies 
                                                
58 The Legal Committee of the Federal House Representatives always received the bill to consider the 
removal presidential term limits in the U.S.  At no time did the bill survive any debate beyond the 
Legal Committee.  
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of Latin America, Eastern Europe, and Asia, some presidents made similar attempts 
to challenge presidential terms limits (Dulani 2011).59  
Figure 6: The frequency of repeal of presidential term limits in various continents 1990-2012. 
 
                                                
59 The following presidents attempted to repeal presidential terms limits in their countries: Hugo 
Chavez of Venezuela (2007 and 2009); Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua (2009); Albvaro Ulribe of 
Columbia (2009); Manuel Zelaya of Honduras (2009); Mahina Rajapaksa of Sri Lanka (2010); 
Nursultan Nazarbayev of Khazakhstan (2007); and Ilham Aliyev of Azebaijan (2009). 
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Source, data obtained from Dulani 2010 and updated until 2013 by the author.  
Although attempts to remove presidential term limits cut across various 
continents, post-Cold War African democracies produce the highest number of actual 
repeals. In the 1990s many African countries responded to the democratic openings 
ushered in by the demise of the Cold War. Between 1990 and 2000, thirty-eight 
African countries made swift democratic transitions. While some witnessed what was 
to be their first election since independence, 60  others returned to multiparty 
democracy after an interval of military or civilian dictatorship. By 2004, thirty-eight 
African countries have had second elections, indicating a swift democratic 
consolidation process (Huntington 1993; Stepan and Linz 1996; Beetham 1994). 
However, the excitement brought on by the democratic beginnings in many African 
countries did not last more than ten years (Vencovsky 2007). At the expiration of 
their final terms in office, many incumbent presidents have tampered with the 
constitutional provisions of two-term limits in order to extend their mandates. Instead 
of organizing credible elections to ensure democratic power transfer at the end of 
their final terms, many incumbent presidents chose to invest huge resources in 
securing constitutional frameworks to either allow a third term for themselves, or to 
completely expunge presidential term limits from the constitution.  
                                                
60 By 1990s, thirty African countries were witnessing unprecedented multiparty elections. A one-party 
system under the firm control of life presidents was popular in many African states before the third 
wave of democracy. 
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Sam Nujoma of Namibia was the first to repeal presidential term limits in 
1999 by amending the Namibian constitution to accommodate his third term 
ambition. He thereby paved the way for the popular Ôthird-term agenda.Õ Many 
incumbent presidents who wanted to remain in power for extended periods designed a 
strategy to manipulate the constitution in order to achieve longer terms (Bratton 1998; 
Dulani 2011). The trend assumed higher proportions between 2001 and 2012, as most 
incumbent presidents influenced debates and campaigns to remove presidential term 
limits when they approached the end of their final terms. In Africa, thirty-four 
countries held national debates between 1999 and 2014 to consider removing 
presidential term limits. Thirteen countries successfully repealed presidential term 
limits during this period, with four successful attempts and three cases of term limits 
neglect. Debates to remove presidential term limits continue in Rwanda and DRC. 
For some scholars the incessant attacks on presidential term limits, especially 
in the post-Cold War democracies, have cast doubt on the survival and retention of 
term limits as a democratic institution (Dulani 2010; Vencovsky 2007; Maltz 2007).61 
The frequency may increase in Africa. With about thirteen incumbent presidents still 
on the second tenure of their mandates, the number of national debates to remove 
term limits is likely to increase by forty percent as these presidents approach the end 
                                                
61 DulaniÕs work demonstrates the extent to which presidential term limits are under pressure: six out 
of every ten countries that adopted presidential term limits during the third-wave democracy held 




of their last terms. The high proportion of African countries engaged in debates to 
remove term limits, however, signals a significant threat to the survival of 
presidential term limits as a universally acceptable basic requirement of democracy in 
a presidential system (Dulani 2011). Presidential term limits are relatively new in 
most democracies, especially in Africa. With weak institutional formations and semi-
informed populaces, the attack on term limits raises particular concern in Africa more 
than other continents. The frequency of attacks on term limits, and the concerns it 
generates globally and particularly in Africa remains real.62 
 
2.5 Presidential Term Limits and the Democratic Rule of Law  
Some scholars consider the African adoption of presidential term limits as one 
of the best innovations introduced by the constitutional negotiations in the 1990s that 
quickly followed the transitions from one-party, authoritarian regimes to multiparty 
democracies (Schedler 1998; Posner &Young 2007; Maltz 2007; Dulani 2011). The 
adoption of presidential term limits was swift and accepted by all stakeholders in all 
the thirty-eight countries that democratized within this period. This indicates that the 
majority of African countries ab initio accepted term limits as a prominent feature and 
                                                
62 To underscore the real threat occasioned by the removal of presidential term limits and the concerns 




principle of democracy.63 Once a country accepted and implemented term limits, that 
country did no treat the term limits as accidental arrangements, but rather, as part of 
the normal order of democracy (Schedler 1998). According to Schmitter, presidential 
term limits applied during a transition to multiparty democracy, evolved from a 
contingent solution into prudential norms,, structures, and into reliable, regularly 
practiced, and habitually accepted relationships (Schmitter 1988).  
Presidential term limits impose limits on the number of years and terms an 
individual may holds presidential office or power (Dulani 2011). This checkmates 
power abuse, authoritarian regression, democratic slow death, and the gradual 
weakening of the democratic process (Schedler 1998; Huntington 1996; OÕDonnell 
1992). For Ojeshile, "people expect that officers elected into power under a 
constitutional provision of pro-tempore to be disciplined enough to respect the rules 
that brought them to power." 64 
Unfortunately, presidential term limits have come under pressure in many 
countries from those sworn to protect the constitution and democratic rules. 
Democracies cannot stabilize without respect for democratic rules. Particularly, 
disrespect and disregard for presidential term limits causes democratic erosion and 
puts nascent democracies at the risk of authoritarian regression. Weissert and 
                                                
63 Field research by Dulani (2011) confirms that seventy-five percent of the people questioned on the 
importance of presidential term limits appreciate term limits and would want them enforced. 
64 AuthorÕs interview with professor Ojeshile. Pilsen, Czech Republic. May 2013 
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Halperin (2007) have discussed the demerits and merits of term limits in the U.S. 
legislature and the U.S. presidential system, while Elhauge (1997) has queried the 
usefulness of term limits for state and national officers in developed countries.  
With reference to the legislature, both writers raise the obvious question of 
whether the absence of term limits confers a special capacity on the quality of a 
legislature. Do unlimited terms make for a more efficient legislature? Are career 
politicians with cognate experience better for the legislative institution? Though these 
questions seem to fall outside the focus of the present study, they introduce 
skepticism concerning the usefulness of presidential term limits for democratic 
consolidation. Should we consider presidential term limits necessary for power 
alternation? After all, parliamentarian systems as practiced in England, the 
Netherlands, Germany, and many other countries do not depend on term limits for 
power alternation. This argument questions the importance of presidential term limits 
as the guaranteed approach to ensure power alternation, as parliamentary systems 
function effectively and adequately without term limits. My research will consider 
calls to remove term limits within their specific political context and configuration. I 
will situate this study in the political configuration and context of a presidential 
system of government as adapted to the North American presidential system. I will 





 2.6 Presidential Term Limits and Democratic Values  
An on-going debate on the politics of presidential term limits introduces a 
paradox in their democratic nature. While some scholars like Baker (2002) argue that 
presidential term limits restrict democratic choice, others like Beetham (1994), 
Cheeseman (2011), Armstrong (2010), Vencovsky (2007) and Dulani (2011) 
maintain that presidential term limits are indispensable for democracy. Despite the 
seeming benefits of presidential term limits, Baker maintains that presidential term 
limits are undemocratic and unnecessary for power alternation. He argues that if 
democratic accountability is strong enough, the electorate should have the capacity to 
vote an unwanted president or party out of office at the next election or, if necessary, 
democratically impeach a president through a legislative process (2002). Without 
prejudice to BakerÕs argument, the defeat of an incumbent president at the polls in a 
post-Cold War African experiment is not yet common (Collier 2009), let alone an 
impeachment.65 Scholars have proven that institutional processes are weak in most 
new democracies even to sustain an impeachment process without elite pressure 
(Vencovsky 2007; Dulani 2011; Bratton 1998; Villalon 2005). However, BakerÕs 
argument presents a challenge to defenders of presidential term limits. Why deny the 
masses the chance for a candidate whom they trust even if he is an incumbent? If the 
incumbent leader is the best among all the candidates vying for the presidential 
office, should term limits serve as an excuse to deny the electorate the right to choose 
                                                
65 Benin is the second African country since 1960 and the first since 1990 where an incumbent 
president is defeated at the polls. 
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such an incumbent? This argument is currently making the rounds in Rwanda where 
the incumbent president is due to step down in 2017 at the expiration of his second 
term. Many feel that Paul Kagame has performed exceedingly well and has moved 
Rwanda both economically and politically forward (Arinaitwe, 28 February 2013). 
They argue that presidential term limits should not serve as an excuse to deny the 
country the services of a good incumbent president. The extension of presidential 
terms requires an amendment of the Rwandan Constitution and a repealing of the 
presidential term limit. Is it right to deny the people their choice of Kagame as life 
president? 
Promoters of presidential terms limit argue otherwise, insisting that a 
presidential term limits provision signifies a degree of lack of trust in the electorate 
and democratic institutions to make informed decisions (Armstrong 2010; Chabal and 
Daloz 1990). According to Professor Falola, the electorate sways with African 
political rhetoric and is not adequately concerned about the merits and demerits of 
democracy.66 Therefore, the institution of presidential term limits requires protection 
to forestall abuses and empty rhetoric.67 During the third term debates in Nigeria in 
2006, a loyalist of the president strongly defended the third term as an Òindisputable 
democratic exercise.Ó He further described the third term as an opportunity for the 
masses to retain their choice for president (Sun, 22 April 2006).  
                                                




The scenario was also the same in Cameroon. A government minister 
described the repeal of term limits in 2008 as a Òclassic democratic exercise, claiming 
that the intent of constitutions is not a limiting of voterÕs choice (Butty 2008). This 
argument may appear cogent, but the repeal of presidential term limits gives 
incumbent presidents undue advantages over other aspirants. The resource advantages 
available to incumbent presidents may make it difficult for institutions to function 
effectively and for the electorate to make informed electoral choices and decisions. 
Since political competition cannot sufficiently guarantee the type of acceptable 
democratic choice that elections and contestations designate in the absence of 
presidential term limits (Armstrong 2010), the enforcement of term limits compliance 
is necessary. Despite arguments that presidential term limits do not produce or create 
democracies, HuntingtonÕs thesis and CheesemanÕs data show that presidential term 
limits facilitate the democratic process and provide the environment in which 
democracy is more likely to materialize and consolidate. 
What is undemocratic about a constitutional amendment to repeal presidential 
limits? Research has shown that many constitutions provide room for amendments. If 
the legislature or the parliament follows due process in repealing presidential term 
limits, does it not act democratically and constitutionally? Respect for rule of law and 
due process is required in handling constitutional issues. Most constitutions stipulate 
mandatory processes for legitimate amendments. These involve different arms and 
tiers of government and usually compel a two-third majority to legitimize the 
amendment of any article in the constitution. If the repealing of presidential term 
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limits follows due process and is able to mobilize support at all levels, it is considered 
as being legitimate.  
However, the challenge on presidential term limits and their repeal in the last 
twenty-five years in Africa have not strictly followed due process (Vencovsky 2007; 
Posner and Young 2007; Armstrong 2010). Neither has it respected the clauses 
protecting presidential term limits in various constitutions (Dulani 2010). We have 
witnessed what many scholars have described as a corrupt and Ôillegitimate assault on 
term limits by some incumbent presidentsÕ (Jean Morrow 2006).68  
In Nigeria, Obasanjo provided the sum of US$350,000 to Senate members 
and US$300,00069 to members of the Federal House of Representatives to support his 
third term bid (Posner and Young 2007). Ugandan legislators received US$3000 to 
support the removal of presidential term limits from president Museveni in 2005 
(Armstrong 2010). Zambian parliamentarians received the sum of US$1,500 to 
support ChilubaÕs third term agenda in 2001 (Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2010; Sardanis 
2014)). Furthermore, incumbent presidents identified those political actors who did 
                                                
68 Other scholars like Armstrong (2010), Posner and Young (2007), Maltz (2007), Vencovsky (2007) 
Chabal and Daloz (1998) and Colier (2005) have documented the use of financial inducements and 
intimidation as strategies by incumbent regimes to coerce support from political actors, civil society, 
and the masses to support the repeal of presidential term limits. 
69 In my interview with the select political elites in Nigeria, each interviewee pointed to the bribery of 
the legislators by Obasanjo to vote in support of the third term.   
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not choose to support the removal of term limits as political enemies, often forcing 
them out of government (Usman 2012; Campbell 2013; Villalon 2005; Dulani 2011; 
Morrow 2006).70 Scholars have observed that constitutional amendments, referenda, 
reforms, and elections have been manipulated and flawed, reducing the legitimacy of 
these processes (Clark 1999; Morrow 2006; Usman 2012). A careful look at the 
processes surrounding the attempts to remove presidential term limits or their actual 
repeal in Africa shows a clear and undemocratic lack of procedural due process, 
devoid of rule of law. 
The argument in support of limitless presidential terms notwithstanding, I 
presidential term limits are relevant and important for democratic consolidation. They 
are a fundamental mechanism to guarantee leadership and power alternation in a 
presidential system of government. A presidential system invests excessive power in 
the executive president. In the case of incumbent presidents in most new 
democracies, this executive power is rarely decentralized, thereby feeding 
incumbency advantages and weakening democratic institutions. Since incumbent 
presidents often entrench state power and leave other stakeholders as spectators in the 
democratic process some analysts like Rakner (2007) and van de Walle (2005) rightly 
                                                
70 I shall elaborate more in the case studies on the use of money and intimidation as strategies to coerce 
opposition into loyalty by incumbent presidents.  
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view the presidential system as the biggest impediment to African democratic 
consolidation.71  
Since institutional processes are weak in most new democracies (Vencovsky 
2007; Dulani 2011; Bratton 1998; Villalon 2005), presidential term limits appear 
necessary to check excessive powers in a presidential system of government. For 
instance, where elections are not sufficiently competitive and contested, presidential 
term limits might present an opening for an open-seat contest to inject fresh ideas into 
the leadership system of a country and to some extent reduce the pressure of 
incumbent advantage (Beetham 1994; Cheeseman 2011). Entrenched incumbency 
advantages have the potential and actual risk of preventing the opposition from 
gaining representation in the government, therefore violating the minimum standards 
of electoral fairness and equal opportunity (Schedler 1998; Dulani 2010; Cheeseman 
2011). Without vibrant opposition, there may be a high possibility of creating and 
consolidating civilian dictatorship and hybrid democracy. Free and fair elections, as 
certified and endorsed by electoral observer groups, do not guarantee or signify 
genuine democratic processes (Carothers 1998). Elections may appear free and fair 
but harbor deep undemocratic processes beneath (Bratton 1998). Campaign 
regulations are not efficient in most post-Cold War democracies and Africa, while 
political sympathy is dependent on patronage and financial inducement (Chabal and 
                                                




Daloz 1998). Incumbent presidents and parties often use their access to state 
apparatus against opposition candidates and parties (Schedler 1998; Posner and 
Young 2007; Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2010; Simon 2005; Morrow 2005). An open-
seat election reduces such incumbency advantages and increases the possibility of 
growing political competition required to consolidate democracy. 
In Gabon, Cameroon, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger for instance, the 
removal of term limits was swift, leaving the populace with no option or time to join 
the debate (Fomunyoh 2001). In these countries, common good or popular opinion 
did not drive the removal of presidential term limits (Dulani 2011; Villalon 2005). 
Legitimate amendments and reforms in presidential term limits politics were scarce, 
as constitutional amendments to repeal term limits were chiefly motivated by the 
vested interests of those in state power (Vencovsky 2007).  It is so far difficult to 
guarantee the repeal of presidential term limits through a strict democratic procedure 
in post-Cold War African democracies since both succeesful and failed attempts to 
remove presidential term limits have rarely followed constitutional due process in 
Africa. The removal of presidential term limits creates imedes democratic 
consolidation an provides opportunity for incumbent presidents to personalize and 
entrench power at the level of the state (Villalon 2005; Armstrong 2010; Vencovsky 
2007; Dulani 2011).  
Contrary to what many third or fourth--term seekers and their supporters have 
claimed, longer presidential terms do not provide or guarantee good governance 
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(Shinn 2009); rather, they support the weakening of democratic institutions and other 
arms of government.72 The removal of presidential term limits promotes and sustains 
power entrenchment and syndrome of power in perpetuity, making the institution of 
the presidency the reference point in all government decisions. Research further 
shows that more than ninety percent of the agitation to repeal presidential terms limits 
originates within the presidency (Armstrong 2010; Shinn 2009; Chabal and Daloz 
1999; Morrow 2005). Incumbent presidents use MPs as proxy to introduce and 
mobilize support in the parliament for the amendment bill, while feigning ignorance 
and denying any knowledge of the project.73 None of the agitations to remove 
presidential term limits emanated from the electorate, disclosing the term limits 
repeal as an entirely presidential incumbency project.74  
 
 
                                                
72 Gabon, Cameroon, Togo, Burkina Faso, Guinea, and Niger represent this category of democracies.  
73 I will demonstrate in the three case studies that the incumbent presidents all deny knowledge of the 
amendment bills, while the presidents at the same organized amendment rallies distributed slush funds 
to lobby support. 
74 In an interview with the author, Professor Ojeshile questioned the sincerity of incumbent presidents 
who claim that their third-term ambitions enjoyed mass popularity. If this was true, why did 
incumbents fear a referendum, and why has no amendment bill originated from the masses? (Pilzen, 





I have argued in this section that the removal of presidential term limits 
reduces a democracy to a routine object with only skeletal elements, lacking in 
substance and essence. It exposes a democratic process to a more subtle process of 
slow death, where elected officials progressively weaken integral elements of 
democratic rule, and expose a nascent democracy to regression and hybridity. By 
undermining electoral competition and contestation, by eroding checks on executive 
authority and placing constraints on political participation, incumbent presidents who 
have successfully removed presidential term limits use the state apparatus to 
personalize state power, leaving the masses with little option in the process of 
selecting or electing their leaders. The democratic process neither grows nor 
consolidates.  
I have also argued that presidential term limits are beneficial for the 
deepening and consolidation of democracy, since it halts the chances available to 
incumbent presidents and elected officers from turning into dictators. Presidential 
terms limits ensure the possibility of policy change to institutionalize the democratic 
principle and process of power rotation and alternation. Term limits are required to 
guarantee a regular electoral contest so that the masses, by participating in a regular 
electoral process can grow a democratic culture and acquire the basic democratic 
experience needed for democratic consolidation. As mentioned above, in the 
  
111 
countries that repealed presidential term limits, electoral participation has been 
minimal and voter apathy rampant in electoral and democratic processes. The 
populace has remained politically docile, unaware, or uninterested in the democratic 
process.75  
Contra tempore presidencies demonstrate the harm caused by the removal of 
term limits. African turnout rates of elections in democracies with contra tempore 
presidencies went down from an average of 64.1% in the first and second elections to 
38.2% after the removal of presidential term limits. The consistent low turnout of 
voters in Gabon, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon after the removal of presidential 
term limits appears to signal an electorate seriously disengaged from the democratic 
process. With these democratic setbacks, the repeal of presidential term limits 
endangers democratic consolidation and plunges the democratic process into 





                                                
75 A personal comparison of the last elections in Cameroon and Nigeria shows a marked difference in 
terms of interests and participation. While the presidential election in Cameroon in 2009 was 
characterized by high voter apathy and low interest, NigeriaÕs 2011 presidential election witnessed an 




Chapter 3: Theoretical Framework. 
 
3 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I addressed the politics of presidential term limits, 
their benefits for democracy, and their importance for consolidation in new 
democracies. I discussed the link between presidential term limits and democratic 
consolidation without resolving the puzzle of why the attempts to repeal term limits 
failed in some countries and succeeded in others. 
The present chapter is intended to introduce various perspectives that can 
assist in providing answer to the questions: how can a system enforce presidential 
term limits compliance? What pressures converge to enforce presidential term limits, 
and who galvanizes and mobilizes these pressures?  
I shall limit my focus in this chapter on two distinct theories that will be dominant in 
this study: the political elite and Institutional theories. While I will prioritize political 
elite theory, I will emphasize institutional theory using the examples of democratic 
institutions that either served as channels of activism or protection for some political 
elites in their attempt to galvanize and mobilize pressures to demand and enforce term 
limit compliance in the case studies. I shall argue that an effective entrepreneurship of 
particular political elites, their dissidence and resistance seem to create the needed 
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opportunity for alternative platform for convergence in mobilizing pressures to 
demand and enforce compliance. 
In the case studies, I shall introduce other approaches inherent in the democratization 
literature as effective pressures in enforcing presidential term limits compliance. 
These include, civil society, popular, contextual, political party, parliamentary, 
judicial and exogenous pressures. I shall further re-examine and piece these 
perspectives together in chapter seven to ascertain how they impacted on each other 
in achieving the complaint outcomes in the case studies. A strong resistance from 
political elites appears to be necessary and irreplaceable to counter attempts to repeal 
presidential term limits in Africa. 
 
3.1 Political elite Approach: Activism and Pressure 
Political elite perspective to term limits enforcement claims that a determined 
and active resistance from key individual political elites is necessary for presidential 
term limits compliance, especially, from elites who assisted incumbent presidents in 
their ascent to power. As Russel (1961) notes: ÒNo revolution of the masses can 
triumph without the support of a portion of the elites or insiders that sustained the old 
regime.Ó76 No incumbent president may consistently entrench state power, or move to 
                                                
76 Adapted from a quote in Lieuwen 1961, page 134, originally from D.E.H Russell, Rebellion, 
Revolution, and Armed Forces: A Comparative Study of Fifteen Countries with special Emphasis on 
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challenge term limits, without the active connivance and support of key individual 
elites both from within and outside the regime. As Linz (1996) notes, internal elite 
dissidence possesses the capacity to alter party cohesion and rupture executive 
loyalty. It also yields a parliamentary balance of power, especially where the 
parliament is the terminus ad quem of the amendment bill. 
Elite political activism was among the pressures that preceded the post-Cold 
War democratization in many African countries. Particular political elites capitalized 
on the regional and global democratic changes to challenge long-term, personal rule 
across Africa (Dulani 2010; Svasand 2009; Tusalem 2007; Lane and Ersson 2007; 
Diamond 2015). Combined elite and group activism, led by many political actors, has 
also contributed to high scores of variables in political capital (Booth and Richard 
1998). Thus, political activism and resistance, as observed by Easton (1965), can 
support democratic outcomes and serve as a necessary school of democracy.  
In 1990, Frederick Chiluba contributed in mobilizing and coordinating the 
political activism that ended the long rule of Kenneth Kaunda in Zambia, though he 
also was to benefit from the activism (Sardanis 2014). In Nigeria, the activism and 
resistance led by old and new political elites of the National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO) and the Peoples Democratic Mandate (PDM) mobilized university 
professors, the Labour Union, and students in the resistance that forced the military 
                                                                                                                                      
Cuba and South Africa, ed. Charles Tilly and Edward Shorter, Studies in Social Discontinuity, New 
York: Academic Press, Inc., 1974, page 3. 
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dictatorship of Ibrahim Babangida to "step aside" in 1992. The same elite political 
activism led by NADECO and PDM challenged the dictatorship of Sani Abacha in 
1995 and laid the foundation for the return of civil and democratic rule in Nigeria in 
1999 (Usman 2012; Falana 2015). The introduction of quasi-electoral democracy in 
Uganda in 1995 was a direct result of political activism led by Yorim Musseveni, 
who formed and coordinated political activism under the National Resistance Army 
(NRA) that ended the personal, human rights abusive rule of Gen. Tito Okello in 
1986. Unfortunately, Yorim Musseveni is at the moment one of the longest African 
serving presidents, and may require elite coalition and activism to force him into 
retirement. In Malawi, Muluzi supported and benefitted from church-led political 
defection that ended the thirty yearlong dictatorship of Hasstings Kamuzi Banda in 
1994 (Morrow 2006). His attempts to re-introduce open-term limits was strongly 
resisted by a coalition of elite opposition, the CSOs, (Salih et al. 2007), including the 
Church and international community (Dulani 2005; Morrow 2005; Khembo 2004; 
Armstrong 2010). 
The majority of political elites who participated in enthroning democracy in 
their various countries eventually became elected executives or MPs as in Nigeria, 
Zambia, Malawi, and Kenya. The presence of this set of activist elites was to become 
necessary in mobilizing elite coalition and activism as was the case in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi. This was however not completely so in those countries where 
existing dictators manipulated their way back to power as in Cameroon, Burkina Faso 
and Uganda. As I will demonstrate in the case studies, elite activism against the 
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breach of presidential term limits formed the nucleus of internal dissidence and 
resistance that resulted in the compliance outcomes. These internal elite dissidents 
and pressure groups included old and new politicians who were able to mobilize 
university professors, leaders of professional and ethnic associations, the media, 
judiciary, civil society, and the international actors to safeguard the institution of 
presidential term limits. Their influence contributed to full and partial presidential 
term limits compliance in some post-Cold War African democracies.  
Many scholars already recognize the capacity of political elites in creating 
internal resistance, especially within the ruling parties (Bratton and van de Walle 
1994; Linz and Stepan 1996; Lindberg and Bryant 2001; O'Donnell 1998). When 
O'Donnell speaks of Ôan important factorÕ, which is hard to pin, he may be referring 
to the importance of specific political actors. He refers specifically to political and 
institutional leaders who shape public opinion by acting publicly, deliberately, and 
according to liberal and republican injunctions (1998). O'Donnell argues that the 
leadership provided by these leaders can encourage other strategically located 
individuals or agencies to risk taking similar positions (O'Donnell 1998). However, 
O'Donnell wonders Òhow and whyÓ such leaders emerge, emphasizing the need to 
study such leaders for their scarcity and lack of success in most new democracies.  
There are grounds, thus, to consider how and why political elites and political 
actors emerge and operate as dissidents. An investigation of their emergence and 
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operation as a pressure group would disclose their role in the enforcement of 
presidential term limits compliance.  
In his study of pressures against the removal of presidential term limits in 
Africa, Armstrong (2010), building on Posner and Young (2007), Vencovsky (2007), 
and Maltz (2007), focused on three categories of pressures. Armstrong emphasized 
institutional, contextual, and exogenous pressures while paying little attention to 
political elite role. Though he recognized the effectiveness of elite internal pressure in 
rupturing executive loyalty, he overlooked the elite pressures that blocked the 
potential third-term projects of Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Arap Moi of Kenya. 
Armstrong equally ignored the significant role played by political elites in forming a 
political barrier against the third-term aspirations of Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo of 
Nigeria and Frederick Chiluba of Zambia. Armstrong emphasized exogenous factors, 
which he believed influenced Rawlings and Moi to step down after their second 
terms. Like most countries in Africa, Kenya and Ghana at the time of Rawlings and 
Moi respectively, depended on external development aid for their budgetary 
provisions, raising the issue of external pressure as an influential factor. However, 
Armstrong failed to ask why the same exogenous factors could not enforce 
presidential term limits compliance in Burkina Faso, Togo, Cameroon, and Uganda. 
These countries depend more on external development aid for their economy than 
Ghana and Kenya.  
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Sen (1999) emphasizes that the achievement of democracy does not solely 
depend on the rules and procedures that a particular democracy adopts, but also on 
the ways that citizens use the opportunities presented to them. As a system of 
government, democracy creates such opportunities instrumentally and constructively, 
through the establishment of values and norms. The opportunism of citizens depends 
on a variety of factors, which Sen characterizes as the vigor of democracy 
(multipartyism) and the operators of the system. He pays particular attention to the 
role of elite activism in galvanizing the citizens to seize such opportunities and in 
preventing democratic deadlock by keeping regimes on alert.  
For Sen, the activism of particular opposition elites is a major force in both 
democratic and non-democratic societies. Using Chile and South Korea as examples, 
he detailed how, the lack of democratic guarantees notwithstanding, the vigor of elite 
activism was directly and indirectly effective in the governance of those countries 
prior to their implementation of democracy. Elite activism brings issues into public 
debate and consciousness, which may pressure regimes to provide some response. 
Human rights, gender issues, and the institutionalization of presidential term limits, 
are examples where political activism has pressured incumbent regimes into 
confrontation, debates, and activism in many new democracies. While confirming the 
importance of democratic institutions, Sen maintains that institutions are not 
mechanical devices for consolidating democracy. Human values and priorities are 
conditions for their use, which also benefits from available opportunities for 
articulation, reformation, and participation.  .  
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The agency role of an organized elite resistance and opposition are of 
particular importance in making meaningful use of opportunities for articulation and 
reformation. Sen appreciates the contribution of opposition elites in shaping the 
future of democracy through public debate in India and in many other new 
democracies. Sen acknowledges them for capitalizing on the given opportunities for 
the articulation and reformation of the democratic system (1999).  
The provisions made by some scholars on the role of political elites in the 
democratization processes, especially in Latin America and Eastern Europe, offer a 
guide on existing literature on political elites in democratic processes. Linz and 
Stepan's Crafting Democracy (1998) places emphasis on the need for political elites 
to create a competitive political environment that can produce alternative political 
forces and options for the populace. Most democracies have accepted political 
contestation and efficient electoral competition as co-principles of democracy. 
Conversely, they view the lack of political competition and elite dissidence as 
antithetic to both the survival of democracy and the safeguarding of presidential 
terms limits. Democracies that lack a competitive environment do not fully qualify as 
democracy, as they present little or no possibility for the electorate to choose or rotate 
their leaders, (Huntington 1996; Schedler 1998). Many scholars have described non-
competitive democracies as ÔquasiÕ or ÔhybridÕ democracy with diverse characteristics 
(Schedler 1998; Epstein 2006; Rakner 2004; Gates et al 2006; Elkins 2000; Munck & 
Verkuilen 2002; Trier and Jackman 2008). Quasi-democracies represent democratic 
systems that combine an absence of effective contestation with repressed political 
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participation, one party system, civilian authoritarian dictatorship, and a conquered 
state (Goldstone et al 2012).  
Other scholars like McFaul (2002), building on Lijphart (1996), emphasize 
the ability of political actors to form broad coalitions or pacts to address issues of 
specific national interests bordering on power distribution and economic matters. The 
recognition by some scholars of elite capacity to create platforms to address specific 
national issues attributes the same capacity to some political elites to mobilize into 
pressure groups to demand and enforce term limits compliance. In this way, elite 
activism creates an opportunity for the emergence of strong opponents whose 
decisions can shape the trajectory of democratic consolidation processes irrespective 
of their institutional contexts (Villalon 2005).  
Bratton and van de Walle present political actors as agents who have the 
ability and capacity to shape and reshape the structures in which they operate. 
Leftwich (2010) discusses the importance of Ôpolitical-actor-agencyÕ in shaping both 
development and political processes. He argues that political-actor-agency possesses 
the ability to create, reshape, fashion, re-fashion, and reconstruct the institutions that 
guide their operations. Using Botswana as an example, Leftwich defended the role of 
political elites and coalitions in constructing and fashioning the enabling institutional 
configurations that have successfully deepened democracy and development in 
Botswana (ibid.).  
  
121 
In the case studies, I shall treat political-actor-agency as an independent 
variable. I am concerned on how the Ôactor agency' shall interact with both structures 
and institutions of democracy in the case studies, to produce the pressures that 
yielded term limits compliant outcome as dependent variable in the case studies. 
Using Bratton and van de Walle's "structured contingency" approach, I shall show 
how specific political elites used institutional and extra-institutional platforms as 
means of protection. Finally, I will demonstrate how they interacted with 
international and structural contexts to produce compliant outcomes in the three cases 
under study.  
As some scholars argue, it may be difficult to deduce one single variable as 
responsible for the survival and thriving of democracy (Diamond 2015; Levitsky 
2015; Villalon 2005). However, Gomez (2011) argues that some variables tend to 
apply more pressure than others do toward the achievement of a democratic outcome. 
In his survey of the democratic experiments in Columbia and Venezuela, Gomez 
credits the survival and growth of democracy to the following elite values in these 
two countries: elite activism, pacts, and consensus. Gomez considers elite activism, 
pact, and consensus more significant than mass political culture in the achievement of 
democratic results in Venezuela and Columbia. Since most post-Cold War countries 
in the 1990s made unprecedented attempts toward a democratic experiment, it may be 
misleading to give sole credence to institutions, structures, a viable state, or rule of 
law. Because these elements were only recently established, they could not have been 
solely responsible for the compliant outcomes in Africa.  
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Most democratic institutions were neither established nor tested at the time of 
transition. For instance, the evolution and composition of many political parties in 
Africa have not equipped them to strengthen democracy (Salih 2003, 2007). Since the 
efficacy of the democratic political process was yet undetermined, institutions and 
structures could not have solely sustained democracy or enforced terms limit 
compliance in the new African democracies. More than seventy percent of the 
African population was still economically poor between 1990 and 2004 (Moyo 2009). 
This is why it is misleading to emphasize economic and social factors as catalysts 
toward democratic consolidation. On the long term, however, other variables such as 
cultural, economic, and mass political culture may impact the thriving and survival of 
democracy (Schedler 1998; Villalon 2005). In order for democracy to survive, 
political elites must imbibe or fashion norms and a political culture that can sustain 
the existing democratic and economic tempo (Leftwich 2010; Gomez 2011).  
Thus, survival of democratic space, as well as the expansion and the eventual 
consolidation of the democratic process, also depend on the capacity and political will 
of some political elites. Political elites, however, must be willing to make use of the 
opportunities provided at different junctures during the political process to create and 
enable policies to stabilize, expand, and consolidate the democratic process (Linz 
1978; OÕDonnell and Schmitter 1986; Bunce 2000). The politics and process of 
repealing presidential term limits coincide with the consolidation period in new 
democracies (Beetham 2004). This incorporates the confrontation of ambitious 
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incumbent presidents and the mobilization to enforce term limits compliance as 
means to defend and save democracy from SchedlerÕs slow death.  
Further, the democratic experiment regularly generates opportunities for 
growth or relapse. . Many African autocratic and dictatorial regimes that were open to 
multiparty democracy in the 1990s succeeded in reconsolidating power following 
initial elections that many scholars had considered democratic transitions (Diamond 
2015; Levitsky 2015). The removal of presidential term limits in Cameroon, Uganda, 
Niger, Togo, Gabon, and Burkina Faso demonstrate how existing Ôreformed' 
authoritarian regimes succumbed to local and international pressures to open up for 
multiparty democracy. Later, these same regimes quickly re-consolidated power by 
returning their countries to an Ôauthoritarian status quo' following a brief authoritarian 
crisis (Diamond 2015; Levitsky 2015).  
On the other hand, a particular democracy may witness a boost after 
confronting and enforcing presidential term limits compliance. The confrontation of 
ambitious presidents with compliance enforcement provides an opportunity to 
strengthen institutional frameworks and create enabling policies to stabilize and 
consolidate democracy. In Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi, specific political elites have 
used the opportunity presented by such fluid periods to strengthen new and weak 
  
124 
democratic institutions put into place at the time of transition.77 Muller and Seligson 
(1994) recommend that those elite roles that contribute in strengthening the 
democratic process merit special attention. 
Twenty years ago, when they criticized Inglehart«s set of variables as 
statistically insignificant in explaining changes in democracy, Muller and Seligson 
(1994) proposed a new direction for future research in studying the democratic 
consolidation processes. They explicitly advocated for a shift in influence from 
attitudes of the general populace to attitudes of political elites. They suggested that 
the attitudes of political elites deserved more emphasis in new democracies. They 
argued that in non-western democracies, political elites possess greater opportunity 
and capacity for regime influence than the general populace. Robert Dahl (1977) had 
already made the same point by attributing importance to the impact of attitudes of 
political leaders on the consolidation process and the stability of new democracies. 
Building on earlier works of Dahl and Rustow, Higley and Burton (1988) argue that 
critical measures of analysis in evaluating the stability of democratic regimes are 
consensus among political elites and their support for democratic institutions and 
values. They agree with Rustow, stipulating that the support of key political elites is 
                                                
77 I shall give attention to this point in the three case studies and the concluding chapter, especially on 
how compliant outcome has led to the strengthening or on-going reformation of some key institutions 
in the cases studies. 
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necessary to create, fashion, or sustain a democratic process.78 Leftwitch also concurs 
with Rustow, underscoring the indispensability of political leaders in the fashioning 
and maintenance of the democratization process. 
For Leftwitch, the implementation of a democratic system hinges on the 
conscious decisions of "a small circle of leaders" that can be relied upon to carry the 
burden of democratic survival. Emphasizing the role of political elites, Linz (1978) 
models his argument on Rustow and assigns a prominent role to political elites in the 
democratic process. This role not only contributes to stabilization of the process, but 
also to the carrying and sharing of the burden of a democratic collapse.  
The classic work of Rustow initiated a discussion in 1970 on the role of 
political elites in the democratization process. However, since the elite variable did 
not exert pressures on the stable Western democracies examined by scholars like 
Lijphart (1999) and Spinner (2007), the elite approach has received minimal attention 
in democratization studies. Thus, institutionalists and students of democratization 
processes seem to disregard the significant role of the political-elite factor in studying 
non-Western democracies. This academic neglect of the elite role in democracy, 
especially in enforcing term limits in new democracies underestimates the impact that 
elite political values, behavior, and attitudes may have in strengthening democracies. 
                                                
78 Leftwitch concurs with Rustow in the indispensability of political leaders in fashioning and 
sustaining the democratization process. 
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Such a role has become more important in enforcing term limits compliance in new 
democracies. 
3.2  Institutional Approach 
The institutional approach holds that formal and efficient institutions facilitate 
the emergence of consolidated democracies and suffice to enforce presidential term 
limits compliance. It stresses that through formal and efficient political and 
democratic institutions, it is possible to disperse power in order to create multiple 
veto players and actors in a decision-making process with the necessary checks and 
balances. By creating multiple veto players and limiting the power of incumbent and 
central governments, democracy consolidates in emerging and divided societies 
(Lijphart 1999, Mainwaring 2001). Drawing on Weber (1946) and Schumpeter 
(1947), Lipset (1959:71) approached democracy as "a political system, which 
supplies regular constitutional opportunity to change the governing officials.Ó Lipset 
emphasized democracy as Òa social mechanism for the resolution of the problem of 
societal decision-making among conflicting interests groups, which permits the 
largest possible part of the population to influence these decisions through their 
ability to choose among alternative contenders for political office" (ibid.).  
Stable democracies tend to function as Lipset describes above. However, the 
political elite approach claims that democratization requires more than well-designed 
formal institutions or the implementation of a proper constitution, particularly in 
nascent democracies. Without good operators, well-designed agencies and laws may 
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still yield an opportunity to entrench power as witnessed in some African states. With 
due respect to advanced industrialized democracies where institutions like the 
parliament and political parties have been tested, by accumulating experience and 
maturity for some hundreds of years, one cannot adequately make such a claim for 
institutions in the systematic study of democratic processes in Africa (Salih et al 
2007).  
  In reference to democratic institutions, it is important to note the extent to 
which they influence or guide the actions, choices, and behavior of political elites, 
and how in turn, the same actions, choices, and behavior impact on democratic 
institutions. Which play a more significant role in the protection of new democratic 
space and the enforcement of presidential term limits compliance, the institutions or 
the political elites?  
Institutionalists stress that institutions are more important for the enhancement 
of the democratic process. As mentioned above, the experience of stable democracies, 
where democratic institutions have existed for many years, substantiates this 
argument. In stable democracies, strong institutions have been the credible result of 
learning processes and adjustments. However, the argument may not hold for new 
democracies that established democratic institutions only a few months before 
transition elections. Moreover, as most transition constitutions were photocopies of 
constitutions from Western countries, they did not reflect real, local contingencies 
(Bradt 2011). Diamond (2015) and Levitsky (2015) argue further that the re-
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consolidation of power by some pseudo-democratic regimes was a result of the 
manipulation of weak institutions by some incumbent governments. This encouraged 
ambitious incumbent presidents to return their democracies to the autocratic status 
quo, confirming that institutions scarcely function without good operators.  
Institutions (political parties, parliament, the judiciary government branches, 
civil society, and the constitution) appear as independent variables in the politics of 
enforcing of term limits compliance (Posner and Young 2007; Dulani 2011; Maltz 
2007; Armstrong 2011; Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996). The 
levels of strength, autonomy, and will of democratic institutions determine the extent 
of pressure they can exert against presidential behavior and ambitions. Bratton and 
Van de Walle argue that the strengthening of institutions is an excellent remedy 
against the entrenchment of power. However, two points remain unclear: who has the 
role of strengthening institutions?  Do institutions come before democracy, or vice 
versa?   
Institutions are new in the majority of post-Cold War democracies. The 
existence of democratic institutions before the advent of multiparty democracy in 
some African countries before the 1990s remains uncertain. If they did not exist 
before this period, it is doubtful that these institutions would suddenly have gained 
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enough strength to influence executive behaviors that had existed for thirty years 
before the introduction of democracy79  
Democratic institutions differ, in this sense, from economic structures 
(Armstrong). We view democratic institutions as Ôagents,Õ reflecting Linz and 
StepanÕs five-part analyses of stable democracy as aggregated in political society, the 
bureaucracy, the rule of law, agency, and civil society. The extent to which these 
institutions have enforced presidential term limits compliance in post-Cold War 
democracies in Africa remains an on-going debate. Though I recognize that some 
institutions of democracy are new in Africa, quite a number have gone through a 
rapid improvement process since the 1990s. Even with this improvement, scholars 
disagree on their institutional impact in enforcing presidential term limits compliance. 
The inability to stop thirteen presidential term limits repeals or neglects implicate the 
institutional role and obviously deflect the pro-institutional argument in protecting 
term limits in Africa.  
Autonomous and active institutions allegedly account for the evolvement of 
the democratic process in stable democracies (Morrow 2005). To be autonomous 
however, institutions must have boundaries, which require the acknowledgement and 
respect of other relevant agencies and actors in the democratic process. For 
                                                
79 Some like Cameroon, Gabon, Togo, Uganda, and Burkina Faso had long reigning, authoritarian, 
one-party regimes. Moreover, the absence of parliaments and strong opposition parties created an 
imbalance only remedied by decisive pressure.  
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OÕDonnell (1998), these other actors must exist and be available to defend and 
redress such boundaries when transgressed. Many incumbent governments in new 
democracies steadily encroach beyond the political boundaries demarcated for and by 
institution.80 Many of them consciously choose not to strengthen the institutions that 
are likely to work against them, but rather work to diminish the powers of such 
institutions (OÕDonnell 1998). OÕDonnell argues that executive delegates tend to 
sidetrack some institutions with the strategies of Ôelimination co-optationÕ and the 
neutralization of institutions in order to maximize their powers. Political dissidence, 
resistance and activism is necessary to limit executive power, especially in the course 
of a power play that involves the invocation of some institutions like the courts, the 
parliaments, and the rule of law. New democracies cannot guarantee autonomous and 
strong institutions without the interactive intervention of political elites (Leftwich 
2010).  
Since democratic experience in some post-Cold War democracies is yet at the 
transition level, institutional frameworks alone may not sufficiently and 
independently guarantee presidential term limits compliance. The active role of 
particular political actors to demand compliance is necessary in challenging non-
compliance. The pro-institutional argument might prove itself invalid if the 
                                                
80 Many authors have discussed the ability of the executive to pressure to influence party decisions and 
judicial and parliamentary outcomes in some new democracies, diluting and sometimes erasing the 
principle of democratic division of power in some new democracies. 
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institutions in question function in new democracies as they function in stable 
Western democracies. Not only that most democratic institution is weak in new 
democracies, many incumbent presidents prefer to operate strong informal 
institutions to the detriment of formal democratic institutions (Collier 1999, 2005; 
Iwu 2007, 2008; Villalon 2005). These informal institutions function to undermine 
democratic institutions for vested interests (Chabal and Daloz; Calderisi 2006; Bayart 
1992; Ayitey 2006; Collier 2005; Calderisi 2006; Diamond 2015). The agential push 
of political actors in the form of political activism and resistance to demand 
compliance and constitutionalism not only challenges institutional efficacy, but 
become necessary in strengthening hitherto dormant institutional capacities in post-
Cold War African democracies.  
Institutions in new democracies function also as platforms and protective 
mechanisms for dissenting elites (Villalon 2005). While regime internals weaken and 
manipulate democratic institutions to consolidate and retain state power, political 
dissenters create a way of linking with the same institutions for protection. Thus, 
institutions are likely and able to come into action through elitesÕ agential push and 
activism (OÕDonnell 1998). The agential role of political elites becomes essential in 
the assignment of a role to otherwise dormant institutions. Incumbent presidents, 
therefore, experience political embarrassment when elite dissidents use the weakened 
system to challenge non-compliance. Since most institutions seem to operate as 
extensions of the presidency in new democracies, incumbents are even more 
humiliated when the vulnerable institutions link with elite dissidents and offer them 
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protection from incumbent decisions. In this regard, particular political elites engage 
institutions in political action.   
The pressures generated from the interaction between political elite dissidents 
and different institutions may combine to embarrass incumbent presidents and their 
calculations, and therefor increase the costs of repression for such regimes (Mesquita 
and Smith 2010; Armstrong 2010). In this sense, the interaction between specific 
political elites and different institutions may directly pressure an incumbentÕs 
president to yield to partial or full compliance.81 Thus, institutions do not function or 
act in isolation of political agents (Leftwich 2010), represented here in elite resistance 
and activism, especially in African democracies.  
For institutional pressure to occur as suggested for new African democracies, 
a particular institution has to be independent while members of that particular 
institution, representing its agency must be willing to act without external influence. 
Since most post-Cold War African democratic institutions unfortunately fall under 
the firm control of incumbent presidents, it is not likely that these institutions can act 
independently or without external influence. Diamond (2015) discusses the relapse of 
new democracies that benefitted from an authoritarian crisis after the Cold War, in 
                                                
81 Two cases confirm the argument. Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Arap Moi of Kenya decided to 
withdraw their intentions to go for third term when they discovered that some individual political elites 
within their ruling parties have perfected a strategy to block their attempts to amend their various 
constitutions tenure extension.  
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many of these democracies, incumbent presidents capitalized on the weak and 
dependent nature of democratic institutions to re-consolidate power and repeal 
presidential term limits. The rescue of institutions from the grip of incumbent 
presidents requires therefore a particular strand of dissidence and activism from 
political elites. When political elites challenge the institutions as political agents they 
inject the needed will and autonomy required to strengthen and position the particular 
institutions toward action.  
I will detail how elite activists linked with democratic institutions to mobilize 
and bundle pressures to enforce compliance. In 2001, the expelled MPs of the ruling 
party who did not support the third-term agenda of Frederick Chiluba pursued links 
with the court to boost their activism. The ruling party had ordered the vacation of 
their parliamentary seats after defecting from the ruling party. The decision of the 
MPs to approach the court to challenge the partyÕs decision to declare their legislative 
seats vacant introduced elite-institutional interaction in the Zambian case. The court 
granted them a hearing and nullified the ruling partyÕs decision to expel or vacate 
their parliamentary seats. Their court victory was a sort of protection, which boosted 
their motivation and activism to engage the parliament to further pressure president 
Chiluba into compliance in Zambia.  The same occurred in Malawi, which I will 
discuss in Chapter Six. These instances demonstrate that an institution does not apply 
political pressure in a vacuum.  An act influences an institution and results in a 
political reaction that can further yield other political outcomes. 
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Various African countries enacted ninety-eight constitutions between 1960 
and the end of Cold War in 1989.82 Seven of these constitutions contained provisions 
or clauses that stipulated presidential term limits. The period between 1990 and 2014 
saw the ratification of seventy-four new constitutional enactments and amendments in 
Africa.83 Fifty-two of these seventy-four new constitutions and modifications contain 
explicit clauses stipulating presidential term limits. Fourteen amendments made 
within this period have tampered with presidential term limits while five constitutions 
remain ambiguous over presidential term limits. 84  In fifty-nine constitutions 
containing presidential term limits specifications since 1957, fifty-two occurred after 
1990. In other words, ninety-two percent of constitutions that contain the presidential 
term limits provision in Africa occurred after 1990.  
In the same period, thirty-four countries have held national debates to 
consider repealing presidential term limits, with current debates still taking place in 
two countries. While five incumbent presidents have willingly conceded power after 
their second terms in compliance with presidential term limits requirements since 
1990, thirteen incumbent presidents have repealed or neglected term limits and 
                                                
82 I draw on various sources on African political development to create a database of constitutional 
enactments and amendments from the period of independence to the period of post-Cold War 
democratic movements in Africa, covering the period between 1957 and2014. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid.  
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refused power alternation. Only four attempts to abolish term limits have failed, with 
one incumbent president refusing to acknowledge defeat.  
The data suggests that institutions lack the capacity to exercise pressure to 
enforce presidential term limits compliance in post-Cold War African democracies. 
Institutional pressure in new democracies remains low without the activism of 
interaction with political elites. The successful defeats of the third-term amendment 
in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi were possible because elite political dissidents were 
determined to create an alternative platform for resistance.  The ability to link their 
political activism with institutional forces in order to mobilize pressures created the 
necessary legitimacy needed to demand and enforce term limits compliance.85  
Some scholars accurately recognize the lack of stability and reliability in 
institutions in terms of their influence on the behavior of African ambitious presidents 
(Chabal and Daloz 1998; OÕDonnell 1998; Armstrong 2010; Diamond 2015; Levitsky 
2015). The lack of elite resistance and activism appear to encourage some incumbent 
presidents to disrespect the protocol of presidential term limits. Political elite pressure 
appears to create the opportunity to counter-balance sitting presidents who nurse the 
ambition to manipulate the democratic process to consolidate power.86 As trends have 
                                                
85 I will elaborate more on this point in the case studies.   
86 The two cases of Kenya and Ghana earlier referenced in this study confirms the effectiveness of 




shown, democratic institutions have not sufficiently applied the needed pressure to 
constrain tenure elongation bids of incumbent presidents in African. At best, political 
and democratic institutions have only provided platforms for political agents to either 
consolidate power or launch counter-elite pressures (Villalon 2005).  
Linz and Stepan (1996) are therefore right to refer to institutions as ÒagentsÓ 
in the form of political society, the bureaucracy, the rule of law, and civil society. 
Vulnerable to manipulation, institutions in most post-Cold War African democracies 
serve as means, instruments, or stepping-stones to achieve a particular political end . 
Incumbent presidents often use democratic institutions like the parliament, judiciary, 
media, and civil society to achieve desired political goals (Villalon 2005; Posner and 
Young 2007; Armstrong 2010; Diamond 2015; Smith 1996). Elite political dissidents, 
operating on almost the same level with incumbents, use the same institutions to 
achieve alternative outcomes to enforce term limits compliance. 
 
Conclusion  
 In this chapter, I presented some political institutions as instruments of 
manipulation by political elites who Ôuse and co-optÕ the institutions as means and 
tool to achieve desired outcomes. I emphasized political elite capacity in mobilizing 
other sectors into action to demand compliance. I argued that through political elite 
activism, dissidence, and resistance, alternative platforms are created to mobilizing 
other pressures to resist the removal of presidential term limits. 
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In the next three chapters, I shall examine how political resistance arising 
from some political elites became necessary in mobilizing institutional and extra-
institutional pressures to rupture party loyalty, splinter the ruling parties and alter 
parliamentary balance of power in the case studies. I shall examine how various 
sectors (political elites, parliament, judiciary, CSOs and the international community) 
reacted to the attempts by various presidents to repeal term limits in the case studies.  
The next chapter introduces Nigeria as the first case study for this research. It 





















Chapter 4: No Third Term, No Nigeria! (First Case Study) 
 
4 Introduction 
I seek to establish that the political activism of particular actors was 
responsible for the enforcement of term limits compliance on the Nigerian President 
Olusegun Obasanjo in 2006. ObasanjoÕs attempt to amend the constitution to extend 
his presidential term met stiff opposition among some political elites, especially in 
the ruling PeopleÕs Democratic Party (PDP). The dissenting political elites in PDP, 
led by the vice-president Atiku Abubakar and Governor Orji Kalu of Abia State, 
formed a broad coalition of internal party internals that mobilized other external party 
members and various institutional and non-institutional sectors like parliament, the 
media, civil society organizations, and the masses to raise the cost of repression for 
Obasanjo. With their dissidence and political resistance, particular political elites 
internally ruptured political cohesion within the ruling party. They decimated 
ObasanjoÕs executive loyalty, created an alternative political platform for activism, 
and used the parliament as a center for opposition to apply pressure on President 
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Obasanjo. This coalition of elite political activists pressured and prevented Obasanjo 
from consolidating power in 2006, forcing him to retire.  
After seven years of democratic experiment, democracy in Nigeria was at the 
crossroads because of the presidential term limits amendment bill. 87  Both the 
technical and substantial 88  consolidation of Nigerian democracy was subject to 
immense pressure: NigeriaÕs nascent democracy stood on the brink of a successful 
repeal of presidential term limits and SchedlerÕs slow democratic death. President 
ObasanjoÕs campaign for a one-party system, and his dismissal of the multiparty 
system as disloyal and undisciplined, foreshadowed a regression toward life 
presidency and a one-party system. The defeat of ObasanjoÕs constitutional 
                                                
87 Most academic and newspaper reports described the Nigerian democratic experience as extension of 
military rule, lacking real democratic credentials. There was a general longing of Ôreal democracyÕ 
with respect for the rule of law and devolution of power. The constant request from the public for a 
National Conference confirmed this feeling. Professor Maurice Iwu, the Chairman of the Nigerian 
Independent Electoral Commission, confirmed in an interview with the author that by 2006, the 
Nigerian public had lost hope in the Nigerian democracy because it failed to yield sufficient 
democracy dividends. 
88 Technical democracy fulfills some outward democratic forms and attributes such as elections with 
parliamentary and judicial arms, yet lacks the needed separation of powers, freedom of expression, 




amendment bill was necessary to avoid slow democratic death by allowing a 
multiparty system to thrive in Nigeria.  
Secondly, the enforcement of term limits on Obasanjo made an open-seat 
contest possible in 2007 and enabled Nigeria to experience the unprecedented transfer 
of power from one elected regime to another elected regime, a feat never achieved in 
Nigeria since her independence in 1960. The enforcement of compliance on Obasanjo 
in 2006 further enabled Nigeria to qualify for BeethamÕs two-election test and 
HuntingtonÕs two election-turnovers, necessary for the qualification of new 
democracies as consolidating. Nigeria has subsequently held three elections since 
2006, with power alternating at intra and extra party within this period. The open-seat 
contest, power and party alternations that Nigeria experienced would have appeared 
difficult without pro-tempore presidency. 
Some indigenous writers have described political elites as the cause of 
NigeriaÕs problems and the bane of NigeriaÕs political woes and democratic failure 
(Mahmudat 2009; Agboola 2008). These woes include the manipulation of ethnicity 
as a tool to advance parochial and sectional interests of the dominant ruling class 
(Iwu 2008, 2009; Campbell 2011). For these authors, political incompetency among 
some political elites has resulted in the crisis of legitimacy and a governance deficit, 
hampering good governance and national integration (Campbell 2011). The 
enforcement of term limit compliance on President Olusegun Obasanjo by a 
contending faction of political elites shifted the technical democracy towards a 
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substance democracy and challenged the position of theorists that deride the political 
elite role in democratization.  
This recovery of democratic space from autocratic control reveals that 
political elite activism can have positive impact on the process of democratic 
consolidation. The Nigerian democratic experience was on the verge of SchedlerÕs 
democratic reversal and slow democratic death. It was also veering toward RaknerÕs 
hybrid democracy. Had Obasanjo been successful in amending NigeriaÕs constitution 
to repeal presidential term limits, these situations would have confronted Nigeria, as 
they did in many other African countries. The political elite recovery of the political 
and democratic space from the grip of an incumbent president reveals that political 
elite activism can have a positive impact on the process of democratic consolidation. I 
will examine the role particular political actors played in enforcing term limits 
compliance on President Obasanjo in Nigeria in 2006.  
 
4.1 Background 
Since December 1983, when a military coup led by Mohammed Buhari foiled 
NigeriaÕs second democratic republic, Nigeria struggled to return to a functional 
democracy with regular elections, power alternation, diffusion of power, and rule of 
law. Nigeria missed a good opportunity in June 1992 when it experienced its most 
organized, free, and popular election (1992 Presidential Election Report; Collier 
2009; Iwu 2008; Usman 2012). Unfortunately, the military regime led by Ibrahim 
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Babangida annulled the 1992 elections and forced Moshood Abiola into a short exile, 
the candidate most Nigerians saw as the winner of the presidential election.  
The joint struggle to reclaim Abiola's mandate from the military, and to return 
Nigeria to democratic rule created many political pressure groups led by notable 
political elites. The likes of former presidents, Alex Ekwueme, Shehu Musa YÕardua, 
and Atiku Abubakar, as well as political activists Gani Fawemi, Ben Nwabueze, 
Wole Soyinka, and Femi Falana), joined forces to create resistance platforms against 
the military. The struggle led to the formation of political associations like the 
National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) led by the former speaker of the national 
Assembly, Anthony Enahoro, and PeoplesÕ Democratic Mandate (PDM) led by 
Shehu Musa YÕardua. These formed themselves into elite activists and pressured 
Babangida into Òstepping asideÓ89 in July 1992. A National Interim Government 
(NIG) put together by Babangida lasted only four months when General Sani Abacha 
overthrew the NIG led by Ernest Shonekan in November 1992 in a palace coup.  
The overthrow of the NIG by General Abacha intensified the struggle and 
activism of NADECO and PDM, who requested General Abacha to quicken the 
process of returning Nigeria to democratic rule.90 In 1995, Abacha yielded to the 
political pressure from the political elites and accepted to return the country to 
                                                
89 This took place after the nation-wide industrial action which paralyzed Nigeria after the annulment  
90 NADECO issued a communiqu and gave a press conference on September 23, 1994 requesting the 
military regime to make a transition program and choose a hand-over date. 
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democratic rule by calling for a constitutional conference. However, he did not hide 
his intent to evolve into a civilian president, an effort resisted by leading political 
elites, like Musa YÕardua, and PDM members, who included Atiku Abubakar. The 
opposition elites outsmarted Abacha by using AbachaÕs constitutional conference in 
1995 to produce a timetable for transition that gave the military a transition dateline.91 
Embarrassed, Abacha became hostile to the opposition elites by clamping down on 
and arresting many, including Shehu Musa YÕardua and Olusegun Obasanjo. Others, 
like Atiku Abubakar, Lt-Gen. David Mark, and Lt. Gen. Abdulkarim Adisa went into 
self-imposed exile.  
Having intimidated the leading political elites into compliance, Abacha set out 
to transform himself into an elected president by coercing the five registered political 
parties to adopt him as their presidential candidate. In May 1996, Daniel Kanu 
organized a ÒOne Million Man MarchÓ in support of AbachaÕs metamorphosis into 
civilian president. Surprisingly, Abacha even coerced many notable political elites 
into participating in the pro-Abacha rally.92 However, Gen. Abacha's death on June 
                                                
91 Atiku Abubukar gave a personal interview in the Sun newspaper of Sunday, September 22 2013. In 
it, hegave a detailed expos of his own exile and the arrest and death of Shehu Musa YÕardua. The 
latter was leader of PDM, persecuted for masterminding and influencing the drawing of a Transition 
Time Table for Gen. Abacha at the National Constitutional Conference in 1995. 
92 The aim of coercing prominent political actors into participation in the rally was to lend the 
appearance of credibility to AbachaÕs interests in becoming NigeriaÕs next elected president.  
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12, 1998 after ruling Nigeria with iron fist for five years presented Nigeria with 
another opportunity at democratization. The death of Abiola in prison on July 10, 
1998, followed quickly. The passing on of both men opened a window of opportunity 
for Nigeria to democratize. In June 1998, General Abdulsami Abubakar inherited a 
disgruntled and irritated Nigerian society that yearned for democratic rule. Gen. 
Abdulsami ruled Nigeria for eight months, during which he lifted all bans on political 
activities in the country. The release of the transition timetable followed quickly to 
sustain the general demand for democratization. As the formation and merger of 
political associations occurred, electoral activities gradually took place with three 
leading political parties in Nigeria: PeopleÕs Democratic Party (PDP), All PeoplesÕ 
Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy (AD). 
The multiparty elections of February 1999 put Nigeria back on the list of post-
Cold War democratizing African nations. The transition elections equally raised 
NigeriaÕs democratic profile from Ônot freeÕ before 1999, to Ôpartly freeÕ in 1999 
(Freedom House 1999). The biggest party at the time, PDP adopted General 
Olusegun Obasanjo as presidential candidate. After winning the presidential election, 
he was inaugurated on June 29, 1999 as the first post-Cold War democratic president 
of Nigeria. This occurred twenty years after he organized and supervised a transition 
election that returned Nigeria to democracy in 1979 as a Military Head of State.  
Obasanjo was in detention during the transition activities that produced 
NigeriaÕs fourth republic. Though he did not take part in the negotiations for the 
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formation of PDP, the party adopted Obasanjo as a presidential candidate because the 
political elites had zoned the presidency to the South West.93  In addition, the 
incumbent military regime sought to relinquish power quickly to someone capable of 
stabilizing the polity and building political bridges across the nation. Many believed 
that Obasanjo had such qualities as a former head of state and an African elder 
statesman.  
According to Ibrahim (2006), General Obasanjo had three significant 
strengths in his curriculum vitae. Firstly, his war record demonstrated his nationalist 
credentials. Secondly, Obasanjor's Òtransfer of power to the elected Shehu Shagari 
regime in 1979 portrayed his capacity to bow to democratic demands for a Second 
Republic in NigeriaÓ (ibid.). Thirdly, Obasanjo demonstrated engagement in civil 
society through the Africa Leadership Forum, Transparency International and his 
Òtrack record of democratic struggle and commitment to combat corruption,Ó by 
promoting good governance. As some analysts observed, ObasanjoÕs rich background 
may have convinced Nigerians to believe that this President would not be like the 
other military leaders who tried to manipulate the country to perpetuate their self-rule 
and loot the treasury (Ibrahim 2006). Obasanjo carried himself as a democrat and 
placated a section of Nigeria who felt short-changed by the annulment of the 1993 
                                                
93 The PDP created an internal arrangement of rotational presidency and zoned the presidency to the 
south. The choice of Obasanjo, a Yoruba from the southwest, placated the Yoruba people after the 
annulment of the election won by the Yoruba, Abiola, on June 12, 1992. 
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presidential election. As a military leader, he enjoyed the greatest capacity to restrict 
the military from encroaching into politics (Usman 2012). According to Ibrahim, 
"General Obasanjo came to power in 1999 in a groundswell of optimism that 
Nigerian leaders had allegedly learned their lessons and would honor the desire of the 
Nigerian people to the respect of the rule of law, democracy, and federalism" (ibid). 
To the contrary, Obasanjo began early in his regime to entrench power by 
disregarding and disrespecting the principle of separation of powers as enshrined in 
the Nigerian Constitution of 1999. He imposed Evans Enwerem as Senate President 
in 1999 against the choice of the Senate and his party (Adejumobi 2011).94 Even 
when the senate impeached Enwerem and replaced him with Chuba Okadigbo, 
Obasanjo viewed the impeachment as an affront and masterminded the removal of 
Okadigbo in January 2001.95 Okadigbo became the first high profile political actor to 
defect from the ruling party to join an opposition party in 2002.96 In 2003, Obasanjo 
                                                
94 Many leading news agencies, including Pointblank News, including some members of the Senate, 
exposed ObasanjoÕs unilateral imposition of Evan Enweren on the Senate. Refer also to ÒHow Shagari 
saved Obasanjo from impeachment Ð Abaribe, Todyay, August 24, 2015. 
95 The Nigerian Senate President Chuba Okadigbo became the first casualty of ObasanjoÕs effort to 
conquer the Senate. Before he left in 2007 as the transition president, Obasanjo had single-handedly 
caused the removal of four Senate presidents whom he accused of being disloyal to him. 
96 Chuba described Obasanjo in his defection speech as highhanded and undemocratic, warning that 
Obasanjo would seek to destroy the Nigerian nascent democracy in his effort to entrench power. 
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was due for re-election. Because his sponsors were beginning to doubt his loyalty and 
sincerity, many state governors began to resist his re-election bid, making it difficult 
for him to secure the party ticket.  Orji Uzor Kalu, the governor of Abia State, had 
raised objections to ObasanjoÕs re-election bid. He predicted that Obasanjo would 
seek a third term if allowed to go for a second term.97 The majority of state governors 
had lost faith in ObasanjoÕs government and had approached the vice-president to 
contest the 2003 party primaries against Obasanjo, promising him their support.98 The 
vice-president turned down this request and insisted on the rotational presidency as 
adopted by the ruling party.   
In hindsight, Obasanjo already nursed a third-term ambition even before the 
end of his first term in office. One year into his second term, his loyalists erected 
campaign offices for a third term. Obasanjo denied this repeatedly, openly declaring 
that he would respect the two-term mandate as stipulated by the constitution (El Rufai 
2012). He frequently claimed in a joking manner that his chickens were missing him 
in his Otta farms. By May 2004, the third-term rumors and campaign had grown 
                                                
97 In an interview with the author, Orji gave reasons why he opposed ObasanjoÕs re-emergence as PDP 
presidential candidate. Orji felt Obasanjo secretly nursed serious ambitions to entrench power. He also 
felt Obasanjo was going to misuse such powers as a former military man. 
98 In an interview with the author, Orji Kalu mentioned about seventeen governors who had grown 
weary with the way Obasanjo ran the affairs of the PDP government. ObasanjoÕs blatant passion for 
power further irritated these state governors, who unanimously agreed to nominate and support the 
vice-president as presidential candidate of the ruling PDP during the partyÕs convention in 2003. 
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stronger as third-term loyalists began to mobilize funds for the third-term project. 
There were strategic replacements in the cabinet and within the ruling party, 
ostensibly to ease off political actors unsympathetic to the third-term agenda like the 
party chair, the senate president, and the defense and finance ministries. However, 
with OrjiÕs exposure in 2003 of ObasanjoÕs intention, political actors became closely 
watchful of ObasanjoÕs moves. In June 2004, the vice president and five state 
governors publicized and confirmed the rumor in separate press conferences by 
declaring their opposition to any attempt to change the constitution in favor of third 
term for president Obasanjo. This raised further public dissent against the third 
term.99 
  Between 1960 and 1999, Nigeria had experienced five failed democratic 
experiments. Though military adventurism was the main bane of NigeriaÕs 
democratic growth, political elites were equally culpable for the failure of previous 
democratic experiments (Dyson ed. 1998).100  Inexperience, power lust, political 
intolerance, ethnic bigotry, and the entrenchment of power by the ruling party and 
                                                
99 In an interview with the author, Atiku confirmed that out of frustration, he took the decision to 
expose ObasanjoÕs third term because the president had not been sincere to him. His efforts to ask the 
president if he nursed third term ambition failed, as the president remained closed on the third term 
issue. He went public in order to avoid confrontation with an issue of which he was ignorant.  
100 In almost all the interviews conducted by the author, respondents mentioned the inexperience of the 
political class and the electorate as the factor that robbed Nigeria of its first republic. This, with other 
minor factors, also explains NigeriaÕs failure to develop a democracy prior to 1999. 
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elites have colluded to erode democratic values, causing the deepening of democracy 
in Nigeria (ibid.). It is not surprising that some political elites, having been at the 
forefront of the struggle against former military regimes, would rally to oppose any 
tendency towards civilian dictatorship. They resisted ObasanjoÕs attempt to entrench 
power from the onset of his regime. He met the stiff opposition of party members 
when he attempted to capture the parliament, the Senate, and the House of 
Representatives, despite a clear parliamentary majority by his own party. After the 
successful unseating of three military dictators, political elites knew that ObasanjoÕs 
perceived invincibility was unsubstantiated.101  
ObasanjoÕs loyalists and legal experts knew that the actualizing of a third term 
would require constitutional amendments of the ruling PDP. 102  The Nigerian 
constitution would also require an amendment, since the 1999 Nigerian constitution 
adopted a two term of four years for all executive positions. In 2005, Obasanjo 
caused the national and state administrations of the ruling party to effect some 
changes in their personnel by replacing all officers opposed to the third term agenda 
                                                
101 Orji confirmed in an interview with the author that the political actors who piloted NigeriaÕs Fourth 
Republic were not ready to compromise NigeriaÕs democracy to any group, including the military. 
According to Orji, the political leaders were prepared to defend NigeriaÕs democracy (Ehime, 
December 2008). 
102 PDPÕs constitutions had already adopted presidential term limits of two terms of four years, and a 
further adoption of a formula for a rotational presidency. In order for Obasanjo to go for a third term, 
these two constitutions required amendments. 
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with his loyalists.  This move displaced the chair of the national party and twenty-
eight out of thirty-six state chairs in the ruling party. Directed by the president, the 
new national party chair embarked on a revalidation exercise of party membership. 
He tactically de-registered all prominent opposition elites, including the vice 
president and many state governors, from the ruling party. By displacing these 
opponents, it was not difficult for Obasanjo to scale the hurdles at the party level. 
In November 2005, the new party chair called a National Convention of the 
ruling party that adopted changed party rules to accommodate ObasanjoÕs third-term 
agenda. Obasanjo and his loyalists barred all internal dissidents from participating in 
the partyÕs National Convention, including the vice president, Governor Orji Kalu, 
and many other state governors and legislators. Several attempts to secure court 
injunctions to return to status quo by the opposition elites were unsuccessful.103  
Having crossed the hurdle at the party level ObasanjoÕs next task was to call a 
national conference to recommend any amendments to the Constitution of the Federal 
Republic to the National Assembly, as stipulated by the Constitution. The legislature 
could handle minor constitutional amendments without a national Conference, but 
any major changes in the constitution like that regarding Ôterm limitsÕ required a 
national conference to make a recommendation to the National Assembly.  
                                                
103 The court struck out the case brought to it against the party by the opposition elites and referred to 
the case as a family case. 
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Realizing the ominous task ahead, Obasanjo and his loyalists drafted the 
Deputy Senate President Ibrahim Mantu, an Obasanjo loyalist, to lead the 
Constitution Review Committee (CRC). 104  In January 2006, Obasanjo called a 
National Constitution Reform Conference (NCRC) with a self-made agenda from the 
CRC and handpicked delegates. Obasanjo was aware that leading political actors 
(now dissidents) were opposed to the third-term agenda and had avoided them in the 
composition of the delegates to the National Conference. Obasanjo had also 
sponsored the National Conference himself, fearing that the divided parliament would 
refuse to approve any funds for NCRC.  
The delegates for the NCRC were to meet for two weeks. They did not have 
much work to do than to confirm prepared amendments to the 1999 constitution with 
one hundred sixteen alterations. The most sensitive and controversial clause of the 
proposed amendment was to increase the tenure of the president and the state 
governors to a three-term of four years as opposed to a two-term of four years 
prescribed by the 1999 Constitution (Kwaja 2006). Under pressure from state 
governors, President Obasanjo allowed them to benefit from the tenure amendment. 
The amendments would allow both the president and the governors105, apart from 
                                                
104 The choice of the deputy senate president, a core loyalist of the president Obasanjo to chair the 
CRC was also to make the adoption of the recommendations easy at the parliament where Mantu was 
supposed to command much loyalty. 
105 The state governors wielded much power over the State Houses of Assembly and the national 
legislators from their states. Though he included the State Governors in amendment package, the 
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having already served two terms of four years each, to run for three more terms of 
four years. If the amendment passed, it would block major political positions in 
Nigeria until further notice. Resistance and opposition to the bill became critical, not 
only to 'offload' President Obasanjo, but also to leave political spaces open. 
With the exception of the conference chair and secretary, all other delegates to 
the NCRC were Obasanjo loyalists, strategically placed to give some credibility and 
legitimacy to the NCRC (Usman 2012). However, the opposition elites did not waste 
futile energy in putting pressure on the conference delegates to reject the third-term 
agenda. Instead, the opposition elites brought the pressure and lobby to the two 
legislative houses that had the power to reject or approve the amendments. The 
approved recommended changes by the National Conference would have to go 
through to the National Assembly for ratification. Ratification required a two-third 
majority of both houses of  National Assembly, as well as a two-third majority of the 
State Houses of Assembly.106 Though ObasanjoÕs PDP had a clear majority in the 
legislature and twenty-nine of the thirty-six State Houses of Assembly, the two-third 
                                                                                                                                      
majority of these governors already had grudges with president Obasanjo. ObasanjoÕs particular 
interest in including them as beneficiaries of the new amendment was to win their support for the 
amendment. Unfortunately, most of the governors did not trust the sincerity of president Obasanjo.  
106   Both the Senate and the House of Representatives would need two-thirds of their members to 
agree on the amendment bill.  Two-thirds of the twenty-three State Houses of Assembly of the thirty-
six states in Nigeria also had to agree to the changes. 
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majority required from all the involved components was going to be difficult to 
achieve without elite support.  
However, by the end of February 2006, the National Constitution Review 
Conference (NCRC) approved ObasanjoÕs one hundred and sixteen amendments, 
overseen by Deputy Senate President Ibrahim Mantu in its entirety. In April 2006, 
President Olusegun Obasanjo submitted the recommendation as a bill to the National 
Assembly seeking hundred and sixteen amendments to the Nigerian 1999 constitution 
(Kwaja 2006). After two years of protracted political and constitutional crises, and 
following, abuse of power, intimidation, financial lobbying, and political violence, 
the two parliaments threw out the bill in its entirety on May 16, 2006, refusing to 
debate the proposed amendments (Kwaja 2006).  The throwing out of the bill barely a 
week after its arrival shows the strength of elite dissidence and activism in 
influencing the outcome of the presidential term limits politics in Nigeria in 2006. 
Elite influence and the style adopted by both houses of Parliament ensured the death 
of the bill on its arrival at the parliament. 
Newspaper and interview reports show that the presidential term limits 
politics in Nigeria in 2006 was decisive, intricate, and extensive in human costs and 
material resources107 (Iwu 2008; 2009; Ozoh 2009). As shall be seen in the Zambian 
                                                
107  AuthorÕs interview with Professor Maurice Iwu, former chairman Independent Electoral 




case, Obasanjo used intimidation against perceived opponents and purged his cabinet 
and the ruling party of all potential opponents to the third-term project. Prior to the 
public manifestation of the third-term agenda, key political actors who opposed the 
plan at its inception at the party level were either intimidated out of the party, 
humiliated, or reduced to persona-non-grata in the party and government. Obasanjo 
extended his brutal purging to active and retired top military leaders,108 the vice 
president, and top leaders of the legislature. Senate President Adolphus Nwagbara 
and the chair of the ruling party, Audu Ogbe, lost their positions at the consultation 
level in 2005 for not showing enough support for the third-term agenda.109 Other 
political office holders were intimidated, as in the case of Governors Orji Kalu, 
Ahmed Tinubu, and Boni Haruna. ObasanjoÕs regime went on further against a court 
order to seize federal allocations that accrued to Lagos and Abia States for many 
years because their governors were at the forefront of resistance against him.110 Not 
                                                
108 Obasanjo approved the compulsory retirement of all military personnel that held a political office. 
Effectively, Obansanjo purged the military of potential challengers and experienced officers. 
109 A personal interview shows that Obasanjo had met separately with the Party Chair and the Senate 
President to seek support for his third-term dream. Both officers declined their support for the third-
term, reminding Obasanjo of a subsisting party memorandum of understanding that supports rotational 
presidency.  
110 Orji Kalu, Ahmed Tinubu, and Boni Haruna opposed the third term. The presidency unleashed the 
EFCC on them, an instigated political opposition in their various states. Federal allocations to their 
states experienced delay, occasionally coercing them into submission.  
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only did Obasanjo rebuff court injunctions to secure the federal allocations, he also 
ignored court injunctions secured by the vice president and other dissenting political 
elites to stop the National Constitutional Review Conference. 
Obasanjo utilized anti-corruption and state security agencies to intimidate key 
dissenting voices during the crisis. While key Obasanjo loyalists received funds to 
mobilize support among the populace. According to Chris Kwaja:  
While security forces have made it a priority to arrest those opposed to the 
Third Term Agenda, the rabid supporters of tenure extension for Obasanjo are 
having a field day. So far, the supporters have spent close to $3 million on 
their "Vote for Greatness, Vote for Tenure Extension" newspaper campaign 
on behalf of the PresidentÓ (2006). 
In the run-up to the constitutional amendment debates in National Assembly 
ObasanjoÕs loyalists used state agents to intimidate opponents both at the national and 
state levels. In the cities of Ibadan and Katsina, police assaulted and drove away 
opposition elites who attended the conference (Usman 2012). On the National level, 
for instance, the participation of all known third-term opponents in the National 
Conference (CRC) was barred. The president selected all delegates to the 
Constitution Review Committee from the pro-third-term group (Usman 2012).  
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The CRC refused to entertain any submissions coming from the elite 
dissenting groups, demonstrating a clear abuse of power.111 The Conference delegates 
argued that the conference would consider a proposed constitutional amendment 
coming from the NCRC without debate over other options. The delegates reserved 
further debates for National Assembly, hoping to secure an easy passage of the bill at 
the parliament. Thus, instead of dissipating energy at the CRC, the dissenting 
political elites shifted their resistance to the National Assembly, thereby turning the 
parliament into a platform for elite activism and resistance.112  
While some dissenting political elites described the composition of the NCRC 
as illegal, petitioning the courts to stop the proceedings, some civil society 
organizations demonstrated both in favor and against the proposed amendment.113 
The campaign against the third term and the intimidation of political insiders caused 
the fracturing of the ruling party and resulted in the formation of a broad coalition of 
                                                
111 Though the National Conference preparatory group visited the six geopolitical zones to seek 
intervention from the populace, the group considered little input. The executive had already prepared 
versions of the new constitution, which were smuggled into the National Conference. 
112  More than seventy percent of interviewed political elites acknowledged that the National 
Conference denied them any forum, since it was insulated and tele-guided. The best option for them 
was to mobilize at the national assembly, which offered the best possibilities to defeat the third term 
because of its neutrality. 




political elites against the third term. Unlike in Zambia, where intimidated party 
members immediately defected and formed the oppositional Forum for Democracy, 
the core opponents of third term in the Nigerian case refused to leave the party and 
fought internally until the third term was defeated.114  
By challenging ObasanjoÕs third-term agenda at the courts, the opposition 
elites tested the legitimacy and independence of the courts to deliver popular 
judgments (Armstrong 2010; Campbell 2011). For instance, between 2005 and May 
2006, the coalition of opposition elites inundated the courts with more than thirty 
cases bordering on constitutional interpretation and implication of ObasanjoÕs third 
term.115 Some have interpreted that the barrage of court cases was strategic, aimed at 
conjuring sympathy and sentiment for the dissenting elites and at seeking protection 
through the courts.116 Although Obasanjo had performed creditably on economic 
                                                
114 For instance, the vice president and twelve state governors, including thirty-two senators, defected 
after they confirmed the defeat of the third-term agenda. They coalesced with opponents from other 
parties and provided the necessary intelligence and funds to defeat the anti-third-term project.     
115 Newspaper reports and case files at the Federal High Court, the Appeal, and Supreme courts had 
court cases and proceedings that named Atiku, Orji, Dariye, Haruna, and Tinubu Nwagbara, as 
opposing Obasanjo, the PDP, or the Federal Government. 
116 A personal interview with Orji Uzor Kalu confirmed the role of the courts in providing protection to 
the opposition elites and arousing sympathy among the masses. 
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reforms and political stabilization during his first term,117 his third-term agenda had 
eroded these credits and pitched him against many former core supporters and 
loyalists. Unlike the Zambian case, which demonstrated a confluence of forces 
ranging from the elites to other small sources that pressured Chiluba to retirement, the 
Nigerian case shows an arrogant President that had no regard for exogenous, 
temporal, and institutional prohibitions. It took a strongly rooted elite resistance to 
pressure Obasanjo into term limits compliance.  
 
4.2   Pressures   
I begin this sub-topic with the hypothesis that pressures from the political elite 
represent the central variable shaping the term limits compliant outcome in Nigeria in 
2006. However, I will examine various pressures that converged and thus, contributed 
indirectly to the term limits compliance outcome in Nigeria. These include political 
elite, institutional, Civil Society and International pressures. I will analyze these 
pressures on their merit to consider the extent to which each particular pressure 
contributed to the compliance outcome in Nigeria.  
 
 
                                                
117 Obasanjo prided himself for assembling the best economic team and for presiding over an economy 
that grew at 6.5% per annum. This raised his profile locally and internationally. 
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4.2.1 Political Elite Pressure: Resistance and Activism  
Political resistance within the ruling party against ObasanjoÕs attempt to 
entrench power began during the transition period. The composition of the party and 
the prominence given to particular political actors who contributed immensely 
towards its formation provided an opportunity to balance the power of the president. 
For instance, heavy elite opposition within the ruling party confronted ObasanjoÕs 
second term re-election. In 2003, Governor Orji Kalu spearheaded the attempt to 
scuttle ObasanjoÕs re-emergence as PDPÕs presidential candidate for a second tenure. 
Orji Kalu conspired with twenty-four other state governors to move against the 
Obasanjo candidacy by convincing the vice president to withdraw his support for 
Obasanjo. 118 
Three reasons apparently motivated this factional group to ÔabandonÕ 
Obasanjo in 2003.119 Firstly, those who drafted Obasanjo into the presidential race in 
1999 (including Vice President Atiku Abubakar, Ibrahim Babainda, and Orji Kalu) 
had secured an understanding from Obasanjo that he would go for one term to 
stabilize the divided Nigerian polity, and then give way to younger politicians. 
                                                
118 AuthorÕs interview with Emeka Duru, former Director of Research and Planning of the ruling party 
(PDP). Abuja. November 2013 
119 In an interview with the author, Orji Kalu enumerated the various reasons why it became important 
to stop ObasanjoÕs second term bid. ObasanjoÕs attempt to amend the constitution only confirmed his 
anticipation that Obasanjo would pursue a second term against earlier agreement.  
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Secondly, ObasanjoÕs adoption in 1999 was to placate the southwestern Yoruba tribe 
for the annulment of 1992 presidential election allegedly won by a Yoruba, Moshood 
Abiola. ObasanjoÕs one term as a president would have healed the wounds inflicted 
on the YorubaÕs by that annulment. Thirdly, ObasanjoÕs apparent dictatorial and 
autocratic tendencies gave the impression that Obasanjo would not stop at second 
term if allowed to go on.120  
The factional group requested Vice President Atiku Abubakar to consider 
coming into the presidential race to replace Obasanjo. If Obasanjo would insist on 
running, the group planned to disgrace him at the party primaries by supporting the 
vice president. However, Atiku refused the request, insisting on the partyÕs 
constitution, which had rotated the presidency to the South for two terms.121 Vice 
President Atiku Abubakar insisted that if the governors did not want to support 
ObasanjoÕs candidacy, they should shop for another candidate from the South while 
retaining his position as vice president. It was not difficult for the governors to 
persuade a former vice president, Alex Ekwueme, whom they quickly drafted into the 
                                                
120 Cf. Orji KaluÕs interview with Ozioma Ubabuko, Punch Newspaper, Enugu, 11 March 2014.This 
reflected Orji KaluÕs particular fear, which he voiced in January 2003 at the PDPÕs presidential 
primaries. In an interview with the author, he maintained the following motivation behind his 
opposition to Obasanjo: Obasanjo was going to behave like other African life presidents.  
121 Atiku repeatedly alluded to his respect for the zoning formula as a democratic interest. He saw his 
rejection of the call to become a president in 2003 as a commitment to grow democracy in Nigeria and 
to respect the rules guiding democracy. 
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presidential context. With assurances from the governors, Alex Ekwueme became a 
strong candidate to compete for the presidential ticket of the ruling party.  
A nervous Obasanjo, lacking a political base, knew the danger ahead. It 
became apparent on the eve of the party's presidential primaries that victory would go 
to former vice president Alex Ekwueme. All the PDM governors who controlled 
about seventy-five percent of the delegates to the ruling partyÕs presidential primaries 
planned to vote against President Obasanjo in favor of Ekwueme. The only strategy 
open to Obasanjo was to approach the vice president and negotiate with him, which 
he did.122 The negotiation between the two probably influenced the intervention of 
the vice president, which led to a change in decision by state governors to support 
President Obasanjo's second-term bid. Governor Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State who 
had raised initial doubts and fears about ObasanjoÕs sincerity on presidential term 
limits, refused to support ObasanjoÕs second term, despite the said reconciliation and 
negotiation.123 Prominent members of the ruling party maintained that the events 
                                                
122 In the company of the chair of the Board of Trustees, and the National Chair of the party, Obasanjo 
had approached Atiku and reached a negotiation with him. They agreed that if Atiku could convince 
the governors to support ObasanjoÕs emergence in his second-term bid, Obasanjo would assist Atiku to 
succeed him in 2007. 
123 The record of the presidential primaries of the ruling party in 2003 shows that Governors Orji Kalu 
and Joshua Dariye of Plateau States were the only governors who withdrew their support for Obasanjo 
in favor of Alex Ekwueme 
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surrounding the PDPÕs primaries of 2003 were politically strategic for both the vice 
president and Orji Kalu.124 
After his emergence as the presidential candidate of the ruling party and his 
eventual victory at the polls for a second term in office, however, Obasanjo quickly 
turned the table against prominent party members, including the vice president and 
his loyalists. After his re-election, Obasanjo moved to ÔconquerÕ the ruling party in 
order to establish his authority. He systematically withdrew the positions Atiku 
Abubakar had enjoyed as vice president and leader of the ruling party. Neither was 
Governor Orji Kalu exempt from the witch-hunt to punish both known and imaginary 
internal enemies in the ruling party. Obasanjo began consultations for his third-term 
bid as early as 2004, though he openly denied it. Once again, Governor Orji Kalu 
became the first to confront President Obasanjo directly on the third-term issue in a 
party executive meeting in August 2004. Orji asked Obasanjo to declare his intention 
on third-term rumors. Obasanjo again denied any third term dream and intention to 
amend the constitution (El Rufai 2012).  
However, the vice president did not make his stand on the third term issue 
known until May 2005, when it became clear that Obasanjo was sponsoring a motion 
                                                
124 In an interview with the author, Emeka Duru, former Director of Research and Planning of the 
ruling party and a delegate to the partyÕs presidential primaries in 2003, claimed that Orji and some 
governors carried out the moral coup against Obasanjo in order to re-establish their strength and 
indispensability within the party as political ÒgodfathersÓ (October 2013). 
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to repeal term limits in Nigeria. While the position of the vice president remained 
silent, Obasanjo enjoyed a free political ride in the ruling party. From interview 
reports, the position of the vice president within the struggle was to become most 
significant.125 AtikuÕs open declaration in May 2005 against ObasanjoÕs third term 
provided the platform for other political actors to place pressure on the president. As 
Emeka Duru indicated in an interview with the author, ÒMany state governors and 
legislators rallied round the vice president and together with him, it became easy to 
mobilize funds, the civil society, the media, and a section of the masses against 
ObasanjoÕs third term.Ó126  
Most political actors and the masses seemed to trust the vice president more 
than they trusted President Obasanjo. Because the third-term bill was also not on 
ruling partyÕs agenda the presidentÕs popularity also declined among his party 
members.  President Obasanjo probably knew that as most office holders were loyal 
to the vice president, the third-term project would not garner much support. The 
Senate president and the speaker of the House of Representatives were supporters of 
                                                
125 AuthorÕs interviews with Professors Toyin Falola, Oyejishile, and Dr. Frank Ozoh confirmed this 
position differently. The former U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell confirms that AtikuÕs 
involvement and his position against the third term agenda became a rallying point for the political 
elites and other stakeholders to galvanize more support against the third term (Campbell 2011). 
126 AuthorÕs interview with Emeka Duru, former Director of Research and Planning for the ruling party 
in Abuja, October 2013. 
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the vice president and indicated less interest in the tenure elongation project.127 It also 
appeared that the majority of the governors were averse to the third term, having 
immediately supported the vice president.128  
The replacement of Audo Ogbe, a major supporter and ally of the vice 
president as the chair of the ruling party, with Ahmadu Ali, ObasanjoÕs former 
colleague in the military, was strategic. The refurbished ruling party was to fulfill 
Obasanjo's bidding. Next, Obasanjo dismissed the Senate president Adolphus 
Nwagabara on corruption allegation charges (The Sun 14 April 2006). Though 
President Obasanjo was quick to influence the selection of his core loyalist, Ahmadu 
Ali, to replace Audu Ogbe as party Chair, it became difficult for him to act 
accordingly in the Senate. Senators loyal to the vice president blocked ObasanjoÕs 
move to install his loyalist as Senate president (Usman 2012).129 On May 29, 2005, 
the Nigerian Democracy Day, the vice president and twelve state governors issued 
separate and coordinated messages condemning and disassociating themselves from 
ObasanjoÕs plan to amend the constitution for his third-term dream (The Sun May 30, 
                                                
127 Ibid. 
128 Ibid. 
129 In an interview with the author, Adolph Nwagabara and Ken Nnamani, former senate presidents 
confirmed this position.   
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2005).  As some analysts noted, the vice president made this to raise a strong public 
opinion against ObasanjoÕs third term (Ibrahim 2006).130  
The position and involvement of Vice President Atiku Abubakar and 
Governor Orji Kalu against President ObasanjoÕs third term re-enforced elite activism 
and dissidence against ObasanjoÕs third term, further raising the cost of repression for 
the president. Ayo Makinde has described the challenge from the vice president as 
fearless and resolute for fighting the removal of presidential term limit:   
...the resolute decision of Vice President Atiku Abubakar to ally himself with 
the aspirations of Nigerians for a genuine democratic order that guarantees a 
level playing field and encourages due process gave the opponents of the 
obnoxious third-term agenda a shot in the arm.  At a time when there was 
anxiety about the crumbling spirit of the opposition; the historic decision of 
the Vice President to join the fray on the side of the people against despotic 
forces became a clear demonstration that he was not a coward. His loyalty to 
the President and sacrifices for the success of ObasanjoÕs regime, despite 
ingratitude and humiliation, was once mistaken for weakness, irresolution, 
and cowardice (2006).  
                                                
130 Though the masses did not initially engage directly in any activity or protest to express their 
disaffection against the third-term rumor, the vice president and the dissenting political elites 
capitalized on an ÔassumedÕ public opinion against the third term to launch multi-faceted campaign 
against Obasanjo and his third term. 
  
166 
The position of the vice president represented the interest of the marginalized 
majority of the population, as well as the wishes of the founding fathers of the ruling 
party to instigate a rotational presidency. The vice president created a platform for 
these groups by taking a decisive position against the amendment of the constitution 
to allow a third-term for Obasanjo.  
Dr. Frank Ozoh, a former director of the Nigerian Electoral Institute, insisted 
in an interview with the author that, ÒObasanjoÕs third term probably would have 
succeeded if the vice president had played along.Ó131 According to Ozoh, AtikuÕs 
popularity, his wealth, his antecedent as a pro-democracy activist, and his 
followership in the ruling party were great assets that Obasanjo needed to secure the 
constitution amendment.132  
For instance, while the government sponsored visits of the National Conference and 
Reform Committee (NCRC) to the six geo-political zones of Nigeria to canvas 
support for the constitutional amendment, the dissident political elites planned 
                                                
131 In the same in interview with the author, Dr. Frank Ozoh summarized his speech saying, ÒYou can 
write whatever you want, but Vice President Atiku Abubakar destroyed every chance of success for 
the amendment bill. He had strong loyalty in the ruling party, he had enormous financial resources, and 
he supplied and doubled the amount delivered to the MPs by the president.Õ  
132 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Frank Ozoh, former Director of the Nigerian Electoral Institute. Abuja. 
October 2013. Also confirmed in another interview with Professor Toyin Falola, Pilsen, Czech 
Republic. May 2014. 
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parallel visits to the thirty-six federating states to counter the move to amend the 
constitution for tenure extension. In each of these states, an anti-third term rally took 
place, aimed at sensitizing the masses and civil society against the Ôevil intentionÕ of 
third-term project (Makinde 2006; Usman 2012).133  
There was a strong opinion among the press that such rallies promoted and 
sustained anti-third term sentiments among the populace (Oladele 2006; Ojo 2013; 
Suka 2013). Newspaper reports show that between 2005 and May 2006, the vice 
president held more than one hundred separate meetings with the core anti-third term 
groups, which he founded and sponsored. Furthermore, the vice president utilized 
every available opportunity to cajole ObasanjoÕs attempt to change the constitution 
and invite every stakeholder to reject it. The vice president addressed private media 
institutions about thirty more times, granted forty-two interviews, addressed members 
of the National Assembly in twelve press conferences, and led about forty popular 
protests against the third-term amendment bill. In so doing, Atiku secured a 
comfortable place among major democratic stakeholders and forced third-term 
loyalists to adopt a defensive approach towards the amendment bill by painting 
President Obasanjo as a dictator.  
                                                
133 The greatest attack on the third term agenda was perhaps the ability of the opposition group led by 
the vice president to organize parallel rallies against the third term. The strategy to bring the rally to 
the grassroots level appeared successful by clearing the impression propagated by the state-controlled 
media that the third term would stimulate and stabilize the Nigerian democracy and economy. 
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For instance, in each of the meetings and press conferences where the vice 
president spoke, he boasted: ÓI and fellow democrats are out to kill and bury the third 
term agenda as we chased {sic} the military out of power.Õ134 Strategically, the 
meetings and press conferences produced results. Many NGOs, media outlets, the 
masses, and prominent political elites identified with AtikuÕs resistance.135 According 
to Makinde, ÒAtikuÕs resolve to participate in the meetings of anti-third term 
lawmakers and leading democratic voices across the country and worldwide, 
tremendously raised the spirit of those struggling to save our democracy from the 
lionÕs mouth of brazen dictatorship clothed in the cloak of democracyÓ (2006). 
AtikuÕs address to the media on January 17, 2006 demonstrated AtikuÕs resilience 
and resistance:   
The promise of democracy is not just fulfilled by keeping the military out of 
political governance; the promise of democracy requires protection of 
peopleÕs rights and freedom. A real democracy is one that promotes the 
wishes and aspirations of the people, one that promotes governing through 
                                                
134 In all his speeches against third term, the vice president invited his audience to reject and kill 
ObasanjoÕs third term and be on the right side of history. This gave rise to a popular slogan against 
third term: ÒKill third term and be on the right side of history!ÓÕ 
135 Professor Falola agrees that AtikuÕs appeal and closeness to the media and civil society became a 
major blow to the third-term dream of Obasanjo, not only by letting the cat out of the bag, but also by 
providing alternative information to the public on the third-term issue.  
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consensus and conciliation as opposed to ruling unilaterally and one that 
ensures that the will of the few cannot trample the majority. Protection of 
peopleÕs right to change their leaders or representatives remains an important 
pillar of democracy. A third-term bid is in direct contradiction to maintaining 
those values and those components of our democracy. We cannot rest until we 
defeat third term (Makinde 2006). 
When speaking to anti-third term MPs at the National Assembly in Abuja in March 
2006, the vice president recalled his interview with the newspaper This Day in 2005, 
in which he had hinted of a Òhidden third term agenda.Ó The vice president also 
recalled his persistent warning that the president was hijacking the ruling party to 
actualize his third-term agenda. Judging other countries with Nigeria, the vice 
president lamented Òcountries such as Ghana, Benin, Tanzania, Niger Republic, and 
Mali,Ó were Òstealing the spotlight from Nigeria in terms of genuine and credible 
democratic order, while the president of Nigeria was busy conquering his party to 
achieve his dream to become life president.Ó  
On April 12, 2006, Vice President Atiku Abubakar addressed anti-third term 
protesters at Yola International Airport Adamawa and boasted that he would fight to 
the last to ensure that democracy survived in Nigeria by not allowing the third-term 
agenda to pass through the National Assembly. The vice president argued at the same 
rally that if allowed to succeed, the removal of presidential term limits would 
implement the life presidency in Nigeria, which is contrary to democratic 
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consolidation and leadership alternation.  He insisted that Nigerians never bargained 
for lawlessness and a life president at the inception of the ObasanjoÕs administration. 
His choice of words and invitation to those who had labored for Nigerian democracy 
to join hands with him to rescue it from dictatorship drew not only retired elites, but 
also students and unemployed youth into the struggle against the repealing of term 
limits in Nigeria.  
At the same venue in Yola, Atiku said, ÒI appeal to Ôfellow compatriotsÕ and all those 
who stood firm against the military to come out again and defend our democracy. I 
appeal to the members of the National Assembly, especially those who seemed to be 
showing sympathy towards ObasanjoÕs scheming to impose life presidency in Nigeria 
to retrace their steps and join the Ôright side of history.ÕÓ AtikuÕs message kindled 
hope as many party members and government functionaries were afraid to 
demonstrate their opposition to the president but really did not believe in the third-
term project. According to Emeka Duru, many young politicians supported the vice 
president based on his and other governorsÕ claim that ObasanjoÕs third term could be 
defeated.136  
Defending his stance against the removal of presidential term limits, the vice 
president argued that, if allowed, the third term bill would further erode the little 
progress made in NigeriaÕs democracy at a time when many countries, both 
                                                




developed and developing, were attempting to internalize the permanent tenets of 
democracy (Makinde 2006).  
Furthermore, the vice presidentÕs tacit support for constitutionalism boosted 
the confidence of other dissenting elites in mobilizing an overwhelming opposition in 
the Senate to ÒkillÓ137 the amendment bill. The vice president was the first to cheer 
the apparent defeat of third-term agenda as soon as initial debates on the amendment 
bill commenced in the parliaments: ÒToday, we definitely know that the third-term 
agenda is dead. We have mobilized enough votes to kill the third term agenda and it 
is also a blessing for NigeriansÓ (Punch 5 May 2006).  
Governor of Abia State, Orji Kalu, declared the third agenda dead in the same venue, 
and challenged all democrats to stand up and Òbe counted.Ó Orji spoke with full 
assurance over the imminent defeat of ObasanjoÕs third term. He produced a 
photograph of senators who were allegedly  Òcollecting moneyÓ to vote in favor of 
the third term, declaring that he would soon prove that the president had bribed them 
with Fifty Million Naira (US$350.000). 138 All the speakers at the rally boasted of 
                                                
137 The anti-third term elite dissidents and the media regularly employed the word ÒkillÓ to emphasize 
the defeat of the third-term amendment bill. 
138 In an interview with the author, Emeka Duru revealed that the threat by Orji Kalu to expose the 
bribery incident within the parliament was strategic because the threat to reveal the identity of senators 
who received money to back the third term may have put pressure on many legislators to withdraw 
their support for the amendment bill 
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their intent to kill the term third-term agenda in the parliament. They expressed shock 
that an elected president would insist on staying in office in defiance of the 
constitution. Gambo Jimeta, a former Senate leader, said,  
We must defeat the third term and can begin to celebrate because we have 
acquired the required number to defeat dictatorship through the National Assembly. 
A situation where the president is prepared to set apart brazenly all the rules of the 
land in order to elongate his tenure is not acceptable. We must send him packing. And 
now that we are sure that we have defeated third term agenda, all democrats must 
stand up and be counted (ibid.). 
The vice presidentÕs public rejection of Obasanjo's third term also influenced 
and motivated various sectors to take a firm position against the amendment bill. 
Consequently, the number of MPs disposed to the amendment bill decreased daily, 
while both Atiku and Kalu continued to pressurize particular MPs against the bill.139 
Since the presidency had strategically avoided the involvement of the masses by 
ruling out any possibility for a referendum, the parliament became the decisive 
destination of the political battle. As I will explain later, a fierce battle took place for 
                                                
139 Several senators interviewed for the purpose of this study confirmed that initially, the number of 
MPs willing to allow the passage of the third-term bill were in the majority, a factor that probably 
boosted ObasanjoÕs confidence to submit the amendment bill to the parliament. I shall elaborate further 
on this point when I discuss the pressures that stemmed from the parliament, the judiciary, political 
parties, and civil society.  
  
173 
the soul of the parliament. The president and his loyalists were on one side, while the 
vice president and his loyalists were on the other.  
Popularity, political experience, loyalty, connection, and the size of slush cash 
(for lobbying) were decisive factors in the outcome of the amendment bill in the 
parliament. Political entreaties from both sides turned the parliament into a platform 
for lobby and resistance. The vice president and his loyalists saw the parliament as 
the terminus ad quem of the amendment bill. They intended to  Òmarshal outÓ every 
means to ÒkillÓ the third term in the parliament, including making use of 
Òundemocratic means.Ó After failing to stop Obasanjo at the party and National 
Conference levels, elite political activists shifted to the National Assembly for 
lobbying. As mentioned already, the vice president addressed the Parliament about 
the need to reject the third-term bill on twelve different occasions. Governors Orji 
Kalu, Boni Haruna, and several other governors opposed to the third-term bill also 
scheduled and sponsored several meetings with parliamentarians from their federating 
states with the aim of convincing them to reject the third term bill.140 The vice 
president and Governors Orji Kalu and Boni Haruna personally lobbied and 
                                                
140 In an interview with Orji Uzo Kalu of Abia State, Orji confirmed that the anti-third term governors 
agreed in a meeting to work around the clock in order to convince members of the National Assembly 
from their various states to reject ObasanjoÕs third term.  
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convinced some MPs from various political parties to reject the third-term 
amendment bill.141 
As I will discuss later in this chapter, elite activism to protect term limits in 
Nigeria influenced and pressured the judiciary into action. The duo of Atiku 
Abubakar and Orji Kalu challenged the credibility of the courts with thirty-six court 
cases. Furthermore, prominent party members ignored during the National 
Convention of the ruling party in 2005 challenged the legality, composition, and 
outcome of the convention in several courts, appealing it to the Supreme Court.  
Initially, the courts appeared restrained to entertain the cases, describing them 
as a party affair. However, the vice president and some state governors placed 
pressure on the courts, and five separate mass protests against the judiciary followed 
in 2005 and 2006. This pressure and the mass protests forced the courts to entertain 
and deliver judgments on most of the pending court cases, the outcome of which was 
often in favor of the dissidents.  
An example of one case challenged the legality of the National Constitution 
Review Conference (NCRC), convened to back the third-term amendment bill. Elite 
pressure on the courts radically forced the courts to deliver an independent judgement 
against the NCRC, referring to its process and composition as Òunconstitutional.Ó142 
                                                
141 Author's interviews with some individual political elites, civil society, and media personnel 
disclosed the influence of the leadership and personal lobby of the vice president and state governors. 
142 Refer to the presentation of Ibrahim Gambari, ÒThe Challenges of Nations Building: the Case of NigeriaÓ 
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The vice president and other dissenting elites had already petitioned the courts to 
challenge the legality, the process, and the composition of the conference to render it 
invalid. Though President Obasanjo pressed on to conduct the NCRC without 
respecting the court injunctions, the anti-third term elites were emboldened by the 
apparent support coming from the judiciary.143   
Several other leading political elites worked hard from behind the scenes to 
kill the third-term amendment bill in Nigeria. For instance, former presidents Ibrahim 
Babaginda and Muhammadu Buhari used their extensive connections, political 
loyalties, and wealth to influence the outcome of the bill (Campbell 2011). The 
Senate president at the time, Ken Nnamani, provided particularly fertile ground for 
dissenting elites to operate unhindered within the Senate, though they generated the 
impression of working on a level playing ground and in parliament neutrality (Usman 
2012; Campbell 2011). Although the senate president repeatedly claimed neutrality, 
his colleagues and analysts claim that his closeness to the vice president influenced 
the senate leadership decision to adopt legislative strategies that favored ÔdissidentÕ 
political actors during the amendment bill debates. As a member of the ruling party 
and the third in the hierarchy of government, the Senate president was keenly aware 
                                                                                                                                      
delivered on February 7, 2008. 
 
143 I shall elaborate on the issue of judicial projection in the section on judicial mobilization and pressures. 
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of ObasanjoÕs determination to see the amendment bill passed.144 During the debate, 
Nnamani was instrumental in protecting the MPs from presidential intimidation. This 
enabled their sense of freedom and individual discretion during the amendment 
debate.  
In response to the efforts of the vice president, some prominent cabinet 
members of the ruling party silently worked against the third-term bill, apparently 
recognizing the hopelessness of ObasanjoÕs misadventure. Former ministers Liyel 
Imoke and El-Rufai withdrew their confidence in the third-term and chose to work 
against the bill, while outwardly feigning sympathy to Obasanjo.145 Political defiance 
and pressure from the vice president and his loyalists surprised the PDP hierarchy, 
presidency, and Obasanjo himself when they matched ObasanjoÕs onslaught with 
equal resistance. On May 14, 2006, two days prior to the defeat of the third-term bill, 
the vice president challenged ObasanjoÕs invincibility and the success of the third 
term bill in a pre-emptive victory speech, saying: ÒWhen I start speaking, you will 
know more." 
                                                
144 He confirmed that Obasanjo informed him about the agenda shortly after he became the Senate 
president: ÒImmediately, I became Senate President, he told me of his intentions and told me how he 
wanted to achieve it. I did not initially take him serious until event began to unfold.Ó 
145 El Rufai has given an account of how he worked secretly against the third term by working closely 




Like Orji Kalu and other founding fathers of the ruling party, the vice 
president apologized for his part in the negotiations that installed Obasanjo in 1999 
and 2003. While acknowledging this error, which Obasanjo himself confirmed 
through his intended violation of the Nigerian constitution, Atiku promised to right 
the wrong by leading the struggle to enthrone constitutionalism. The final speech by 
the vice president before the defeat of President ObasanjoÕs third-term amendment 
bill was strategic. It moved various sections of the populace,146 eliminated any 
remaining relevance and credibility Obasanjo had as a democrat,147 and laid the 
foundation for the defeat of the bill. 
The dissenting elites may have realized that the best way to defeat power 
entrenchment and create room for leadership alternation was to stop Obasanjo at the 
elite level. Since all incumbent presidents who had repealed presidential term limits 
went on to win subsequent elections, the entrustment of NigeriaÕs democracy to the 
electorate was risky at the time. Judging from the weak nature of the Nigerian 
electorate and institutions, Obasanjo was fully capable of manipulating elections to 
his advantage. Since the electorate was ill equipped to stop Obasanjo at the polls, the 
best option for democracy in Nigeria was in collaborative elite activism aimed at 
defeating his third-term attempt and effectively creating an open-seat contest in 2007.  
                                                
146 AuthorÕs interview with Professor Falola, Pilzen Czech Republic. May 2014. 
147 AuthorÕs interview with Emeka Duru, former Director of Research and Planning of the Ruling PDP. 
Abuja Nigeria. October 2013. 
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Paradoxically, the dissenting elites sometimes employed undemocratic 
approaches and the strategy of counter-financial inducement in resisting the third 
term.148 However, the undemocratic actions apparently produced democratic results. 
They forced compliance onto Obasanjo, created an open seat contest, and ensured 
power alternation. Nigeria would have relinquished these three democratic values had 
Obasanjo succeeded in entrenching state power. 
 
4.2.2 The Institutions 
Elite mobilization of the institutions occurred in Nigerian through three 
channels. These major channels were the judiciary, parliament and political party. I 
shall show that these various institutions did not set out and were not equipped to 
protect constitutionalism. Instead, some political elites particularly utilized these 
institutions to mobilize pressures against president Obasanjo. 
 
4.2.2.1  The Judiciary  
The Judiciary is an important tenet of democracy. Its independence represents 
a sign of thriving and consolidated democracy (Schedler 1998; Bratton 1998; 
OÕDonnel 1998; Villalon et al 2005; Armstrong 2010; Maltz 2007). By 2006, Nigeria 
did not qualify as a consolidating democracy (Freedom House 2006; Polity IV 2007)  
                                                
148 I shall elaborate on this point later in this chapter 
  
179 
The judiciary and other arms of government have yet to enjoy the level of 
independence corresponding to a consolidating democracy. Both Freedom House and 
Polity IV rated NigeriaÕs democracy as partly free (Freedom House 2006; Polity IV 
2007). However, some political elites were able to mobilize the judiciary during the 
third-term controversy in Nigeria as a channel to express their grievance and further 
raise the cost of repression for ObasanjoÕs regime. The dissenting elites used the 
judiciary strategically as a protective shield against intimidation and executive abuse. 
They tested the judiciary by challenging the credibility of the courts and the ability of 
judicial officers to deliver independent judgments.  
Prior to the third term debate, the Nigerian courts exercised little credibility. 
They had cultivated an unpopular reputation of delivering favorable judgements to 
the highest bidder (Nwabuzor 2004). Between 1999 and 2005, a culture of bribery 
and corruption among the judges had apparently influenced many high-profile 
political cases and eroded the credibility of the courts (Oko 2011; Iwu 2008, 2009). 
The popular saying, Òthe court is the last hope of the common manÓ lost its relevance 
in Nigeria between 2003 and 2006 (Usman 2012). 
Many Nigerian judges had ÔbastardizedÕ the judicial processes and handed 
favorable judgments to the highest bidder (Usman 2012; Vanguard 8, 2003). Judicial 
abuse reached its apogee in a legal battle concerning the contested 2003 presidential 
election between President Obasanjo and opposition presidential candidate, General 
Muhamabdu Buhari. After the 2003 general elections, the Nigerian president 
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influenced judges to delay the judgement tactically for four years in court (EU 
Election Observation Report 2007; Nwabuzor 2004). The ruling party and President 
Obasanjo, who had rigged the 2003 presidential elections, would have lost the 
tribunal case had the judges delivered a prompt judgement (ibid.). After four years of 
delay, the Supreme Court judges delivered an ÒunpopularÓ and ÒunenforceableÓ 
judgement in favor of the opposition candidate. The Supreme Court, nevertheless, 
asked President Obasanjo to continue as president since an alternation less than one 
year prior to the end of the tenure would have instigated a constitutional crisis for 
Nigerian democracy.  
The above Supreme Court judgement, judicial delays, the regular dismissal of 
court cases, and other unpopular judgements concerning the rigged elections of state 
governors made the judiciary very unpopular.149 Protests against the courts and the 
courtsÕ dwindling credibility among the masses prompted the Minister of Justice to 
introduce judicial reforms in 2005 to improve judicial credibility in Nigeria (Azinge 
2012).  
Obasanjo himself boasted a record of reckless disobedience of court orders. In 
2004, he refused to obey a court order that reinstated Governor Joshua Dariye, an 
impeached governor of Plateau state. In the same year, he disobeyed court orders 
directing the federal government to pay all seized allocations accruing to Lagos and 
                                                
149 Eight protests took place between 2003 and 2005 against court judgments and decisions. 
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Abia States. In 2003, Obasanjo ordered the closure of the Savannah Bank.150 He also 
ordered the withdrawal of the business license of Slok Air and Shipping Lines, 
belonging to Orji Kalu. Kalu was the governor of Abia State and a prominent 
member of the anti-third term group. President Obasanjo refused to honor three 
separate injunctions given by different courts to release the above assets. He also 
intimidated judges by forcing some judges to retire for delivering unfavourable 
judgments against the government or the ruling party.151  During the third-term 
politics, many still considered the judiciary as an extension of the presidency (Usman 
2012; Nigerian Voice 2012).  
As mentioned above, an independent judiciary is  Óthe last hope of common 
man.Ó Should the judiciary present itself as a dependent and ineffective institution, 
however, people will take the law into their own hands. They will seek justice 
through protest or violence when the court presents itself as an illegitimate and 
nonviable platform.  
The breakdown of the nascent democracy in Congo-Brazzaville in 1997; 
Madagascar in 1998; and in Benin, Niger, and Kenya in 2007 occurred because 
aggrieved political actors lost confidence in the judiciary (Obi 2007; Villalon 2007; 
                                                
150 There allegations that ordered the closure of Savannah bank because Jim Nwobodo, a senator and 
stakeholder in the bank had intended to contest against Obasanjo him in the presidential elections. 
151 Many argue that the sack of many high profile judges including Ayo Salami was because such 
judges pronounced unfavorable judgments to the ruling powers.  
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Diamond 2015). The aggrieved political actors resorted to violence and the Ôlaw of 
the streetsÕ to express their frustration, because the legal institutions were not 
independent.152  
The Nigerian political crisis of the third-term amendment bill in 2006 took a 
different shape. The dissenting actors faced state persecution and intimidation 
because of their position against the third term amendment bill. The dissenting elites 
may have recognized the counter-productivity of resorting to violence, especially in a 
developing country where the president possesses unrestrained power. For protection, 
Vice President Atiku Abubakar and other political elites chose to seek redress 
through the courts. By doing so, they strategically shunned violence and the Ôlaw of 
the streetÕ as political strategies. Before the third-term controversy climaxed in 2006, 
the courts visibly tilted towards the presidency. However, as the third-term 
controversy witnessed an increasing degree of political intimidation and 
victimization, the elite political dissidents pressured the judiciary for protection. The 
pressure on the judiciary finally forced the court to transform into the Ôhope for the 
common man.Õ153  
In 2005, when members of the ruling party approached the court to intervene 
on their forced dismissal from the party, the court initially refused a hearing on their 
                                                
152 This was the case in Nigeria in 1965, 1983, and 1993.  
153 Most political elites who received favorable legal outcomes from the courts referred to the courts as 
the Òlast hope of common man.Ó  
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case, describing it as a party affair. In the same year, the court responded with levity 
to more complaints brought by members of the ruling party concerning the Òillegal 
party conventionÓ organized by Obasanjo to legitimize his third-term agenda. Again, 
the court referred to the case as Òfamily matter.Ó154  
In 2006, however, a High Court in Abuja granted an injunction to stop the 
National Political Reform Conference organized by Obasanjo to give legal backing to 
the third-term amendment bill. Though Obasanjo ignored the injunction and held the 
National Conference, the court ruling instilled confidence in elite political dissidents. 
This ruling confirmed public sentiment, as the masses already viewed Obasanjo as 
pursuing an illegal mandate and did not take him seriously.  
On the other hand, the court decision provided the vice president and his anti-
third term loyalists with needed relief. Consequently, they used the judgment as a 
weapon to break the remainder of ObasanjoÕs grip in the parliament, the judiciary, 
and the ruling party. ObasanjoÕs                       choice to conduct the NCRC in 
disregard of the judicial ruling further equipped the elite political dissidents to 
approach the courts and nullify the Conference Report.                                
Having noticed the likely failure of the amendment bill and the corresponding 
role of the vice president, the ruling party and the presidency made a last effort in 
May 2006 to break the resolve of the vice president. The president and the ruling 
                                                
154 ÒFamily matterÓ is Nigerian jargon synonymous with illegality. 
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party attempted to revoke Atiku Abubakar«s position as the vice president of Nigeria. 
Atiku Abubakar needed his immunity as vice president for both protection and 
loyalty.  However, to get Atiku Abubakar and reduce his political influence, the 
president needed to strip him of his function. The president saw this chance in 2006 
when the vice president and most of his loyalists revived their political association 
within the ruling party, to sustain political pressure against Obasanjo. Without 
seeking any court injunction, the president used Atiku Abubakar's association with 
the PDM as a ploy to divest him of his status as vice president, using anti-party 
activities as an excuse. However, the Supreme Court ruled that Atiku could retain the 
vice presidency even if he chose to be in a different party.  
Many analysts believe that the favorable judgment for the vice president was 
consequential to the previous judgment on the National Constitutional Reform 
Conference, without which the ruling to salvage his vice presidency may not have 
been possible. The judgment served two purposes. On the one hand, it was a clear 
case of judicial protection. The vice presidentÕs immunity protected him and his 
followers from humiliation from the president. A withdrawal of such immunity would 
have exposed him to violence and more intimidation. Secondly, the court probably 
recognized the importance of the vice president for the struggle against the removal 
of term limits in Nigeria. Demoting the leader of the dissenting elites would have 
ended the struggle or instigated anarchy in the presidential term limits controversy.  
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After the success of two court cases, the elite political dissidents were 
probably emboldened to challenge many presidential decisions, even where they did 
not directly involve the amendment bill. Apart from the vice president, Governors 
Tinubu, Haruna, Dariye, and Kalu each challenged Obasanjo«s and the ruling party«s 
policies in court on more than six occasions. In fifty percent of these cases, the court 
granted a swift hearing and favorable judgments to the opponents. In cases where the 
Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) had filed corruption charges, 
the three dissident governors received interim injunctions that placed the charges on 
hold.155 Although the president and the ruling party often disobeyed court rulings, the 
readiness of the courts to entertain and deliver judgements on such cases, albeit at the 
later stage of the debate, boosted elite activism.  
The relationship between some elite dissidents and the judiciary during the 
third term struggle in Nigeria was symbiotic. While the courts provided the political 
elites with protection, the political elites equally provided an opportunity for the 
judiciary to reclaim its lost credibility. Legal experts and the many human rights 
organizations referred to many of the judgements delivered during the presidential 
term limits controversy as popular and landmark judgments (Azinge 2012) 
                                                
155 Some legal experts interviewed dismissed the cases against the dissident governors as trump-up 
charges made in bad faith to punish the dissidents for their rejection of ObasanjoÕs third term. 
According to them, the courts became mindful of ObasanjoÕs faith and rightfully decided to offer 
protection to the dissident governors. 
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The judiciary institution is reactionary and not proactive (Shepsle 2010). 
Judicial involvement in most constitutional and legal issues is an invitation to 
interpret, confirm, or nullify a certain policy decision or action. The court, therefore, 
may choose to remain silent over pieces of legislation or policies if it is uninvited or 
unpressured to give its opinion. It was a surprise, thus, that the court would be at the 
forefront of third-term debate in Nigeria. To what extent did the court entertain and 
deliver sound and popular judgements on cases brought to them by the contending 
parties in the third-term controversy? What were the sources of those legal cases that 
pressured the involvement of the court?  
I mentioned earlier in this chapter that political elite dissidents inundated the 
court with a barrage of cases that pressured the judiciary into action. Either for 
protection or in order to avoid using the law of the streets, the aggrieved elite 
dissidents involved the judiciary in the Nigerian third-term controversy. The courts 
were not prominent at the beginning of the third-term debates in Nigeria and did not 
participate directly in the struggle against the third-term project. In 2004, the judicial 
officers protested against the incessant assault on the rule of law and the reckless 
disobedience of legal judgments by the executive. President Obasanjo disobeyed five 
high-profile judgements relating to his third-term project. However, the courts won 
support in Nigeria by delivering some popular judgments that not only offered 
protection to particular dissidents, but also sustained the process of third-term debate 
until its defeat in May 2006. Without this, the dissenting elites would have probably 
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lost the battle halfway, especially if the president had succeeded in divesting the head 
of the Nigerian anti-third term movement, the vice president..  
The courtÕs readiness to entertain and deliver judgements in favor of the 
dissenting elites is remarkable. The fate of presidential term limits indirectly 
depended on the outcome of some of those pending legal cases, indicating the 
importance of elite-institutional interaction in enforcing term limits compliance. The 
jubilation that preceded the judgments signified popular support for elite resistance 
against the removal of term limits and for the recovery of judicial legitimacy in 
Nigeria (Arewa 2007). Therefore, the impact of political elite resistance on the 
judiciary not only tested the credibility of the court, but also challenged the courts to 
assume a new role of being a co-defender of the democratic process. In response to 
elite pressure, the court further played a supportive role for the political elites by 
assisting the political dissidents to mobilize, sustain, and bundle political pressure to 
enforce compliance in Nigeria. 
 
4.2.2.2  Political Parties 
Political parties are an important component of the democratic process. In 
Nigeria, the three major political parties that took part in the transitional elections of 
1999 had national coverage and well-defined manifestos. The PeopleÕs Democratic 
Party won the transition election because of the popularity of its founders.  Moreover, 
mass movements that were very active in the struggle against the military regimes 
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converged in PDP and merged to form what many have described as the biggest party 
in Africa.156 Its founding principle was to bridge Nigerian political gap and to spread 
democratic principles in Nigeria (Ekwueme 2015). The PDP logo, an umbrella, 
symbolizes this. 
Obasanjo, however, was not part of the founding fathers of the PeopleÕs Democratic 
Party that won elections in 1999. He was also not part of the negotiations that went 
into the formation of political parties in 1998. Atiku Abubakar and former vice-
president Alex Ekwueme led the two important political associations, the PeoplesÕ 
Democratic Mandate (PDM) and the G-34 that collapsed into PDP. These formed the 
nucleus of the ruling party. Obasanjo was serving a prison term while political party 
formations took place in 1998. Prominent PDP members, including Atiku Abubakar, 
negotiated ObasanjoÕs release with the military regime in 1998. The same group 
within the PDP consequently influenced Obasanjo's adoption as the presidential 
candidate of the party and Atiku Abubakar as a running mate.  
Atiku Abubakar was a strategic choice for a running mate to Obasanjo. 
Obasanjo was a former military dictator whose military mentality stood to benefit 
from Atiku Abubakar's party influence and leadership. Atiku Abubakar's financial 
capacity and political experience were also convenient for the party itself, which was 
new and needed much funding. For instance, Orji Kalu, Ibrahim Babangida, and 
                                                
156 Many former and serving Chairmen of the ruling party including Vincent Ogbulafor described PDP 
as the biggest political party in Africa, and boasted that PDP was going to rule Nigeria for sixty years.   
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Atiku Abubakar financed the campaign costs for ObasanjoÕs presidency.157 Although 
the populace hailed Obasanjo as the ÒBaba,Ó158 the significant social and political 
resources at his proposal did not help him to initially consolidate power. The vice 
president and Governor Orji Kalu had strategically denied him the personal and 
political coalition he needed to convince the political elites that his rule was 
indispensable.  
President Obasanjo used most of his second tenure to consolidate power by 
strategically influencing many changes at the partyÕs leadership level. In 2004, 
Obasanjo particularly purged the PDM of prominent members within the ruling party 
who were loyal to the vice-president. By 2005, Obasanjo had the ruling party firmly 
under his control after positioning his loyalists in all sensitive party positions across 
the country, including the local governments. As mentioned above, a new party 
policy of Òre-integration,Ó barred the party re-entry of many major potential internal 
opponents whose loyalty was in question. Only the courts could arrange for a renewal 
of party membership for the banned vice president and twelve state governors,    
                                                
157 Orji Kalu provided one million dollars, while Ibrahim Babangida provided $fifteen million dollars 
as the initial campaign take-off to put Obasanjo forward as the presidential candidate of PDP. 
158  ObasanjoÕs nicknames were Oga and Baba -- the father of the nation and the father of modern 
Nigeria because of his previous patriotic inputs in Nigeria. He was a civil war hero, a democratic 
activist, and the first African military leader to organize a successful democratic transition by handing 
over power an elected civilian president in 1979. 
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At the time, when it was unclear why Obasanjo moved to control the party, 
the vice president and Orji Kalu vaguely convinced the public of ObasanjoÕs Òhidden 
agenda.Ó Obasanjo may have thought that his third-term ambition guaranteed the 
elimination of dissident party internals. Contrary to his political calculation, most of 
the internal dissidents remained in the party, courtesy of judicial assistance and 
protection. These Ôpolitical dissidentsÕ fought from within the party until the third 
term amendment bill was defeated.  
Furthermore, no sufficient pressure could have come from the opposition 
parties. At the time of the third term debates, the opposition parties were in disarray, 
with several crises haunting their legitimacy. Moreover, the opposition party system 
in many post-Cold War African democracies was still weak at the time. Though fifty-
two political parties existed in Nigeria in 2006, forty-eight of these political parties 
functioned as extensions of the ruling party.159 The formation of these parties neither 
based itself on ideology nor aimed itself at applying pressure to the ruling party. 
Mostly, they figure as platforms for political negotiation and patronage (Campbell 
2011). 
Immediately after each election, losers from these political parties align with 
the government in power for political patronage (Ibeanu 2007; Usman; Iwu 2007, 
                                                
159 With the exception of Action Congress (AC) and All Nigeria Peoples Party (ANPP), All Peoples 
Grand Alliance (APGA) and Labour Party (LP), dissidents from the ruling party, floated majority of 
other political parties, and mostly returned to the ruling after each election 
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2008; Adetula 2009 Agboola 2008; Iyayi 2007). Even when candidates from these 
parties won elections, they returned to the ruling party as soon as the elections were 
over (Iwu 2008, 2009). Except in the case of the ruling party, fifty-one other parties 
remain dormant until election periods, when elites who lose primary party elections 
struggle for smaller parties to stand for elections. The regime exchanged candidacy 
for a position or patronage. Thus, opposition parties were not a threat to ObasanjoÕs 
third term and applied insignificant pressure on the third-term agenda. The 
Conference of Nigerian Political Parties, comprising of many small parties, however, 
issued a statement in May 2006 condemning the third-term agenda, barely two weeks 
before the defeat of the third-term agenda. Analysts have interpreted this move as a 
face-saving gesture, or an effort to be on the good side of history (Agboola 2008). 
However, the Nigerian multiparty system played an indirect role in the 
struggle and defeat of ObasanjoÕs third-term agenda. With so many political parties 
and the possibility of easily forming more, the political elites who opposed the third-
term agenda from within the ruling party were not willing to take abandonment. 
Unlike in Uganda, Cameroon, Gabon, and Togo, which systems reflected the one 
party or semi-single party system, the multiparty system afforded the dissenting elites 
in Nigeria the opportunity to defect and apply the same pressure from a new or 
another party. The possibility to defect also accorded the dissenting elites an 
opportunity to retain their seats in the parliament even when the ruling party disposed 
of them. By retaining their seats even after defection, dissenting MPs engendered the 
parliamentary balance of power and sustained the activism in the parliament against 
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the third-term agenda. In this sense, the possibility to cross over to other parties 
reduced the strength of the ruling party by about thirty-five percent. By crossing over, 
the elite political dissidents grew in number and strength while the ruling party 
staggered to retain its majority in both houses of the Nigerian parliament.  
Without the possibility of defecting or forming a broad coalition, the political 
elites may not have been able to apply sufficient pressure on Obasanjo. In Uganda, 
where only one party operated during the third-term agenda of Yorim Mussuveni in 
2005, the internal dissidents were forced to succumb to the will of the president, since 
no alternative party existed to which they could defect (Armstrong 2010). The 
president was the owner of the party (Movement), and firmly controlled its structures 
(ibid.). The absence of alternative political parties made it perhaps difficult for the 
two political actors who opposed MussoveniÕs third-term agenda to exert sufficient 
pressure, since there was no other platform for them to express their dissatisfaction 
with the alteration of term limits in Uganda.   
The most notable pressure on Obasanjo did not come from the opposition 
political parties as an institution. The pressure arose from some political actors within 
the ruling party, particularly, from a faction of core political actors led by the vice 
president. A strong coalition of party internal elites and some opposition elites 
mobilized what was to be a decisive pressure on ObasanjoÕs third term project.  
 
4.2.2.3  The Parliament 
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Events after the transition elections in 1999 created mixed opportunities for 
the entrenchment of power by the president, much to the detriment of parliamentary 
independence.  Although the parliament constantly quarrelled with the president, the 
parliament as an institution, as demonstrated above, never gained independence. The 
removal of five Senate presidents within seven years through presidential executive 
influence does not portray an independent parliament. However, particular political 
actors did challenge presidential influence on the parliament on many occasions.  
Chuba Okadigbo, Pius Anyim, Adolphus Nwagbara, Ken Nnamani, Ghali 
Umar NaÕ Abba, and Aminu Massari provided the highest pressure within the 
parliament by allowing individual discretion within it (Nwabuzor 2012). 
Parliamentary independence manifested in 2002 after the president had influenced the 
removal of two senate Presidents. Senate members who insisted on electing their own 
choice in Pius Anyim strongly resisted ObasanjoÕs effort to install another loyalist as 
Senate president (Oyewo 2007). An erratic Obasanjo moved against the new senate 
president and attempted to use some loyalists in the senate to impeach him.  
In 2003, Obasanjo was embarrassed when the new senate president mobilized the 
members to suspend some Obasanjo loyalists and instituted an impeachment process 
against him. It took the intervention of four former presidents to save a threatened 
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Obasanjo from impeachment.160 Between 2003 and 2005, Obasanjo was to reduce the 
little independence gained by the Senate in 2002. In 2003, Obasanjo masterminded 
the election of Adolphus Nwagbara as Senate president and equally masterminded his 
removal as Senate president in 2005 for not supporting his third-term agenda. Though 
Nwagbara resigned his position, some senators loyal to the vice-president blocked 
Obasanjo from installing his loyalist as a Senate president.161 An Obasanjo loyalist as 
Senate president would mean a total dependence of the Senate on the presidency. It 
would also mean a railroading of the third-term agenda of President Obasanjo. The 
independent and dissenting eliteÕs choice of Ken Nnamani as Senate president moved 
to recover some independence from the executive and send a signal to president 
Obasanjo that the dissenting elites had neutralized his power in the Senate.162 
It was impossible for the new senate president to mobilize the senators as a 
body against the third-term project. However, he strategically gave free space to the 
                                                
160 the former presidents who negotiated for the withdrawal of impeachment process against president 
Obasanjo with the Senate included Yakubu Gowon, Shehu Shagari, Mohamadu Buhari, Ibrahim 
Babangida, Ernest Shonekon and Abdulsalami Abubakar. 
161 Against the Senate Standing Rule not to elect as Senate President any senator without a cognate 
experience of at least two terms in the senate, the senate amended the rule in 2005 to elect Ken 
Nnamani who was a first time senator 
162 Many former senators interviewed confirmed that the choice of Ken Nnamani as Senate President 
was to recover some parliamentary independence. A level of presidential intimidation would drive a 
weak senate president into irrelevance. 
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senators, especially the dissenting elites, to operate unhindered within the Senate 
(Popoola 2012; Nwabuzor 2004). While the Senate president appeared neutral, the 
Deputy Senate President was a leading pro-third term member. The ruling party 
controlled a clear majority in the parliament, but party loyalty did not count anymore, 
to the benefit of individual discretion and activism. In 2005, the Senate supported 
Obasanjo to repeal the bill protecting Nigerian CSOs. The Senate also supported 
Obasanjo in most of his anti-humanitarian policies, including the bill on minimum 
wage and derivation formulas. By 2006, the legislature that hitherto assisted 
Obasanjo in passing some unpopular bills had become an arena of dissidence. Many 
legislators belonging to the ruling party no longer identified themselves by their 
partyÕs position on the third term, but rather, on where they stood as individuals 
regarding the third term agenda.163  
It was, therefore, easy for dissenting elites to penetrate the legislature to lobby 
senators against the third-term agenda. For instance, on Thursday, April 6, 2006, 
Atiku addressed the meeting of ÒMovement 2007,Ó an amalgam of senators opposed 
to the third-term agenda. He strongly condemned ObasanjoÕs third-term bid and 
urged the legislators, including the former Speaker of the House of Representatives, 
Ghali Umar NaÕAbba, and National Assembly members, to resist the third-term: 
                                                
163 There were varied factions within the ruling party. It was also the case with opposition parties. 
Within the ruling PDP, a faction called Ôold PDPÕ and the PDM formed an alliance with some anti-
third term factions in other opposition parties.  
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What better testimony, what better evidence do we need that this is a real 
agenda? Let us step up this campaign; let us step up the lobby among other members 
of the National Assembly. LetÕs keep on campaigning to our brothers and sisters. As 
long as the numbers keep increasing, they will never bring their bill to the National 
Assembly (Guardian 7 April 2006). Such lobby campaign by dissenting elites may 
have strongly influenced the behavior of the members of the National Assembly 
towards the third term.   
Against state financial inducement of some members of the National 
Assembly (with US$350,000) to support the tenure elongation bill (Iwu 2008, 2009; 
Campbell 2011; Posner and Young 2007; Ozoh 2008), a confirmed report claims that 
the opposition elites mobilized funds and pulled resources together to counter-induce 
senators with US$650,000 to reject the amendment bill.164 On May 15, 2006, in the 
heat of National Assembly debates, the President and the chair of the ruling party 
summoned parliament leaders to the Government House. The aim was to coerce them 
into bending the rules in the parliaments to favor the third-term agenda. The Senate 
president had approved that all proceedings would be open to the public and covered 
on live television coverage, as opposed to the secret ballot system recommended by 
the party.  
                                                
164 The financial inducement for and against the third-term bill has been confirmed by many former 
senators, including the former senate President Ken Nnamani, Ifeanyi Ararume, and the Chief of Staff 
to the former INEC Chairman, Dr. Ozoh 
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Before commencement of the debate and voting, the Senate president also 
requested each senator to publicly declare his or her stand on the third-term 
amendment bill, warning that each MP should act independently. Dissenting elites in 
both houses of the National Assembly blocked all attempts by the presidency and 
third-term loyalists to change this strategy for the secret ballot system. Meanwhile, 
the vice-president, anti-third term governors led by Orji Kalu, and several dissenting 
elites were present at the parliament to observe the proceedings. With a resounding 
ÒNO!Ó to the third-term agenda after the public speech, the parliament decided not to 
table the bill for a second reading and debate, tossing it out on the floor of the House. 
It may appear that the parliament exerted some pressure in enforcing 
compliance in Nigeria. However, as in the Zambian case, the parliament did not act as 
an institutional body against the third-term bill. The blocking of systematic 
proceedings and the amendment process simply aimed to prevent the third term from 
surviving beyond the parliament. The Senate avoided the secret ballot system to limit 
the capacity of Obasanjo and his loyalists to manipulate the parliament in the voting 
process of the amendment bill. The dissenting elites equally envisaged that the easiest 
way to defeat the third-term project was to block it from going beyond the house 
floor. 
The senate decision to publicize and televise the senate debate and vote 
strategically blocked the influence of executive financial inducements and 
intimidation. By insisting on public and televised opening proceedings of the debate, 
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the dissenting elites set a trap for pro-third term senators who planned to support the 
third-term agenda secretly. When the parliament strategically allowed rules that 
favored the opposition, dissenting elites and anti-third term legislators claimed it as a 
platform for elite activism to organize and launch their strike against the third term. 
 
4.2.3 Civil Society and Media  
The Nigerian role of civil society and media in the struggle against the third 
term was not as visible as in other countries I researched. In 1994, the combined 
demonstrations of National Democratic Coalition (NADECO), the Student Union, the 
Academic Staff Union of Universities (ASUU) and the United Action for Democracy 
(UAD) forced General Babangida out of power (Usman 2012; Ubani et al. 2006). The 
civil society group of 2006 missed the intensity of  the acting parties in 1994  
While civil society had developed in the course of the Nigerian democratic 
struggle, like in other new democracies, the roles of civil society and the elite struggle 
against dictatorship overlapped. Yet civil societyÕs role requires an independent 
source of funding, which was missing from the case in Nigeria. Western civil 
organizations or particular political actors exercised a monopoly and practice of 
funding local CSOs for their interests (Chabal et al. 1999; Khembo 2004). The 
inability for independent funding made it nearly impossible for civil society to 
operate independently and objectively outside elite influence. CSOs danced according 
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to the tune of its sponsors, siding with the opposition or the government based on 
financial support.  
Within the Nigerian framework of third-term politics, there were equal CSOs 
and protests on both sides, depending on the side from which the funds were coming. 
While the proponents of the third term were able to recruit an array of civil society 
members, the anti-third term group recruited just as many. For instance, while the 
Save Nigeria Group (SNG) protested in Lagos against the third term, the Nigerian 
Manufacturers Association (NMA) was protesting in the Nigerian capital city of 
Abuja in support of ObasanjoÕs third-term agenda. On April 12, 2006, a combined 
group of protesters mobilized to support the vice-president at Yola International 
Airport Adamawa state to protest against the third term. On the same day, another 
group, the ÒConcerned CitizenÓ led by Wampara, a core Obasanjo loyalist, staged 
another protest in favor of third term in the same city of Yola. Some of the 
inscriptions on the placards read in Hausa and English languages. ÒAtiku 
AzzalumineÓ Numan AtikuÓ (ÒWe are tired of AtikuÓ). ÒBamu sonkaÓ and ÒKai 
mugh ne Ó (ÒAtiku is an unserious presidential aspirantÓ).  
The situation on April 10, 2006 was not any different. As pro-third term 
protesters mobbed the vice-president and vandalized his home in Lagos, Governor 
Orji Kalu was welcomed as a hero in Abia State by Aba Traders Association for 
opposing ObasanjoÕs third term. Anti-third term loyalists mobilized this group to 
counter the incident in Lagos and to win more support and sympathy for their 
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resistance to the third-term project.165 With such confusion within the civil society, it 
was difficult for the masses to inform an objective opinion based on the arrays of 
demonstrations in support and against the third term.  
The civil society in Nigeria had previously operated under the one umbrella of 
the Nigeria Civil Society Organizations (NCSO). This umbrella had protected small 
CSOs and had afforded civil society a platform to coordinate actions and speak with 
one voice. It was easy and possible for the central body to organize and enforce the 
joint decisions of Nigerian CSOs through the Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC). On 
economic and social issues, the CSO central umbrella had recorded huge 
achievements in forcing the government to implement minimum wages, petrol 
subsidy, and the Thirteen-Percent Oil Producing Derivation Formula.166 Twice, the 
NLC has forced the government of Obasanjo to capitulate and reduce the price 
increases of petroleum products (Usman 2012).  
On the political level, however, the achievement of CSOs in Nigeria has been 
minimal. For instance, after the fraudulent elections of 2003, a combined national 
mass protest led by prominent civil society crusaders like Wole Soyinka, Femi 
                                                
165 Governor Orji Kalu sponsored the Aba Traders Association, Okada Ridders Association, and Aba 
Market Women Association to stage a protest in Aba on April 11, 2006. 
166 In 2004, the NLC mobilized other CSOs to put pressure on ObasanjoÕs government to implement 
the 1995 agreed Federal Allocation of thirteen percent to Oil Producing Areas and States. States that 
produce oil are entitled to thirteen percent of the proceeds. 
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Falana, Gani Fawenhimi, and the NLC paralyzed activities in Nigeria for many 
days.167 The Nigerian state succeeded in using force to disperse protesters with the 
pretext of not having obtained police clearance (Usman 2012).  
Possibly, aware that the dissenting elites might use the national civil society 
body against the third-term agenda, the government used an executive bill to ban the 
national umbrella body of the CSO in Nigeria in 2005. By proscribing the national 
umbrella body of the CSOs, the government forced civil society groups to work 
separately and exclusively on issues affecting each group. Each CSO received the 
mandate to obtain police clearance before it could embark on civil protests. A law 
that required police permission and protection prior to protests made it difficult for 
CSOs to demonstrate, because the police rarely granted such clearance. During the 
public hearing at the National Constitution Reform Conference (NCRC), CSOs like 
NDC and Save Nigeria Group combined with dissenting elites to take a united stand 
before the government overpowered them.  
On December 14, 2005, the representatives of twenty-nine CSOs came 
together and issued a communiqu detailing their stance on the third-term agenda. 
                                                
167 In 2003, the All Nigerian Peoples Party, which cheated at the presidential and governorship  
elections, rejected the election results and called for mass civil disobedience. Democracy activists and 
the Labour Congress joined in the mass protest, which paralyzed Nigeria for two days. The 




After outlining the danger of a third term, the G-29 produced a six-point article 
(communiqu) in which they agreed to align with the dissenting elites to challenge 
the looming and emerging dictatorship in Nigeria.  
The CSOs apparently made their communiqu in good faith. However, 
Nigeria in 2006 was a semi-illiterate society where about fifty percent could not read. 
Any communiqu against the third term that could not commit itself to public protest 
or action was lost and not meaningful for the public. The statement by human rights 
activists and representatives of civil society on the political agenda of President 
Olusegun Obasanjo did not go far and apparently made an insufficient impact on the 
struggle against the third term. In the first place, none of the CSOs could mobilize the 
masses for public protest or present an alternative approach to them. In the second 
place, President Obasanjo continued with his political agenda without any reference 
to the said communiqu.  
On February 22, 2006, the clampdown on civil society groups intensified 
when the Nigerian Police clamped down on protesters in Oshogbo, Ogun State. The 
protesters had come to participate in the public hearing for the proposed 
constitutional reforms by the Obasanjo regime. The Nigerian police successfully 
attacked and dispersed the protesters and the leader of the United Action for 
Democracy (UAD) with teargas for protesting without a police clearance. According 
to Femi Falana, a pro-democracy activist and attorney for the detained protesters, the 
police exhibited a serious level of bias and intolerance against the protesters. On the 
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same day, police arrested Bamidele Aturu of the UAD at the public hearing in 
Oshogbo, Osun state for speaking against President ObasanjoÕs third term. On 
February 16, 2006, the public hearing in Kastina turned violent as police moved 
against anti-third term campaigners led by opposition elite Haruna Shetima. While 
the protesters carried placards which read ÒThird term extensions are immoralÓ and 
ÓSay no to greed,Ó, they were forced out of the venue by security before Shetima 
could make any presentation (Usman 2012; The Punch February 23, 2006). 
By the end of February 2006, the CSOs felt exhausted and incapacitated. 
Meanwhile, Obasanjo had succeeded with the Party Convention and the National 
Constitution Review Conference, despite court injunctions. The bulk of the struggle 
to stop President Obasanjo's third term lay in the hands of dissenting elites. By 
enforcing the law that demanded police clearance before civil protests, the 
government controlled and limited the activities of the CSOs ahead of third term 
politics in 2006. With the civil society not at the forefront of the anti-third term 
demonstrations and struggle, many among the populace assumed that civil society 
had accepted the third term (Usman 2012). Only those CSOs mobilized and 
sponsored by dissenting elites could defy government orders and sporadically 
establish a visible protest with consequences ranging from arrests and prosecution, to 
imprisonment.  
Alarmed by the apparently lukewarm attitude towards the third term by the 
Nigeria Labour Congress (NLC), some leading opposition members scheduled 
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several meetings with the leadership of CSOs, hoping to motivate them into the 
struggle. On April 20, 2006, the vice president led dissenting elites and members of 
the National Assembly under the aegis of the Ò2007 MovementÓ to address some civil 
society groups and invite them to join the struggle (This Day April 21, 2006). 
Specifically, this meeting concerned the silence of the NLC leadership on the third--
term agenda. The concerned political elites also requested the NLC's National 
President, Comrade Adam Oshiomhole, to announce Labour's position on the issue to 
the nation. Many analysts interpreted the poor interest in the third-term struggle by 
the NLC and many other CSOs as ÒscandalousÓ (Olaiya 2003). 
While I affirm in this research that public opinion was overwhelmingly 
against the constitutional amendment of president Obasanjo, the masses had no 
opportunity to participate fully in the third-term debate. The planning of the third-
term project systematically excluded the masses and civil society. Apart from the 
initial enthusiasm during the National Conference, the CSOs could not create a 
platform for the masses to express their grudges against the third-term agenda, nor 
personally lobby the MPs or sponsor against the removal of term limits in Nigeria. 
The civil society could also not mobilize the masses against one clear and common 
ground. As Chris Ngwodo succinctly puts it: 
The Nigerian Labour Congress (NLC) and some other civil society bodies 
were on their way to evolving into a mass political movement. But having exhausted 
a tired and obsolete confrontational approach and run out of ideas, their leaders have 
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shied away from the arena of political participation and constructive engagement 
(February 18, 2006)  
Thus, the role of the civil society was limited, varied, and dependent. Of about the 
five hundred registered CSOs in Nigeria, only about five officially participated in the 
protest against the third term. An analyst describes the poor showing of the NLC as 
disappointing. Judging from the elite-dependent actions of CSOs during the third-
term controversy in Nigeria, I conclude that pressure of CSOs made an insufficient 
impact on the decision of the parliament to throw away the third-term bill. Dissident 
and loyal political elites in either opposition or support of the third-term agenda 
mobilized and funded the sporadic participation of Nigerian civil society. The CSOs 
lacked an independent voice and capacity to have enforced term limits on president 
Obasanjo. 
 
4.2.4 The International Community 
The transition of Nigeria to multiparty democracy in 1999 was not a result of 
any exogenous pressure (Campbell 2011; Ibeanu 2007). The Nigerian political elites 
had launched continuous pressure on the military since 1983, when the last 
democratic dispensation had collapsed. Elite pressure led by NADECO had directly 
resulted in Ibrahim BabangidaÕs abortive transition programs. Although Abiola, the 
winner of the deadlocked and annulled 1993 presidential election, had died in the 
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presence of U.N. and U.S. envoys visiting Nigeria to broker peace in 1998, little or no 
exogenous pressure had figured in the Nigerian struggle towards democracy.  
Nigeria was also not heavily dependent on external development assistance, as 
were other neighboring countries like Ghana, Cameroon, and Uganda. If there were 
any external pressures towards democratization in Nigeria, both Babangida and 
Abacha ignored those international pressures. Elite activism put pressure on both 
regimes and forced them out of power (Obi 2002). For instance, in 1992, a combined 
pressure from political elites under the umbrella of the National Democratic Coalition 
(NADECO) and the Academic Staff Union of Nigeria (ASUU) forced Babangida to 
Òstep aside.Ó168 Though the EU, Commonwealth, and other western countries placed 
sanctions on AbachaÕs regime after the execution of the Ogoni activists led by Ken 
Saro-Wiwa in 1995, Abacha did not bulge. The sanctions from the Commonwealth of 
Nations and the EU strictly targeted AbachaÕs abuse of human rights and had nothing 
to do with democracy promotion (Obi 2008; News Watch 1995). Like the Babangida 
regime, there was no direct international pressure on Abacha to democratize. The 
U.S. and E.U. policy on Nigeria during the military era concerned itself more with the 
stability of oil prices, the security of oil production and supply, and with the security 
                                                
168 In 1992, after the annulment of the June 1992 presidential elections (believed to be the fairest and 
freest election in NigeriaÕs history), the president faced an unprecedented opposition from NADECO 
and ASUU. Babangida, who never expected such a level of opposition, succumbed to pressure from 
the NADECO and ASUU and announced his retirement saying, ÒI wish to step aside.Ó  This became a 
popular political jargon in Nigeria. 
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in the Niger Delta (Obi 2002, 2006, 2008). Abacha remained on the verge of 
becoming a civilian dictator until his death in June 1998. After the death of Abacha in 
1998, the consistent pressure against the military regime from the NADECO and 
PDM forced the new military government of Abdulsalami Abubakar to return Nigeria 
to a democratic rule within nine months of his regime. The new military regime did 
not doubt that a delayed transition timetable could cause a confrontation with 
NADECO and PDM.  
International pressure did not have any effect on ObasanjoÕs third-term 
project. In his book, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink, the former United States 
Ambassador to Nigeria, John Campbell, detailed his frustration and disappointment.  
Campbell lamented the aloofness of the international community, namely the E.U., 
and the U.S., during the Nigerian struggle against the third term (2011). He watched 
in utter disappointment as these two important international actors played politics 
with the fate of the Nigerian people and their hard-earned democracy without taking 
an official stand on the issue (ibid.).  
Nigeria has been an important ally of the United States and the European 
Union. Nigeria is also the largest oil producer in Africa and the big exporter of oil 
and gas to the U.S. and E.U. member states. Nigeria supplies ten percent of U.S. oil 
needs and eight percent of E.U. oil needs. Nigeria also plays a significant role in the 
war on terror and cooperates with both the U.S. and the E.U. on their African foreign 
policy. That notwithstanding, Nigeria is the most populous black nation with a 
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population of about one-hundred and seventy million. Due to NigeriaÕs population 
and size, any conflict in Nigeria would affect global oil supply and price and 
destabilize the entire sub-region.  
U.S. and many E.U. member states may have seen the third-term agenda of 
Obasanjo as a potential source of conflict, especially considering the ethnic 
sensitivity of Nigerian politics. The U.S. State Department had therefore asked 
Nigeria to manage the third-term debate maturely without taking any clear position 
on its impact on the consolidation of Nigerian democracy (Financial Times London, 
21 February2006). The neutral warning of the State Department was more a strategy 
motivated by national interest than it was a promotion of democracy (Campbell 
2011). Washington feared that ObasanjoÕs third-term agenda could provoke mass 
upheavals as well as exacerbate ethnic tensions and worsen the almost intractable 
global energy crisis. John Negroponte, the overall head of the U.S. intelligence 
services warned in February 2006 that, a third term for Obasanjo could threaten to 
unleash major turmoil and conflict and could lead to disruption of oil supplies, 
secessionist moves by regional governments and major refugee flows and instability 
elsewhere in West Africa.169 
The only high profile statement issued from the U.S. never referred to the 
removal of presidential term limits and democratic consolidation. Campbell found it a 
scandalous, statement on the flimsiness of the theory of democracy promotion and 
                                                
169 Refer to Financial Times London, 21 February 2006. 
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democratization.170 Obasanjo probably knew that the E.U. and U.S. had no interest in 
democracy in Nigeria. He went ahead to execute his third- term agenda and simply 
allowed oil to flow without disruption. 
However, the U.S. statement on the third term in Nigeria, though insufficient, 
is significant. Although the message was diplomatic and strategic, it may have re-
enforced the determination of dissenting political elites against a third term. I   cannot 
creditably conclude that the warning exerted pressure on Obasanjo, since Obasanjo 
carried on with his third-term project, free of sanctions until its defeat. Nonetheless, 
the statement strengthened the resolve of the opposition elites and reinforced their 
determination to press on with the third-term agenda.  
For instance, both Atiku and Kalu alluded frequently to AmericaÕs warning in 
their rallies against third term (Premium times, November 28, 2011).171  Many 
political elites, who were still seating on the fence, may have felt motivated to join 
the anti-third term pressure group due to the statement from the U.S. State 
Department. The Nigerian masses cheered the U.S. and the E.U. and credited the 
defeat of the third term to the U.S., who they stereotypically viewed as the worldÕs 
                                                
170 Campbell detailed in his book, Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink (2011), how the Bush administration 
prevented him from making any official statement on the third term as a U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria. 
171 Orji Kalu has claimed in various interviews that President Bush stopped ObasanjoÕs third term. 
John Campbell sees OrjiÕs comments as absurd, knowing that the Bush administration did nothing to 
pressure Obasanjo against a third term. 
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police officer (Campbell 2011). Campbell notes that the recognition of the U.S. in a 
struggle in which the U.S. only played lip service was the most absurd event in his 
tenure as the U.S. ambassador to Nigeria (ibid.).  
Governor Orji Kalu internationalized the struggle against the third term. He 
alludes in his interviews to how he alerted President George W. Bush about 
ObasanjoÕs intention to change NigeriaÕs constitution to become life president 
(Premium Times, 28 November 2011). In her book, No Higher Honor, former U.S. 
Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice confirmed that Mr. Obasanjo nurtured a third-
term agenda. She wrote: ÒIn 2006, when President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria 
sidled up to President Bush and suggested that he (Obasanjo) might change the 
constitution so that he could serve a third term, President Bush told him not to do it.Ó 
Obasanjo went on with his third-term agenda without any official statement from 
George Bush until it was defeated, indicating that the communication with President 
Bush was a private affair without any effect.  
This study notes no direct exogenous pressure to stop ObasanjoÕs third term or 
to save democracy in Nigeria during the third-term debate. Obasanjo went on with his 
third-term project despite the statement from the U.S. On an individual basis, the 
statement from the U.S. State Department may have indirectly had an effect on some 
dissenting elites, and not on Obasanjo and his loyalists. The dissenting elites may 






I conclude in this chapter that key dissenting elites caused the defeat of 
Obasanjo's third-term agenda in Nigeria. Elite activism created the platform for 
sectoral interactions, which produced the ancillary pressures that some political elites 
bundled to enforce compliance. Though some dissenting political elites who resisted 
ObasanjoÕs third term embarked on the project for a mixture of interests, they saw the 
project as threatening to the democratic space and as a grand plan to re-introduce 
authoritarianism in Nigeria consciously chose to resist it.172 According to Dr. Ibrahim 
Jibrin),  
the present political situation in the country is very grave for the consolidation 
of democracy. There is widespread opposition to the Third Term Agenda of 
the President. Except for the narrow circle that is directly benefiting from 
government patronage, virtually all the political class is opposed to the 
scheme. The mainstream political elites of all the zones in the country are also 
opposed to the plan (2006). 
Those who genuinely resisted Obasanjo's attempt to entrench state power remained 
resolute, despite intimidation and financial inducement. 
                                                
172 In several statements and interviews, some quoted in this study, both vice-president Atiku Abubakar 
and Governor Orji Kalu expressed their concern on the negative consequences that ObasnjoÕs third 
term or life-presidency would have on the consolidation Nigerian nascent democracy.  
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Other dissenting elites engaged in the struggle for hidden political, economic, 
and social interests. Ultimately, the cost of political repression against the political 
elites became too high for Obasanjo. When the dissenting political elites coalesced 
under Vice President Atiku Abubakar to combine their resources, they invested with 
the hope of reaping benefits. While Obasanjo could muster US$350,000 to induce the 
legislatures to support the third term, opponents of the third term combined resources 
to double the amount for the legislatures to kill the bill. The third term opponents 
outsmarted the government by sponsoring media debates and civil protests against the 
third term. The mobilization of various sectors against the third term underscored the 
importance and role of an elite coalition in creating a platform for democracy to 










Chapter 5: ÒI must stay! No, you must go!Ó Failed Attempt to Repeal 
Presidential Terms Limit in Zambia 
 
5 Introduction 
The presidential term limits politics in Zambia resulted in the defeat of 
President Frederick ChilubaÕs attempt to extend his tenure in office beyond 2001. At 
the bidding of a few political elites, many sectors converged and bundled pressures to 
raise the cost of repression for Chiluba. The debate was intricate and costly. It left the 
democratic process in Zambia temporarily bruised, but on the long term, stronger. 
While the role of some political elites, especially internal political elites, was decisive 
and clear in the defeat of the third-term agenda of Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, the 
Zambian case presents a confluence of dissipated pressures which political elites 
mobilized and bundled in order to apply pressure on ChilubaÕs regime. The role of 
political elites became instrumental in sensitizing and harnessing pressures from 
various segments of Zambian society to enforce compliance.  
By opening up to multiparty elections in 1991, Zambia became one of the first 
countries to pave the way for the latest phase of democratization in sub-Saharan 
Africa. It was also to become the first post-Cold War African democracy to enforce 
full term limits compliance in an attempt to repeal term limits by an incumbent 
president. The founding leader of Zambia, Kenneth Kaunda, held multiparty electoral 
elections in 1991 after twenty-seven years in power. Frederick Chiluba succeeded 
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Kenneth Kaunda in 1991 after winning the transition election and a popular but 
controversial re-election in 1996 (Simon 2002, 2005; van de Walle 2002). Halfway 
through his second term in office, some political elites became distrustful of President 
Chiluba because of his dictatorial policies and penchant to entrench state power. 
Analysts regarded the bitter days of Kenneth Kaunda as better than the democracy 
under Frederick Chiluba (Sardanis 2014; Rakner 1999).  
ChilubaÕs anti-democratic and anti-opposition behavior caused many political 
elites and observers to raise objections and concerns for the stabilization of Zambian 
democracy under Chiluba (Sardanis 2014). The former president of Zambia, Kenneth 
Kaunda, predicted in1998 that President Frederick Chiluba was most likely to alter 
the constitution to perpetuate his presidency, justifying the doubts many had in 
Chiluba.173 Like in the Nigerian case, Chiluba rhetorically denied the allegation in 
private and public forums. He declared through several of his spokespeople that he 
would respect the two-term provision as provided by the Zambian Constitution (Skala 
2000; 2001). Interview and expert reports show that the local and international 
democracy stakeholders initially trusted Chiluba (Sardanis 2014).174 The local media, 
                                                
173 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona. Lusaka, Zambia, October 2014. 
174 In an interview with the author, Chona and Haagala all confirmed the Chiluba enjoyed an 
overwhelming local and international trust at the beginning of his presidency, but sabotaged this trust 
halfway into his regime by immersing his regime in scandalous and human rights abuses that involved 
high profile political assassinations and corruption. 
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including daily newspapers, continuously broadcast Chiluba's apparent commitment 
to democracy in various local languages (Sardanis 2014; Simon 2002, 2005).  
The introduction of national debate to elongate his presidency confirmed the 
popular distrust on Chiluba. This presidential term limits debates lasted a little more 
than a year and swayed the president against leading political elites in Zambia. This 
was a period of large-scale party defection, political intimidation, political 
assassinations, high political patronage, and dwindling democratic dividends 
(Sardanis 2014). The third-term controversy also saw the active mobilization of two 
sectors by opposition elites in Zambian politics, namely that of the courts and student 
union, (Rakner 2004; van de Walle and Mulaisho 2001).  
In May 2001, Frederick ChilubaÕs third-term dream faced a disgraceful defeat 
from elite political dissidents on the floor of the parliament. The role of dissenting 
political elites became significant to the extent that these political actors were 
instrumental in sensitizing and harnessing pressures from various segments of 
Zambian society to enforce compliance.  
I argue in this chapter that elite-led activism against Chiluba's third term 
applied the greatest pressures. Elite-led activism also awakened other sectors that 
coalesced to enforce term limits compliance on Chiluba in 2000. I will base reports 
and analysis on semi-structured interviews involving fifteen persons within the target 





5.1 The Background 
Zambia gained its independence in October 1964 with Kenneth Kaunda as the 
first president of the new independent Zambian Republic. The United National 
Independence Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda, which became the only official 
political party in 1966, ruled Zambia until 1991. In that last year, a combination of 
local and international pressures forced Kenneth Kaunda to agree on a constitutional 
amendment for multiparty democracy that limited the presidential tenure to two terms 
of five years (Simon 2005; OÕDonnel 1999; Joseph 1998). All political stakeholders 
supported the amendment,175 including the leader of the main opposition party 
Frederick Chiluba. The amendment introduced the first multiparty elections in 
Zambia in 1991. As presidential candidate of the main opposition Movement for 
Multiparty Democracy (MMD), Chiluba defeated President Kaunda in the election. 
With this success, a multiparty democracy and a new constitution that was clear on 
power alternation and power-sharing formula replaced ZambiaÕs one-party state. The 
defeat of Kenneth Kaunda in a competitive, multiparty presidential election in 1991 
raised the stakes and hope for democracy in Zambia (van Donge 1995; Joseph 1992) 
with high prospects for democracy consolidation that reached across the southern 
African region (Sardanis 2014). 
                                                
175  Stakeholders include the former president, members of UNIP, the churches, civil society 
organizations, student union and the international community. 
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The struggle for democratization in Zambia did not occur as painfully as in 
other countries where political conflict preceded such transition. Perhaps the near 
unanimity for a multiparty democracy within the ruling UNIP176 played a role in the 
swift transition. Though some writers argue that the highest pressure stemmed from 
Zambian civil society, organized and led by trade union activist Frederick Chiluba, 
(Sardanis 2014; Skala 2000, 2001; Simon 2003, 2005; Dulani 2010), other opinions 
recognize the willingness of the ruling party to relinquish power as a factor.177 
Moreover, the masses were weary of the dominance of one party and one president in 
Zambia. They clamored for change, which the president was willing to respect. This 
and mild international pressure led to the quick democratization in Zambia. 
The few pressure groups and political movements that emerged during the 
agitation for Zambian democratization collapsed into the MMD, a platform Chiluba 
used to confront Kenneth Kaunda in the 1991 presidential elections. The MMD 
enjoyed a free political ride through the large-scale willingness for change. By 
inventing slogans that announced the true arrival of democracy in Zambia, Chiluba 
succeeded in mobilizing all sectors to introduce multiparty democracy (Sardanis 
2014; Simon 2005; van de Walle 2001).  
                                                
176 Mark Chona informed the author in an interview that there was a consensus within the ruling UNIP 




Sardanis argues that Chiluba invented democratic slogans in order to discredit 
Kenneth Kaunda as a Marxist, promote himself as a liberal democrat, and win the 
trust of the international community (2014). This strategy worked, as international 
donors queued behind him as Zambian liberator (ibid.). The ruling UNIP effectively 
defected into the MMD, forcing Kenneth Kaunda into retirement (Simon 2002; Skala 
2000; Sandanis 2014). With the prominent political elites in the new MMD, these 
joined forces with pro-democracy pressure groups and donor communities. It was 
easy for the MMD to become grassroots-oriented, raising enormous hopes with 
popular acceptance as an alternative to UNIP. The MMDÕs candidate thus won the 
1991 elections with relative ease as the first multiparty president of Zambia. Chiluba 
and his MMD were re-elected in 1996 on what many observers described as a wave 
of popular support for the values of democracy and good governance (Simon 2002; 
Burnell 2001; Skala 2000). 
One thing that worked tremendously for President Chiluba was his ability to 
publicly package and to present himself as a true democrat. Having led the coalition 
in 1991 that brought down the regime of Kenneth Kaunda and ushered in multi-party 
democracy in Zambia, Chiluba sold himself to the international community and 
donors as a democrat (Sardanis 2014). In his campaign rally in 1996, Chiluba made a 
firm promise saying: ÒWhen my term of office comes to an end, do not even think of 
retaining me, because when a person gets old, he runs out of ideasÓ (SACBC, 
December 2002). In the African Head of States summit in Cameroon in 1995, 
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Chiluba appealed to other African leaders to never cling to power: ÒSuch practice 
breeds dictatorshipÓ (ibid.).    
These kind of statements endeared Chiluba to the public as a democrat, while 
Chiluba secretly concentrated efforts to entrench state power (Armstrong 2010). 
Among his most heinous undemocratic behaviors were the looting of public treasure 
and political assassinations under his tenure (Sardanis 2014). In spite of his denials 
and public display as a democrat, Chiluba had in May 2001 coerced his party into 
voting to change its constitution to allow him a third term in office, despite 
opposition and protests. The ambition for popular political support and the delivery of 
democracy dividends have figured as two contradictory characteristics of many 
presidents in the post-Cold War African democratic experiment.  
As many writers have noted, Chiluba failed to consolidate democracy in 
Zambia against popular expectation, but concentrated much of his energy and 
strategy in the consolidation of power (Skala 2001; Sardanis 2014). Assassination, 
imprisonment, or economic isolation systematically dislodged potential political 
competitors. As victims of ChilubaÕs political ambitions, the family of the first 
president experienced political assassination, imprisonment, and economic 
victimization from the same regime. However, ChilubaÕs focus on consolidation of 
personal power put him out of favor with a section of political elites and some civil 
society organizations in Zambia (Armstrong 2010; Simon 2005; Sandanis 2014).  
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According to Simon, the Zambian democracy struggled to live to its early 
promise over the course of ChilubaÕs ten years in office (2005), showing few signs of 
consolidation (Freedom House 1999). After two unwarranted declarations of states of 
emergency, two flawed and manipulated elections, and a record of political 
intimidation, assassinations, violence, and corruption, Chiluba and the MMD did not 
distinguish themselves from their predecessors in political behavior and style 
(Nyambe 1999; Chabal and Daloz 1999; Sardanis 2014; Skala 2001; Mphaisha 1996). 
Chiluba stood accused of taking Zambia back to the worst periods in history, 
incomparable even with the mild authoritarianism under Kaunda (Joseph 1998; 
Sanders 2014). All these together reduced ZambiaÕs Freedom House rating from 2.5 
(free) in 1991 to 4.5 (partly free) in 1996 (Freedom House 1996).  
In hindsight, the constitutional amendment debate to remove presidential term 
limits in Zambia, popularly referred to as the Ôthird-term agenda,Õ tested the 
rootedness of democracy in Zambia, and the readiness of different sectors to defend 
democracy in Zambia. It exposed the extent to which various sectors and institutions 
could protect democracy in Zambia.  
In the next section, I will examine the particular role of some political elites in 
mobilizing, harnessing, and bundling pressures to achieve the compliance outcome in 
Zambia. Why was the political elite dissident group apparently the only sector that 
could confront Chiluba? While contemplating his third-term agenda in 2000, why did 
Chiluba not foresee a defeat? Why did Chiluba not recognize the similarity between 
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the elite collaboration against Kaunda in 1990 and the elite collaboration against him 
with the singular agenda: ÒChiluba Must GoÓ? 
 
5.2 The Third Term Debate and Elite Activism in Zambia 
By early 1999, public dissent had grown strong against Chiluba and third-term 
rumors had reached their peak. Government-controlled newspapers (The Times of 
Zambia and the Zambian Daily Mail) and the only licensed radio station in Zambia 
had been rigged to popularize the third-term intention of Frederick Chiluba (Phiri 
2001). The Youth Wing of MMD was likewise encouraged to propagate the third-
term project (Simon 2005; SACBC 2002). However, like in the Nigerian case, any 
attempt at tenure elongation would have required a constitutional amendment of the 
ruling party that hitherto recognized only two terms in office. The Zambian 
Constitution would have required an amendment to accommodate any third-term 
ambitions since the RepublicÕs constitution prescribed two presidential terms of five 
years. Chiluba apparently underestimated elite resistance and the dissident elite 
capacity to mobilize forces like civil society and religious bodies against him (Inter 
Press Service, News Agency, Lusaka. 21 April2001; Christianity Today, 23 April 
2001).  
Two prominent members of the ruling party introduced the resistance against 
President ChilubaÕs third term by convincing a retired politician, Mark Chona, to 
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create and lead a movement to stop the amendment process.178 The caucus meeting of 
the ruling party endorsed a motion on January 29, 2000 to amend the constitution of 
the ruling MMD to allow President Chiluba go for a third term. On the same day, two 
prominent MMD members who took part in the caucus meeting met with Mark 
Chona to discuss the outcome of the caucus meeting. Their meeting with Chona on 
the evening of January 29, 2000 became the basis for the formation of OASIS, the 
platform that mobilized various sectors against President Chiluba and his third-term 
agenda.  
The decision of party internals to entrust the organization and leadership of 
the opposition platform to Mark Chona was both strategic and result-oriented. In the 
first place, Chona enjoyed much popularity on the Zambian political climate. Having 
served on the highest levels of the diplomatic mission, he had resigned with a good 
record as Zambian chief negotiator for the liberation of South Africa. On the 
international level, Chona commanded much respect having also served as consultant 
to IMF, World Bank, and many foreign embassies in Zambia. ChonaÕs leadership of 
OASIS would guarantee the necessary funding needed for their activism. It would be 
difficult for President Chiluba to intimidate Mark Chona without attracting immediate 
international reaction because of ChonaÕs international connections. On April 29, 
2000, OASIS held its anti-third term rally in Lusaka. It mobilized   church, womenÕs, 
and student groups to signal a strong opposition and rejection of any form of 
                                                
178 AuthorÕs interview with Haagala, Director  
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amendment to alter the presidential term limit of two terms in the Zambian 
Constitution. OASIS under Mark Chona was also able to mobilize support for 
constitutionalism among the MPs, cabinet members and prominent members of the 
ruling MMD. For instance, on April 29, 2001, the vice president of the republic and 
eighty serving MPs not only identified with the course of OASIS, but also strongly 
dissociated themselves from Chiluba's third-term ambition. 
The vice president was the highest-ranking political elite to reject ChilubaÕs 
attempts to amend the constitution for a third term. As a prominent member of the 
ruling MMD, his open disapproval of the attempt by Chiluba to seek a third term 
became a rallying point for other cabinet members and MPS mobilizing against 
Chiluba (News Agency Service, 21 April 2001; Armstrong 2010). Despite elite 
resistance and mobilization against the third-term agenda, President Chiluba and his 
loyalists went on to organize a National Convention to amend the partyÕs constitution 
to allow Chiluba a third term. The police were on hand to forcefully prevent all 
dissenting party elites from gaining access to the venue where the third-term issues 
would be decided. Internal opposition grew, with more prominent party internals 
including Miyanda, the Minister of Education, coming out strongly and making 
public statements against the third term (The Post, Lusaka, 12 February 2001). Using 
OASIS as a platform, Mark Chona and other dissenting elites went on to further 
mobilize students who, on two separate occasions, took to the streets denouncing 
Chiluba as a dictator (ibid.), while the Zambian Law Association (also sponsored by 
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OASIS) staged protests against Chiluba (Inter Press Service, News Agency, Lusaka. 
April 21, 2001).179 
As the government struggled to contain the elite activism, defection, and 
protests organized by OASIS, the drafting of tribal and regional chiefs into the protest 
movement further raised the cost of repression for President Chiluba. In the following 
public statement, tribal and regional chiefs threatened to mobilize further opposition 
against the third term in rural communities, should the MMD go on to approve third 
term for Chiluba:  
We make bold to ask our parliamentarians to state their views on the third 
term issue publicly. If they support the cause to extend President ChilubaÕs 
term of office, they have failed us in their functions and must quickly come 
back to their respective homes. (The Post, Lusaka Zambia, 30 January 2001).  
Newspaper reports show that Chiluba provided his loyalists with ready cash 
funds to finance the third-term agenda, especially for lobbying and image laundering 
(SACCB 2002; Dole 2001; Armstrong 2010; Dulani 2011). At the same time, 
opposition political actors who did not show enough sympathy towards ChilubaÕs 
third term became victims of political and economic intimidation, corruption 
allegations, or dismissal.  
                                                
179 International donors and embassies provided sufficient funds   to sponsor elite dissidence and 
enforce compliance.  
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Unfortunately, the president could not sack members of his cabinet who were 
opposed to his third them. Attempts to sack the ministers would have caused a 
governmental collapse and a constitutional mandate for a new election within three 
months. With his popularity waning and only a few months to the end of his second 
tenure, Chiluba did not consider new elections an option. He had no choice but to 
retain his cabinet, where more than five ministers openly spoke and worked against 
his third-term agenda (SACCB, December 2002).180 Instead the dismissal affected 
mainly members of the military, the police, the intelligence service, top officers of the 
ruling party, members of the legislature, and many political elites whose sympathy 
for the third term agenda was questionable (Simon 2005; Armstrong 2010; Sardanis 
2014).181 
President ChilubaÕs hardline posture towards internal dissidents ultimately 
resulted in a complete rupture of the ruling MMD, creating room for massive elite 
defection from the ruling party and followed by the formation of a new political 
association to challenge the ruling party. Though Chiluba knew the strength of the 
                                                
180 Mark Chona remarked that president Chiluba initially approved the sacking of four Ministers for 
speaking out openly against third term, but refrained when he noticed that the sacking of ministers 
would trigger mass resignation of other ministers, which would lead to the collapse of his government.  
181  Interview reports generally remark that the police, the army and members of the national 
intelligence community were particularly punished for shielding OASIS and the dissident elites and 
their protests against presidential directives 
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elite coalition against him, it is uncertain why he underestimated their capacity to 
defeat his third term project. However, despite ChilubaÕs public hardline posture 
against the dissenting political elites, he found time to personally meet with Mark 
Chona (the leader of OASIS) and each of the national executive members 
individually to persuade them with patronage to support his third-term bid, a gesture 
rejected by majority of cabinet members (SACCB, December 2002).182 The massive 
defection from the ruling party after Chiluba had secured his partyÕs mandate for a 
third term shows that ChilubaÕs carrot and stick strategies to win political elite 
support did not succeed.  
President Chiluba could not presume ignorance of the danger posed by 
internal dissidence toward him and his third term. By 2001, seventeen officials had 
resigned from his government while more than twenty prominent members of the 
party had defected.183 The external and internal elite resistance led by Mark Chona 
and the vice president had mobilized enough support to stop the third term agenda at 
the party level.  Since Chiluba needed the ruling party's approval for a third term, he 
ordered state police to stop the dissenting elites from participating in the party 
                                                
182 Mark Chona confirmed in an interview with the author that President Chiluba personally met with 
him to discuss a way out of the controversy 
183 I base my calculation on my interview, various literature and newspaper reports on the defections in 
Zambia between 1997 and 2001. 
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conference (Simon 2005).184 Prior to the party convention that endorsed ChilubaÕs 
third term, a large number of party members voiced their opposition to Chiluba and 
boycotted the convention.185 However, the absence of the dissenting elites worked 
toward the advantage for ChilubaÕs loyalists to approve the third term for Chiluba.  
The convention also approved a proposal to expel all party members opposed 
to ChilubaÕs third term. The threat of expulsion did not deter the elite dissidents, who 
chose to fight back through the courts. Even though the courts turned down their 
demands, the elite dissidents set a precedent for the judiciaryÕs involvement in the 
constitution amendment controversy in Zambia. As I shall discuss later in this 
chapter, the court was to give a landmark ruling at a later stage of the debate that 
sustained and shaped the outcome of the controversy. Having secured the 
commitment of the ruling party and the National Constitutional Conference for a 
third-term proposal, Chiluba still needed to convince the MPs to confirm the removal 
of presidential term limits in Zambia. This task proved difficult, since some 
prominent elites had already lobbied and mobilized the MPs against ChilubaÕs third 
term.  
As a first strategy, the elite dissidents agreed to refrain from boycotting any 
session in the parliament and by default, give Chiluba an undue advantage. The ruling 
                                                




party controlled a clear majority (seventy percent) in the parliament, but it was 
difficult for Chiluba to secure the required two-third majority of votes to pass the 
amendment bill. The elite dissidents made their presence and activism so strongly felt 
in the parliament that it necessitated the postponement of the presentation of the 
third-term bill to the parliament on three occasions (Dulani 2011).186  
However, the more Chiluba used threats and physical violence to intimidate 
the dissenting elites, the more his prominent party and cabinet members defected. In 
an opposition rally organized by the Law Association of Zambia, Vice President 
Christo Tembo and Minister of Education Miyanda warned Chiluba to respect the 
Zambian Constitution or face humiliation. They vowed to resist any attempt by the 
president to manipulate the constitution for personal ambition (Inter Press Service, 
23April 2001).  
By April 2001, OASIS has assembled a strong coalition of party internals and 
externals against Chiluba's third term.  Prominent party internals like Godfrey 
Miyanda, Nevers Mumba, Defense Minister Ben Nwila, Anderson Madoka, Michael 
Sata, and over eighty MPs had switched loyalty to retire Chiluba (Simon 2005). The 
broad coalition and the massive defection of political elites from the ruling party 
raised the cost of oppression for Chiluba considerably, isolating his regime further 
from the public. The vice president and the Minister of Education alluded to the 
                                                
186 Confirmed in the authorÕs interview with Mark Chona in Lusaka Zambia, October 2014. 
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coalition in May 2001 when they lobbied the MPs to reject ChilubaÕs third term to 
forestall dictatorship in Zambia (SACCB, December 2002).  
In response, more than eighty-five of ZambiaÕs one hundred and fifty-eight 
MPs signed a petition agreeing to oppose and frustrate the constitutional amendment 
to give Chiluba a third term. Among those who signed the petition were sixty MMD 
MPs, twenty opposition members, and five independent members of the 
Parliament.187 With eighty-five MPs, the elite dissident group enjoyed a superior 
position over Chiluba and his loyalists. Chiluba and his loyalists could not coerce 
these MPs to change their mind in favor of the third term, financial inducements and 
patronage notwithstanding. 188  OASIS presented a counter strategy to provide 
dissenting MPs and cabinet members with pocket money and transport fairs for anti-
third term rallies. This probably worked against ChilubaÕs attempted inducement of 
MPs and cabinet members to support the amendment bill.189  
                                                
187Ibid. 
188 There is a confirmed allegation that Chiluba promised and paid US$3000 to MPs who would 
support his third term bid (cf. Dulani 2011; Armstrong 2010). 
189 According Mark Chona, the founder of the OASIS Movement, the ability of OASIS to secure funds 
from international donors made it possible to counter ChilubaÕs use of state funds to bribe support for 
the amendment bill. Certain of rally allowances and transport fairs, the dissenting elites put their 
weight against ChilubaÕs third-term bill, having nothing to lose financially. 
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The platform and leadership provided by Mark Chona, the vice president and 
speaker of the parliament, set the stage for the dissenting elites to apply pressure on 
Chiluba. By May 2001, a significant number of internal and external anti-third term 
elites had combined with other sectors to overpower ChilubaÕs group in the 
parliament. Though assured of a two-third majority vote in the parliament, Chona and 
the leading dissents were prepared for contingencies. Anticipating that some MPs 
might give in to the fear of intimidation, the dissenting elites designed an alternative 
plan for impeachment, should Chiluba refuse to relinquish his third-term agenda. 
With the majority of MPs on their side, it was easy for OASIS to mobilize an 
impeachment process against Chiluba. This influenced voting on the constitutional 
amendment in May 2001.The cabinet members needed by Chiluba for a 
parliamentary victory joined the dissenting group, further depleting the pro-third term 
group and deflecting any hope that the third-term project would succeed. The 
impeachment process for the dissenting elites overshadowed any prospects of 
parliamentary voting on the third-term bill. The impeachment process gained ground 
quickly and pressured President Chiluba to withdraw the third-term bill and announce 
his retirement from politics.190  
                                                
190 In an earlier discussion with Chiluba, Chona had admonished the president to withdraw the 
amendment bill, to which Chiluba refused. In an interview with the author, Mark Chona spoke of 
President ChilubaÕs sudden interest in meeting him again later, following the commencement of the 
impeachment process. Chona refused to meet the president, as the dissenting elites were set to 




5.3 Other Pressures Against ChilubaÕs Third Term  
Other sectoral pressures converged to enforce compliance on President 
Frederick Chiluba. However, these pressures would have been insignificant to 
guarantee the compliance outcome in Zambia without elite mobilization. Firstly, elite 
dissidence had stimulated, sponsored, and distributed these sectoral pressures. 
Secondly, Chiluba strategically isolated many sectors in the presidential term limits 
debate by focusing and targeting the ruling party and the parliament, over which he 
had apparent control. He avoided a referendum that would have given sectors the 
mandate to put Chiluba under pressure. 
  Chiluba had anticipated a successful passage of the amendment, because his 
party controlled the majority of parliamentary MPs. Internal elite dissidence and 
activism prevented this, having thwarted ChilubaÕs third--term calculations and 
strategies. The formation of OASIS became a rallying point for all oppositional 
actors/sectors. The formation of an alternative political platform by the vice-president 
and other dissenting MMD elites, the Forum for Democracy and Development 
(FDD), became a political counter-initiative against the ruling MMD. While OASIS 
remained apolitical and resistant to political and institutional divides, the internal 
dissenting elites presented the FDD as an alternative platform to MMD. The vice 
president and other dissenting cabinet members used the FDD as a political platform 
to maintain political pressure on Chiluba. The non-political stance, of OASIS, 
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enabled its partnership with the FDD and further simplified the mobilization of 
CSOs, the church, womenÕs groups, and the media against the third-term agenda of 
Chiluba.  
Some analysts argue that about sixty-eight percent of the Zambian political 
community, including the judiciary, the international community, market men, and 
women, were involved in the third-term politics (Sardanis 2014).  Political elites like 
Mark Chona, vice- president Criston Tembo, and the speaker of the parliament stirred 
the political consciousness against ChilubaÕs third-term agenda. They were 
instrumental in mobilizing other elites to bundle the sparse pressures arising from 
CSOs, the church, democratic institutions, and international actors. The elite activism 
and bundling of pressures forced Chiluba to retire. In the following, I will analyze the 
effectiveness of some of these pressures accordingly in producing the compliance 
outcome in Zambia. 
 
5.3.1 Civil Society and Media 
Zambian civil society has a long history of political activism dating back to 
the 1990s, when the first signs of a democratic transition were evident in Zambia. 
Some civil society organizations were active in the struggle that brought down the 
twenty-seven years one-party regime of President Kenneth Kaunda. By default, these 
CSOs helped install the multi-party democracy that brought Frederick Chiluba to 
power in 1991 (Dulani 2011).  
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In the struggle against ChilubaÕs third-term agenda, however, the involvement 
of the civil society was not central. In 1991, the populace yearned for democracy and 
a multi-party system.  However, the CSOs that became active in the process that 
supported President ChilubaÕs election to president in 1991 lost their enthusiasm after 
they had helped install a multi-party democracy in Zambia. With the end of the Cold 
War, the populace had high expectations for the impact of democracy on Zambian 
economic development. After the implementation of a democratic system and initial 
enthusiasm, many Zambians became less optimistic about the promise of democracy 
and its effect on economic development.191  
In Zambia, as in most other post cold-War African democracies, popular 
support for democracy declined due to the apparent inability of democracy to address 
the economic expectations of the people. The sporadic demonstrations against the 
third-term bill indicated that a section of the populace was not in favor of ChilubaÕs 
continued stay in power. The apparent failure of his democratic regime to deliver on 
                                                
191 Inglehart 1977; 2003 describes this general decrease in enthusiasm on the 
promises of democracy as over expectation and the cause of a Òmass lack of support 




democracy dividends as earlier expected of a democracy became a factor in ÒChiluba 
must goÓ project.192  
However, some other civil society organizations, including the National 
Organization for Civic Education (NOCE) and the Independent Churches of Zambia 
(ICOZ), supported protests in favor of the regime. Many other minor CSOs remained 
less visible and active during the controversy. President Chiluba operated a regime 
that was antagonistic to both Zambian civil society and media, even though he 
benefitted from civil society and media activism in 1991 (Sardanis 2014). Many 
prominent journalists were intimidated and arrested to coerce the media into 
submission.193 As Simon (2005) points out, harassment of the media demonstrates the 
Chiluba administrationÕs intolerance of the dissenting view. 
For instance, youth members of the MMD in the Copperbelt region attacked 
an independent radio station in March 1999 that broadcasted an interview with an 
opposition politician, destroying its equipment and putting it out of the air.194 The 
police also sounded a warning to other journalists to refrain from openly criticizing 
                                                
192 Only the students and the National Women Association (NWA) came out strongly in 
opposition of the amendment of the constitution, seemingly because OASIS invited them to do so. The 
other few CSOs that joined the anti-third term struggle did so on varied reasons.  
193  AuthorÕs interview with Swithin Haangala, Managing Director, Zambezi FM Radion in 
Livingstone, Zambia, October 2014. 
194 The Foundation for the Democratic Process documented such anti-media behavior in 2002.  
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the regime. Officers arrested and imprisoned Masautso Phiri, the editor of The Post, 
in 2001 for publishing articles criticizing ChilubaÕs third-term.195 Also in 2001, 
Chiluba ordered the prosecution of an editor and some dissenting elites for defaming 
the president in an article that published in The Post. 196  Though this kind of 
repression drew condemnation from local and international human rights crusaders, 
the message from the Chiluba regime was clear (Human Rights Watch 1996, 1997; 
Phiri 1999). 
ChilubaÕs government did not spare civil society any intimidation. Civic 
education NGOs suffered the most in Zambia, targeted because they represented the 
sensitive dynamics of Ôdonor-elite relationsÕ in Zambia (Simon 2005). For instance, 
the mission of the Foundation for Democratic Progress (FODEP), the NGO 
Coordinating Council (NGOCC), and the Committee for a Clean Campaign (CCC) 
was Òpromoting democracy and good governance.Ó This mission had a direct bearing 
on the substance of democratic consolidation. It involved the education of the 
citizenry about their democratic rights, the tutoring of politicians about their 
responsibilities, and the creation of opportunities to serve their constituencies, 
supporting greater participation in politics.  
                                                
195 Ibid. 
196 The Post allegedly referred to the president by calling him a Ôthief.Õ  
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In order to entrench and retain state power as many incumbent presidents 
elsewhere have done in Africa (Ingelhart 2014; Diamond 2015; Collier 2008), 
president Chiluba used executive powers to suppress policies that would have 
expanded democratic practices in Zambia. Democracy NGOs, as mentioned above, 
drew the wrath of ChilubaÕs regime. The regime targeted these NGOs with anti-
democratic policies in order to keep the populace ignorant about their democratic 
rights (Simon 2002; Sardanis 2014). To realize this objective, Chiluba's government 
utilized frivolous excuses to minimize the impact of these democracy NGOs, linking 
them to external support and banning them unequivocally (Simon 2002; Sardanis 
2014). In 1996, for instance, prominent MMD leaders called for the banning of the 
three major democracy-oriented NGOs: the FODEP, the Zambian Independent 
Monitoring Team (ZIMT) and the CCC. The regime identified and banned several 
other groups that were outspoken and critical of the regimeÕs style of governance 
(Simon 2005). In one of his public messages, Chiluba distinguished local NGOs as 
Òconveyor belts of external forces that resembled mercenary operations,Ó using this as 
an excuse to further stifle the voice of civil society by subjecting them to additional 
registration and conduct requirements (Zambia Daily Mail, 6 October 1996).  
It was obvious that both the civil society and the media were exhausted and 
conquered long before the third-term debates had begun in Zambia. Because the 
regime weakened the potency of leading civil society organizations, neither civil 
society nor the media would figure at the forefront of the struggle against ChilubaÕs 
third term. Their most viable option was to ally with the leading anti-third term 
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movement, OASIS. Alliance with the leading elite political dissidents offered the 
NGOs a platform, funding, and protection.  
Interview reports confirm that those CSOs that had participated in anti-third 
term rallies had simply queued into the anti-third term rallies organized and 
sponsored by OASIS.197 Owing to paucity of funds among some NGOs, OASIS 
funded many NGOs that indicated an interest in participating in anti-third term rallies 
organized by OASIS.198 It became evident that particular political elites, who were 
the masterminds of the resistance, mobilized and sponsored many of the NGOs that 
participated in the OASIS-led anti-third term movement in Zambia (Armstrong 
2010). Political affiliation, connection, protection, and funding played a significant 
role in the mobilization of these NGOs. However, once incorporated in the struggle, 
the pressures emanating from these CSOs became mutually dependent and concurrent 
with elite political activism (Dulani 2011, Armstrong 2010). Simultaneously, some 
political elites in the likes of Mark Chona, Cristo Tembo, and the speaker of the 
parliament were indispensable in the harnessing and channeling of the bundled 
pressures to enforce compliance.  
As shown in the Nigerian case, internal political dissidents served as 
whistleblowers. According to Armstrong (2010), these whistleblowers presented a 
                                                





Òhigh-profile oppositionÓ to Chiluba. Elite opposition activism against the removal of 
term limits had been taking place for months before NGOs and other sectors joined 
the struggle. Newspaper accounts show that civil society, represented by student and 
religious bodies, only legitimized and strengthened the initial and on-going pressures 
from some political elites. Though the involvement of some CSOs in the anti-third 
term protests raised the costs of repression for Chiluba, analysts affirm that particular 
political elites initiated the movement against ChilubaÕs third term, and brought the 
movement to its final fruition (Simon 2005; Armstrong 2010).  
For instance, university students organized three mass protests in Lusaka in 
2001. They organized these protests in solidarity with OASIS and elite dissenters that 
the regime had persecuted for their political stance against Chiluba's third term. As in 
the Nigerian case, these so-called mass protests were actually offshoots from the elite 
resistance against the removal of term limits. Mark Chona and Haangala all spoke of 
their difficulty in convincing and mobilizing the masses against the removal of 
presidential term limits. Since the majority of the rural grassroots did not understand 
the intricacies of term limits politics, it became difficult to mobilize them against the 
president, who had already bribed them with patronage and slush cash. Part of the 
governmentÕs strategy involved the selling of government houses to village heads at 




Relying on funds from international donors, OASIS, on the other hand, 
mobilized a section of the masses by producing and distributing t-shirts, face caps, 
towels, and handkerchiefs. Additionally, OASIS organized incidents of minor civil 
disobedience to attract popular attention among the masses. These included the 
appeal for two minutes of daily silence every afternoon at 17:00; the blowing of 
whistles; and the display of a red card to symbolize a total rejection of President 
Chiluba.199 This helped anti-third term slogans and sentiments to gain strength among 
a section of the populace. Eventually, the regime deployed security agents to prevent 
people from observing the 17:00 hoursÕ anti-third term ritual of silent protest. But 
even these security agents switched sides, protecting the people who observed the 
protest ritual and seizing  t-shirts, towels, and face caps for themselves.200 
CSOs participated in the protests against Chiluba for varied reasons. Judging 
from reports and public statements, CSO participation was motivated socially, 
religiously, and economically. Students, for instance, particularly opposed Chiluba 
for breaching the constitution (The Post, 2 May 2001). The Labour Union, however, 
cared little about the third term and joined the struggle to protest ChilubaÕs inability 
to create jobs for the unemployed masses (The Post, Lu 25 January 2001). Elite-led 
religious bodies, on the other hand, opposed Chiluba because of Òhis hypocrisy.ÕÓ 
                                                
199 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona and Haangala in Lusaka, Zambia on October 5, 2014 
200 AuthorÕs interview with Swithin K.M Hangala, Managing Director of Zambezi FM Radio in 
Livingstone, Zambia, on October 2014 
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According to their statement, while Chiluba had declared Zambia a Christian state, 
his governance style demonstrated the opposite. Religious organizations referred to 
this attitude as hypocritical (BBC News, 3 April 2001). Mark ChonaÕs close 
relationship to Fr. Nkwette, the personal secretary to the Archbishop of Lusaka, made 
the church willing to ally with OASIS. Fr. Nkwette had worked on the same 
commission with Chona. He facilitated a meeting between Chona and the 
Archbishop, as well as a meeting between Chona and the National WomenÕs 
Association, to which he was a chaplain. With such connections, OASIS expanded 
and penetrated other organizations using the church, womenÕs groups, and other small 
but powerful clubs.  
Of all these CSOs, the protest generated from the students was most targeted. 
When the students protested the illegality of the intended removal of presidential term 
limits, they directly influenced the struggle against ChilubaÕs third-term amendment 
bill. The protest actions of other groups were Ônon-directed,Õ having manipulated the 
ongoing political situation to exhibit their separate grievances. There was no evidence 
of direct lobbying of the MPs emanating from CSOs, nor evidence of CSO-sponsored 
protests. CSO protests were anchored and dependent on dissenting elites and 
therefore could not have directly and independently influenced the outcome of the 
third term debate. In the end, political elites supplied the highest pressure that 




5.3.2 The Parliament 
As in most presidential systems in developing democracies, the Zambian 
political system accommodated power entrenchment by concentrating power within 
the presidency. Though the constitution clearly demarcated the role of parliament, the 
overbearing and monopolizing nature of the presidency hindered the independence of 
parliament. The parliament, though, had only existed for nine years. As an institution, 
it lacked the experience and maturity to assert its independence. 
Furthermore, no precedent for independent action had existed under the mild 
authoritarianism of Kenneth KaundaÕs regime, which has lasted twenty-seven years. 
Under Kaunda, an unbalanced relationship existed between the executive, the 
parliament, and the judiciary, providing an opportunity for executive recklessness and 
undemocratic political behavior. For a large part, this remained unchanged under 
Frederick Chiluba.The judiciary and parliament often served as institutional tools to 
legitimize ChilubaÕs desired programs (Simon 2005; Sardanis 2014).  
Like Kaunda, Chiluba used the parliament as a rubber stamp to confirm his 
oppressive policies (Rakner 1998). Records show that the parliament never recorded 
any clear victory against presidential initiatives prior to third-term politics 
(Armstrong 2010). According to a Zambian political experts, no one expected 
parliament to reject ChilubaÕs bill (Sardanis 2014). Parliament had often figured as an 
extension of the presidency. It neglected its function to Ôcheck and balanceÕ the 
executive, a role which it did not take seriously (Armstrong 2010; Sardanis 2014). 
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For instance, the parliament readily approved the ÔState Proceeding ActÕ initiated by 
Chiluba in 1998, which stripped the courts of their power to hold the executive 
accountable (Business Day South Africa, 15 September 2000).  
ParliamentÕs dependence on the executive reveals how the parliament initially 
understood its duties within the new Zambian democracy. At the beginning of the 
transition regime in the 1990s, the parliament apparently understood cooperation with 
the executive as a sign of political maturity and democratic consolidation. The 
parliament did not serve as a place for opposition politics until the third-term debate 
fractured and ruptured the ruling party and loyalties within the parliament. Elite 
activism against third-term politics would re-shape the understanding of democratic 
growth and consolidation in Zambia.  Political leaders would employ the tactics of 
political realignment and an elite coalition to apply pressure on and demand 
accountability from Chiluba, using the parliament as a platform for resistance. 
Through elite activism, the parliament suddenly became a political battlefield for 
third-term politics.  
Parliament provided the platform for dissenting political actors to launch three 
important decisive actions that increased political pressure on Chiluba and ultimately 
pressurized him into compliance (IRIN, 7 May 2001). The parliament became the 
venue where internal party opponents mobilized and launched impeachment 
proceedings against Chiluba. Dissenting elites used the parliament too to demand the 
dissolution of ChilubaÕs cabinet. Lastly, the parliament offered the speaker the 
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opportunity to overrule the president on the dismissal of dissenting ruling MMD 
MPs.  
Like in the Nigerian case, the parliament provided the platform for an 
organized struggle against ChilubaÕs third term by becoming a destination for Òwar.Ó 
Dissenting political elites used the parliament to execute a prepared political agenda, 
without compromising the needed and usual parliamentary debates, arguments, and 
procedures (Dulani 2009). Party affiliation no longer mattered, as individual 
discretion took an upper hand. Instead of party affiliation, the position of each MP on 
ChilubaÕs third term was decisive.  Ultimately, parliament did not act as an 
autonomous body in the third-term debate. Particular dissenting elites transformed the 
parliament into a combatant venue to pressure President Chiluba into compliance 
relying on individual discretion. 
Furthermore, as in most new democracies operating a presidential system, the 
Zambian Constitution allowed an Òinstitutionalized resource advantage for incumbent 
presidentsÓ (Simon 2005). President Chiluba often exercised an unrestrained 
monopoly on issues of finance with other branches of government (ibid). A majority 
advantage of the ruling party in the parliament often made this possible. Former 
president Kenneth Kaunda enjoyed these institutional advantages for twenty-seven 
years. Unfortunately, the transition constitution particularly failed to reshuffle many 
of the resource advantages available to an incumbent regime.  
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President Chiluba enjoyed unbalanced advantages, to the detriment of 
multiparty democracy and its consolidation efforts in Zambia. He employed these 
resource advantages against his opponents throughout his two tenures and intensified 
it especially during the third-term politics (Sardanis 2014). President Chiluba and his 
loyalists particularly monopolized the state media to the disadvantage of other parties 
and opponents (Phiri 1999; Sardanis 2014). During the third-term amendment bill 
debate, the regime allowed itself and loyalists unrestrained access to public media for 
their lobby activities, while it denied dissenting elites access to the very same 
media.201  
The incumbent regime also controlled major aspects of the economy. Chiluba 
maintained a competitive imbalance toward his favor by controlling a wide range of 
assets from National Banks to Copper Mines (Simon 2005; Sardanis 205).202 Some 
analysts have observed that Chiluba used an economic monopoly to maintain his 
political and economic dominance over the opposition (Rakner 1999; van de Walle 
2001). Chiluba used the proceeds as patronage to coerce dissenting voices and 
achieve an electoral advantage (Sardanis 2014). The executive branch in Zambia 
heavily dominated other branches in its government using this kind of carrot and stick 
                                                
201Ibid. 
202 In an interview with the arthor, Mark Chona particularly criticized president for the handling of 
national Copper Mines, a scandal he argued gave OASIS a seeming advantage in spreading anti-third 
term message to the masses. 
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strategy, as was the case in most other African countries (Tordoff and Molteno 1974; 
Gertz 1984).   
Describing the imbalance in Zambia, van de Walle states that Òexecutive 
dominanceÓ had Òeaten away at Zambian democracyÓ (2002), while Philip Alderfel 
observed little improvement in the quality and quantity of parliamentary activities in 
Zambia after 1991: for every step forward on the path of legislative development, 
there were two steps backwardÓ (1997). Chiluba's dominance over parliament, 
coupled with the institutionalized resource advantages accruable to his regime, made 
it difficult for the parliament to exert any meaningful institutional pressure on 
Chiluba. Parliament only succeeded in effectively coercing Chiluba with the help of 
elite agents during the third-term debate (Burnnel 2001; Wehner 2001).  
Mark Chona recognized his own agential influence within parliament, when 
he and other political elites mobilized over one hundred MPs against the repealing of 
term limits in Zambia. He acknowledged that the outcome of the presidential terms 
limit amendment debate would have been different without the consistent pressure 
mounted on the MPs by OASIS, the vice president, and the speaker of the parliament.  
He commended the role of other prominent members of the ruling party, whose 
rejection of ChilubaÕs third-term amendment bill ruptured executive loyalty within 
the ruling party and engendered a parliamentary balance of power.  
A parliament that had been docile would not have suddenly risen up to apply 
decisive institutional pressure on the president, without a decisive and radical push 
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from some political dissenting elites who may have used the parliament as a platform 
to settle political scores with President Chiluba. 
 
5.3.3 The Judiciary  
Initially, the Zambian courts did not differ from the Zambian parliament. Like 
in many other post-Cold War African democracies, the courts enjoyed little 
independence. Many people across post-Cold War African democracies regarded the 
courts as an appendage of the executive (Bratton and van de Walle 1994; Diamond 
1988). As an institutional body, the Zambian courts did not take a clear stand on any 
issue concerning the entrenchment of power by Chiluba. Instead, the courts assisted 
the government in securing victory in many controversial court cases involving the 
government (Simon 2002). However, during the presidential term limits debates, 
dissenting political elites tested the credibility of the courts by providing an 
opportunity for the courts to show some courage and independence (Armstrong 
2010). The internal dissenting elites were undoubtedly aware of the weakness of the 
Zambian courts, but still decided to reach out to the judiciary during the third-term 
controversy for two reasons. The dissenting political actors wanted to protest against 
what the vice president described as ChilubaÕs Òreckless impunity and approach to the 
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rule of law.Ó The dissenting elites also wanted to use the courts to legitimize their 
resistance.203  
Mark Chona emphasized the importance of legitimizing elite activism through 
the court. While being careful to avoid his personal connections with judicial 
officials, he believed that the judiciary could help challenge certain executive 
decisions against dissenting elites. By enlisting the help of the courts, Chona could 
involve the judiciary in the third-term debate. The dissenting elites probably 
understood the role of the judiciary as a reactionary institution that would only take a 
stand if opponents raised objections and approached the courts for interpretation. Like 
in the Nigerian case, the dissenting elites in Zambia utilized this space and inundated 
the judiciary with court cases related to the politics of presidential term limits.  
While the judiciary initially failed to show interest in the third-term 
controversy, the courts adjusted their stand as the debate heated up. The courts 
became even more involved as ChilubaÕs camp began to litter the political space with 
political casualties. For instance, the neutrality of the courts disappointed the masses 
when Chiluba and his loyalists barred the dissenting elites from the party convention 
that repealed the MMDÕs constitution, allowing Chiluba to run for a third time. The 
courts initially refused to entertain the hearing on the charge brought forward by the 
opposition elites, describing it as a party affair (The Post 30 April 2001).  In its 
                                                
203 According to the authorÕs interview with Mark Chona, approaching the courts was a better strategy 
for inviting the judiciary into the third-term amendment bill.  
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refusal to intervene early, the judiciary appeared to protect President Chiluba and 
allow his consolidation of more power (Phiri 2002). Others interpreted the courtÕs 
inaction as judicial recklessness (IRIN 7 May 2001). 
How and why did the court suddenly begin to deliver judgments in favor of 
the dissenting elites? The first judicial decision that favored the dissenting elites was 
the overruling of an executive and MMD party order, which declared the 
parliamentary seats of defected and expelled MPs vacant. At the time of the 
overruling, the MPs were preparing for a parliamentary vote on the third term bill, 
and the amendment debate was nearing its end. Though President Chiluba had 
anticipated the absence of over eighty expelled and defected MPs to allow the bill 
through, he was not certain that the remaining MPs were on his side. Some MPs loyal 
to Chiluba were to cast protest votes against Chiluba, in solidarity with the expelled 
MPs.204  
The courts, thus, only advocated the dissenting elites when the elites already 
appeared to have won. In April 2001, the Zambian Lawyers Association, (a strong 
member of OASIS) organized a rally in which the vice president was a key speaker. 
The rally was a protest against the executive order that had declared the seats of 
expelled and defected members of the ruling party vacant. Observers argued that the 
                                                
204 In separate interviews, Mark Chona and Haangala convinced the author that the MPs were 
optimistic and eager to vote down the bill to protest the executive order that declared the parliamentary 
seats vacant of those expelled colleagues who had demonstrated opposition to ChilubaÕs third term. 
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Zambian Lawyers Association had organized the rally to pressure the judiciary to 
protect the dissenting elites. At the rally, the lawyers invited the judiciary to Ôstand on 
the right side of history,Õ since ChilubaÕs third term would be defeated (Inter Press 
Service, 21 April 2001). Any contrary judgment would supposedly influence the 
credibility of the Zambian courts negatively. The case before the courts proved a 
difficult one, but it became an opportunity for the judiciary to redeem itself and 
secure its independence from President Chiluba. 
In 1998, Chiluba passed a parliamentary bill that amended the ÔState 
Proceedings ActsÕ and stripped the courts of their capacity to issue injunctions. 
Before May 2001, the courts had continuously been supportive of the incumbent 
Zambian presidents and respected the terms of the State Proceeding Acts, even after 
their amendment in 1998. In May 2001, the courts suddenly decided to disobey them. 
The courts illegally issued injunctions in favor of the internal dissenting elites 
expelled from the ruling party, acting in direct consequence of elite pressure on the 
judiciary. Why did the courts act in breach of the amended State Proceeding Act, 
which refrained them from granting court injunctions against the executive? 
Though some interview reports alleged a personal connection between the 
dissenting elites and some top judicial officers,205 I judge the breaching as important 
                                                
205 Haagala alleged in an interview with the Author that Mark Chona had very good connection with 
top judicial officials, a factor he could not disconnect from judicial soft spot for the dissenting elites. 
However, the author could not confirm this allegation independently.  
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for many reasons. It enabled the dismissed ruling party dissident MPs to retain their 
seats in the parliament. The injunction also enabled the affected ruling party MPs to 
continue to apply pressure on Chiluba from within the parliament. The injunction 
guaranteed the parliamentary majority needed by anti-third term elites to defeat the 
amendment bill. Equipped with the judicial injunction, the Speaker of Parliament 
quickly overruled the executive order, recalled the dismissed MPs, and retained their 
seats in parliament. The retention of these parliamentary seats of expelled party 
members was necessary to block any move from Chiluba to push any legislation 
concerning the third term (IRIN 7 May 2001). Furthermore, it fuelled the 
impeachment process against Chiluba, giving it more support and speed. The 
impeachment attempt sent a strong signal to ChilubaÕs loyalists and strengthened the 
elite dissenting camp against the third term.   
The last judicial intervention was crucial in sustaining a majority advantage 
for the dissenting elites in the parliament. However, the intervention came late, at a 
time when the dissenting elites had already resisted executive intimidation, sustained 
their activism, and further strategized to enforce compliance on Chiluba. Though the 
intervention of the courts appeared to quicken the defeat of the amendment bill, it 
came when the fight was almost over, and was moreover, elite-induced, targeted to 
give protection to victims of ChilubaÕs executive intimidation. For many actors, the 
defeat of the amendment bill had not been dependent on judicial intervention.  
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According to Mark Chona, President Chiluba and his government had already 
been facing strong political isolation. The loss of more than seventy-five percent of 
his cabinet members and more than one hundred MPs to the anti-third term 
movement (OASIS) rendered the president powerless. As Mark Chona remarked:  
We appreciated the judicial judgment that restored the parliamentary seats of 
the expelled MPs. Of course, we became more confident. However, we had our plans 
and strategies. We were not waiting for the court because we knew that the 
government had already collapsed. The president had already become a lame duck. 
We would have still defeated the amendment bill without the late intervention from 
the court.206 
The judiciary, thus, joined the struggle to exploit the apparent victory of the 
opposition and place itself Ôon the good side of history.Õ There was no evidence of 
independent pressure from the courts. Unlike the parliament, the courts did not 
function as effective platform for the dissenting elites to apply pressure to Chiluba. 
They only provided last minute protection for the dissenters to stop Chiluba and his 




                                                
206 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona in, Lusaka, Zambia, in October 2015 
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5.3.4 Political Parties 
In 1991, a coalition of political movements had combined to pressure Kenneth 
Kaunda to allow a multi-party democracy. International donors, civil society groups, 
political activists, and religious bodies produced the bundled pressure that resulted in 
ZambiaÕs democratization. The successful democratic transitions in Benin Republic, 
Niger, Togo, and Gabon in the early 1990s further encouraged Kaunda to lift the ban 
on multi-party political activities in Zambia (U.S. State Department, April 2001). The 
combination of these forces with strong local and internal elite activism207 within the 
ruling party pressured Kaunda to a roundtable negotiation, which culminated in the 
formation of political parties and the first ever, open, multi-party elections in Zambia 
in 1991 (Armstrong 2010; Sardanis 2014).  
Before 1991, Kenneth Kaunda had ruled Zambia as a one-party state for 
twenty-seven years with his United National Independence Party (UNIP), 
consolidating and entrenching state power (Simon 2005; van de Walle 2001; Rakner 
1999; Sardanis 2014). With the democratic opening assured, many political 
associations and movements officially gained ground, and after that transformed into 
political parties. The Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD) became the 
                                                
207 According to Mark Chona, an agreement already existed in the ruling UNIP for democratization 
and a multi-party democracy. Kaunda had already yielded to internal pressure from the party to hold 




dominant and most significant political party that created an alternative platform for 
popular convergence208 to challenge Kenneth Kaunda and his ruling UNIP. The 
MMD therefore became a loose coalition of former UNIP elites, Labour and 
Professional Unions, and many other opponents of President Kaunda. The 
convergence in the MMD aimed to force Kaunda into retirement (Simon 2005; 
Dulani 2011; Sardanis 2014). The competition for the presidency and the parliament 
took place primarily between two parties, the ruling UNIP and the newly formed 
MMD.  
In 1991, the presidential candidate of the MMD, Frederick Chiluba, won the 
parliamentary and presidential elections with an overwhelming majority. The ruling 
MMD under Chiluba, however, quickly became guilty of KaundaÕs mistake of 
running a one-party state with little tolerance for opposition parties. This attitude 
placed him in opposition to other political elites in Zambia (Bratton 1999; Sardanis 
2014). By 1996, when Zambia was due for its second elections, Chiluba used a 
system of carrot and stick to either lure or coerce most opponents into the ruling 
party. The government used patronage, bribery, and intimidation to destroy the newly 
introduced multi-party system in Zambia (Simon 2005; Sardanis 2014).  
                                                
208 Knowing that Zambians had become tired with UNIP and wanted a change, some prominent 
members of the ruling UNIP merged their political factions and associations with the MMD to create a 
formidable opposition and remain relevant in the new democratic dispensation. 
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By the second election in 1996, some political parties were almost extinct 
because of ChilubaÕs little tolerance for opposition parties.  For instance, in 1996, 
Chiluba barred the only prominent opposition candidate, Kenneth Kaunda, from 
contesting in the presidential elections. Kaunda had led the UNIP as the main 
opposition party to boycott the presidential and parliamentary elections in 1996.209 
ChilubaÕs political intolerance caused political disaffection in Zambia, especially 
among political elites (and within his MMD), who accused Chiluba of returning 
Zambia to a one-party state.210 Kenneth Kaunda was an independence hero and still 
commanded much respect and loyalty, even within the ruling MMD. Not many 
political elites accepted the humiliation to which President Chiluba subjected 
Kaunda, a situation that was later to hunt President Chiluba.211 
Thus, Chiluba did not only face great opposition from political elites from 
other parties, but the internal MMD's opposition elites also grew exponentially, 
                                                
209 Chiluba implemented a discriminatory Electoral Law in 1996 that barred all politicians from 
contesting the presidency whose parents were not of original Zambian decent. The target of this policy 
was apparently Kenneth Kaunda, who was the main opposition candidate.  
210 The decision to amend the constitution to forbid presidential candidates without Zambian roots 
aimed to prevent Kenneth Kaunda from further the contesting the presidency against the incumbent. 
Chiluba saw Kenneth Kaunda as a political threat with massive loyalty and support among the elites. 





mainly because of ChilubaÕs intolerance of opposing views (Ihonvbere 1995; 
Sardanis 2014). However, the strongest opposition to ChilubaÕs third term came from 
within the ruling MMD.  The internal resistance was obvious.  A loose coalition of 
former disenchanted and frustrated UNIP elites, who could not accept KaundaÕs 
entrenchment of state power, had culminated in the first formation of the MMD. It 
was not surprising to see the same political elites abandon Chiluba, once Chiluba 
showed similar signs of entrenching of state power.  
By 1996, it had become clear that the MMD lacked any ideological 
grounding. The MMD began to demonstrate the same factors that had once brought 
down the UNIP. Judging from its internal political incoherence, the party that had 
popularly defeated an incumbent president in 1991, strongly portrayed itself only a 
few years later as an interest group with a singular agenda: to oppose and retire 
Kenneth Kaunda. Beyond this, the MMD lacked any focus on how to manage its 
political success. According to Ihonvbere (1995), the MMD was an assemblage of 
political dissidents who turned themselves into an elite pressure group to checkmate 
KaundaÕs presidential powers and grab power. The implosion and chaos in the MDD 
between 1999 and 2000, which culminated in elite defection, indicated not only a lack 
of ideological unity and political loyalty in the ruling party, but also in other political 
parties (Armstrong 2010). It also demonstrated how little the Zambian political party 
system had grown, which echoed the larger situation within Africa.  
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Like in the Nigeria case, the political parties in Zambia functioned as 
platforms for power access lacking in ideological motivation and unity (Campbell 
2011; Armstrong 2010). Between 1995 and 1996, Chiluba moved against prominent 
members of the UNIP, including Kenneth Kaunda, in a calculated attempt to 
intimidate the opposition party out of the 1996 electoral contest. This strategy 
attracted strong opposition from prominent members of the ruling party, who did not 
conceal their political abandonment of the president. Again, this incident confirmed 
that the MMD was not a political party, but rather, an interest group aimed at forcing 
the 1991 retirement of Kenneth Kaunda. The ideological disunity in the ruling MMD 
was to play a significant role in the defeat of ChilubaÕs third term (Simon 2005). The 
combination of power entrenching tendencies combined with political 
miscalculations to form the nucleus of internal opposition against ChilubaÕs third 
term.  
Initially, internal dissent was not a factor in the ruling MMD. Chiluba had 
been able to pass key parliamentary bills without opposition from the ruling party and 
parliament during his first tenure. The State Proceeding Act212 had passed without 
opposition, for example. It may even have helped Chiluba to consolidate power. 
However, elite activism between 1999 and 2001 turned the tide and undermined 
ChilubaÕs regime by presenting extra political hurdles that hindered ChilubaÕs 
actualization of his third term. Chiluba knew the strength of the opposition elites, 
                                                
212 This act barred the courts from issuing injunctions against the government. 
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especially that of the vice president, Gen. Christo Tembo, the Minister of Education, 
Gen. Miyanda, and the Speaker of the Parliament. Having tried in vain to win them 
over with patronage, he made an effort to isolate them from the ruling party, 
especially prior to the party convention in 2001(The Post, 7 April 2001).  
The more Chiluba employed intimidation and violence against his opponents, 
the stronger the internal resistance in the MMD grew and the more party loyalty 
disintegrated. The official dismissal of Chiluba's internal opponents from the ruling 
party, for instance, had a far-reaching consequence on Chiluba's third term. The 
sacked members of the ruling party (cabinet members and MPs alike) emerged as 
public, aggressive opponents of the regime.  They channeled their frustration with 
OASIS in the organization and sponsorship of anti-third term conferences, seminars, 
and media debates (Phiri 2003; Sardanis 2014).  
The boldness of the dismissed members and their alliance with OASIS may 
have inspired and attracted some CSOs, especially the students, into the struggle. The 
vice president made a ÔPublic PleaÕ on April 29, 2001, one week before MMDÕs 
convention that approved ChilubaÕs third term. In his widely listened public plea, he 
opposed any attempt to change the presidential term limits provision in the Zambian 
Constitution. He requested his party members and the public to resist and reject 
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Chiluba and his third term in its totality, and boasted to help kill the third-term bill 
(BBC News, 21 April 2001).213 
Chiluba was probably aware that the success or failure of his third-term bill 
depended on his level of support among political elites and the size of his elite base 
(Burnell 2001). In the run-up to the third-term debate, Chiluba invested exorbitant 
funds in his elite support-base. His use of intimidation and patronages was notable, 
aimed to guarantee that his loyalists won every available election (Armstrong 2010; 
Simon 2005). He sought to have more of his loyalists in prominent positions to boost 
his political elite support base and counter potential dissidence from prominent 
political elites within the ruling party. Chiluba was probably mindful of the 
importance of political elites for the success or failure of his third-term bill. He, 
therefore, tried to boost his elite base by investing energy and resources in luring and 
amassing more loyalists, even though his party already had an overwhelming 
parliamentary majority (Burnnel 2001). By intimidating and financially inducing 
some of his opponents for support, Chiluba targeted particular political elites who 
ultimately were to force him to retire, despite the MMDÕs parliamentary majority 
(ibid).  
                                                
213 The BBC news, headline reflected the Vice PresidentÕs plea, reading ÒMinisters tell 
Chiluba: Time is up.Ó BBC acknowledged that no statement was more inspirational in galvanizing 




While I argue that the ruling party as an institution failed to check Chiluba's 
powers, I recognize the crucial role of Zambia's multiparty configuration for the 
outcome of the presidential term limits politics in Zambia. Because the multiparty 
system in Zambia allowed room for defection, it increased the potency for internal 
political activism against Chiluba (Simon 2005; Burnel 2001; Armstrong 2010). The 
party system, with the possibility of defection, not only provided a platform for elite 
activism, but also guaranteed the formation of alternative platforms. The elite 
political dissidents needed the platform to sustain their activism and pressure on 
President Chiluba, taking into consideration how the president as a party member 
solely influenced and coerced the ruling party into altering its constitution to grant 
him a third term. The ruling MMD did not apply constitutional pressure on Chiluba. 
Rather, the president conquered the ruling MMD, which became an instrument of 
manipulation in ChilubaÕs attempt to entrench power. Individual elements, not the 
party supplied the pressures. 
The exclusion and expulsion of dissenting party members, as well as and the 
controversial amendment to the partyÕs constitution indicate that the ruling party 
lacked internal democracy. As an institution, the ruling MMD also lacked the 
capacity to check excessive presidential power. ChilubaÕs affront on the ruling MMD 
demonstrates how some incumbent presidents assume the stature of a Ôbig manÕ in 
African politics (Iwu 2008; 2009, Calderisi 2006). As in most post-Cold War African 
democracies, the Zambian case shows how a presidentÕs power exceeds that of the 
party (Daloz and Chabal 1999; Posner & Young 2007; Diamond 2015). As the 
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President of the Republic, Chiluba assumed the position of a grand- commander of 
the ruling party. Since the party depended on him for funding, he could manipulate 
the party, as he desired (Sardanis 2014). Elite internal dissidence became necessary to 
loosen ChilubaÕs hold on the party. Elite internal dissidence went on to balance his 
presidential powers in the party. 
Since the party provided a limited forum for alternative views, while stifling 
internal competition, dissenting internal elites relocated to the parliament. The 
neutrality of the parliament apparently provided a forum for elite convergence against 
ChilubaÕs third term, which the party failed to provide. The MMD had more than the 
required two-thirds majority to pass the amendment bill in the parliament, but elite 
dissidence and resistance caused the MMD to forfeit it.  
 
5.3.5 International Pressures 
Zambia has a long history with the international community and international 
donor agencies. By 1999, foreign funding represented about seventy percent of all 
project funding in Zambia (Rakner 1999). During ChilubaÕs regime, especially in his 
first term, foreign aid increased when Zambia appeared open to democracy (van de 
Walle and Mulaisho 2001). Chiluba accepted the Structural Adjustment Program and 
boasted of his positive economic relationship with western donors (Simon 2005), 
specifically referring to the importance of foreign funding to the Zambian economy 
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(Ihonvbere 1995). The reliance of the Zambian economy on foreign funding came, 
however, with responsibilities.  
The western donors who funded ChilubaÕs regime and the Zambian economy 
placed expectations on Chiluba. They expected, on the one hand, that Chiluba would 
help politically stabilize the southern African region and on the other hand, liberalize 
the Zambian economy by enforcing laws to guarantee the privatization of state-owned 
companies in Zambia (Sardanis 2014). Chiluba initially appeared ready to deliver on 
these expectations (ibid). 
The consolidation of the Zambian democracy was apparently not a primary focus of 
the international community. While Chiluba committed human rights abuses and 
intimidated political parties, the international community showed little concern 
(Simon 2005; Sardanis 2014). However, Chiluba did produce proof of liberating the 
Zambian economy and stabilizing the region, but failed to sustain these interests, 
though, as the third-term agenda became a priority (ibid.).  
An alleged coup resulted in the arrest and detention of Kenneth Kaunda, the 
former president of Zambia, in 1997. This incident drew the international attention of 
western media and governments to Chiluba, for the detention of Kaunda in a 
maximum prison in Lusaka (The New York Times January 1, 1998). Concerned about 
the unfounded allegation and the lack of a fair trial, the African Union, U.S., U.K., 
South Africa, and other countries pressured Chiluba to release Kaunda. After a week 
of diplomatic wrangling and persistent pressure from Julius Nyerere, who chose to 
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relocate with his wife to KaundaÕs prison, Chiluba reluctantly bowed to international 
pressure. He transferred Kaunda from prison to house arrest.  
After witnessing the international pressure against Chiluba for the release of 
Kaunda, Zambians expected the same external pressures to respond to ChilubaÕs third 
term in 2001. In the case of the third term, international actors only pressured Chiluba 
indirectly and only due to the involvement of OASIS in the anti-third term struggle. 
The term limits politics in Zambia saw an increase in external pressures when 
particular political elites, like Mark Chona, began an expansive lobby through OASIS 
to attract international attention against Chiluba.214  
Mark Chona personally appealed and lobbied many embassies and home 
countries to support constitutionalism in Zambia. In an interview with the author, he 
revealed how many international donors secretly funded elite activism against 
ChilubaÕs third term by channelling funds through a designated embassy in Lusaka.215 
The funds were necessary for the sponsoring of anti-third term rallies and the 
lobbying of MPs, the media, and civil society organizations. It financed the printing 
campaign and rally materials like t-shirts, pamphlets, brochures, handkerchiefs, as 





well as provided pocket money for MPs and cabinet members for anti-third term 
activities.216  
Mark Chona is responsible for the international lobby, which rested more on 
his global connections and popularity than the international communityÕs interest in 
saving the Zambian democracy. In actuality, international donors had admired 
Chiluba, regarding him as the darling of the international community despite the 
detailed human rights abuses credited to his regime (Sardanis 2014).  International 
donors either trusted Chiluba to respect the constitution, or cowered before ChilubaÕs 
hard stance against foreign NGOs, whom he frequently accused of meddling in 
Zambian internal politics (Simon 2005; Sardanis 2014), resulted in the closure of 
many Zambian democracy NGOs with links to international offices (ibid.).  
While preparations by the regimeÕs loyalists to actualize the third-term agenda 
were underway, ChilubaÕs third-term project was free of external pressure. Then, a 
violent incident took place at the MMD party conference, which resulted in the 
breaking of the arm of the Minister of Mines. OASIS used this incident to attract 
international attention. 217  In response to the international condemnation of the 
violence, Chiluba quickly and strategically reassured the international community 





that he would fulfil his pledge to serve only two terms (BBC Monitoring International 
Reports, 27 April 2001).  
The absence of strong and direct international pressure against ChilubaÕs third 
term prior to the involvement of OASIS reflected a general decline in international 
interest for democracy consolidation in African countries where term limits were 
repealed (Diamaond 2015, Levitsky 2015). With exception, Nigeria was the only 
country held accountable to an official statement on the third-term amendment bill 
from an international power, which dissenting elites used to their advantage.218 In 
Zambia, direct political pressure from the international community on the third-term 
amendment bill was non-existent and wanting. The secret funding of the elite 
dissenting group through OASIS was indirect and dependent on elite pressure, 
mobilization, and international contacts and connections. Political opponents, elite 
activism, and non-exogenous pressures directly impeded ChilubaÕs third term, 




                                                
218 The U.S. State Department issued a statement in which he admonished Obasanjo to re-think his 
intention in seeking a third term. Though diplomatic and chiefly aimed at avoiding conflict and 





I have identified and analyzed different pressures that interacted to enforce 
term limits compliance on President Chiluba in 2001. I chose to analyze five sectors 
that were directly involved in the debate and struggle to enforce compliance in 
Zambia: elite activism, the judiciary, the parliament, political parties, civil society and 
international actors. From field research and literature, I conclude that elite political 
activism interacted with institutional dynamics to produce direct and more focused 
pressures that enforced compliance on President Chiluba. Elite political activism 
ruptured the dominant executive loyalty in the ruling party, altered the hegemonic 
position of the ruling MMD in the parliament, and forced the judiciary to reclaim its 
legitimacy by rendering popular judgements. Political elite dissidents turned the 
parliament into an important platform for opposition against the third term and 
invited the courts to provide protection for the dissenting politicians to sustain their 
resistance and activism.  
The liberation of these institutions by elite activism implemented 
unprecedented institutional independence, positioning those institutions to play a role 
in the enforcement of term limits compliance in Zambia. Mass involvement in the 
form of protests was insignificant and mostly dependent on elite mobilization and 
sponsorship, thus unable to raise independent and sufficient costs of repression for 
Chiluba. Pressures arising from the civil society were secondary and dependent, since 
they stemmed from elite dissent within the ruling MMD. The multiparty system 
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provided a veritable ground for elite defection while political parties, especially the 
ruling MMD, aided the entrenchment of power by Chiluba.  
International pressure would have been non-existent without elite involvement 
and the lobby initiated by OASIS. This was an oppositional forum led by Mark 
Chona, former Underminister of Foreign Affairs and consultant to the IMF and 
World Bank. Chiluba was a darling of the international community for championing 
the liberation of Zambian economy from KaundaÕs state-controlled economy 
(Sardanis 2014). A figure of ChonaÕs capacity was necessary to lobby the 
international community to reconsider its position on Chiluba. The decision of the 
international community to support constitutionalism by sponsoring anti-third term 
activities in Zambia was possible due to ChonaÕs connection and popularity within 
the international circle.   
Zambians hailed Frederick Chiluba as a hero for leading other political elites 
and the civil society to pressure Kaunda to move the country toward a multiparty 
democracy in 1991. Analysts have also noted ChilubaÕs capacity to use enormous 
political resources to consolidate power, especially after his second election in 1996. 
However, like Obasanjo in Nigeria, Chiluba failed to garner a personal political 
coalition with which to convince key political elites within his ruling MMD that his 
political power was invincible (Dulani 2011; Simon 2005; Armstrong 2010). The 
collaboration of some political actors from the ruling MMD and a broad coalition of 
Zambian political elites ultimately mounted pressures that effectively enforced term 
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limits compliance on Chiluba (Phiri 1999). Political elite dissidents became 
responsible in mobilizing the MPs, the courts, civil society organizations, and 
religious bodies. The dissenting elites bundled these collective but sparse pressures to 
enforce term limits compliance on President Frederick Chiluba.  
In the next chapter, I will examine the final case study, which focuses on the 
presidential term limits politics of the open and third-term constitutional amendment 













Chapter 6: The ÔElite Pork-Barrel PoliticsÕ
219
 of Presidential Term Limits in 
Malawi 
 
Elite behavior represents the central variable shaping MalawiÕs democratic 
experience. That is, both quick and slow democratic death are understood as 
ultimately authored by political elites who, operating in the context of other factors, 




The peaceful power alternation in Malawi through multi-party democratic 
elections in 1994 gave both democracy observers and promoters hope in a changing 
international policy rooted in Ôdemocracy exportation.Õ In the general elections of 
1994 Malawi experienced for the first time, an electoral process in which multiple 
parties and persons contested for elective positions. Democracy observers quickly 
                                                
219 Morrow describes the politics of presidential term limits in Malawi as Ôelite pork-barrel politics.Õ 
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heralded Malawi as a model of democratization under harsh circumstances. 220 
However, less than a decade later, the Malawian democratic experiment would 
witness a major challenge toward consolidation. The transitional president, Bakili 
Muluzi, had never hidden his intention to rule beyond his constitutional two-term 
mandates. He had successfully repealed the law establishing senate and local 
governments before moving against the presidential term limits. The two consecutive 
attempts to amend the Malawian constitution to remove presidential term limits and 
re-introduce open presidential terms in Malawi pitched him against major political 
allies, both from within and outside his party, including church elites and some 
foreign donors. These major forces assisted his rise to power in 1994. The same 
alliance that assisted MuluziÕs rise to power later played a major role in blocking his 
tendency to entrench power.  
This case study investigates the politics of presidential term limits in Malawi 
and the pressures that converged to enforce compliance on President Bakili Muluzi in 
2002. Unlike previous case studies, I will use the present case study to focus on the 
ways in which various political elite alliances, including church elites, conspired to 
deny President Muluzi the opportunity to entrench power. In order to provide a 
background of Malawian politics, I shall begin by examining the combination of 
                                                
220 Immediately after elections in Zambia, Ivory Coast, Cameroon and Uganda, democracy observers 
had also prematurely promoted these governments as models of democracy without waiting to 




factors that caused the swift and smooth replacement of the thirty-year dictatorship of 
Hastings Banda through multi-party elections in 1994. Since the process of transition 
has a direct effect on the post-transitional politics of a given new democracy, I shall 
further seek to analyze how the dynamics of MalawiÕs ÔmodelÕ transition gave rise to 
and shaped the presidential term limits controversy. 221 I will also analyze how those 
forces that shaped the Malawian democratic transition later rallied in 2002 to save the 
democratic process from relapsing to SchedlerÕs Òslow democratic deathÓ (1998). 
Though some may argue that the contending elite alliance did not set out to salvage 
democracy, but to fight for personal interests (Villalon 2005), the outcome of the 
presidential term limits controversy remains important for democracy observers. The 
Malawian democracy itself gained directly from the outcome of the controversy and 
the said elite alliance.  
The end of the Cold War and the international pressures generated through aid 
conditionality played a central role in ushering in the democratic transition in 1994. 
However, the centrality of international pressure and donor-dependency at the time of 
transition seemed to have equally undermined the growth of other democratic 
institutions like the parliament, judiciary, and civil society in Malawi (Morrow 2005). 
                                                
221 Many scholars and observers quickly termed Malawi a model democracy following its smooth 
transition to democracy in 1994. Perhaps the successful elections of 1994 formed the basis of this 
judgment, which failed to confirm whether other important aspects of democracy such as human 
rights, rule of law and institutional independence were observed or implemented in the new 
democracy; Cf Khembo 2004. 
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This might explain the inability of these democratic institutions to play active roles in 
defending democratic gains and in enforcing the desired democratic checks and 
balances in MalawiÕs post-transitional period.   
The absence of any form of checks from Malawian democratic institutions 
resulted in the deterioration of democratic governance, as the presidency, reminiscent 
of the Banda era, remained overly powerful and insufficiently accountable with a 
strong penchant to entrench more power (Morro 2005). No other actors or branches 
of government including the parliament, opposition political parties, or civil society 
organizations seemed able to check executive abuses other than, in a random and 
unorganized manner, or through the political resistance and mobilization led by some 
political actors and church elites. This case study also notes that many international 
donors who played significant roles during the transitional period were reluctant to be 
visibly involved in the presidential term limits controversy, obviously to avoid being 
seen as meddling in local politics (Brown 2004). However, the local resistance and 
mobilization marshaled by particular political and church elites appear to have 
created an avenue for the role of donor aid.222   
The present chapter is divided into three sections. In section one, I shall deal 
with a brief history and demography of Malawi. I will demonstrate how these 
prepared Malawi for the long one-party dictatorship under President Banda. I will 
                                                
222 I shall come back to this point in the following sections of this case study. 
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demonstrate how such formations potentially shaped and sustained the presidential 
term limits controversy in Malawi in 2002.  
In section two, I will concentrate on the context of the presidential term limits 
controversy with the aim of exposing different actors and alliances that canvassed for 
recognition during the controversy. I will focus on the emergence of Ôelitist-hang 
outsÕ during the presidential term limits debates, which contributed to the failure and 
defeat of the amendment bills.  
Lastly, in section three, I will investigate and analyze the various pressures 
that combined to enforce presidential term limits compliance on President Bakili 
Muluzi. Though I will emphasize the role of particular political elites and dissidents, I 
will also examine how specific political elites made use of the existing institutional 
and religious channels as effective instruments of activism.  
 
6.1 Brief History of Malawi  
What we know of today as Malawi was once a humble British protectorate 
referred to as Nyasaland before 1964. Subsistence and peasant agriculture were the 
mainstays of Nyasaland during the colonial and post-colonial era, with tobacco and 
tea topping the list of its commercial crops (Short 1974). Nyasaland further sustained 
its weak economy by exporting labor to neighboring Rhodesia and South Africa 
during the colonial era, and later, during the ten-year existence of the Federation 
(Morrow 2005).  
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Nyasaland was a mixture of illiterate, mostly manual laborers who supplied 
work for southern Rhodesian farms and northern Rhodesian mines. Unlike 
Nyasaland, the other components of the protectorate enjoyed relative literacy. This is 
probably the consequence of Scottish migrants and missionaries, who established a 
presence in the North and South due to favorable weather and mineral resources. 
Because it lacked the copper of Northern Rhodesia and the expanding industrial, 
agricultural, and mining economy of Southern Rhodesia, Nyasaland formed a liability 
to the British colonial administration (Short 1974). In 1953, the colonial 
administration joined Nyasaland with its neighbors in the Central African Federation, 
exercising an administrative policy that many argued was a reward from Britain for 
facilitating white settler domination (Short 1974).  
Though the pressure for independence increased after the end of World War 
II, Nyasaland could not immediately benefit because it lacked trained and enthusiastic 
leaders in the form of Kame Nkrumah of Ghana, Nnamdi Azikiwe of Nigeria, 
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia, Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya, and Julius Nyererre of 
Tangayika (later Tanzania).  
In 1964, Dr. Hastings Kamuzu Banda, an American-trained medical doctor 
who had lived in Britain and Ghana, became a national figure. While his academic 
training and exposure seemed to qualify him as a leader at the time, his political and 
leadership qualities were yet to be tested (Morrow 2005). Nevertheless, the young 
nationalists agitating for independence had already approached Banda in 1963 and 
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requested him to come back to lead the Malawi Congress Party (MCP) in its fight for 
independence against the Central African Federation (Short 1974). Banda readily 
obliged by quickly returning to Malawi in 1964 to lead the MCP. Unfortunately, 
Malawi under BandaÕs leadership did not differ significantly from the experience of 
the young nation under the Central African Federation (Short 1974; Morrow 2005).  
With Banda on board as the new political leader from 1964, Malawi 
experienced what many writers have described as Ôthirty years of stringent 
dictatorship under the NgwaziÕ(Short 1974, Morrow 2005). 223 Following the trends 
in the southern African sub-region, Banda wasted no time in establishing his 
authority over the young, semi-literate nationalist movement, which already seemed 
to contain the seeds of authoritarianism (McCracken 1998). As the most learned and 
exposed at the time in Malawi, Banda could quickly imposed his will on his 
predominantly young and semi-literate allies in the immediate aftermath of MalawiÕs 
independence in 1964 (ibid.). Banda ran a strict one-party authoritarian regime for 
thirty years in Malawi. Though there were outward signs and forms of parliamentary 
procedures under Banda, his regime heavily relied on traditional courts, MCP Young 
Pioneers, the state police, and the army for political repression and domination 
                                                
223 Ngwasi is often used as an attribute for God. Literally translated, it means Ôsupreme leader.Õ 
Originally used to refer to God, this term became an attribute of the Malawian presidency under Banda 




(Morrow 2005). BandaÕs penchant for intolerance and brutal suppression of 
opposition took root in Malawian politics and ostensibly became a precursor for the 
post-transition term limits controversies in Malawi between 2001 and 2002.  
 
6.2 The Democratic Transition of 1994: Regional and International 
Influence.  
BandaÕs rule, which many refer to as oppressive, lasted thirty years (SACBC 
2004; Morrow 2005; Brown 2000 & 2004). While neighboring countries like Zambia 
and Namibia democratized and showed signs of political liberation after the Cold 
War, Banda argued and possibly believed that Malawi had developed its own unique 
form of government, Òan entrenched and stable one-party systemÓ led by the Ngwazi 
and the MCP (Brown 2004). Banda argued that a one-party Malawi was efficient and 
popular, and therefore, needed no liberalization (Brown 2004). However, yielding to 
international, religious, and regional pressures (vonDoepp 2005, Morrow 2005), 
Banda reluctantly allowed a referendum in 1992 that was specifically aimed at 
confirming a one-party system in Malawi (Morrow 2005).  
To the disadvantage of the regime, the referendum saw to the quick collapse 
of the old order and laid the grounds for the first ever multi-party elections.224 In June 
                                                
224 Writers like Stephen Brown interpreted the referendum as regimeÕs error because Banda had 
overrated his popularity and underestimated the capacity of some opposition elites and the populace to 
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1993, referendum voters expressed a preference for a multi-party system. Banda 
reluctantly accepted this while opting to contest in the multi-party presidential 
elections billed for April 1994, thus signifying his interest to remain in power. In the 
first ever multi-party elections in 1994, President Banda competed against two of his 
former loyalists who internally revolted to form new opposition political parties. 
Bakili Muluzi, a former secretary of the ruling independence MCP under Banda and a 
founder of United Democratic Front (UDF), defeated president Banda in a closely 
contested election to become the first multi-party elected president of Malawi in 
1994. Banda and his party, having lost both the presidential and parliamentary 
elections of April 1994, gracefully conceded to Bakili Muluzi, who was to rule 
Malawi for the next ten years.  
The orderly nature and successful outcome of the elections were not, however, 
to guarantee Malawi as a ÔmodelÕ democracy. MalawiÕs political structures and 
context remained the same, as Banda had left most of the former political structures 
in place, hoping to benefit from them when elected as president as many 
metamorphosing presidents had done in other new democracies (Ross 2004). The 
new president himself, being a member of the old order, became the beneficiary of 
these old structures that he maintained and built upon.  
                                                                                                                                      




With the retention of old structures, the democratization in Malawi found 
itself caught between a ÔreformaÕ and ÔrupturaÕ transition, a situation that encouraged 
Muluzi to seek to retain and entrench more power. The socio-economic structures 
remained the same while Muluzi maintained the politics of patronage reminiscent of 
Banda era (vonDoepp2005; Morrow 2005). Furthermore, Muluzi appeared to neglect 
the poverty level, as the policies initiated to ameliorate poverty became political 
strategies to maintain power and were scarcely implemented (Banda 1998). By 2000, 
when rumors of open presidential term limits surfaced, Malawi stood at a population 
of 10,900,000 inhabitants. With GNI/Capita of US$615 and a life expectancy of 
thirty-eight years, political rights and civil liberty scores were captured at four on the 
scale of ten (Freedom House 2000). This was the context for the presidential term 
limits debate in Malawi in 2002.  
Why did Banda suddenly decide to open up to a multi-party system and 
subsequently yield power? Though this seems to be outside the scope of this study, it 
is important to note that the literature on Malawian democracy has been controversial 
in this regard. Some observers attribute Malawian democratization to resistance from 
domestic forces initiated by religious authorities (CIRR 1993; Mchombo 1998; 
Newell 1995; Nzunda and Ross 1995; Ross 1995 & 1996). Some authors specifically 
emphasize external pressures, arguing that the suspension of foreign aid and aid 
conditionality of the early 1990s left Banda with little choice than to accede quickly 
to the demands of foreign donors (Clapham 1996 & 2002; Decalo 1998; van Donge 
1995). While this study does not completely reject such claims, it notes that aid 
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conditionality is most effective and decisive in dismantling dictatorships. However, 
aid conditionality has failed to sustain democracy in Gabon, Cameroon, Burkina 
Faso, Uganda, Togo, and other countries reluctant to expel a one-party system, even 
after democratization. Research in hybrid democracies shows that aid conditionality 
without vibrant local forces may not sufficiently generate the desired momentum and 
pressure to sustain democracy or prevent it from SchedlerÕs slow democratic death or 
reversal (Rakner 2004).  
 
6.3 Build-Up to the Open-Ended /Third-Term Politics in Malawi  
Scholars have likened the politics of open-ended and third-term presidency in 
Malawi to the Ôelite pork-barrel politicsÕ of the post-Banda era (Morrow 2005). In the 
first place, presidential term limits politics operated at the political elite level through 
slight donor collusion and an active collaboration with church elites (Villalon 2005, 
Morrow 2005). The parliament exclusively served as a platform for opposition, 
dissidence, and resistance. The main gladiators were Bakili Muluzi (the incumbent 
president) and his loyalists cutting across the party divide, represented mainly by the 
Speaker of the parliament and Peter Fachi, the Attorney General of the Republic and 
Dumbo Lemani, a prominent UDF loyalist of the president.  
Internal party dissidents like Brown Mpinganjira, Jaap Sonke, Danga 
Mughogo, Cassim Chilumpah, Mattews Chikaondo and Kaleso who, at the beginning 
of the controversy were members of the ruling UDF led the internal opposition group. 
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These were instrumental in the formation of an opposition party, the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), which became a converging platform for resistance. The 
gladiators against an open-ended term were further comprised of religious leaders of 
predominantly Christian groups led by Catholic bishops and priests. The Public 
Affairs Commission (PAC), led by Nicholas Mkwabata, acted as the militant wing of 
the churches. It provided the platform for alliance between church elites and 
politically dissenting elites to raise the cost of repression for President Muluzi.  
As a former member and Secretary General of MCP during the one-party 
system in Malawi, Bakili Muluzi had gained considerable experience and popularity 
in Malawian politics. It was not, however, the popularity that secured his victory over 
Hastings Banda. Instead, he benefited from a major resistance by major Malawian 
stakeholders against Banda.225 Unfortunately, Muluzi could not translate his victory 
and popularity into popular governance in the Malawian post-transitional era 
(Clapham 1996 & 2002; Morrow 2005). Because the Ôold-orderÕ in which he was a 
stakeholder had not completely ruptured, the political formation acquired during the 
Banda era continued to persist. This situation may have turned Muluzi into BandaÕs 
Ôalter ego.Õ His free access to wealth, most of which was questionable, was 
reminiscent of the Banda regime and reduced his government to a patronage industry 
(Villalon 2005).  
                                                
225AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, HOD Department of Social Science Research, 
University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi, October 2014. 
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During his first term, Muluzi raised political patronage to an extensive level, 
using his executive position as an advantage while simultaneously punishing the 
same crime among the opposition (SACBC 2004). The poverty level in Malawi,226 
with sixty-five percent of the population living below one dollar per day, may have 
fertilized the grounds on which such an extensive patronage system could thrive 
(Freedom House 1996, CIA Fact Book 1995-2000). Newspaper and expert reports 
present Malawian public schools and institutions as lacking in basic amenities and 
functional materials to perform at an average level (Morrow 2005, Brown 2000). This 
situation provided Muluzi with an opportunity to swap political support with 
patronage. Two incidents in 2000 confirm this allegation.227 Morrow has also detailed 
how Muluzi regularly travelled with large sums of cash, which his loyalists and 
supporters openly distributed at meetings and visits to individuals and institutions 
(2005). Writing about Malawi under President Muluzi, Villalon notes, ÒIn an 
environment where politics provided the highest level of income, it became 
advantageous for Muluzi to use patronage as a strategy to sustain his support base 
both among the ruling class and the populaceÓ (2005).   
                                                
226 Cf. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003-Malawi. Malawi was rated among the worldÕs ten 
poorest countries, with sixty-five percent of the population living on less than one dollar a day. 
227 Upon a visit to a public school in Blantyre in 2000, Muluzi and his loyalists doled out a brown 
envelope with K50.000 for school desks, taking it from a Land Cruiser where piles of such envelopes 
were stored. Furthermore, Muluzi donated a cash sum of K300.000 for clothes to a Presbyterian church 
in Blantyre in the hope reaping support for his open-term bill.  
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Presidential term limits politics in Malawi enjoyed a fertile environment of 
easy money devoid of questions for accountability, a social context of extreme 
poverty and illiteracy, and a declining economy. An ex-minister told me that Muluzi 
had calculated that some political elites and church leaders could succumb to 
patronage and therefore remain docile over the presidential term limits issue.228 But 
his calculation seemed to be wrong. According to Monsignor Tamani, political and 
church elites felt confronted with two questions: Should the political and church elites 
make use of such an opportunity to benefit themselves and allow Muluzi to entrench 
state power, or should they demand accountability from him and look the other 
way?229 While Muluzi and his loyalists would mistake the large gatherings at pro-
third term rallies for popularity, the dissenting elites would capitalize on the extreme 
poverty in the country to demand a strict compliance to constitutionalism. For 
instance, the church leaders raised the stakes for Muluzi by constantly referring to 
poverty, the maize grain shortage, executive corruption, and scandals as the Ôpolitical 
trail-blazerÕ of their strict demand for compliance (Brown 2004 & Morrow 2005).230 
                                                
228  AuthorÕs interview with an ex-cabinet member under MuluizÕs regime, Lilongwe, Malawi, 
November 2014  
229 AuthorÕs interview with Monsignor Boniface Tamani, former chairman of the Public Action 




As was the case in some other new democracies, where attempts to repeal 
presidential term limits were launched, the idea to repeal presidential term limits and 
the push for life presidency in Malawi started immediately after the second term 
elections of 1999. MuluziÕs attempt to amend the Malawian constitution in 2001, 
barely mid-way into his constitutional second term, followed a history of extravagant 
abuse of the rule of law reminiscent of most African transitional presidents (Morrow 
2005 & Brown 2004).231 He never concealed his tendency to doctor or manipulate 
public policies to his advantage. For instance, in 1998, a commission created to 
oversee the 1999 General Elections recommended the creation of seventy new 
constituencies to balance political representation in the Malawian parliament. Muluzi 
saw it as an opportunity to swell his political base by unilaterally appropriating forty-
two of the seventy proposed new constituencies for the Southern region, the 
stronghold of the ruling UDF (Dulani 2005; Morrow 2005).  
This incident and the manipulation of the voters register in favor of UDF 
seem a thought out strategy to aid his ambition for life presidency. Unfortunately, the 
controversy over constituency boundaries recalled the insensitivity of the colonial era, 
                                                
231 Chiluba of Zambia, Nujoma of Namibia, Bongo of Gabon, and Gnasimgbe Eyedema of Togo began 
to toil with the idea of amending their constitutions for open-ended or third-term presidencies 
immediately after their second elections.  
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which Muluzi seemed to imitate (Morrow 2005).232 Furthermore, Muluzi introduced 
political suspicion in Malawi by refusing to let the Electoral Commission be specific 
on the date of the 1999 general elections until he was sure of potential victory (Brown 
2000; Morrow 2005). This reflects an attitude that politically suffocated opposition 
parties and their leaders and therefore put them on a red alert for MuluziÕs potential 
manipulation of the democratic process (Dulani 2005). The former Minister of 
Finance, who later defected from the ruling UDF notes that, ÒPresident MuluziÕs 
regime had the culture and history of interfering with due process, thereby rubbishing 
the hope of growing true multi-party democracy which many stakeholders fought 
forÓ233.  
The culture and history of interference gave rise to the suspicion and distrust 
that became a potential arsenal against Muluzi. His political influence came under the 
scrutiny of an alliance of political and church elites, some international donors, and a 
handful of local NGOs as he prepared to manipulate the constitution for a life-
presidency. The judiciary was to supply Ôjudicial empathyÕ by giving protection to 
particular political dissidents, referred to as enemies of the government. Elite 
dissidence increased in response to the ability of the courts to strike out some pro-
                                                
232 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, HOD, Social Science Research, University of 
Malawi, Choba, Kenya, October 2014. 
233 AuthorÕs interview with former Minister Kaleso, who resigned from MuluziÕs cabinet because of 
his opposition to open and third-term presidency, September 2014.  
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government decisions taken by the Electoral Commission (Wiseman 2000 & Morrow 
2005), to the belated protection of the parliamentary seats of sacked MPs (vonDoepp 
2005; Armstrong 2010), and to the revocation of an executive order banning street 
protests (ibid.)  
Regime loyalists and some party leaders from opposition parties introduced and 
sustained the bill to repeal presidential term limits in Malawi as part of a strategic 
conspiracy that gave the bill a semblance of cross-party support (Armstrong 2010 & 
Morrow 2005). While the Attorney General, Peter Fachi, prepared the amendment 
dossier and introduced the agenda to the national public, Khwauli Miska, an 
opposition MP of the Alliance for Democracy (AFORD), introduced the bill in the 
parliament, making the bill appear as private. In the heat of the controversy over the 
legitimacy of the fraudulent 1999 presidential elections, the Attorney General hinted, 
ÒMuluzi may even become life president regardless of what the courts would ruleÓ 
(Patel 2004). This was followed by another revelation by another prominent member 
of the ruling UDF who openly declared: ÒThe constitution will be amended to pave 
way for open and limitless presidential terms for President MuluziÓ (Patel 2004).234  
                                                
234 In a BBC news report in 2002, the Attorney General insisted that despite the uproar, many 
Malawians wanted the president to remain in office, saying: ÒWe cannot escape the fact that people 
still want Dr. Muluzi. The new bill to be introduced next month would allow presidents three terms of 
office, which could be extended following a national referendumÓ (BBC, September 2002). 
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Thus, the events that preceded the 1999 presidential elections, the post-
election activities, as well as the rhetoric of the president and his loyalists became 
crucial in erasing any doubts about a hidden tenure elongation agenda by the 
incumbent president. However, the same events put many political elites of the 
opposing camp on red alert. For many political actors, the revelation and statements 
by the Attorney-General and prominent loyal members of the ruling and some 
opposition parties were not sudden or incidental, taking into consideration that the 
political activities leading to the 1999 presidential and parliamentary elections were 
marked by unprecedented violence against opponents (Simon 2005; Morrow 2005).  
Furthermore, the use of state funds for political ends became more extensive 
when compared to the 1994 transition elections (Morrow 2005), which many political 
elites already interpreted as genuine attempts by President Muluzi to entrench state 
power (SACBC 2004). The majority of actors interviewed acknowledged that the line 
between government and politics became hard to differentiate both during the second 
elections of 1999 and the presidential term limits politics of 2001 to 2002, as Muluzi 
marshaled state police and the ÔYOUNG UDFÕ against opponents (Villalon 2005; 
Morrow 2005).235 This blurring of the line between government and politics from 
1999 onward explains why some writers observed that constitutionalism was under 
attack (Kamwendo 2000). This left hopes dim for the budding Malawian democracy 
to experience a power alternation and open-seat contest in 2004.   
                                                




6.4 Pushing the Bill Further through Undemocratic Means and Actions  
With the introduction of the open-term presidential bill in Malawi 2002, the 
MPs experienced considerable pressure to support the passing of the bill (SACBC 
2004 & Morrow 2005). An attempt to pressure the MPs in favor of the bill further 
split the parliament into compartments, as individual MPs gave more loyalty to their 
political sponsors than their political parties. The regime sought individuals and 
groups who might influence the MPs. The use of enormous slush funds and 
patronage, disguised as gifts (Morrow 2005), became powerful strategies to woo MPs 
and the masses to the amendment bill236. In a pro open- term rally in Blantyre in 
February 2002, Muluzi described his cash awards as Òa token of appreciation to 
veterans for strengthening the ruling UDFÓ (Freedom House 2002 & Morrow 200). In 
another rally in a public school in Blantyre, Muluzi arrived with four hundred school 
notebooks, two hundred ball pens, one set of football uniforms, two soccer balls, and 
two bicycles to donate to what some local observers described as a Òrun-down and 
over-crowded urban primary schoolÓ (Morrow 2005).  
At the same venue, Muluzi prided and distinguished himself from the 
dissenting elites saying, ÒYou should see the difference between our partyÕs rallies 
and the dissidents. I donÕt just come, I always bring something alongÓ (ibid.). 
                                                




Obviously seeking to improve the support base for his open-term amendment bill, 
Muluzi officially raised the monthly allowances paid to local chiefs by twenty-five 
percent in May 2002 (Daily Times 17 May 2002). Local chiefs were expected to 
apply pressure on their parliamentarians to support the amendment bill, since local 
chiefs are known to have significant influence in their localities.237  
Additionally, influential politicians of different parties, including amenable 
MPs who were willing to swap loyalty, were openly rewarded with choice urban land 
allocations in return for more opposition members to MuluziÕs camp (Morrow 2005 
& Daily Times 17 May 2002). Influential political elites and businesspersons who had 
the apparent capacity to influence a negative outcome of the bill or to finance the elite 
political dissidents, were clearly asked to stay clear or face the risk of losing their 
government contracts and connections.238 For instance, one million Kwacha were 
allegedly made available for the ruling UDF MPs, while two and half million Kwacha 
were allocated for any MP from the opposition parties willing to vote in favor of the 
amendment bill.239  
                                                
237 AuthorÕs interview with Boniface Tamani. Limbe, Malawi. October 2014 
238 Ibid.  
239 Sean Morrow mentioned the allegation in his article Toxic Mushrooms? The Presidential Third-




There were further allegations of suitcases stashed with money, freighted 
from Libya into Malawi, and delivered to the Sanjika Presidential Palace in Balntyre 
without customs investigation (Morrow 2005). Apparently, the suitcases sustained 
immense pressure on the UDF and opposition MPs to support the presidential open-
term bill.240 Though some prominent party members defected from the ruling UDF, 
the attraction of huge financial benefits also caused defection from opposition parties 
into the ruling UDF. For instance, Chakufwa Chihana of the opposition AFORD and 
Tembo of the MCP joined the ruling UDF with nearly half of the MPs of their parties, 
with whom they negotiated for a substantial patronage from Muluzi.241  As was 
widely believed, opposition party leaders like Chihana and Tembo conspired to 
corrupt their own party members, thereby making it initially difficult to accuse or 
blame Muluzi for the open-term controversy (Morrow 2005).242 The cash awards and 
gifts were to attract praise and support for Muluzi, further increasing his popularity at 
the grassroots level.243 
                                                
240 Ibid. 
241 Confirmed in authorÕs interview with Monsignor Tamani, former chairman of the PAC. Limbe 
Malawi. October 2014 
242 This allegation was corroborated in an authorÕs interview with an ex-MP in Lilongwe, Malawi. 
November 2014. 
243 Newspaper headlines and pictures have shown poor villagers singing praise and donning the ruling 
UDFs yellow colours at political rallies. Observers referred to MuluziÕs rallies as Òpay centersÓ 
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The strategy to hire political contractors to influence MPs to support the 
amendment bill became a means to coerce support for the open-term amendment bill. 
Upon immense pressure from the UDF regime, for instance, Martin Kansichi, a 
prominent businessperson and president of the Malawi Confederation of Chambers, 
Commerce and Industry had reluctantly accepted to act as an intermediary between a 
group of twenty-two opposition MPs and Muluzi.244.  
Some opposition MPs of MCP in particular argued that acceptance of a bribe 
risked their public integrity; accordingly, they demanded a higher price 
commensurate with that sacrifice. It was alleged that in a negotiating meeting with 
the president, the group of twenty-two MPs demanded Five Million Malawian 
Kwacha each (equivalent of US$20.000) to support the amendment bill (Morrow 
2005). Though their demands were swiftly accepted, the President was unable to raise 
the funds in a short time. The suspension of development assistance to Malawi by 
international donors apparently made it difficult for Muluzi to keep the terms of 
agreement.  
                                                                                                                                      
because of the tendency to dish out cash to participants at the rallies, which made the rallies very 
attractive. 
244 Confirmed in authorÕs interviews with Monsignor Tamani, and two ex-MPs. Tamani equally 
confirmed in an interview with the author that church elites recommended that the MPs receive 
whatever Muluzi was willing to give as a bribe while insisting that MPs, in conscience, should vote 
against MuluziÕs open-term bill.  
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In an interview with Morrow (2005), Martin Kansichi argues that the open-
term amendment bill failed because these twenty-two opposition MPs strategically 
raised the stakes for Muluzi to a level he was unable to meet.245 MuluziÕs failure to 
get the twenty-two MPs to support the constitutional amendment bill contributed to 
his losing the two-thirds majority required to passing the bill at the parliament. 
Khembo (2004) acknowledges this fact, describing it as a strategic, elite-church 
collaboration against Muluzi.  
Apart from internal political conflicts in the ruling UDF, leading politicians, 
as well as various political and religious elites became involved in intensive lobby 
and negotiations both for and against the amendment bill. The lobby also resulted in 
considerable split in various political parties and religious bodies.246 However, while 
the dissident elites lobbied and co-opted the leadership of some Christian churches to 
its side, the open-term loyalists attracted huge support among some Muslim groups. 
Religious differences between Christian groups who generally opposed MuluziÕs 
tenure extension and the Muslim minority who supported tenure extension for a 
                                                
245 Cited in an interview granted in 2005 to Morrow by Dr. Martin Kansichi, former President of the 
Malawi Confederation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry, Lilongwe. 
246 In an authorÕs interview Father John Guwa pointed out that both the Catholic and Protestant 
churches witnessed major rifts concerning the amendment bill. The rift, however, was more noticeable 




Muslim incumbent president led to division and distrust across many sectors 
including the media, ethnic groups, and civil society.247   
In general, such divisions and distrust either played out or resulted in 
increased violence and intimidation from the ruling UDF against journalists and 
NGOs sympathetic to the dissenting elites248. The Young Democrats (the youth wing 
of the ruling UDF) assumed the role of militants using intimidation and random 
violence against perceived and real enemies of President MuluziÕs regime, especially 
prominent members of the MCP, AFORD, the newly formed NDA, the media, and 
other apparently nonconforming actors (Dulani 2005).249 For instance, the Young 
Democrats attacked and destroyed three media houses and two radio stations, as well 
as abducted and molested many journalists, mostly in the presence of the state 
police.250 Some media houses that dared to publish articles contrary to the view of the 
                                                
247 Cf. Attack on the Press, The Chronicle, August 24, 2002. 
248 During the tenure elongation controversy, seven journalists were kidnapped while three clergy men 
were physically assaulted by the Young UDF, all in full view of state police and other security agents. 
Many felt that the severity of these incidents surpassed the violence during the period of the 
presidency. 
249 Ibid. 
250 In February 2002, Young Democrats abducted Mallick Mnela of the Chronicle Weekly and 
assaulted three other Chronicle journalists after the Chronicle published an article about apparent 
disagreement and in-fighting within the ruling UDF over tenure extension. 
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ruling UDF on the constitution amendment controversy also faced the stateÕs 
executive intimidation through the Young Democrats. In May 2002, thousands of 
Young Democrats besieged and destroyed the offices of Blantyre Newspapers, which 
privately published the Daily Times and weekly Malawi news in favor of dissenting 
elites (The Nation, 29 May 2002).251  
As Paul Collier notes in his book Democracy, Guns and Election, many 
incumbent presidents have succeeded in brutalizing civil society and the masses in 
order to entrench power. This seems to be a recurring factor in some post-Cold War 
African democracies. Muluzi did not prove to be different from other incumbents that 
had entrenched power by muscling the opposition, the civil society, and the masses. 
His attempt to minimize opposition against the constitution amendment damaged and 
incapacitated some NGOs in Malawi. In January 2002, a few NGOs showed 
significant interest in working with the dissenting elites and the church by supporting 
the PACÕs organized rallies against MuluziÕs open-term bill (Morrow 2005). Possibly 
fearing that dissenting elites would benefit from the NGOsÕ nonconformity, Muluzi 
declared a ban on demonstrations and open rallies against the amendment bill through 
an executive order in May 2002 (Nation, 29 May 2002).252  
                                                




The ban notwithstanding, regime loyalists could organize rallies with police 
protection while the dissenting elites and some CSOs became targets of police 
violence.253 An attempt to seek judicial protection by dissenting elites prompted a 
high court to overturn the ban on public rallies and demonstrations.254 However, the 
overturning of the executive order did not last, as Muluzi quickly intervened by 
calling on the public to ÒignoreÓ the ruling, describing it as Òirresponsible and highly 
insensitiveÓ (Nation, 5 June 2002). With the presidentÕs insistence on the executive 
ban on demonstrations and rallies, another High Court overturned Judge Dustain 
MwaungluÕs judgment and sustained MuluziÕs ban on public rallies and 
demonstrations.255 The police were always on hand to take action against rallies 
organized by dissenting elites by dispersing meetings and a handful of protests 
organized by an insignificant number of CSOs (Morrow 2005; Brown 2004).  
 
                                                
253 Several newspaper reports detailed how protesters were arbitrarily arrested, beaten, molested, and 
put behind bars for weeks without prosecution. Cf. The Malawi Human Rights Commission, August 
2002; The Chronicle, February 23, 2002; The Sun, August 24, 2002; The Malawi Standard August 23, 
2002; The Malawi Insider Agugust 25, 2002  
254 Dustain Mwaunglu, a High Court judge, upturned MuluziÕs executive order by describing the ban 
as an Òaffront on the constitutional rights of the Malawian people to express themselves on a matter of 
public interestÓ (Nation, 4 June 2002). 
255 The role of the courts shall be discussed further below. 
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6.5 Involving the Church 
By the beginning of 2002, regime loyalists blocked all avenues of protest and 
pressure. The only channel seemingly still open for dissenting elites was the church. 
These considered the churchÕs structure immune to executive bans, police, and court 
actions. 256  Moreover, the church had in 1993 created the Political Affairs 
Commission (PAC) as a lobby group against governmentÕs anti-people policies. The 
PAC was also a spearhead of the protests that, after thirty years, brought down 
Hastings BandaÕs one-party system in 1994  
It became a good strategy for dissenting elites to collaborate with the church 
and use the existing and favorable church structures to sustain the anti-open term 
pressure. They penetrated the church through their connection to the PAC and church 
leadership, as eighty percent of Malawian political elites was Christian (Morrow 
2005).257 The politically dissenting elites became active in sponsoring meetings 
through the church,258 a strategy that they advantageously used in setting the agenda 
and converting church gatherings to opposition political rallies against MuluziÕs 
tenure extension project. The church also became a veritable channel for information 
distribution at the grassroots level, publishing pastoral letters for reading in every 
                                                
256 AuthorÕs interview with John Guwa, Catholic University of Malawi. October 2014. 
257 AuthorÕs interview with John Guwa, Catholic University of Malawi, October 2014 
258 AuthorÕs interview with Boniface Tamani, former chairman of the PAC. 
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church gathering. 259  Though the government officially banned public rallies, 
dissenting elites went on to organize rallies through the church in the form of 
crusades, public worship, and prayers, thereby strategically defying the executive ban 
on public rallies.260  
The coalition and partnership between dissenting political elites and the 
Church became instrumental in attracting international concern and action against 
Muluzi. The coalition had petitioned international donors in 2002 to suspend 
development aid to Malawi, alleging that the regime had used funds to impose 
dictatorship on Malawi without strictly abiding to the rules of transparency according 
to donor regulations.261 Thus, as the debates and controversy over constitutional 
amendment raged in Malawi, many donor agencies either stopped or suspended 
financial aid to Malawi (Villalon 2005 & Morrow 2005).  
While the United States stopped its financial assistance to Malawi, referring to 
financial recklessness and unaccountability from the regime, the Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA) suspended and later cancelled its development aid 
policy to Malawi referring to internal government policies in the donor country as its 
                                                
259 Ibid., also confirmed in the authorÕs interview with John Guwa, October 2014. 
260 Cf. AuthorÕs interview with Monsgr. Tamani, former Chairman of PAC and professor of Politics 




motivation (Morrow 2005). However, some donor agencies that had suspended aid to 
Malawi in the heat of the controversy found a way to channel their funds through the 
church. Such secret funds supported and sustained opposition against MuluziÕs tenure 
extension bill (ibid).262 On several occasions, Muluzi accused church and religious 
groups of bribery by dissenting elites and international donors, whom he described as 
Òformer colonialistsÓ (Malawi Standard, 25-30September2002).263  
Before the commencement of the open-term amendment controversy, the 
ruling UDF controlled a clear majority in the parliament with 101 out of 193 seats. 
Despite an extensive lobby, intimidation, and financial inducements, the UDF could 
not mobilize the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution. The inability 
of the regime to secure a two-thirds majority in the parliament resulted in two 
consecutive postponements of parliamentary voting on the bill,264 though the bill was 
to be hastily handed in on July 4, 2002 without due process.265 
                                                
262 Ibid. 
263 The elite coalition and connection between the church and foreign donors against the constitutional 
amendment shall be further discussed in the section ÒMobilization through the Church.Ó  
264  AuthorÕs interview with former Minister of Finance under President Muluzi. Lilongwe, October 
2014.   
265 ÔDue processÕ refers to proper consultation or discussion with the cabinet, partyÕs national 
executive, or the parliament. 
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After two postponements, heavy financial inducements, political intimidation, 
and violence, the open-term amendment bill failed by a very narrow margin (short of 
five votes) to meet the required two-thirds majority. The dissenting elite group was 
able to muster fifty-one votes against, in comparison to one hundred and twenty-nine 
votes in support, despite the combined forces of the UDF and major figures from 
opposition political parties like Tembo of the MCP and Chihana of the AFORD party. 
Interestingly, many ruling UDF and some MCP MPs belonging to the pro-faction 
groups voted against the tenure extension while several others abstained, indicating 
that many prominent politicians who openly supported Muluzi did so to maintain 
their political positions and to avoid political intimidation. It shows also how the 
opposition group could penetrate the pro-government faction, using the strategy of 
comradeship.  
The failure of the open-term amendment bill did not seem to deter president 
Muluzi and his loyalists. While the dissenting coalition of political and church elites 
celebrated the defeat of the open-term bill as a victory for democracy, Muluzi and his 
loyalists quickly introduced another tenure elongation bill, now strictly for a Ôthird-
term.Õ The third-term bill appears to have been a Òplan BÓ for the event that the open-
term bill should fail. The introduction of the third-term bill intensified violence, 
intimidation, and lobbying, as the ban on public rallies against the bill continued. The 
Catholic Church, however, continued to provide the platform and vehicle for elite 
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activism through crusades and prayer meetings, which were once more used as 
political rallies and a forum for protest.266  
Unhappy that the Church continued to provide the platform for elite dissent, 
therefore playing a major role in the defeat of the open-term amendment bill, Muluzi 
tactically intensified and extended his executive intimidation toward the Church.267 
For instance, the Governor of the Southern Region once attempted to stop a ÔPublic 
Song WorshipÕ organized by the Church in Blantyre, referring to it as Ôcritical of the 
third-term proposalÕ (Daily Times, 23October 2002). The Young Democrats equally 
dispersed several public worship services where pastoral letters against third-term 
presidency were read and dissenting elites due to speak, dismissing them as political 
rallies (Morrow 2005).268 
                                                
266 According to Monsignor Tamani, this became necessary to fill the gap created by the banning of 
CSOs on participation in any kind of protest concerning the open-term amendment bill by President 
Muluzi. This has also been confirmed by Dr. Chissinga,   
267 Author Mosignor Tamani explained in an interview that Muluzi had nothing more to lose. His 
decision to extend his intimidation to the Church and church elites was informed by how church elites 
conspired with political dissidents and opposition elites by allowing the Church to be used as a vehicle 
of opposition, thereby dragging the church into politics. He was therefore to treat the Church as vehicle 
of a political opposition. 
268 Confirmed in authorÕs interview with John Guwa, Catholic University of Malawi, October 2014. 
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As has been noted, the second attempt at tenure elongation by President 
Muluzi exercised much intimidation, bribery, and violence on the part of the regime. 
However, the more the regime intimidated and induced the dissenting elites and their 
church counter-parts, the more support for the third-term amendment bill declined. As 
it became increasingly apparent that the bill was going to fail, many MPs who voted 
in favor of the open-term bill began to retrieve their support, apparently to be on the 
better side of history.269 At a special session of the parliament in January 2003, the 
possibility of securing the two-thirds majority required to amend the constitution 
appeared impossible270. Unwilling to go through a second humiliating parliamentary 
defeat, Muluzi quickly recalled the bill, but decided to keep silent on whether the bill 
would be re-introduced or not. After about six weeks of rumor concerning president 
MuluziÕs next line of action, Muluzi announced his retirement on March 30, 2003, 
proclaiming Bingu wa Mutharika as the UDF presidential candidate for the 2004 
presidential election (Ross 2004 & Africa Confidential 44, 9: 5-6). With this move, 
he rested every case concerning his tenure extension and the removal of presidential 
term limits in Malawi.  
 
 
                                                
269 AuthorÕs interview with an ex-MP in Lilongwe, Malawi, November 2014. 
270 AuthorÕs interview with an ex- ruling party MP. Though the ruling party had 93 MPs, it would 
require 35 extra MPs to pass the amendment bill based on two-thirds majority. 
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6.6  The Pressures 
The pressure against the removal of presidential term limits in Malawi 
qualifies the Malawian presidential term limits politics as a Òfully enforced 
compliance.Ó This section shall outline and analyze the different pressures that 
culminated to yield the compliance outcome in Malawi. By treating the Malawian 
case as fully enforced compliance, this study recognizes that some pressures or a 
combination of pressures were responsible for the enforcement outcome in Malawi. It 
also means that without applying pressure on President Bakili Muluzi, the removal of 
presidential term limits in Malawi would have been successful. In other words, the 
full compliance in Malawi was the direct result of the pressures applied on President 
Muluzi by some or a combination of forces. I will aim to detect the specific forces 
that applied the highest pressures. I will also identify the particular forces responsible 
for mobilizing and bundling those pressures that resulted in the outcome of 
compliance. I will analyze pressures coming from dissenting elites, civil society, 
media, and international sources. I will treat the involvement of the Church as a 
separate pressure arising from elite mobilization and partnership. 
6.6.1  The Civil Society 
By definition, the civil society is a vital source of pressure against bad policies 
and governance (Diamond 2015; Rakner 2004). Scholars have convincingly argued 
that vibrant civil society organizations and massive democratic movements have 
piloted some changes that occurred in the area of democratization (Wezels 2009 & 
  
301 
Gibson 1998), though Inglehart (2003) questions the solidity and rootedness of civil 
and mass support for democracy. However, the civil society in Malawi has not been a 
consistent source of pressure in the area of democratization and further consolidation. 
Some writers have attributed this failure to the long one-party regime under Banda 
that seemed to have given little space for civil society to thrive due to political 
victimization and intimidation (Chirwa 2000; Meinhardt and Patel 2003).  
Many writers would not agree with Meinhardt and Patel since in any form of 
authoritarianism, political Ôopportunity structureÕ or Ôcontrol deficitÕ (Tarrow 1998 & 
Ulfelder 2005) makes such a regime vulnerable and offers democratic forces different 
opportunities to emerge (Welzel 2009). Such opportunities were rare in Malawi, as 
the civil society in Malawi remained almost invisible, especially in the area of 
championing democratic courses. Even efforts leading to democratization in 1994 
were championed by the Catholic bishopÕs Conference of Malawi and supported by 
international donors (Morrow 2005 & Brown 2004), with the civil society only 
playing a supporting role. Further, civil society failure in Malawi as in many post-
Cold War African democracies is linked to widespread poverty and lack of funding, 
which make civil society vulnerable for financial inducements and weak political 
outing (Chirwa 2000; Morrow 2005). Trade unionism crippled under the Banda 
regime was yet to recover at the time of the debate on constitutional amendment in 
Malawi. Even those unions that still portrayed outward signs of existence showed 
poor organization and offered no substantial services to their members to engage in 
the open and third-term amendment debates (ibid). 
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As some Malawian democracy observers have pointed out, the role of CSOs 
in general and of NGOs in particular during the presidential term limits politics was 
secondary (Tsoka 2002; Brown 2004), ambiguous, and disappointing (Morrow 2005). 
Though the political changes in Malawi in the 1990s led to the springing up of many 
mushroom NGOs, the CSOs put little or no pressure on the government after the 
1994 elections, at least in opposition to bad policies and bad governance. Some 
observers think that this inaction was due to the successful achievement of regime 
change in 1994, which tended to overshadow the broader democratic reforms, thereby 
making it difficult to focus on good governance, specific freedoms, and consolidation 
(Chirwa 2000). Furthermore, many leaders in civil society organizations joined the 
ruling party or other political associations, as was the case with Chihana Chafkuwa, 
who returned from exile in 1993 to ally with the Catholic Church in their demand for 
multi-party politics in Malawi. ChafkuwaÕs contribution in the alliance enhanced the 
coordination of some civil protests and demonstrations against BandaÕs one-party 
system in 1993. However, Chafkuwa later became a co-founder of AFORD and 
played a significant role in dividing his party in favor of MuluziÕs tenure elongation 
attempt (Dulani 2005).271  
                                                
271 Monsignor Boniface Tamani, the former chairman of the PAC, emphasized in an interview with the 
author the PACÕs disappointment with ChafkuwaÕs inconsistency. The CSOs lost their credulity when 




Furthermore, it seems that most Malawians do not trust the capacity of CSOs 
to influence government activities and behavior.272 According to a national survey 
conducted in Malawi in 1999, bulk respondents emphasized that they would Òdo 
nothingÓ if the government were to ban CSOs and opposition parties in large part, 
since their actions have had no impact on MalawiÕs democracy (Tsoka 2002, 29, 31). 
It appears also that only church-organized, broad-based protest and activism between 
1992 and 1994 created some impact among ordinary Malawians regarding 
democratization. Since most people trusted the Church more than they trusted the 
CSOs in Malawi, an alliance with the Church seems to have become an accepted 
route to civil society action. The presidential term limits controversy created another 
opportunity for activism. The churches seized the opportunity again by providing the 
structures and platform for elite activism, which the CSOs lacked. By visibly aligning 
itself with the opposition elites to pressure Muluzi to compliance, the church became 
central in successfully opposing two consecutive government actions in a decade. 
Obviously, the centrality of the Church did not diminish the civil society role. 
Instead, the prominence and active involvement of the churches was more of a 
response to the vacuum in civil society than an expression of their strength in social 
                                                
272 In an interview with the author, Dr. Blessing Chissinga of the University of Malawi pointed out that 




concerns (Ross 2004).273 According to Chissinga and confirmed by John Guwa, ÒThe 
church arose to provide the links and structures for activism that the civil society was 
not able to provide.Ó274  
Other major setbacks in the operation of NGOs in Malawi, as in most new 
African democracies, include the narrow urban operating base and lack of specialized 
departments. These made the issue of mass mobilization exceedingly difficult, 
especially in the rural communities. Because of the lack of specialized departments, 
NGOs lack genuine information on key policy issues, making NGO operations in 
such places as Malawi more Òevent driven and reactive,Ó rather than proactive, 
process, and policy driven (Meinhardt and Patel 2003). 
The democratic openings that started in Malawi in 1992 afforded many NGOs 
the opportunity to commit themselves to civic education and human rights issues 
(PAC 2004 & Chirwa 2000). However, the operation of many NGOs that sprang up 
did not differ from many other institutions in Malawi, including the political parties. 
This resulted in some writers criticizing the NGOs as vehicles for Òaggrandizement 
and mechanisms for milking donor funds, symbolized by interminable seminars and 
workshops in five star hotelsÓ (Englund 2000; & 2003). As has been noted in the 
                                                
273 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, University of Malawi, Zomba Malawi, October 
2014. 




Nigerian and Zambian cases, the status of many NGOs during the presidential term 
limits debate in Malawi was imprecise. For instance, the National Institute for Civic 
Education (NICE) was initially against the constitutional amendment, but 
subsequently went underground and remained silent all through the period of debate 
on the presidential term limits politics in Malawi (Englund 2003). Ostensibly, NICE 
withdrew from the controversy because it was firmly under government control after 
receiving its funds from a donor partnership between the government and the EU 
(ibid.). 
The Muluzi Foundation for Democracy (MFD) was another NGO expected to 
make an impact on the pro-democracy movement. Regarded as the ruling UDF think-
tank, the foundation was politically inclined. With its direct connection with the 
ruling party, MFD received substantial funding from the ruling regime, and tended to 
tilt its policies and activities towards favoring the ruling UDF (Englund 2003). 
Though MFD comprised of regional and district governors and some university 
academics, its dependence on the regime and ruling party for funding perhaps 
contributed to its docility over the constitutional amendment debate.  
Lastly, the regimeÕs executive ban on protests over the amendment bill and 
the consequent intimidation of NGOs opposed to open-ended and third-term 
presidency further diminished the strength of the few non-conforming NGOs to exert 
meaningful and independent pressure on the regime against the amendment bill. As a 
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result, the few NGOs that dared to oppose the third term project did so by aligning 
with and seeking protection in churches.  
Though the NGOs have been obliged since January 2001 to become a member 
of the Council for Non-Governmental Organizations, a move that was interpreted as 
an unwarranted control (Meinhardt and Patel, 2003), the NGOs did not use the 
opportunity provided by elite resistance against MuluziÕs amendment bill to restore or 
manifest their independence. This demonstrates the weakness of NGO operations in 
Malawi. I concur with some writers like Englund (2000 & 2003), Anders (2002), and 
Morrow (2005) that the civil society in Malawi as represented by the NOGs was not a 
strong force at the time of the controversial presidential term limits debate, and 
therefore played no independent role in the defeat of the open and third-term debates 
in Malawi. 
6.6.2 The Media 
The role of the media is comparable to the secondary and disappointing role 
of the civil society during the presidential term limits controversy in Malawi. Morrow 
(2005) and Brown (2004) attribute the media failure to the extreme level of poverty 
and rurality in Malawi. By 2002, television and newspaper coverage was still very 
limited and city-bound, and available to only urban dwellers (Morrow 2005). Radio 
broadcasts seemed to be the only medium that had national coverage. However, the 
only two media outlets that had such capacity for national coverage were the two 
Malawi Broadcasting Corporations (MBC 1 and 2) that were strictly under 
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government control. The private radio stations that sprung up after the fall of 
Hastings Banda had limited coverage and were restricted to the big cities of Blantyre 
(the old capital) and Lilongwe (the new capital). Thus, even though the media could 
have wished to do more, unfortunately both the MBC 1 and 2 were under firm control 
of the government during the constitutional debate.  
Some journalists who were sympathetic to the dissenting elites made several 
attempts to air opposing views through disguised Òpopular soap operaÓ programs. The 
government responded swiftly with censorship or sanctions (Morrow 2005, Englund 
2003). A few independent radio stations that wanted or even dared to broadcast 
opposing views were intimidated or threatened with sanction. For instance, Power 
101 F.M, who showed some interests in broadcasting the position of the dissenting 
elites, faced threats of censorship and the revocation of its license. Thereafter, Power 
101 FM relaxed its approach in giving information about the constitutional 
amendment (Englund 2003). Malawi Institute of Journalism (MIJ) was the most 
radical radio station and operated from Blantyre. It closed down after airing an 
interview with Mpiangilari, a prominent member of the dissenting elite group. A 
court injunction was necessary to bring it back on the air.  
Printed media was equally a victim of executive intimidation (Brown 2004). 
Critical newspapers experienced harassment while journalists were beaten, 
kidnapped, or arrested for merely reporting on popular opposition to UDF policies 
(ibid.). The Muluzi regime and its loyalists used intimidation as a strategy to cripple 
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the media ahead of the tenure elongation politics. The government was ostensibly 
aware that persons who had possible affinity with some elites, especially from the 
MCP, privately owned seventy-five percent of printed media (Morrow 2005).275 The 
Daily Times had an MCP background, while Aleke Banda, a popular figure who had 
split from the ruling UDF to become a leading opponent of Muluzi, owned the 
Nation. The Chronicle, a bi-weekly news journal that many referred to as the most 
consistently independent voice in Malawian journalism, equally had an opposition 
background. These three independent print media outlets were consistent at the 
beginning of the debate by providing alternative information and debate on the 
amendment bill (Morrow 2005). However, the rurarity level of the Malawian public 
made the efforts of these media outlets less visible during the early stages of the 
constitutional amendment debates in Malawi.276  
As the controversy progressed, the regime loyalists not only used intimidation 
and physical assault on the media, but also effectively used legal actions to cripple 
some of the media companies. For instance, in February 2002, some Young 
                                                
275 During the long regime of MCP under Hastings Banda, many prominent members of the MCP 
acquired licenses to float media companies. Unfortunately, after the 1994 elections, which the MCP 
lost, the MCP became an opposition party. Muluzi feared that the opposition elites would use the 
private media companies owned by prominent opposition MCP members against him. Where he could 
not induce loyalty by patronage, he used  intimidation to silence such media companies.  
276 AuthorÕs interview with the Director of Operations at The Chronicle. Lilongwe, October 2014 
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Democrats abducted Mallick Mnela (a journalist working for The Chronicle) for 
publishing an article against Muluzi.277 The abduction occurred in the presence of 
state police (while the police looked the other way) and indicated cooperation 
between the regime and the police in the intimidation of opponents of the regime, as 
was the case in BandaÕs era (Brown 2004).  
There were also efforts to blackmail journalists and force them to back down 
or remain silent on the presidential term limits politics. For instance, the ruling UDF 
took legal actions against two prominent private print media companies for 
publishing articles in which they exposed executive corruption within the ruling UDF 
during the debates.278 These legal actions have been interpreted as attempts to cripple 
media companies financially, knowing that most print media companies in Malawi 
lacked enough financial resource to sustain prolonged legal actions (Englund 2003).  
The violence and intimidation toward media houses and personnel had the 
singular goal of silencing the media in order to withhold any privilege toward the 
dissenting elites on issues concerning the amendment bill.279 Consequently, as the 
level of intimidation and attack on the media increased with continued abduction, 
                                                
277 Daily Times January 16, 2002 
278 The Chronicle 4, April 2002. 
279 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, Head of Department, Social Science Research, 
University of Malawi. Choba, Kenya, October 2014 
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physical molestation, and legal actions, the print media companies and journalists 
gradually lost their capacity to provide alternative information on the tenure 
elongation debates. The opposition therefore needed other channels to mount 
pressure. Thus, public demonstrations and protests in the form of church crusades, 
prayer worships, and pastoral letters became crucial for the dissenting political actors, 
not just as a manifestation of opinions, but as means of disseminating alternative 
information and sustaining pressure against MuluziÕs open and third-term projects.280 
6.6.3 Political Parties 
Like in many new democracies, political parties in Malawi from the inception 
of democracy in 1994 did not set out toward further democratization (Brown 2004). 
The five main political parties were offshoots of the ruling CMP and acted as mere 
vehicles in the competition for power among defectors from the MCP. They were less 
visible in converging ideology and common vision around national development. 
This explains why compromise remained non-institutionalized in the party politics. 
Moreover, strong individuals formed and ran the political parties, using party 
structure to attract personal benefits and patronage. A prominent observer of 
Malawian politics once described the parties and their leaders as Machiavellian in 
their changing alliances. Because of the weakness of the parties and lack of common 
vision, the ruling UDF was able to further split two main opposition parties (Dulani 
                                                
280 AuthorÕs interview with Monsignor Boniface Tamani, Professor of Politics, University of Malawi 
and former chairman of the Public Action Committee (PAC), Limbe, Malawi, October 2014. 
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and van Donge 2005), by favoring one faction over the other, using Ôcarrot-and-stickÕ 
strategies (Morrow 2005).  
6.6.4 The Parliament 
From the inception of multi-party democracy in 1994, the Malawian 
parliament was not a place for opposition and activism (Dulani 2005). Though 
competition for political power existed between the UDF, MCP, and AFORD, these 
parties often compromised their interests within the parliament to allow easy passage 
of bills from the executive (Morrow 2005 & vonDoepp 2005).  
Eliciting cooperation from other political platforms in favor of the 
government was initially not difficult for the ruling UDF. A few examples confirm 
this fact. The working alliance of UDF with MCP within the parliament facilitated the 
constitutional amendment that curtailed the autonomy of MPs with the leaders 
benefiting directly from the amendment (Dulani 2005; von Doepp 2005). The alliance 
facilitated the scrapping of the senate and supported the impeachment of three High 
Court Judges whose judgments contradicted the interests of the ruling UDF (von 
Doepp 2005)). In early 2000, UDF used financial inducement to persuade many 
AFORD MPs to support the amendment of the constitution for tenure elongation. For 
instance, Chakufwa Chihana of the opposition AFORD joined the ruling UDF with 
nearly half of the MPs of AFORD, with whom he negotiated for a substantial 
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patronage from Muluzi (Dulani and van Donge 2005).281  A member of the MCP 
faction loyal to Muluzi described how the alliance and cooperation with the regime 
yielded important benefits to him and his constituency.282  The government used the 
resources at its disposal to entice its opponents.  
Generally, the parliament was extremely weak283 and only reacted to the 
executive, setting no precise agenda of its own (Brown 2004). This inability to set a 
precise agenda for itself was a benefit for the ruling UDF, specifically since the ruling 
party in all various elections failed to garner parliamentary two-third majority. As 
many observers noted, established checks and balances were lacking within the 
parliament to hold the regime effectively accountable, which some writers described 
as an unfortunate element of continuity with the Banda regime (Cammack 2004; 
Brown 2004; Meinhardt and Patel 2003). Moreover, representation among the MPs 
was in abeyance; the president had imposed or coopted most MPs, who therefore did 
not effectively represent their constituencies (Brown 2004). 
                                                
281  Cf. MorrowÕs investigation of corruption allegations in his article Toxic Mushrooms: The 
presidential Term Limits Debate in Malawi (2005). 
282 Two former MPs MCP informed the author that many projects implemented in their constituencies 
were products of cooperative strategy between their faction and the ruling UDF. The projects (mainly 
borehole projects) were unrealizable when MCP represented a formal opposition in the parliament. 
283 AuthorÕs interview with Blessing Chissinga, University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi,. October 2014. 
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However, dynamics in Malawian politics after the second elections threw up 
new political challenges and stakes that turned the parliament partly into a place for 
resistance and activism. Some political elites defected, enabling the formation of new 
political platforms that brought about fragmentation in the party system in Malawi 
(Brown 2000; 2004). Obviously, the fragmentation further deprived the ruling UDF 
of its hegemony in the Malawian politics and therefore limited its capacity to have its 
way with both simple legislation and constitutional amendment.  
The formation of National Democratic Alliance (NDA) by Brown Mpiangilari 
and six other dissenting prominent ruling UDF members successfully caused the 
ruling party to lose its majority status in the parliament. The NDA was specifically 
formed to fight against the extension of MuluziÕs presidency (Dulani and van Donge 
2005). The defection of Mpiangilari and his loyalists, most of them UDF and 
opposition MPs, seemed to restore the parliamentary balance of power and 
independence. The ruling party probably failed to foresee the implosion and defection 
that were to occur when it expelled Mpinganjira, Cassim Chilumpha and Professor 
Chikaondo as cabinet members and was therefore not in an immediate position to 
wriggle out of the loss caused by their defection. Efforts to entrench power appear 
stalled by the activism and resistance of new NDA elites and their coopted opposition 
MPs. For instance, dissenting MPs of the NDA joined hand with some opposition 
MPs of MCP and AFORD to block a bill seeking to modify parliamentary standing 
rule for constitutional amendments in 2000 (Dulani and van Donge 2005). While the 
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UDF wanted and lobbied for a simple majority to be able to pass constitutional 
amendment bills, NDA elites resisted it.  
Furthermore, with the retention of two-thirds majority as a legislative standing 
rule to adopt constitutional amendments, it became difficult for the UDF to mobilize 
the two-thirds votes necessary to amend the Local Government Act in the parliament. 
This would have given the president the power to hire and fire local government 
officers (Africa News Service 2000 & von Doepp 2005). By blocking the 
modification of the Local Government Act and the legislative quorum, dissenting 
elites showed their strength by successfully and potentially signaling the death of any 
future hope of a constitutional amendment to allow Muluzi a third term. A once high-
handed party was subdued into obtaining the cooperation of other parties and 
individuals in parliament to pass both simple legislation (requiring a majority) and 
constitutional amendments (requiring two-thirds of the MPs).  
This particular change of dynamics within the parliament exposed President 
Muluzi and his loyalists into Ôpolitical beggars,Õ while turning the dissenting elites 
into Ôpolitical hot cakes.Õ This change further gave rise to the political economy of 
opposition politics, as many political jobbers and contractors emerged to negotiate 
between the government and the dissenting NDA elites. One such political jobber 
was Martin Kansichi, a prominent businessperson and president of the Malawi 
Confederation of Chambers, Commerce and Industry, who stepped forward to 
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negotiate between President Muluzi and twenty-two opposition MPs (Khembo 
2004).284  
While money played a significant role in securing parliamentary advantage 
for the government, individual resistance and the space for alternative leadership 
provided by Mpiangilari and Jaap Sonke for the dissenting group provided the 
necessary activism to alter the balance of power within parliament. Apart from 
financial inducement by the government to coerce MPs into supporting the 
amendment, political interests and church induced moral burden equally influenced 
many MPs at the last minute to drop their support for the tenure elongation bill.285 
The massive elite resistance and mobilization against the newly introduced third-term 
bill was the only reason why President Muluzi withdrew the new bill and announced 
his retirement.  
In conclusion, the parliament did not function strictly as an institution to 
enforce compliance on President Muluzi. Rather, it functioned as a political 
marketplace where political loyalty was on sale and where individual discretion and 
interest usurped party and parliamentary unity. For instance, the failure of the first 
bill by only three votes short of a two-thirds majority is an implication that the 
                                                
284 Refer to section 6.2 of the present chapter 
285 The moral burden as a political pressure which came from the church during the tenure debate and 




Malawian parliament was not yet sufficiently mature to protect the new democracy. 
As in the case of many other post-Cold War African democracies, this also shows 
that parliamentary alliance could not be trusted (vonDoepp 2005). The presence of 
the clergy in the parliament acted as moral intimidation on the MPs, who felt 
compelled to vote against the amendment bill on an individual basis.  Having been 
emboldened with massive support from the Church and civil society, efforts to 
introduce a new bill by pro-government MPs failed three times because of resistance 
and control in the parliament by dissenting elites.   
6.6.5 The Judiciary  
The Malawian judiciary was accustomed to a one-party system and operated within 
the limits of dictatorship for thirty years. Unlike the parliament, the judiciary had 
often rendered popular judgments that upset the government in power. Banda left the 
high courts, appeal courts, and the supreme courts intact but created a parallel court 
called the ÔTraditional Court.Õ His regime used the traditional court, which was 
visibly loyal to him, to legitimize his regimeÕs policies while the other courts 
concentrated on civil and criminal matters. The traditional court was therefore 
available to provide legal backing to BandaÕs policies. However, the new transitional 
constitution merged the courts and created a central legal system, striking out the 
parallel traditional court that had leaned towards the regime.  
After 1994 transitional elections, the courts did show a significant sign of 
independence, sporadically and selectively challenging some government programs 
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though the executive selectively applied courtsÕ rulings (vonDoepp 2000; Brown 
2004). Dr. Blessings Chissinga and Boniface Tamani acknowledged the judiciary role 
in encouraging democracy in Malawi.286  In the electoral petitions of 1994 for 
instance, the courts favored the presidential challenger instead of the incumbent.287 
Nevertheless, in 1999, the courts grossly favored the government of President Bakili 
Muluzi after eighteen months of electoral legal process in an election widely voiced 
as highly flawed (Dulani and van Donge 2005; Morrow 2005). President Muluzi had 
the privilege of appointing a number of new judges and therefore expectedly received 
favorable judgments form the courts (Dulani and van Donge 2005).288 
The political nature of the judgmentÕs outcome is undeniable. Equally, some 
of the judges who occupied leadership positions or supervised judicial events at the 
time had received their appointments during Banda era, thus suggesting some direct 
and indirect loyalty and tie to the MCP. Moreover, John Tembo had already defected 
with a faction of MCPs to the ruling UDF. The MCP has a significant influence in the 
                                                
286     Interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga and Boniface Tamani, October 2014.  
287 This was understandable, since most Malawians wanted to do away with Banda after thirty years of 
presidency. 
288 For instance, the judges once interpreted the Constitution narrowly by ruling that a quorum at the 
beginning at each session was sufficient to begin a legislative business. The Judges also ruled that the 
government could overrule the Constitution using the Doctrine of Necessity in the national interest 
(Dulani and van Donge 2005). 
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ruling party, since the UDF was principally an offshoot of the MCP. Prominent 
leaders of UDF like Muluzi and Chakufwa were former prominent members of the 
MCP.  
In the particular case of 1994, the courts played it safe by ruling in favor of 
President Muluzi. The political atmosphere in Malawi was tense. There was a visible 
wind and agitation for change. Though Banda appointed the judges that presided over 
the electoral tribunal, most felt that BandaÕs time was over, giving his age and the 
resistance against him. The courts strategically decided to be on the right side of 
history by pitching their tent with the masses. However, as tenure elongation politics 
incited new dynamics and changes in the political balance of power, the courts were 
also to shift their loyalty as the judiciary became increasingly important in the new 
power play though Mulizi tried to break the courtsÕ apparent resistance.289 
With their connection to the judiciary, coupled with the sympathy awakened 
from executive intimidation, the dissenting elites apparently attracted sympathy and 
protection from the courts using a proactive strategy. Though some dissenting elites 
publicly tried to portray a diminished image of the judiciary, the courts actually 
supported the course of the opposition by delivering some favorable judgments to the 
                                                
289 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessings Chissinga, Univeristy of Malawi, Choba. Malawi. October 
2014. Muluzi used the Supreme court the overturn some judgemnts delivered by the lower courts in 
favor of the dissenting coalition. Refer also to Dulani B and van Donge J.K  ÒA Decade of Legislature-
Executive Squabble in Malawi, 1994-2004 (2005) pp 201-224 
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dissenting elites.290 By blocking the Civil Service Act in the parliament, with which 
President Muluzi sought to monitor and control judges, justices and the judicial 
process, some dissenting elites limited the ability of the government to control judges, 
especially at the High Court level. When they blocked the governmentÕs effort to 
control the courts, dissenting actors secured some independence at the high courts 
with which judges could render judgments that deposed government interests.  
It is interesting that at the heat of the presidential term limits controversy in 
Malawi, several High Court judgments were ruled in support of the dissenting 
elites.291 For instance, in November 2001, a High Court judgment challenged the 
decision of the pro-government faction of the UDF in parliament to declare the 
parliament seats of UDF and other defecting MPs vacant. In October of the same year 
the Speaker of the parliament, a Muluzi loyalist, had declared the seats of all defected 
NDA MPs and other opposition MPs vacant. A politically calculated move, this 
significantly reduced the strength of the non-conforming elites within parliament by 
seven.  
                                                
290 AuthorÕs interview with a prominent member of NDA who formally was an of president Muluzi 
that their closeness to some High Court Judges facilitated some judicial processes and guaranteed 
judicial protection for the dissenting elites. 
291 Apart from giving favorable judgments to the opposition elites, a High Court had also declared a 
presidential ban in October 2002on all demonstrations and protests regarding third-term presidency 
illegal and unconstitutional. 
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A legal petition instituted by the non-conformist group in the High Court 
resulted in the invalidation of the said declaration by the Speaker and a consequent 
institution of a judicial panel of inquiry to review the action of the Speaker. It was a 
victory for the non-conformist elites as the purportedly expelled opposition MPs 
regained their seats and further applied pressure from within the parliament. 
Insistence on a judicial panel of inquiry was a ploy by the dissenting elites and MPs 
to seek judicial protection and to delay any parliamentary decisions tactically until the 
tenure elongation bill was defeated. As vonDoepp (2005) observed, this was critical 
for the defeat of the amendment bill because nine months later, when the open-term 
bill was presented for voting in the parliament, the judicial issues had yet not been 
resolved. The continued seating of the seven purportedly expelled dissenting MPs in 
the parliament also became crucial in defeating the proposed constitutional 
amendment for President MuluziÕs open-presidential terms, as the bill failed by three 
votes.  
The problems the ruling elites confronted in their efforts to modify the 
constitution in favor of Muluzi show the importance of elite activism in the process of 
enforcing presidential term limits compliance in Malawi. As the former chair of PAC, 
Monsignor Tamani notes, ÒShould the opposition elites not have been proactive and 
resisted pro-government antics and strategies using the courts as a shield, Muluzi 
would have certainly succeeded in entrenching power and amending the 
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constitutions.Ó 292  The institutional backing and protections from courts were a 
calculated strategy from the non-conformist elites to counter pro-government 
strategies to weaken the strength of the dissenting elites by illegal dismissals. By 
being more politically proactive, the dissenting elites were able to attract judicial 
protection, delay their expulsion from the parliament, and oversee the death of the 
constitutional amendment project that would have allowed President Muluzi to repeal 
presidential term limits in Malawi.  
6.6.6 International Actors.  
Morrow describes the period and economic context of the presidential term 
limits controversy in Malawi as that of Òimpoverished millions struggling for daily 
existence, where only few opportunities exist to rise above the levelÓ (2005). 
Unfortunately, one of the few opportunities, if not the biggest, was in politics. In 
Malawi, national politics was regarded as a big industry where the scarce resources 
are highly concentrated within the hands of the ruling elites (ibid.). In such a 
distribution, only the Ôlucky or ruthlessÕ few prosper. Lack of a national economic 
resource base and a high poverty level in Malawi created a ÔscrambleÕ for scarce 
resources, forcing Malawi to rely heavily on donor aid.  
                                                
292 AuthorÕs interview with the former chair of the PAC, Monsignor Boniface Tamani, Limbe, Malawi, 
October 2014.  
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As shall be discussed later, MalawiÕs heavy reliance on donor aid made the 
state vulnerable to external pressure (Brown 2004; vonDoepp 20005). Foreign aid 
sustained the Malawian economy in large part (Brown 2000 & 2004; Morrow 2005). 
As tiny as it was though, foreign aid was very important for the survival and relative 
prosperity of the Malawian ruling class. As a result, some form of constitutionalism 
was necessary to allow development aid flow (vonDoepp 2005 & Morrow 2005). 
Any slight shrinking of foreign aid raised tension and agitation among the ruling class 
and among the populace, as the Malawian economy depended heavily on 
development assistance293. In order to keep these channels of foreign aid open, Banda 
yielded to multi-party democracy and effectively lost the election in 1994 (Brown 
2004).  
For the operators of the new Malawian democracy, a form of artificial 
constitutionalism was needed to keep donor aid flowing.294 In Malawi as in most 
other African countries, such artificial constitutionalism, especially periodic elections, 
chiefly represents the wishes of donors rather than that of the local ruling elites. Some 
                                                
293 Between 2006 and 2008, the human rights abuses by the Muktarika regime attracted the suspension 
of foreign aid, which caused economic hardship in Malawi. Within the same period, Malawi recorded 
about 34 street protests involving the students, the trade unions, NGOs and market women who 
agitated against the biting economic situation arising from the suspension of foreign aid to Malawi 
(Malawian Centre for Social Concerns 2010).  
294  Many presidents in new democracies have logically maximized quasi and artificial 
constitutionalism to sustain the flow of foreign aid (vonDoepp 2005). 
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incumbent presidents in Africa would have preferred to dump constitutionalism 
(Brown 2004; Diamond 2015; Levitsky 2015). Foreign aid regime systematically and 
partly became a strategy in the 1990s to ensure constitutionalism. MalawiÕs case 
represents this fact, as international donors somehow became important partners in 
the democratic transition process in Malawi between 1992 and 1994 (Brown 2004; 
vonDoepp 2005; Morrow 2005).  
However, after the success of the 1994 transition elections referred to as 
ÔmodelÕ democratization, international donors seemingly diverted their attention to 
the Malawian economy and paid progressively less attention to Malawian politics and 
the democratic process (Brown 2004). As Brown further notes, Òdonors rarely raised 
issues related to democratization after the 1994 elections, despite clear backsliding by 
the ruling partyÉ.focusing more on economic than political governanceÓ (2004). 
Added to the above, attitudes and policies vary according to the disposition and 
personality of donor representatives in Malawi. In 1998 for instance, some officials of 
the World Bank, the United KingdomÕs Department for International Development 
(DFID), and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) pushed hard for economic and 
political reforms in Malawi. Fortunately, for President Muluzi, the successors of these 
officials chose a softer stance against him by abandoning reform policies approved by 
their predecessors (Brown 2000). This allowed President Muluzi not only to gain 
time but also firmly fix impunity into his regime.  
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However, where political will exists and national interests pose no barriers, 
donors have often recognized their capacity as a formidable force. They can play a 
very important role as watchdog, not only in demanding accountability for the 
financial resources they provide, but also in opting to comment on government 
failures to respect rule of law and constitutional provisions. Post-Cold War 
development aid policy and conditionality contributed directly to democratization in 
many countries, making dependency on donor aid risky for governments. This should 
have informed President Bakili Muluzi to reconsider his attempt to change the 
presidential term limits to his advantage, when he was not in good standing with 
some important donors. Donor support and approval could have potentially provided 
him with a sixty percent chance to pass the amendment bill.  
Uganda, Namibia, Cameroon, Gabon and Togo succeeded, however, without 
attracting the wrath of donors. Why did international donors tilt towards the 
dissenting elites and show visible sign of collaboration against President Muluzi?  
Democratic post-transitional Malawi under President Muluzi demonstrated bad 
governance and highly concentrated presidential power. It lacked accountability, 
transparency, and the rule of law. It displayed human rights abuses and political 
intimidation. All of these points affected MuluziÕs credibility (Cammack 2004; 
Meinhardt & Patel 2003; Brown 2004; Morrow 2005). The executive branch no 
longer respected or enforced constitutional provisions.  
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As a foreign aid dependent country, resources from donors supported the 
recurrent expenditure of Malawi. This accounted for 31.5 percent of MalawiÕs GNP, 
almost triple of the Sub-Saharan African average of 11.1 percent (UNDP 2000, 221-
222). Development aid supported the entire democratic process, especially the 
elections (Brown 2000). The 1994 and 1999 general elections, as well as the 2000 
local elections, depended on donor and overseas aid (vonDoepp 2005; Brown 2000, 
2004; Morrow 2005).295 Even the Malawian Electoral Commission, founded in 1994, 
remained ninety-percent donor-supported (Brown 2000, 2004; Morrow 2005).296 The 
NGOs involved in civic education and other electorally related services were also 
fully donor dependent (Chirwa 2000, Tsoka 2002).  
As many writers argue, the institutions and processes of democracy in Malawi 
were dependent on donor-support (VonDoepp 2005; Kabemba 2005; Tsoka 2002; 
Morrow 2005), thereby exposing Malawi to an extensive external influence on the 
democratic process. The use of development funds exacted an indirect and disguised 
influence on the agitation against the removal of terms limit in Malawi. With party 
opposition splintered and ineffective (Brown 2004), civil society extremely weak 
(Chirwa 2000; Tsoka 2000), and the parliament in disarray (Brown 2004; Morrow 
2005) one Western aid official in 2002 spoke collectively for other donors when he 
                                                
295 AuthorÕs interview with a serving Ambassador in Malawi, Lilongwe, Malawi, November 2004 




remarked: ÒWe are the checks and balancesÓ (Brown 2004). While donors remained 
silent after the transitional elections on the political issues for reasons mentioned 
above, between 2001 and 2003, donors aligned with some dissenting political elites 
and church organizations to enforce constitutionalism by defeating the UDFÕs 
repeated attempt to extend the mandate of President Muluzi. 
The goal was to ÔoffloadÕ President Muluzi, even when placed under the guise 
of Ôgood governanceÕ and an economic undertone. In partnership with the Church, 
some dissenting elites like Jaap Sonke an Brown Mpingilari have petitioned the 
World Bank, IMF, DFID, DANIDA, and the United States Agency for International 
Development (USAID) to consider suspension of development aid to Malawi since 
President Muluzi deployed development aid to buy political loyalty and intimidate 
the opposition.297 With a track record of Òexecutive high-handedness and reckless 
confrontation with donorsÓ (Brown 2004), it became easier for donors to align with 
the dissenting elites and the Church to starve President Muluzi of the funds he 
desperately needed to finance his tenure elongation bill.  
The subsequent suspension of development aid by the United States and 
Denmark reduced the capacity of MuluziÕs regime to effectively finance the 
constitutional bill (Brown 2004), apparently in direct consequence of the petition. 
The United States further suspended a substantial part of its assistance to Malawi in 
                                                
297 In 2001, Brown Mpingalari led the dissenting elites to petition donor agencies in Malawi with the 
headline, ÒCorruption and Reckless Misappropriation of Development Aid by MuluziÕs Regime. 
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2002 in response to what it called Òan increasing lack of financial and political 
transparencyÓ (Brown 2004). However, before the United States placed economic 
pressure on Muluzi, donors had already collectively stopped or suspended 
development aid to Malawi in 2001 in response to accusations of corruption, a 
bloated cabinet, and economic and administrative mismanagement levied against the 
regime by the leaders of the dissenting group (Brown 2004; Morrow 2005). While 
Denmark took the most drastic measure (as shall be discussed later), some donors 
limited their development support to Malawi on a project-by-project basis.  
Muluzi had run a bloated cabinet since 1994, with many of the dissenting 
elites (now defectors) as beneficiaries, while donors allowed funds to flow. Why was 
it necessary for the donors to act now? According to the former Chairman of PAC, ÒIt 
became necessary to suspend foreign aid because the dissenting elites and most of the 
donors found a common ground and were working in tandem with a seeming 
common agenda.Ó298 For instance, the American embassy in Blantyre brought its 
concealed pressure to bear, not directly on the proposed tenure elongation bill, but on 
any procedure that sought to bypass the democratic process in seeking the 
constitutional amendment. Of course, the embassy knew that Muluzi employed 
                                                
298  AuthorÕs interview with Monsignor Tamani, former chairman of Public Action Committee: 
ÒPresident Muluzi needed to go, and it was not the responsibility of the donors to dictate for 
Malawians. The dissenting political actors presented an opportunity for a change and the donors 
bought into it, using development funds as a strategy to help the dissenting elites enforce compliance 
on President Muluzi.Ó Limbe, October 2014 
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undemocratic means to achieve his tenure elongation ambition by intimidating 
opponents, banning civil society actions, and using slush funds to buy support. The 
insistence on democratic process brought Muluzi in direct confrontation with the 
United States, which seemed to have made up its mind against Muluzi. Though the 
United States diplomatically avoided direct meddling in the tenure elongation politics 
of Malawi, which some observers interpreted as insufficient (Brown 2004), it 
partially laid the foundation for the collapse of MuluziÕs campaign by withholding 
funds at a time when Muluzi needed them to maintain his support base (Morrow 
2004).  
 
6.7 Special Case Study: DANIDA and Local Linkage in Malawi. 
I have discussed the hypothetical capacity of international pressure to enforce 
term limits compliance in new democracies. However, the burden of national interest 
seems to often blur this capacity (Diamond 2015 & Levitsky 2015). The Malawian 
case reflects the paradox of foreign aid policy in influencing democratic outcomes, 
especially in its relations with Denmark, which demonstrates extensive donor-
recipient politics (Morrow 2005).  
In January 2002, a change of government in Denmark resulted in the 
suspension of development aid to Malawi (ibid.). According to Khembo (2005), the 
suspension was justified in ÔMalawian venality and inefficiencyÕ and evolved into a 
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diplomatic face-off between Malawi and Denmark. The conflict raised the obvious 
question: whose interest did DANIDA serve in Malawi?  
In reaction to the suspension of donor aid to Malawi, Muluzi accused 
Denmark of having a hidden agenda. He quickly expelled the Danish Ambassador, 
Orla Bakdal, from Malawi. The regime in Malawi took the Danish criticism against 
Muluzi (based on the petition submitted by the dissenting elites), at face value, since 
it weighed heavily on the politics of constitutional amendment. However, much of the 
Danish development assistance targeted at the support of democratic process and 
institutions. The Danish attempt to suspend foreign aid during debates on a 
constitutional amendment for presidential tenure extension lent itself to political 
interpretation.  
Literature reports that the suspension and eventual withdrawal of Danish 
development funds, and the rise in power of a right-wing populist party in Denmark, 
were connected (Morrow 2005). However, the above argument enjoyed minimal 
reception in Malawi, where interviews and local reports framed the Danish domestic 
agenda as a ploy.  These claimed that Denmark ceased development aid in order to 
further impoverish Malawi and punish President Muluzi (Englund 2002). After the 
amendment bill failed, Denmark made a surprisingly quick U-turn and proved those 
media suspicions true. Unlike the United States, the Danish development assistance 
office DANIDA sought and maintained local links in Malawi through which funds 
helped sustain pressure against Muluzi. 
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In July 2002, a delegation of the Public Affairs Committee (PAC), the main 
organ representing the religious bodies (Roman Catholic Episcopal Conference of 
Malawi, the Protestant Malawi Council of Churches, the Muslim Association of 
Malawi, the Malawian Lawyers Association and a handful of local NGOs) held a 
meeting with DANIDA in Lusaka, Zambia. 299  DANIDA had left Malawi in 
2001during the Malawi-Denmark face-off (Morrow 2005). According to Boniface 
Tamani, the main agenda for the meeting was the financing of PAC activities to 
sustain pressure against Muluzi, which DANIDA swiftly accepted to do.300 The 
meeting in Lusaka resulted in funds being approved for PAC, which were channeled 
through a Zambian NGO called ÒWomen for Change.Ó301 This move by DANIDA 
was to attract criticism within MuluziÕs regime. However, DANIDA justified its 
action and intention in terms of good governance and rule of law, defending its links 
with PAC as effectively falling within the boundaries of the law.  
Though the government of Denmark and DANIDA weakly denied supporting 
the dissenting elites against Muluzi, it was still strongly suspected that Denmark had 
covertly supported the Malawian opposition elites against Muluzi through DANIDA 
and PAC. After all, DANIDA suddenly returned to Malawi, held meetings with PAC 
                                                






in Zambia, and channeled funds to PAC when no locally based donors appeared (at 
least openly) to have given resources specifically to groups opposed to open-ended 
and  third-term presidency. Boniface Tamani confirmed in an interview with the 
author that although funds from DANIDA helped to organize church crusades, the 
aim was to strengthen opposition against the repealing of presidential term limits. 
Church crusades and national worship rallies aimed to achieve this specific goal.302   
External pressure became an issue in the Malawian case because dissenting 
political elites had lobbied foreign donors for support against Muluzi and the 
proposed constitutional amendment (Brown 2004). Although many donor agencies 
sided with the dissenting actors against the proposed constitution amendment, they 
avoided involvement in Malawian internal politics and were careful to observe some 
protocols in respect to sovereignty. The United States was very careful about the use 
of its funds in the context of political opposition, as was the case with British High 
Commission in Malawi.303 However, this was not the case with DANIDA.  
                                                
302 Ibid. 
303 The British High Commissioner, Norman Ling, tried to get the PAC to tone down its anti-Muluzi/ 
tenure elongation posture. This became obvious when the PAC was no longer distinguishable from the 
opposition elites who had permeated the PAC and used it as proxy. The channeling of funds to the 
PAC resembled the sponsoring of political opposition against the president, which was considered to 
be against diplomatic rule. This is a fallout from authorÕs interview with Monsg. Boniface Tamani.  
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The Public Affairs Committee (PAC) that worked in tandem with dissenting elites 
was able to attract direct funding from DANIDA against the constitutional 
amendment (Morrow 2005). The PAC was an anti-government organ in which many 
dissenting elites were stakeholders. Funds from DANIDA publicly implemented 
programs and activities against the open-term constitution amendment like the 
publication of Pastoral Letters and the hosting of church rallies, vigils, workshops, 
and dinners in which dissenting elites were given prominent positions and speech 
time against the tenure elongation bill.304  
When it became clear that funds from DANIDA aided political opposition 
purposes and agitation, the government specifically complained to the Danish 
embassy about the use of Danish funds for political purposes in Malawi (Brown 
2004). Denmark responded by calling PAC to order and by crosschecking whether it 
had allocated its funds in this direction. DenmarkÕs response appears, however, more 
cosmetic in nature. Despite the denial of PAC that it diverted funds from DANIDA 
for political agitation,305 it was obvious that PAC channeled the funds into activities 
                                                
304 In an interview with John of the Catholic University of Malawi, it became explicit that the chair of 
the PAC, Boniface Tamani, was a partisan, even to the extent of using church services and his homilies 
to sustain pressure against Muluzi and his open-term ambition.  
305 The PAC had denied using funds from DANIDA to support opposition against constitution 
amendment claiming that the funds supported a program against community violence. The PAC 
referred to church rallies and open air interdenominational worships as organized workshops against 
community violence, even though prominent opposition elites made speeches at such rallies. 
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that sustained opposition and pressure against Muluzi and the constitution 
amendment bill for open-ended term.306 
The international donor connection in the Malawian case played two 
significant roles. The suspension of development funds by donors, which was a direct 
consequence of the political and church elite pressure and lobby, contributed in 
causing MuluziÕs tenure elongation to crash: he lost the funds with which to coerce 
support for his amendment bill. His inability to raise funds crippled Muluzi, who was 
unable to pay MPs who had demanded five million Kwacha ($25.000) to support the 
amendment bill. The suspension of development funds to Malawi denied the 
president of the continuous flow of funds to maintain his support base. Secondly, 
DANIDA funded PAC to support and sustain elite political pressure against Muluzi. 
This enabled PAC and dissenting elite alliance to continue undisrupted to plan and 
implement their programs against MuluziÕs constitution amendment bill. 
Due to the suspension of foreign aid to Malawi during the constitutional 
amendment, Muluzi reacted angrily in a pro-open term rally in Mulanje in August 
2001: ÒWhy do you donors threaten us every day? I am head of state in my own right 
and no donor has a right to meddle in the countryÕs internal issuesÓ (Nation, 
25August 2001). He made a similar statement at Manghochi, saying: ÒDonors should 
work with poor countries as partners and should not release funds to influence 
                                                
306 Refer to Brown 2004. Boniface Tamani confirmed that Denmark was aware of the involvement of 
its funds in sustaining pressure against Muluzi and his open-term ambition. 
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political changeÉnobody should come to Malawi or Africa to lecture us as if we are 
kids at a kindergartenÓ (Nation, 24 January 2002). Unlike the Nigerian and Zambian 
cases, international factors contributed directly to the sustaining of elite political 
pressure against the removal of presidential term limits in Malawi.  
 
6.8 Elite Dissidence as a Mobilizing Factor in Malawi 
The main hypothesis of this chapter is that opposition political elites were 
chiefly responsible for the enforcement of presidential term limits compliance in 
Malawi in 2003. Donor alliance and partnership with church organizations facilitated 
elite activism and resistance. With two rounds of successful elections in Malawi, 
voters, political elites, and parties were beginning to enjoy strong incentives to 
participate in a routine democratic process that they had missed during the thirty 
years of BandaÕs era. For the political parties, the incentive was that elections were 
the route to power. For opposition elites and parties, there was at least a chance of 
power alternation.  
Any attempt to allow Muluzi to succeed in entrenchment of power by 
repealing the presidential term limits recalled the Banda era, an experience none of 
the dissenting elites seemed willing to see happen. As in most new democracies, the 
Malawian electorate has little influence on its government. Still, some political elites 
have learned their lessons and woken up to the fact that life-presidency and the 
entrenchment of power by a single individual or party is a total closure of political 
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space. It leads to intimidation, suppression, and executive highhandedness 
reminiscent of Banda era. The ÒBanda experience was not going to be allowed to be 
repeated.Ó307  
Furthermore, if Muluzi could succeed, some political elites with higher 
political ambitions stood to lose the most. The regime had used intimidation to 
conquere civil society and the media (Chirwa 2000 & Tsoka 2003). Donor 
conditionality had failed to impose discipline on Muzluzi through threats and actual 
suspension of financial assistance (vonDoepp 2005 & Morrow 2005). The only 
option open for the opposition elite to enforce compliance on Muluzi was to seek 
other channels of activism both within and outside formal institutions. While elite 
defection from the ruling party depleted the strength of the ruling party to operate 
freely in the parliament (vonDoepp 2005), co-opting and aligning with the church 
elites seemingly became another successful strategy in applying both political and 
moral pressures on the MPs to reject MuluziÕs tenure elongation bills.  
Elite opposition against Muluzi started immediately after his victory as the 
new president of Malawi in 1994. The opposition elites who were dissatisfied with 
the election results challenged him in courts. Though the court later ruled in favor of 
Muluzi, the challenge coming from some political elites appeared to be a signal to 
Muluzi that business was no longer going to be as usual. It was a clear sign that 
                                                
307 Two former cabinet members expressed that they were prepared to sacrifice their lives to stop 
Muluzi becoming life-president and to forestall a return to Banda era. 
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fellow political elites in the new Malawian democratic process were not to be taken 
for granted, as was in the case in the Banda era.  
Quite unlike in the Banda era, the event of 1994 showed that a president or an 
incumbent could be challenged in Malawi. Both the courts and political parties were 
witnessing such a challenge for the first time. The challenge continued into the 
second elections in 1999, when the presidential candidates of the MCP and AFORD 
formed a coalition to challenge Muluzi in the second presidential elections. Though 
the electoral commission pronounced Muluzi as the winner, opposition to MuluziÕs 
re-elections continued (Brown 2004). Muluzi allegedly won 75,5 percent, compared 
to less than 20 percent for the coalition candidate, Gwanda Chakuamba in an election 
characterized as flawed (Dulani 2005). Not satisfied with the outcome of 1999 
presidential election, some opposition actors from the MCP and AFORD took to the 
courts to challenge what they described as Òmassive electoral fraudÓ by the ruling 
UDF (ibid).308  
Though the Supreme Court later upheld the election of Muluzi, the opposition 
continued. Because many opposition elites had acquired enough political self-
                                                
308 Some leaders of NGOs at the inception of democracy in Malawi later joined political parties and 
sought both elective and cabinet positions. Chafukwa, who led a protest against Banda, formed the 
AFORD party, which later aligned with UDF during the presidential term limits politics. He also 
mobilized some NGOs to protest against the electoral fraud of 1999, using his affinity with some 
NGOs as an advantage. 
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confidence to confront Muluzi, they carried their opposition into the politics of 
presidential term limits. With the opposition challenges of 1994 and 1999, the 
dissenting political elites seemed to have acquired more experience by having studied 
the political terrain and various ways to channel their activism. The political parties 
were neither strong nor reliable. The government had decimated civil society and the 
media through executive intimidation and prohibition. Because of financial 
inducement, the parliament was not a place for opposition and activism. Moreover, 
the opposition elites lacked the required resources to counter the level of financial 
inducement generated by the executive. The opposition elites had to design a strategy 
to challenge MuluziÕs attempt to elongate his tenure effectively.  
 
6.9 Political Elite Dissidents, Church Elites and Donors: The Killer Alliance  
The opposition saw the church as a channel of activism as the presidential 
prohibition on civil society and ban on demonstrations regarding the amendment bill 
prevented the dissenting elites from channeling their resistance through the civil 
society.309 Moreover, the cost of channeling its activism through demonstrations was 
financially high as the dissenting elites lacked the funds to organize street protests 
and lobby the media. Since regime loyalists had done better propaganda by 
                                                
309 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, Head of Department, Social Science Research, 
University of Malawi, Zomba. October 2014. 
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mobilizing popular mass support for Muluzi, exploring the Church, as a platform 
became a better and easier option for the political elite dissidents, since the Church 
already had existing structures that could easily defy government bans. This and three 
factors account for the reason why the dissenting elites sought contact with and used 
the church as a political vehicle to convey its resistance. 
The political parties lacked resources and the capacity to sustain pressure. 
Most prominent foreign donors were not dependable, either succumbing to or 
completely avoiding internal politics. At the same time, the civil society had 
exhausted and lost its capacity to lead, systematically demobilized through an 
executive ban on street protests concerning the amendment bill. While the judiciary 
later began to demonstrate broad independence in its decisions, it grew too cautious 
due to intimidation and an overburdened court system that lacked resources and 
training (Morrow 2005).  
Meanwhile, the media remained under heavy executive attack while 
undergoing physical, financial, and psychological persecution from the regime. The 
masses seemed to be politically unaware and pro-Muluzi because of regimeÕs strategy 
of using patronage to buy support and loyalty from poor villagers. Since the 
dissenting political elites could not work in isolation and needed a channel for its 
activism, they sought alliance and partnership with the already active church 
structures, thereby bringing religion to bear on the politics of presidential term limits 
in Malawi. Church services and pastoral letters became forums for spreading of 
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information, while political elite alliances with church elites formed a politico-
religious collaboration against Muluzi. The church was also to become the channel 
through which international funds flowed into Malawi and allegedly sustained the 
resistance against president Muluzi.   
The ability of the opposition elites to discover this channel in the church 
became a turning point in the presidential term limits politics in Malawi. Through the 
instrumentality of the Malawian Catholic Bishops Conference (MCBC), the Catholic 
Church had already fought against political abuses in Malawi.310 Church-led activism 
in 1992 brought political reforms and saw to the collapse of BandaÕs regime in 1994 
(Brown 2004; Morrow 2005). The Pastoral Letter of 1992 demanded political reforms 
that galvanized both international and local forces, pressuring Banda to agree to a 
referendum that ended the one-party system and ushered in a multi-party democracy 
(CIIR 1993; Mchombo 1998; Newell 1995; Nnzuda and Ross 1995; Ross 1995, 
1996).  
                                                
310 John Guwa explained that the Church in Malawi has a long history of confronting the government 
on social ills and bad policies. Since 1975, when the first bishop of Blantyre Monsignor Brown issued 
the first pastoral letter denouncing some policies considered oppressive under Banda, the body of 
Catholic Bishops of Malawi has maintained itself as a social instrument in confronting social and 




The role of the Catholic Church was also central in mobilizing domestic 
opposition and initially organizing oppositions groups under its banner (Brown 
2004). As John Guwa pointed out in an interview, people generally believe that 
whenever the Catholic Church opposes any regime, that particular regime ultimately 
collapses.311 Dissenting elites had calculated that attracting church partnership with a 
record of opposition against past regimes would enhance their activism and 
resistance. The political elite and church elite partnership proved to be decisive in 
attracting funds for the anti-Muluzi resistance and influencing donor action against 
the regime.312 
By October 2000, some senior members of the ruling UDF like Brown 
Mpingilari, Jaap Sonke, and several MPs had indicated and declared their position 
against the rumored amendment of the Malawian Constitution for an open-term for 
the office of the presidency. Consequently, the regimeÕs hard stance towards the 
dissenting elites prompted the formation of the New Initiative (NI), an elite political 
alliance against the constitution amendment project. The NI promptly invited the 
                                                
311 AuthorÕs interview with John Guwa. Limber, October 2014. 
312 Boniface Tamani, former chair of the PAC, explained in an interview with the author that 
international donors suspended their development aid to Malawi because of the petition written by 
individual actors and supported by the PAC. As was the case with the DANIDA, some funds went to 
the PAC in order to support the opposition against the amendment bill.  
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churches through PAC to join the alliance.313 In a statement issued by the NI and 
copied to the international community, political parties, local and international media, 
human rights organizations, civil society organizations, and the government, the NI 
declared that Òthe body shall comprise of political parties, MPs, religious groups, 
NGOs and other pressure groups in MalawiÓ (NI 2000). However, of all the bodies 
mentioned above, only the religious groups, mainly of the Christian denomination 
represented by PAC, became increasingly, fearlessly, and visibly active in the debates 
and activism against the removal of presidential term limits. According to Boniface 
Tamani, the interest of the dissenting elites was to win the support of the church in 
their activism. These elites included other bodies in the partnership to give the 
coalition a semblance of inclusiveness, while the main target was the church, which 
contained all the structures needed for activism.  
In November 2002, President Muluzi dismissed Deputy Transport and Works 
Minister Jaap Sonke after indicating his opposition against the amendment of the 
constitution. Secretary-General of the UDF Paul Maulidi immediately replaced him. 
In an interview with the Daily Times, Jaap Sonke emphatically insisted that Òthe 
open-term bill would not work,Ó quickly adding that he was in discussion with a lot 
of political elite dissidents and the church through PAC to provide the needed 
activism and resistance to crash the open-term project (Daily Time, 12 November 
                                                




2002). His open reference to being in contact with PAC is a further indication of the 
elite lobby with the Church against the amendment bill. It indicates a disposition on 
the part of the Church to collaborate with the dissenting elites against the amendment 
bill.  
To strengthen the alliance, the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace 
(CCJP) organized a dinner in February 2002 to bring MPs and Catholic clergy 
together to discuss the modalities to resist the amendment bill314. Describing the 
dinner, Morrow writes, ÒWhile MPs loyal to the dissenting elite group was one 
hundred percent represented, no MP loyal to Muluzi was present at the dinnerÓ 
(2005). According to Boniface Tamani, regime insiders and loyalists probably knew 
that the aim of the dinner was to provide the dissenting elites with a platform to lobby 
against the removal of presidential term limits, as well as to commit resources for the 
dissemination of information against the bill through churches. The agenda for the 
dinner proved the regime loyalists right as the main topic of discussion was how the 
Catholic Church could provide the needed structures for the dissemination of 
information through pastoral letters, church services, crusades, and vigils.315 The 
alliance between church and dissenting elites seemed to have been effective, as some 
prominent cabinet members like Jaap Sonke used the platform to canvass for 
resistance and activism against the amendment bill. Though this led to a violent 
                                                




opposition campaign, his removal as a minister, and his resignation from the ruling 
party, his position on the amendment bill became a factor in influencing other party 
leaders to join the dissenting elite group.316  
ÒIt appears to be a common belief in Malawi that whenever the church speaks, 
something happens because the activities of the Catholic(s) in engineering the fall of 
one-party system in 1994 (are) still fresh.Ó317 Malawi is a deeply religious country 
where many identify themselves strongly as Christians or Muslims. While 
Christianity makes up seventy-five percent of the population, Islam accounts for 
about twenty percent (Freedom House 2002). Both Bakili Muluzi and Vice-President 
Cassim Chilumpha were Muslims. The prospective life-rule of a Muslim president 
and Vice-President in a primarily Christian country was an affront to Christian 
leaders and elites. 
Dissenting elites significantly capitalized on this by playing into the religious 
sentiments of the Christian majority. It was easy for some dissenting elites to win the 
support of church leaders in the fight against the removal of presidential term limits 
in Malawi. Though some church denominations and Muslim groups distanced 
themselves from the activities of the churches, the PAC grew as an extension of 
political elite opposition against Muluzi. Thus, presidential term limits politics led to 
                                                
316 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga. University of Malawi, Zomba, Malawi, October 
2014. 
317 John Guwa, in an interview with the author, Catholic University of Malawi, Limbe, October 2014. 
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strains between the government and religious leaders, causing further divisions 
among religious leaders (BBC 2002). While dissenting elites mobilized Christian 
leaders against the amendment bill, some Muslim groups led by the Muslim elites, 
especially in the southern part of Malawi, strongly supported Muluzi and his third 
term (BBC, 10 September 2002). Islam was in the minority, thus, it was politically 
impossible for a Muslim in a Christian-dominated population to stay president for a 
life term. With the three provisos as background, I shall analyze how a coalition of 
Church and political leaders enforced compliance on Muluzi. 
About ninety percent of the political elite who supported Muluzi to win his 
first and second elections were Christian. Many, especially from the opposition MCP 
have expressed the desire for a transition of power, preferably to a Christian after 
eight years of Muslim rule.318 A third term or life-presidency for President Muluzi 
would allow a minority to defeat the majority.319 Apart from that, many considered 
the implications of a life term Muslim presidency on the political economy of 
Malawi. Kate Kainja, Secretary-General of the MCP during the constitution 
                                                
318 In an interview with the author, Reverend John Guwa mentioned that the Christian political elites 
were unwilling to tolerate Muluzi for any number of more years. It was as an affront for a Muslim 
minority to continue to rule in a country whose population was seventy-five percent Christian. Limbe, 
October 2014. 
319 MorrowÕs interview with the former Secretary General of MCP, Kate Kainja, in Toxic Mushroom: 
The Presidential Term Limits Debate in Malawi, 2005 
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amendment debate, stood firmly against the removal of presidential term limits by 
Muluzi insisting that, ÒMuluziÕs amendment bill would chase away Jesus Christ in 
Malawi.Ó  She further accused Muluzi of spreading Islam in Malawi through his 
encouragement of proselytization and marriages between Muslim men and Christian 
women (Morrow 2005).  
KainjaÕs argument places the presidential term limits debate in the context of 
Islamic expansion in Malawi. Referring to the Muslim vice-president, Kainja 
projected her argument into the future, fearing that any potential incapacitation of the 
President would lead to his constitutional replacement by yet another Muslim 
successor ruling over a Christian majority. She also accused Vice-President 
Chilumpha of acting as the conduit for MuluziÕs confessionalism (Morrow 2005).  
Some writers argue that as Islam has not been particularly contentious in 
Malawi, its role has not been as politicized as in other countries (Meinhardt and Patel 
2003). One could therefore argue that the mobilization of church structures against 
MuluziÕs attempt to remove presidential term limits was motivated less by the 
political elitist suspicion of Islam, and more by their concerns regarding power 
entrenchment and constitutionalism (Morrow 2005). In my opinion, Kainja produced 
the above argument in order to appeal to the creedal and emotional appeal of 
Christian churches to join elite resistance against Muluzi. A life term presidency for 
Muluzi would deny her party and herself any hope of presidency in the future. As 
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made apparent during the debates, the Christian-Islamic tension exceeded the 
religious sphere. 
However, the issue of political economy became crucial. With the exception 
of the lakeside area of Nkhotakhota, Malawian Islam has been historically, confined 
within the Yao ethnicity and associated with low levels of modern education 
(Morrow 2005). With Muluzi as president, things were beginning to change in Yao. 
Many political elites of Christian extraction, ostensibly uncomfortable with the 
growth of Islam in Malawi, accused Muluzi of using funds from the more 
economically viable Middle East to construct mosques and launch programs for 
Koranic schools (madrassas).320 
Though Malawians may outwardly pride themselves on their religious 
tolerance, some Christians, especially among the political class, became doubtful and 
confrontational about the rising influence of Islam under Muluzi. The apparent 
tension between Christianity and Islam had a history in events near the end of the 
nineteenth century when the Malawian population entered into a system of economic 
and political competition based on their Christian or Islamic identities (Bone 2000). It 
was predictable, then, that religious intolerance between Christians and Muslims 
                                                
320 John Guwa insisted in an interview with the author that MuluziÕs huge investments on Islam have 
made Islam literally and figuratively more visible in the Malawian political and social landscape, a 




gradually developed in some parts of Malawi, as documented by the Centre for Social 
Concerns (2004).  
Increasing tension and intolerance provided the possible context for the 
church to align with the dissenting political elites against the removal of presidential 
term limits in Malawi. Some Christians on the left, represented by Bishop Patrick 
Kalilombe, were very worried about the growth of fundamentalist Christian sects. 
These sects often received the support of religious groups from the United States. 
These Christians from the left did not stop the dissenting elites from mixing religion 
and politics, or from drawing support and funds from foreign religious groups for 
political purposes (Lungu 2004; Morrow 2005). The alliance between political and 
Church elites against Muluzi visibly introduced a new religious experience of 
chameleon politics in Malawi.  
With its strong Christian presence and Muslim minority, Malawi represents a 
good example of an African country where religion played a vital role in presidential 
term-limits politics. As in some other African countries, the Malawian case 
demonstrates the reality that institutionally and ideologically, churches and mosques 
remain integrated in the social and political reality of everyday life. With the absence 
of vibrant, funded, and focused activities of modern western NGOs, churches and 
mosques are important to the vast majority of the Malawian population and most 
African countries.  
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With its strong Christian presence in Malawi, the institutional role of the 
Catholic Church appears indispensible. The church became vital and central to the 
events that brought down the dictatorship of Hastings Banda in 1994. The Church 
was central in negotiating the birth of multiparty democracy in Malawi (Morrow 
2005; Newell 1995; Nzunda & Ross 1995; Ross 1996; Schoeffeleers & Maille 1999), 
and was equally central in navigating the outcome of MuluziÕs open-term amendment 
bill in Malawi in 2003. The central role of the Church in collapsing BandaÕs 
dictatorial regime in 1994 and the absence of strong media and civil society in 
Malawi may have informed the disposition of the dissenting political elites to 
mobilize their pressure against Muluzi around and through the church. The strategies 
employed include the extensive use of Church platforms to lobby MPs, the dual 
policy approach towards bribery, and the non-reactionary stance in the face of intense 
intimidation from the government.  
In January 2001, Church leaders agreed and planned to spread the message of 
protest and opposition through church services, gatherings, worships, and crusades.321 
A pastoral letter by the Catholic Bishops Conference followed quickly on March 25, 
2001, which admonished the lack of respect for basic democratic principles enshrined 
in the constitution. While pledging to safeguard the constitution in their pastoral 
                                                
321 In an interview with the author, Monsignor Boniface Tamani revealed that some individual 
dissenting elites had made a passionate appeal to the churches, prompting the meeting of January 2001.  




letter, the Bishops urged against the manipulation of others for the purposes of 
eroding the constitution (Lungu 2004).  
In April of the same year, the Church of the Central African Presbyterian 
Council in Malawi (CCAP) issued another pastoral letter, placing the constitutional 
amendment debate within a wider social and political discussion already making 
waves in southern Africa.322 The letter dismissed and condemned any attempt to 
amend the constitution for the removal of presidential term limits as a bad foundation 
for the consolidation of democracy. Entitled ÒSome Worrisome Trends Which 
Undermine the Nurturing of our Young Democracy,Ó the pastoral letter was 
welcomed by dissenting elites but viewed by the UDF as confrontational, 
Òunfriendly, and opposition inducedÓ (SACBC 2002; Ross 2004; CCAP 2001).   
As Blantyre was the main support base of UDF, the emergence of such a 
pastoral letter from Blantyre was an indication for the UDF that the dissenting elites 
had penetrated its support base through the church. It was also an indication that the 
intended amendment of the Malawian constitution to allow Muluzi more terms was 
not going to win solely on party and ethnic divides, but more importantly on religious 
ground. For instance, not one MP loyal to Muluzi was present at the dinner organized 
                                                
322 By 2001, three South African countries had witnessed controversial debates on constitutional 
amendments to remove presidential term limits. While Nujoma succeeded in Namibia, Chilubal failed 
in Zambia. Chisano rejected appeals to change the constitution in Mozambique. The Bishops placed 
the Malawian debate in this wider context, insisting on rule of law in Malawi. 
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by the Catholic Commission on Justice and Peace (CCJP) to bring MPs and clergy 
together to discuss the amendment bill, while the opposition group was present in 
full. It served as a platform to lobby against Muluzi and raise funds for the 
dissemination of information through the churches against MuluziÕs project for open-
ended and third-term presidency.  
As the constitutional amendment controversy progressed, mobilization 
through the church equally progressed and further divided the country in religious 
lines. According to the Southern African Catholic BishopsÕ Conference (SACBC), Òat 
the invitation of their leaders, MalawiÕs Christian communities enhanced their war 
against any measures toward life-term presidency, as religious leaders, both 
Protestant and Catholic, stated their intention to remain united in the fight against any 
attempt to amend the constitution (SACBC 2002). The alliance between dissenting 
political and church elites apparently created self-confidence on both sides, thus 
spurring church leaders and civil rights groups to become openly critical on the 
constitutional amendment issue.  
The Malawian masses remained difficult to mobilize except through churches. 
The ban on demonstrations about the constitutional amendment issue still subsisted.  
Most mass media was state-controlled. Independent newspapers were under pressure 
to not report the opposition view on the proposed amendment. It was only a matter of 
time before the ruling party discovered that it was fighting invisible enemies.  
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While political support was overwhelming from the faction loyal to Muluzi 
within the ruling UDF, the reality outside indicated the opposite. Muluzi appeared to 
enjoy massive support from UDF leaders, but in reality, the same party leaders 
became the voices of opposition in their churches against Muluzi. The crusade 
organized at the National Service of Worship on July 5, 2001 at Mzuzu Univeristy 
was revealing. Bishop James Tengatenga criticized the tendencies and the intentions 
of the constitutional amendment in his homily. He insisted that the project was bound 
to collapse if the intention was to allow Muluzi to run for more than the 
constitutionally stipulated two terms. Tengatenga presented contemporary politics in 
Malawi from the angle of Christian morality, calling on all political actors who 
professed Christian faith to oppose the amendment of the Malawian constitution. 
Though Bishop TengatengaÕs statement was viewed within the UDF circle as 
sensitive (Ross 2004; CCAP 2001), senior opposition leaders present at the crusade 
took turns criticizing the constitutional amendment proposal. No chance was given to 
senior UDF loyalists present at the crusade to defend the proposed bill.  
The tension generated by this crusade led to violent attacks on the organizers 
of the crusade including Bishop Tengatenga. UDF thugs  physically assaulted a 
cleric, apparently mistaking him for the preacher (Morrow 2005). Some political 
dissenting elites from different Christian churches also shelved their differences in 
order to sustain pressure on Muluzi. Malawi is home to the fundamentalist Livingston 
and Blantyre Synods, with their Scottish origins. It is also home to the Nkhoma 
Synod, which has apparent roots in the South African Dutch Reformed Church, a 
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denomination with an often quietist and non-alliance position. The creedal 
antagonism between these two groups was set aside. Roman Catholics also united 
with Anglicans, while Evangelicals and some of the previously politically docile 
Pentecostal and charismatic churches obviously at the bidding of dissenting elites and 
PAC cooperated in mounting extensive pressure against Muluzi and the constitutional 
amendment bill. 
It is also important to mention that the competition to use the Church as a 
platform did not exclusively apply to dissenting elites. The regime of Muluzi also 
made effort to lobby some Christian denominations to its side, thereby making some 
church denominations willing political partners during the constitutional amendment 
controversy in Malawi. The government was not passive in the scramble for churches 
for political support. Allegedly, a few prominent loyalists in the pro-Muluzi camp, 
who exercised influential positions in some churches, particularly lobbied and 
persuaded some church elites and leaders in the Pentecostal and charismatic churches 
for support. However, the more the government pushed, the more opposition elites 
pushed through the churches that many MPs were under pressure to swap loyalty 
because of financial inducement. The opposition elites held a crucial meeting in May 
2001 with some church leaders to further whittle down the effect of any financial 
inducement. The result was an immediate issuance of statement to all MPs through 
PAC insisting on earlier agreements to vote against the proposed amendment to 
section 83 (3) of the Constitution. The statement reads in part, Ò you may receive all 
the gifts from those who support the open term bill, but we call upon you to reject the 
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amendment. Demonstrate to the nation that you can stand for the values of 
democracy. Say no to the proposed amendment. God is with youÓ (Ross 2004: 97 and 
Morrow 2005: 162).  
Boniface Tamani, chair of the PAC during the amendment debate, confirmed 
in an interview with the author that most of the church statements emanated from the 
dissenting leaders. He equally confirmed that the church served as a vehicle of 
information, as it disseminated anti-third term messages mainly through the services 
every Sunday. Both the church and the opposition manipulated and made use of the 
other to achieve separate goals. The opposition elites, mainly of Christian 
background, aligned completely with the church. They used the church as an effective 
channel of opposition, successfully exposing the church to a direct confrontation with 
the government in the case of the amendment bill. 
Conclusion  
I conclude based on my field research that dissenting political elites were 
responsible for demanding and enforcing term limits compliance on President Bakili 
Muluzi in Malawi in 2002.  The event that led to the formation of the New Initiative 
(NI) was started by two prominent party internals who first dictated MuluziÕs 
intention to rule beyond 2004. The formation of the NI was decisive in forming an 
opposition alliance and in creating a platform for elite activism and resistance. By 
consistently withstanding executive intimidation and resisting several attempts by the 
regime to compromise their resistance, the dissenting elites attracted other social 
  
354 
forces into the resistance against President Muluzi. The ability of the dissenting 
political elites to seek linkage with the Church and donor agencies provided the 
needed structures that sustained their resistance and activism to the end.  
The coalition between the dissenting elites, the church and the donors was 
symbiotic in nature. It raises the question whether the dissenting elites could have 
succeeded in enforcing term limits compliance in Malawi without an alliance with the 
Church and some donor agencies. Or whether the Church and the donors could have 
pressured compliance on Muluzi without the activism and resistance provided by 
dissenting political elites. The Church and donor agencies could not have sustained 
the pressure without the initial and sustained resistance from some political elites. 
Though at the forefront of the political actions that brought down the thirty-year long, 
one-party rule of President Hastings Banda in 1994 (Brown 2004; Morrow 2005), the 
enthusiasm and popular demand for change that existed between 1993 and 1994 was 
lacking in 2003. The dissenting political elites benefitted from church structures in 
sustaining its resistance and attracting international funds, while the church attached 
itself to elite activism to prevent a foreseen Muslim domination of the Malawian 
political space. The donors saw in elite activism, the opportunity to get rid of a 
recalcitrant president who refused to play by the Ôrule of the game.Õ  
Thus, the Church and donor agencies who kept some distance after the 
transitional elections, even though it was evident that President Muluzi did not 
provide good governance to the Malawian people, especially during his second 
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presidential tenure, colluded with elite dissidents to pressure him into compliance.323 
The Church and donor agencies in Malawi possibly realized that political resistance 
should emanate from local forces within the Malawian political space (Brown 2004), 
and were willing to support such resistance if it was sufficiently articulated. Some 
political actors within and outside the ruling party provided such resistance during the 
presidential term limits controversy. Though reflecting varied interests, an alliance 
with dissenting elites became necessary for the Church and international donors to 
press for accountability and constitutionality. Judicial, Church, and international 
donor actions were thus dependent on elite activism, only providing a linkage and 
platform for elite activism, legitimacy, and protection.  
In the next chapter, I will focus on a general comparative analysis of the pressures 







                                                
323 AuthorÕs interview with Father John Guwa, Catholic University of Malawi, October 2014 
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Chapter 7: Cross-Sectional Comparison and Convergence in the Enforcement of 
Presidential Terms Limit Compliance 
 
7 Introduction 
In the last three chapters, I presented cases that form the main argument for 
this study. Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi represent African post-Cold War countries 
where attempts to repeal presidential term limits by incumbent presidents were 
resisted. In the three case studies I evaluated all the pressures and sectors that came 
alive during the term limits controversies, and emphasized the centrality of dissident 
political elites in mobilizing and bundling the pressures that enforced term limits 
compliance in the case studies. In the present chapter I shall make a general 
comparison of the various sectors through which elite political dissidents generated 
the pressures that were applied. I aim to demonstrate the extent to which some sectors 
not only provided a platform for activism, but also became objects of manipulation by 
some political actors in the process of both removing and enforcing term limits.  
I shall analyze and compare the role each sector played in the attempt to 
remove or enforce presidential term limits in the case studies. I shall further analyze 
how and why some political elites sought linkage with various sectors as a means for 
protection and as vehicles of activism. I shall demonstrate that what many mistakenly 
refer to as institutional pressure is actually elitist influence and mobilization through 
the institutions.  
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Lastly, in discussing the role of the elite and other sectors and institutions, I 
shall compare the impact of one on the other. In analyzing the reasons why thirteen 
post-Cold War African countries have successfully repealed or neglected presidential 
term limits, I shall seek to demonstrate how elite activism and pressure have been 
responsible for both partial and full compliance outcomes and how lack of elite 
activism and pressure have produced the opposite outcomes. 
Though Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi remain central for this study, I shall 
refer to Ghana, Kenya, Uganda, Namibia, and Cameroon to buttress my hypothesis 
further. While Ghana and Kenya represent partially enforced cases, Namibia, 
Uganda, and Cameroon represent fully repealed cases of presidential term limits. I 
will use the following questions to guide my analysis in this chapter:  Have 
incumbent presidents in post-Cold War African democracies voluntarily allowed 
power to alternate without formal or informal pressure to enforce compliance? How 
far would presidential term limits survive in post-Cold War African democracies 
without political activism from political elites? Could other sectors like democratic 
institutions and the civil society effectively enforce presidential term limits 
compliance without (political elite) agential push in post-Cold War African 
democracies? On the other hand, could dissenting political elites effectively enforce 
presidential term limits compliance without linking and allying with other 




7.1 Political Elites, Political Activism and Term Limits Compliance 
The institution of presidential term limits may not have survived the twenty-
five years of post-Cold War democratic experience in Africa without elite political 
activism and pressure. The retention and enforcement of term limits compliance in 
few African post-Cold War democracies was dependent on the involvement of 
internal and external key political elites. The ability of some political elites to link 
and ally with institutional and extra-institutional sectors enabled them to produce and 
bundle pressures that have yielded partial and full compliance outcomes in Africa. 
Some political elites have the capacity to function as a pressure group (OÕDonnell et 
al 1986 & Higley & Burton 2006). In the three cases studied, elite dissidence ruptured 
political loyalty and cohesion and forced incumbent regimes to make strategic 
mistakes. Elite dissidence also created room for alternative platforms and defection, 
which ultimately became essential for mobilizing and bundling pressures that 
enforced term limits compliance.  
Sen (1999) argues that democracy as a system of government provides 
opportunities for articulation and reformation. For such articulation and reformation 
to occur, Sen insists that particular actors must be ready to step forward to make the 
right use of available opportunities to strengthen and defend democracy. Dissenting 
political actors prevented democratic slow death in Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia by 
mobilizing and bundling pressures to enforce compliance on their presidents. In doing 
so, they laid the foundation for political actors elsewhere in Africa to challenge 
incumbent presidents who are intent on entrenching state power.  
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Linz (1996), Sen (1999), and Leftwitch (2010) further emphasize the 
importance of some political actors and democratizing political elites in the 
fashioning and crafting of new political orders that help sustain democracy. 
Valenzuela (1990), OÕDonnell and Schmitter (1986) argue that a rupture within the 
political elite rank creates the possibility for both democratization and survival of 
democracy. In the particular cases of Africa, the process of removing presidential 
term limits has been elite-based. The support of political elites for or against the 
removal of term limits therefore remains necessary for the outcome of the process. 
My research shows that political elites can contribute to the process of consolidation, 
especially when they choose to demand strict term limits compliance as in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi.324  
For democracies that emerged by ÔtransactionÕ or ÔreformaÕ325, there was a 
high tendency to retain old habits. With the exception of Arap Moi and Jerry 
Rawlings (who were the transition presidents of Kenya and Ghana respectively), 
                                                
324 These three cases have witnessed and survived open-seat contest, leadership alternations, party 
alternation, robust electoral contest, and improved rule of law since attempts to repeal term limits were 
defeated. They have also constitutionally and successfully transferred power after the death of the 
president without hurting the state. This was different from Gabon and Togo where the life-presidents 
laid the foundation for their sons to usurp power immediately after the demise of the presidents.  
325 Democratization by transaction or reforma refers to a polity where an old system or order remains 
un-ÔrupturedÕ while entering into a new order. Worst still, operators of the old order were allowed to 
come in and operate the new order or system. Most often, this results in regression. 
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ninety percent of reigning dictators who metamorphosed into elected presidents by 
transaction and reforma ultimately discarded presidential term limits at the expiration 
of their second terms. They were able to do so despite the institutions, the civil 
society and international community. A sustained political elite activism was needed 
to harness and bundle pressures to rescue the democratic experiment from the grip of 
old habits. 
The case studies detail how political actors like Atiku Abubakar, Orji Kalu, 
Bola Tinubu, Ken Nnmani of Nigeria; Mark Chona, Christon Tembo, Ben Nwila of 
Zambia; Jaap Sonke, Brown Mpingalari, Cassim Chilumpha, Mattews Chikaondo and 
Kaleso of Malawi spearheaded formidable elite activism to enforce compliance on 
Presidents Olusegun Obasanjo, Frederick Chiluba, and Bakili Muluzi respectively. In 
cases outside this study, Armstrong (2010) noted how Mwia Kibbaki and Raila 
Odinga of Kenya, and D.F Annan, and John Kuffour of Ghana led elite activism for 
the survival of presidential term limits in Kenya and Ghana respectively. These 
political actors formed a coalition of political forces that exerted both personal and 
bundled pressures on their presidents to abide by the rules that govern the transition 
of democratic power. By forming a broad coalition and entering into elite pacts that 
mobilized various sectors of the society, including some democratic institutions, 
pressures were made to bear on the ruling regimes that culminated in either willing or 
enforced compliance.  
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According to Simon (2005), political and democratic processes are far from 
operating at an accepted and expected level in new democracies. It becomes essential 
that effective leaders who are committed to democracy can compensate for weak 
institutions by mobilizing mass incentives and interests to sustain democracy 
(Leftwich 2010). I have noted that ninety percent of transitional presidents emerged 
by transaction and reforma, and were therefore determined to maintain old habit and 
structure by demonstrating unwillingness to allow an alternation of power. These 
were the first to lay siege on presidential term limits in the post-Cold War African 
democratic experiment without involving the masses through referendum in the 
process of constitution amendment bill.326 
An elite-based approach has enabled incumbent presidents to avoid the 
masses strategically in the process of removing presidential term limits. These 
incumbents have concentrated on using parliaments, since ruling parties controlled 
the excessive majority in most African parliaments. In these case studies, I 
documented how elite dissidence ruptured party cohesion in Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Malawi. It is important that elite dissidence further affected executive loyalty and 
                                                
326 Refer to Chapter One, Subsection Four: Frequency of Assaults on Presidential Terms Limit. 
Senegal is the only country among post-Cold War African democracies where an attempt by an 
incumbent president resulted in a referendum. The other twelve successful repeals/neglects and three 




adjusted parliamentary balance of power. Political defections of some political elites 
became necessary in altering political loyalties and parliamentary balance of power. 
This jostling for survival laid the foundation for institutional and extra-institutional 
linkages by which the incumbent presidents conceded that power transition was 
absolute and necessary for democracy in a multi-party presidential system.  
Table 3: Impact of Presidential Term Limits in post-Cold War African Democracies 
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Moderate civil society 
pressures 
Source: Fieldwork analysis by author 
The table above demonstrates: 
¥ a weak political elite activism in cases where presidential term limits were 
successfully removed despite the presence of other pressures.  
¥ a strong elite activism in cases of failed attempts to repeal presidential term 
limits even in the absence of other pressures 
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¥ a strong elite activism in cases where incumbent presidents seemingly or 
(in)voluntarily retired 
Table 1 above indicates a prevalence of multiple sectors and institutions that were 
very active in the cases where presidential term limits compliance was enforced. The 
table confirms that various sectors were involved in producing pressures that 
converged to enforce compliance, but specifically on various degrees, with elite 
activism being higher than other sectors. The table thus suggests that in the three case 
studies, elite opposition activism stimulated various institutions and sectors into 
action.  
For instance, in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi, particular political elite 
dissidents mobilized the media and the civil society to participate in the third term 
debates. They sponsored media debates and mass protests against the amendment 
bills. Vice President Atiku Abubakar and Governor Orji Kalu used the media outlet, 
especially The Sun and Turaki Vanguard (which they founded and funded) to provide 
alternative information to counter state-controlled media. In the Nigerian case 
specifically, the leading elite dissidents merged their funds to offer the MPs 
US$600,000 each to diminish presidential offer of US$350,000 to support the 
amendment bill (Posner and Young 2007; Armstrong 2010).327 The duo of Atiku 
Abubakar and Orji Kalu invited the judiciary into the third-term controversy in 
Nigeria by using the courts to seek redress and protection. As professor Falola stated 
                                                
327 Confirmed in authorÕs interview with Dr. Frank Ozoh, Director of the Electoral Institute of Nigeria. 
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in an interview, ÒFunding legal cases in Nigeria is not cheap, I am still wondering 
how Atiku and Orji Kalu sustained over thirty legal cases in Nigeria at the same time, 
with the courts, rather responding rapidly to their cases.Ó328  
In Malawi and to some extent in Zambia, the linkage exists through the 
Church. Nevertheless, the use of such channels like the media, NGOs and the Church 
only served as channels of activism. The political dissenting elites funded and utilized 
church gatherings, prayer sections, crusades, and vigils in Malawi to disseminate 
information. The elite dissidents resorted to Church structures as platforms for rallies 
when they lost linkage with the CSOs because of executive order banning rallies and 
protests against the amendment bill (Brown 2004; Morrow 2005; Khembo 2004).329  
In Zambia, two prominent party internals including Vice-President Christon 
Tembo, Benjamin Mwila (Minister of Defense), and Godfrey Miyanda (the Minister 
of Education) started what was to become an internal dissidence in the ruling party. 
With the support and leadership of Mark Chona, an elite opposition platform 
ÔOASISÕ was created through which students, international actors, women, and 
regional leaders were mobilized against President Frederick Chiluba. OASIS became 
central in setting the agenda that mobilized the MPs, seating ministers, the judiciary, 
and the masses to produce a bundled pressure that enforced compliance in Zambia. In 
                                                
328 AuthorÕs interview with Professor Falola, Pilsen, Czech Republic, May 2014 
329 This was also confirmed in the authorÕs interview with Boniface Tamani, former chair of the PAC 
(Public Affairs Commission of Malawi), Limbe, Malawi, October 2004. 
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the Malawian case, a coalition of political and Church elites produced the Public 
Action Commission (PAC), which became instrumental in mobilizing the MPs, the 
judiciary, international donors, civil society organizations, religious leaders and 
various Christian churches against President Muluzi. The effective use of these 
channels to shape and spread the message of opposition against the removal of 
presidential term limits rested not only on the intention and goal of political 
dissidents, but also on their ability to fund and set the agenda for these groups. While 
I acknowledge the importance of the elite-institution linkage, I maintain that 
institutions appear stimulated by pressure from elite dissidence and activism.  
Some democracy observers might argue that variations in institutional 
developments influence elite role. This would lead us to ignore the important roles of 
some political elites in mobilizing and bundling pressures to enforce presidential term 
limits compliance. A probing question may be whether the leadership of Atiku 
Abubakar, Orji Kalu, Mark Chona, Christon Tembo, Benjamin Mwila, Godfrey 
Muyinda, Jaap Sonke, Cassim Chilumpha, Mattews Chikaondo and Brown 
Mpingalari did not help develop and fashion the elite oppositional structure through 
which they acted.  
The attempt to remove presidential term limits in Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Malawi may have avoided degeneration into political crisis and an enforced 
compliance outcome if seventy-five percent of political elites had supported the 
amendment bills. While it is not the intention of the present research to resolve the 
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endless agency versus structure debate in the social sciences, this study does not shy 
away from such questions.  
The case studies show that particular political elites were instrumental and 
influential in enforcing presidential term limits compliance by developing 
institutional linkage and credibility, and by mobilizing other sectors into action. The 
case studies also show that some political elites directly and indirectly expanded the 
political and democratic space by entering it, redefining the meaning of democratic 
consolidation by challenging the legitimacy, independence, and credibility of some 
democratic institutions, especially the judiciary and the parliament.  
In Nigeria, some political elites from both sides approached the courts forty-
times while political elites in Malawi approached the courts fifteen times to challenge 
some actions and judgments against or for the amendment bill.330 Though the judicial 
challenges did not produce a completely favorable outcome for some political elites 
on the opposing side, they provided an opportunity for the judiciary to reclaim its 
credibility and prove its capacity to deliver independent judgments (Armstrong 2010; 
Maltz 2007; Posner and Young 2007). I maintain that the decisive pressures that 
produced compliance outcome in the case studies came from particular political 
opponents, while institutions played supportive and protective roles. 
                                                
330 Refer to the first case study (Chapter Four) and the third case study (Chapter Six). 
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Beside the three case studies, the process of enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance shows the same pattern in other cases involving presidential term limits 
politics. For instance, in 1999, D.F Annan, the Speaker of the Parliament, and John 
Kuffour convinced Ghanaian President Jerry Rawlings that constitutionalism was 
absolute and necessary by mobilizing the parliament, the media, and the civil society 
to confront Rawlings. While D.F. Annan sought linkage with the media and the civil 
society to set an agenda for the presidential term limits debates in Ghana (Armstrong 
2010), John Kuffour mobilized other political elites, including MPs, to raise the cost 
of repression for Rawlings. In Kenya, some political elites led by Mwia Kibaki and 
Raila Odinga effectively mobilized the MPs to ensure and enforce compliance on 
President Arap Moi. While Kibaki argued and boasted that the political elites would 
not allow an amendment to the constitution for a third term, Raila Odinga declared 
President Arap MoiÕs third-term attempt as Òtime wastingÓ (Armstrong 2010). The 
duo mobilized the MPs who quickly produced clauses that forced Arap Moi to retire. 
Besides seeking institutional linkage, the case studies also detail other 
strategies employed by some political elites in enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance. Political propaganda, political experience, economic wealth, and 
popularity became important attributes that positioned some political elites to 
challenge non-compliance.331 In the Nigerian case, Vice-President Atiku Abubakar 
declared ObasanjoÕs third term a Ògoose chase,Ó while Orji Kalu and other elite 
                                                
331 I shall come back to this point in Chapter Seven. 
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dissidents boasted of a formidable force to Òkill ObasanjoÕs third term agenda.Ó332 
The formidable force to which Orji Kalu seemed to refer turned out to be their 
political experience, the economic wealth at their disposal, their popularity, and 
possibly their international connections, which they heavily deployed against 
ObasanjoÕs third term.  
In the Zambian case, Mark Chona relied on his popularity and international 
contacts to raise the cost of repression for Chiluba, while in the Malawian case, some 
elites relied on their closeness to the Catholic Church and foreign donors to not only 
raise the cost of repression, but also deny Muluzi funds to finance the amendment 
bill. The three cases followed the same model indicating that the decisive pressures 
were produced and mobilized by key dissenting elites, whose experience, economic 
wealth, international and national connections, and popularity seemed to have played 
a role.333  
Having lost grounds in their various political parties, political dissenting elites 
manifested and tested their resistance in the parliament as a last option. They 
transformed the parliament into a theater of opposition and activism. Elite activism in 
                                                
332 In authorÕs interview with Orji Kalu, he boasted that he was financially instrumental to ObasanjoÕs 
rise to power, and therefore still had the capacity to force him to retire despite his (Obasanjo) being the 
President of Nigeria. (Abuja, Nigeria, October 2013). 
333 I shall return to this point in the next section. 
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the parliament consequently offered the parliament an opportunity to develop an 
autonomous and popular voice.  
This seemed to be the case in June 2006, when Nigerian Senate President Ken 
Nnamani admonished the MPs in a parliamentary joint session. Before the final 
debate preceding the parliamentary vote on the amendment bill, he said: ÒYou are 
now on your own, the whole world is watching you, exercise individual discretion 
and do the needed. Ó334 Ken NnamaniÕs statement became instrumental in motivating 
the MPs to do the Òneeded.Ó Most analysts in Nigeria have interpreted the statement 
as crucial in encouraging the MPs to reject the amendment bill by following 
individual discretion instead of party directive.335 The Zambian and Malawian cases 
followed the same model.336  
In all the three cases studied, internal political elites acted as whistle blowers 
by being the first to publicize the rumors regarding the constitution amendment bill. 
In Zambia, two prominent party internals met with Mark Chona the same night 
                                                
334 Cf. Ken NnamaniÕs speech to introduce the final consideration and voting on the Presidential Term 
Limits Amendment Bill in Nigeria.  
335 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Frank Ozoh, Director of the Electoral Institute, Abuja, Nigeria, October 
2013 
336 In the first anti-third term rally organized on April 29, 2001 by OASIS in Zambia, eighty MPs of 
the ruling MMD signed to work against the amendment bill while the vice-president declared his 
opposition in the same rally against ChilubaÕs third term.  
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President Chiluba informed his party of his intention to go for a third term.337 The 
meeting with Mark Chona resulted in the setting up of the opposition platform 
OASIS. These party internals continued to supply the initial information that OASIS 
needed for its first open rally against ChilubaÕs third term.338  
Some political elites further championed media debates against the amendment bill in 
the three case studies. Their connection to private media houses was to become 
instrumental in setting the agenda for media debates. In the Nigerian case, Atiku 
introduced the debates and the media attack through African Independent Television 
(AIT), while Orji Kalu utilized his private media company, The Sun Newspapers, to 
introduce and set the agenda for the debate on the amendment bill. In Zambia, Chona 
mobilized the Zambezi FM Radio and Daily Times as alternative voices in the 
amendment debates.  
The scenario, however, was different in the Malawian case where the three 
singular media outlets were government owned. The dissenting political elites relied 
on their connection and linkage with the Catholic Church to spread their message on 
the amendment bill through pastoral letters, worships/services, prayer sessions, and 
                                                




crusades (Morrow 2005, Brown 2004).339  By initiating debates on the third term 
amendments bill, some political elites further sponsored and widened the scope of 
presidential term limits amendment politics, sustaining the debates until the defeat of 
amendment bills. In other instances outside the case studies, especially, the Ghanaian 
and Kenyan cases, the process followed the same pattern. Internal party dissidents 
sponsored and sustained the debates until the incumbent presidents of Ghana and 
Kenya dropped their third-term ambitions (Armstrong 2010).  
The involvement of the judiciary in the process of enforcing presidential term 
limits compliance has emerged as a new phenomenon in presidential term limits 
politics. The case studies detail how particular political elites strategically involved 
the judiciary as an important partner in confronting non-compliant incumbent 
presidents. In Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi, internal dissidents and defectors initiated 
petitions in the courts that not only challenged the credibility and independence of the 
judiciary, but also pressured the courts to deliver independent judgments.340 By 
attracting the judiciary into the presidential term limits politics, the courts became 
active in rendering judgments that provided political protection for some elites, 
especially to defectors whose seats the ruling parties declared vacant.  
                                                
339 This view has also been confirmed in an interview with the author by Boniface Tamani, former 
chairman of the Public Affairs Commission (PAC), Limbe, Zambia, October 2014. 
340 Refer to the three case studies to see how individual political actors mobilized using the courts. 
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Specific political elites not only laid the foundation and provided the 
sustenance for political activism against the removal presidential term limits, they 
equally mobilized and bundled the pressures that enforced compliance in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi. In the Nigerian case, Vice-President Atiku Abubakar and Orji 
mobilized about five hundred internal party members, including government 
ministers and MPs, against ObasanjoÕs third term.  In Zambia, Mark Chona and Vice-
President Christon Tembo mobilized a broad coalition of political elites against 
President Frederick Chiluba, also comprising of ministers and eighty MPs (Sardanis 
2014). 
The Nigerian and Zambian cases demonstrate a very strong elite coalition 
through the instrumentality of an alternative platform where the political dissidents 
converged to further mobilize and apply pressure on their incumbent presidents. In 
the Malawian case, the historical process of church activism became manifest.  The 
ability of political elites to woo church elites into opposition and further utilize 
church structures for their activism became strategic. Jaap Sonke, Brown Mpingalari, 
Kaleso, the PAC under Mongr Boniface Tamani and Chakufwa Chihana initiated the 
process that attracted the Church into the amendment debate as a coalition partner in 
Malawi. The partnership between political and church elites became decisive in 
producing the outcome of the amendment bill in Malawi: 
The Church has a particular history in Malawi. Anytime the church speaks, a 
change occurs. Being conscious of this, the opposition elites sought linkage and 
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attracted the church through PAC into the presidential term limits controversy. 
However, both the church and the opposition elites gained from the activism by 
making use of each other to achieve different interests341 In contrast, few political 
opponents emerged in other cases where incumbent presidents succeeded in repealing 
presidential term limits.  
In their study of the presidential term limits politics on Uganda and Namibia, 
Dulani (2011) and Armstrong (2010) show that civil society organizations and the 
courts were scarcely involved in the constitution amendments debates. While the 
judiciary was completely uninvolved in both cases, the number of civil society 
organizations that supported both sides of the debate almost cancelled themselves.342 
It can be argued that the absence of elite activism was responsible for the non-
mobilization of any sector in the Ugandan and Namibian cases, and therefore, 
responsible for the successful repealing outcome in those countries. Political elites 
were instrumental in mobilizing the civil society organizations, the courts, and the 
Church in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi. The total support given to the incumbent 
presidents by political elites in Uganda and Namibia appear to have influenced the ill 
                                                
341 AuthorÕs interview with John Guwa, Catholic University of Malawi, October 2014 
342 Refer to Dulani, Democracy Movements as Bulwarks against Presidential Usurpation of Power: 
Lessons from the Third-Term Bids in Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia. Stichproben. Wiener 




mobilization on the part of civil society, the courts, and other sectors to apply 
pressure against the removal of term limits in these countries.  
This supports the hypothesis that attempts to remove presidential term limits 
only become successful when political actors play along and consciously refuse to 
mobilize pressure against it. Though the cases studied for this research do not cover 
the successful presidential term limits repeals, Namibia and Uganda present us with 
apt examples of elite political in-activism.  
In Namibia, only one individual opponent emerged (Armstrong 2011). While 
three CSOs were in opposition, four CSOs supported the presidential term limits 
amendment bill (Dulani 2011). However, their opposition and street protests garnered 
little or no support (Baker 2002) since majority of political elites roundly played 
along and supported NujomaÕs third term in Namibia.  
In the Uganda case in 2005, there was strong opposition within the civil 
society and the media, with a scant opposition among political elites. Renowned 
journalist Andrew Mwenda led the media opposition against Musseveni by using the 
media to mobilize pressure against the term limits amendment bill in Uganda (Dulani 
2011). However, lack of support and funding by political actors and businesspersons 
who queued behind Musseveni diminished his attempts to mobilize any pressure. As 
was the case in Namibia in 1999, only one political opponent emerged, and 
consequently was unable to amass support from other political elites who chose to 
stand on the side of the amendment bill. Furthermore, the only internal dissident in 
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Uganda chose to remain in the ruling party, later contesting the presidency against 
Mussoveni from within.  
Uganda can boast of a fairly blossoming civil society, strong independent 
newspapers, and a sizeable educated middle class with government critics who 
strongly recorded their opposition against the presidential term limits amendment bill 
in 2005 (Armstrong 2010; Dulani 2011). However, the failure of political elites to 
lead or align themselves with the other side of the debate became a big advantage for 
the incumbent president in successfully repealing presidential term limits in Uganda. 
I maintain therefore, that the support of political elites for the amendment bill in 
Uganda and Namibia diminished any substantial activism that could rupture 
executive and incumbent loyalty and mobilize pressure to enforce compliance. Their 
support for the amendment bill further diminished the capacity and narrowed any 
avenue that could have mobilized the MPs, the civil society, the judiciary, and the 
masses to bundle pressure against the removal of presidential term limits in Uganda 
and Namibia.  
With the apparent lack of division among political elites, and their docility 
towards the removal of term limits in the two said countries, the masses and civil 
society could not be maximally mobilized and sponsored. Parliaments functioned as a 
rubber stamp without any sufficient opposition to passing the constitutional 
amendment bill that repealed the presidential term limits provision in Namibia and 
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Uganda.343 As scholars have observed, a split and division among political actors 
(OÕDonnel et al 1986; Higgley and Burton 2006) and an emergence of a political 
arrowhead (Casper and Taylor 1996) would have provided the needed elite activism 
and pressure to mobilize other sectors to raise the costs of repression for Nujomo and 
Mussoveni. Failure of political elites to assume this responsibility in Uganda and 
Namibia apparently caused the successful removal of presidential term limits in those 
countries.  
The above argument notwithstanding, institutionalists may argue that the 
failure of the emergence of political elite dissidents in Uganda and Namibia is rooted 
in institutional and environmental differences (Armstrong 2010). In the Ugandan 
case, Armstrong specifically argues that potential leaders experienced repression 
more easily in Uganda than elsewhere in Africa. He argues that In Ghana, Zambia, 
and Nigeria, however, political leaders enjoyed access to a more reliable legal system 
for protection, as well as a growing civil society that could be mobilized to spread the 
oppositionÕs message (ibid.).  
The existing literature on democratic development in Africa shows that 
repression of political opponents and rivals was higher in Nigeria, Malawi, Ghana, 
                                                
343 It is important to note that the removal of presidential term limits passed as a non-event in Uganda 
and Namibia because of the support of political elites. In Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi, it assumed the 




and Zambia, which demonstrate a history of long civilian and military dictatorships 
(Obi 2005, 2008; Ibeanu 2006; Sardanis 2014; Brown 2004; Usman 2013). Political 
violence, intimidation, and assassinations have also been higher in Nigeria, Zambia, 
and Malawi compared to Namibia and Uganda (Sardanis 2014; Iwu 2008, 2009; 
Morrow 2005; Simon 2005). Until recently, the civil society and media enjoyed more 
freedom in Uganda and Namibia than in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi (Dulani 2011). 
While Nigeria had been under military dictatorship until 1999, Namibia enjoyed 
democratic freedoms since 1989. Uganda, on the other hand, enjoyed vibrant media 
freedom led by Andrew Mwenda since 1995. In Uganda and Namibia, the courts had 
a history of delivering independent judgments (Armstrong 2010), on many occasions 
even against the government. 344  These contradict ArmstrongÕs argument that 
institutional and environmental factors for enforcing compliance were more favorable 
in Nigeria, Zambia, Ghana, and Malawi than in Uganda and Zambia. Only economic 
wealth appear to put Nigeria ahead  
The three cases further indicate that the civil society and legal institutions did 
not create the opposition leaders in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi; instead, political 
elites re-created the institutions and the civil society by challenging their legitimacy 
and mobilizing them into action. The court is not a proactive institution, but 
reactionary by practice, depending mostly on invitation to make interpretations 
(Shepsle 2010). Therefore, the readiness of the legal institution to offer protection to 
                                                
344
 Refer to the three cases lost by the government in Uganda in 2005. 
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political opponents in Zambia, Malawi, and Nigeria was not only beneficial to these 
individual political elites; rather, it was more a benefit for the legal institution, which 
had an opportunity to recreate itself.345 Moreover, the judgments that were delivered 
in favor of political elites occurred after political dissidents had already mobilized 
other sectors and exerted much pressure. The legal institution might have noticed that 
the amendment bills were likely to fail and veered to be on the right side of history.  
According to Chissinga, the case of the courts delivering judgments against 
the Africa governments Òseems to support the theory that men of the bench are likely 
to favor the opposition if they are sure of imminent change of power.Ó346 As 
expressed by a Justice of the Appeal Court in an interview with the author, Òthe 
courts often become biased in their judgments whenever the political space is being 
littered with political casualties, while maintaining that Ôthe courts must be invited to 
do so.Ó347 In her opinion, Òpolitical actors including the opposition must be able to 
make use of such an opportunity.Ó348   
                                                
345
 Dr. Frank Ozoh emphasized in an interview with the author that the judiciary seemed to 
have benefitted more by restoring its credibility during the Third Term politics when it 
rendered some judgments considered independent. 
346 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, Head of the Department of Social Science 
Research, University of Malawi, October 2014. 




Prior to the presidential term limits amendment bill debates, Nigeria, Zambia, 
and Malawi lagged behind Uganda and Namibia in media, civil society, and 
institutional freedoms (cf. Freedom House 2000-2007). President Obasanjo, for 
instance, stood accused of bullying the opposition (Agabti 2006). Civil society did 
not fare well before and during his regime. Obasanjo mostly used the anti-corruption 
regime to hound his political enemies.349  
President Frederick Chiluba was not only accused of high profile political 
assassinations, but also condemned many civil society organizations, which he 
accused of anti-government propaganda (Sardani 2014). The case in Malawi was 
similar, where the civil society and opposition suffered from MuluziÕs executive ban 
and intimidation (Morrow 2005; Brown 2004). However, the emergence of political 
actors equipped with deft political experience, wealth, and charisma seemed to upturn 
the political landscapes in Zambia, Malawi, and Nigeria, while Uganda and Namibia 
felt the absence of such political actors at that critical political juncture.   Political and 
democratic processes in Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia have witnessed robust progress 
through power and party alternations, more than two election turnovers, several open-
seat contests, and buoyant electoral competition following forced compliance. 
                                                
349 Most of the political elites I interviewed confirmed the view of some Nigerian authors that anti-
corruption efforts under President Obasanjo reduced official corruption among office holders. All 
insisted, however, that the anti-corruption net spread to capture those whom the President considered 
political opponents, while the regime exonerated its friends, even after the official exposure of their 
corrupt office practices. 
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Uganda, on the other hand, is representative of a host of post-Cold War African 
countries that have successfully repealed presidential term limits and has yet to 
experience any of the above technical qualities of consolidating democracy. 
Lastly, the three case studies show that political elite activism and institutional 
pressure are often interdependent and sometimes symbiotic. Dissenting political 
actors can rely on institutions, civil society, and the masses as channels of elite 
activism while simultaneously empowering these sectors. As Linz (1996) notes, 
institutional channels remain the recommended avenues of dissent in democracies if 
the destructive law of the streets is not desirable.  
Nigeria and Zambia exemplify cases where opposition actors relied on the 
civil society and the masses for spreading their message by mobilizing and 
sponsoring their protests.  The Malawian case saw a little variation because the 
opposition elites had no access to the civil society and the masses to spread their 
information, thus resorting to religious institutions, in particular the Catholic Church 
as a platform to build up their opposition and activism.  
Enforcement of presidential term limits requires political opposition actors to 
link up with institutional channels for effective activism and resistance (Armstrong 
2010). In this study, I juxtapose thirteen successful repeals or neglects and political 
elite docility with four failed repeals and political elite activism. From that 
juxtaposition, I conclude that the compliance outcomes in post-Cold War African 
democracies have largely depended and may still depend more on political elite 
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activism and less on institutional and other structural factors. While any degree of 
enforcement is dependent on elite political resistance and activism, respect for 
presidential term limits and willful compliance by incumbent presidents presuppose 
strong and stable institutions.     
 
7.2 Perspectives and Pressures 
In Chapter three, I discussed the two main perspectives that formed the basis 
of analysis for this study. However, I indicated that various other perspectives 
commonly regarded by scholars as capable of enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance in new democracies should be discussed in chapter seven. Though some 
of these perspectives (the parliament, political parties, judiciary, CSOs and the 
international community) have been specifically introduced in various case studies, I 
shall generally analyze and criticize these perspectives based on the findings in the 
case studies. I will offer reasons why these perspectives may fail to guarantee or 
enforce presidential term limits compliance, especially in African democracies.  
 
7.2.1 Presidential Initiative (Voluntarism) 
Some writers seem to assume that the choice to repeal or respect the 
institution of presidential term limits rests solely on incumbent presidents (Maltz 
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2007). Many incumbent presidents therefore rightly or erroneously arrogate to 
themselves the right to amend the constitution to extend their tenures.  
For instance, in various interviews, President Obasanjo has claimed that he 
did not actually want a third term, but that his loyalists wanted a third term for him 
and worked towards it. Despite the fact that he was defeated, Obasanjo insists that he 
would have gotten a third term if he had wanted it: ÒIf I wanted (a) third term, I 
would have known what to do, and I would have got (sic) itÓ.350  It becomes 
important therefore to investigate how presidential initiative or voluntarism has 
accounted for the removal of presidential term limits or its compliance in Africa. 
How many incumbent presidents have voluntarily retired in post-Cold War African 
democracies without controversy? How many have voluntarily made room for a 
successor without pressure? 
Political systems where individuals and institutions yield to the will of the 
incumbent president often result in power entrenchment. The rate of challenges to 
presidential term limits in African democracies strongly indicates that incumbent 
presidents choose to step down or challenge presidential term limits on their own 
accord. This is antithetical to democracy and constitutionalism. If power alternation is 
dependent on the incumbent presidentÕs choice to respect or challenge presidential 
term limits, the need for term limits compliance manifests by default.  
                                                
350 Daily Champion, May 20, 2007 
  
384 
From a quantitative perspective, this study has observed that in most new 
democracies, incumbent presidents do not willingly choose to retire. Instead, 
circumstances force their choice to retire. Globally, six out of ten post-Cold War 
democracies have held national debates to remove presidential term limits (Dulani 
2011). In Africa alone, thirty-four of thirty-eight countries that adopted presidential 
term limits in the 1990s have held one or two national debates to repeal presidential 
term limits.351 While eight incumbent presidents are yet to complete their second 
terms, Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo are holding national debates 
to consider repealing term limits. Only six presidents have retired at the end of their 
second tenure in the post-Cold War democratic experiment in Africa, with three of 
them yielding to partially enforced compliance.  
The data indicate that power transfer by incumbent presidents in post-Cold 
War African democracies has not been systematically voluntary. In other words, a 
certain amount of pressure has been responsible for enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance. In democracies where this particular pressure is lacking, incumbent 
presidents have chosen to stay as long as they wished. In democracies where such 
pressures exist and are applied, incumbent presidents either decide to retire or feel 
pressured into compliance. Some political elites have been remarkable in mobilizing, 
bundling, and applying such pressures. 
                                                
351 Updated data from Dulani 2011. 
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For instance, contrary to insinuations that Jerry Rawlings of Ghana and Arap 
Moi of Kenya voluntarily retired (Armstrong 2010), internal political elites pressured 
these two former incumbent presidents into compliance. In the case of Jerry 
Rawlings, powerful opposition and elite activism within his ruling National 
Democratic Coalition (NDC) led by D.F Annan and John Kuffour left him with little 
choice than to step down.  
The case of Arap Moi of Kenya is more revealing for the present study. Like 
Jerry Rawlings and many transition presidents, Moi was one of the many benevolent 
dictators who metamorphosed into elected presidents in the 1990s. His regime was 
not without abuses, ranging from human rights to rule of law. Moi never really 
wanted to vacate office, as he feared for political reprisals if any of his political 
opponents were to succeed him (Armstrong 2010). While consciously failing to 
groom a successor as Obasanjo and Chiluba did, Moi tactically allowed rumors of 
third term to gain ground in Kenya, even to the extent of allowing his loyalists to 
introduce a third-term bill into parliament successfully. After gauging the apparent 
failure of a third-term bill, President Arap Moi decided to retire. Growing internal 
elite activism and opposition led by Mwia Kibaki and Reila Odinga had forced his 
third-term project to a halt.  
Though voluntarism appeared to have gained ground following the successful 
repealing or neglect of presidential term limits by thirteen incumbent presidents, the 
two partially enforced cases of Ghana and Kenya seem to prove this hypothesis weak. 
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The presidential initiative to retire voluntarily conceals a complex dynamics of 
pressures. Some incumbent presidents, as Jerry Rawlings and Arap Moi, are able to 
promptly dictate the opposition and make the informed decision to retire and be on 
the right side of history. Others, like Frederick Chiluba, Olusegun Obasanjo, and 
Bakili Muluzi choose to challenge presidential term limits, willingly or unwillingly, 
or due to poor judgment.  
It is therefore inaccurate to claim, as many scholars seem to believe, that the 
compliance or challenging of presidential term limits is solely a presidential choice. 
Though the choice of incumbent presidents to repeal presidential term limits often 
reflects real ambitions, these presidents face limitations and directions from what 
scholars like Dahl (1971) and Mesquito (2012) respectively call the costs of toleration 
and the costs of repression.  
7.2.2 Institutional Perspective.  
The importance of institutions in the democratic process has been discussed in 
Chapter Two of this study. Institutions are very important because a political 
community is much less likely to treat recurring, consequential problems in an ad hoc 
manner (Shepsle 2010). A political community develops routines and vigorous 
standard ways of doing things by organizations endowed with resources and 
authority. Therefore, regularly recurring problems often illicit institutionalized 
responses. Collective action becomes necessary in the political community because 
established standard procedures provide political actors with appropriate incentives to 
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take the necessary action to provide a public good or control externalities (Shepsle 
2010).   
Institutions act as repositories of authority and resources to solve such 
collective problems. For the sake of this study, official institutions include the 
executives, legislatures, courts, and political parties. They may also involve, in a less 
official manner, private sector organizations such as houses of worship (churches), 
charitable organizations, and unions. Though political science studies tend to 
emphasize official institutions, all the above institutions drive the process of 
democratic consolidation in an actual democratic setting. Each of these is a political 
community in its own right and institutionalizes procedures to deal with recurring 
important challenges and problems.  
The institutionalization of politics or aspects of political life is reserved for 
recurrent, challenging problems and has important consequences. This becomes 
necessary because political performance is not exclusively a function of the ÔqualityÕ 
of political actors, but also a function of strong institutions. According to Shepsle, 
institutions require formalized procedures because men are not angels, but ordinary 
people (Shepsle 2010). The methods for doing political business become necessary to 
guide human political actions. As David Hume notes: 
People ought not to trust the future government of a state entirely to chance, 
but ought to provide a system of laws to regulate the administration of public affairs 
to the latest posterity. Wise regulations in any commonwealth are the most valuable 
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legacy that can be left to future ages. In the smallest courts or office, the stated forms 
and methods, by which business must be conducted, are found to be a considerable 
check on the natural depravity of mankind (1985). 
It is HumeÕs argument that institutions exist in the first place because men 
cannot be trusted. In other words, institutions exist to guide actions, processes, and 
procedures. Institutions, however, do not provide answers when external actors and 
forces suffocate, trample upon, disrespect, pressure, or limit their function.  
In the present study, I do not address the degree to which individual 
institutions matter for democratic consolidation, but rather the extent to which 
institutional pressures have been responsible for enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance. Which institutions in particular are responsible, and how can we 
decipher them?  
Observers of processes in new democracies often tend to mistake mere 
instrumentality of institutional sources as institutional pressure or independence. All 
post-Cold War African democracies operate Ôstrong presidentialismÕ with weak 
institutions, which many democracy observers regard as the bane of African 
democracy (Huntington 1996 & Rakner 2004). Unfortunately, promoters of African 
democracy did not notice or take into account the attributes of strong presidentialism 
at the beginning of the African post-Cold War democratic experiment. Instead, these 
promoters of democracy paid undue emphasis on elections (Bratton and van de Walle 
1997). The beneficiaries of these weak democratic institutions were transitional 
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incumbent presidents who quickly strove to alter the system but adamantly refused to 
change the existing political culture by maintaining the status quo and doing little to 
strengthen democratic institutions.  
The removal of presidential term limits or their neglect in thirteen African 
new democracies within the first decade of democratic experiment seems to give 
credence to this argument. Dr. Blessing Chissinga puts this succinctly, saying ÉÓit is 
disgusting that most transitional incumbent presidents who benefitted from the 
struggle against one-party system chose to retain old habits while outwardly 
portraying themselves as democrats.Ó By moving against presidential term limits, 
these transitional incumbent presidents manifested their favor for the old order and 
worked against the principles of liberal multi-party democracy which the masses 
across Africa yearned for.352 
However, if the hypothesis is correct that institutional pressures have been 
responsible for enforcing presidential term limits compliance, we shall notice higher 
and effective pressures emanating from Nigerian, Zambian, and Malawian 
institutions than those coming from Uganda and Namibia, where repeals were 
successful. We should notice higher institutional pressures in the Zambian, 
Malawian, and Nigerian cases before, during, and after presidential term limits 
debates to have enabled enforcement of compliance. On the other hand, institutional 
                                                
352  AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga, Coordinator of Social Science Research, 
University of Malawi, October 2014. 
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pressures should appear to be considerably low in Uganda and Namibia before, 
during and after presidential term limits debates in order to be able to account for 
institutional inability to enforce compliance.  
Unfortunately, this has not been the case. Institutional pressures in Nigeria 
and Zambia operated at a moderate level before presidential term limits debates. 
Shortly before the debates, and during the early stages of the third-term debates, some 
institutions like political parties, the parliament, and NGOs operated at low levels and 
remained conquered until halfway into the debates, when particular political actors 
discovered them as channels of activism. The institutional linkage became 
responsible for liberating the courts, the parliament, the civil society, and the media in 
Nigeria and Zambia (Brown 2004; Sardani 2014; Egwu 2008).  
 
7.2.2.1. The Judiciary: Courts and Judges 
In the existing literature on political science, especially on rational choice 
approaches to political institutions, the courts and judges (judicial officers) are rarely 
discussed. The explanation for this relative negligence may be in the puzzling nature 
of the courts and judicial officers (Shepsle 2010). Shepsle argues that elected 
politicians, though not less complex than judges, lend themselves to simple 
behavioral hypotheses, either for the straightforward purpose of re-election or the 
anticipation of higher electoral positions. Elected politicians pursue personal 
conceptions of Ôgood public policyÕ and aspire to positions of influence within their 
  
391 
respective spheres. These simple behavioral hypotheses provide the background to 
understanding the operating characteristics of legislative, executive, and electoral 
institutions. On the other hand, the courts, especially, the judicial officers, seem to 
resent being included in the same category as elected politicians, preferring to operate 
outside the daily tussle of politics. Judicial officers react to and interpret legislations 
only when invited to do so. As central players in important political institutions, 
judges however remain politicians. Personal contacts, belief systems, and political 
affiliations also appear to influence their judgments.  
What are the courts supposed to be? Why are courts reactionary? The courts 
operate mainly as a post-facto institution that forces judges into dispute resolution 
and rule interpretation instead of dispute prevention. By interpreting rules, judges as 
ordinary people may often allow personal feelings to influence their resolution of 
disputes or interpretation of laws (Posner). Posner helps us to understand judges as 
ordinary people. Politics, personal friendships, ideology, and pure serendipity 
influence their appointments. With special reference to this study, Posner helps us to 
identify how personal friendships and ideology may have influenced the decision of 
judges during the presidential term limits politics in the cases under study. 
Public opinion and newspaper reports during and after the third-term debates 
indicate that the judicial institutions in the three case studies were dependent on the 
executive. Some observers of African democracy have often described the courts as 
corrupt, ineffective, and lacking in the capacity to deliver independent judgments 
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(Morrow 2005; Armstrong 2010; Usman 2012). People disdained the courts to the 
extent that they chose not to approach the courts for litigations. Court cases also 
experienced unreasonable delays, with some electoral cases lasting up to three years, 
except when the government in power was sure of victory.353 Protests against judicial 
officers often carried the inscriptions ÒJustice delayed is justice denied,Ó and ÒThe 
court is the last hope of common man, so please wake up.Ó354  
As revealed in the three cases studies, many small parties whose electoral 
victories were stolen by the ruling parties often refused to approach electoral tribunals 
because of the fear of delay, excessive judicial costs, and apparent injustice.355 It was 
therefore daring that dissenting political elites still chose to use the courts as channel 
of opposition despite potential disappointments from the courts.  
In Nigeria for instance, the court initially refused to intervene when the Vice-
President and some dissenting party elites approached the courts for an injunction to 
stop the ruling party from changing the partyÕs constitution to accommodate a third 
                                                
353 Refer to the presidential electoral case in Nigeria in 2003 between Obasanjo and Buhari that lasted 
until 2006. 
354 Inscriptions on placards carried by protesters against judicial officers in Nigeria in 2005 and 2006. 
355 AuthorÕs interviews with Emaka Duru and John Guwa in Nigerian and Malawi revealed that some 
aggrieved members of smaller parties whose mandates were allegedly ÔstolenÕ by the ruling parties 
became frustrated after years of delays at the electoral tribunal. Refer also to the electoral case between 
Obasanjo and Buhari in Nigeria that lasted three and half years at the tribunal. 
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term for the incumbent president. Neither the High Court nor the Appeal Court in 
Abuja, Nigerian entertained the requests. They referred to the requests as a Ôfamily 
affair,Õ356 and did not intervene when the same dissenting actors instituted a case 
requesting the courts to stop their expulsion from the ruling party. Also coined as a 
Òfamily affair,Ó the courts in Zambia and Malawi confirmed the decision of the ruling 
party to expel some of its members who opposed presidents ChilubaÕs and MuluziÕs 
third term.  In both countries, the courts declined the opposition elitesÕ requests by 
referring to them as internal party problems.  
However, in all three case studies, the same courts rushed to deliver 
judgments in favor of the political dissenting elites towards the end of the presidential 
third-term debates. What was responsible for the abrupt change of approach by the 
courts?357 Many have emphasized the closeness of some dissenting elites to some 
judicial officers as a possible factor.358 The Nigerian case in particular demonstrates 
how the closeness between some judicial officers and political elites in both camps 
influenced some of the judgments that emanated from the courts. The Nigerian case 
                                                
356 Refer to Chapter Three of the first case study, ÒMobilizing through the Courts.Ó 
357 Some judicial officers interviewed in the three case studies confirmed that some judicial officers 
gave favorable judgments to the opposition because they also wanted to be on the good side of history, 
having seen the potential failure of the third-term bills. 




has recorded allegations of financial inducement and party affiliation that allegedly 
influenced some decisions coming from the court.  
In April 2001, barely two weeks before the defeat of ChilubaÕs third-term 
agenda, the courts pronounced a judgment in favor of the opposition MPs of the 
ruling MMD, whose seats had been declared vacant after their expulsion by the ruling 
party. In the Nigerian case, the courts re-instated Atiku Abubkar barely one week 
before the defeat of ObasanjoÕs third-term project. The courts reinstated Atiku 
Abubakar as the Vice-President, whose seat the ruling party had declared vacant. 
Some other key opponents of the third-term agenda, including Governors Orji Kalu 
and Bola Tinubu, all got interim injunctions stopping further trials on cases of trump-
up corruption allegations by the Obasanjo regime.  
In Malawi, the dissenting elites obtained a favorable judgment from the courts 
on their complaint regarding the right of the president to change the constitution. In 
its judgment in favor of the dissenting elites, the court insisted that the president had 
no right to interfere with the constitutional term limits. Though scholars might 
consider these judgments as coming rather late, they became landmark judgments for 
the dissenting elites by boosting their motivation and sustaining their activism to the 
end. On the other hand, the independent judgments that emanated from the courts 
toward the end of the term elongation controversies indicate a kind of unbundling 
process of the judiciary. Having leaned toward the regime, the controversy and elite 
activism presented the courts with good opportunities to experience judicial balance 
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and independence. According to newspaper reports, the reactions that came from the 
public after the judgments indicated that the courts had been under siege, possibly 
explaining why it took the courts too long to intervene during the presidential term 
limits controversies.359 Why did the judicial officers change their mind? Regardless 
of financial inducements or political and ethnic affiliations, judicial officials 
apparently began to change their mind towards popular opinion when they noticed the 
obvious failure and futility of the amendment bills. The courtÕs interest to be on the 
right and safer side of history appear to have motivated her leaning toward the 
dissenting elites and its granting of judicial protection and a favorable judgment.  
The unbundling of the courts and their apparently popular and independent 
judgments resulted directly from a combination of factors. These included elite 
activism, insistence by dissenting political elites, ties between dissenting political 
elites and judicial interests, and an induced pressure on judicial officers to align 




                                                
359 Several news dailies including the Vanguard, Sun, Daily Times and the Guardian reported the 
incidents concerning various protests by the masses and civil society to protest against unpopular 
judgments and unnecessary delays of judicial cases in Nigeria.  
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Table 4: Frequency of Judicial Cases and Outcomes Involving Presidential Term 





Number of legal 
cases by 
dissenting elites 
Number of legal 











Nigeria  35  6 9 15 
Zambia 22 5 6 - 
Malawi 18 3 3 - 
Namibia 0 0 0 0 
Uganda  0 0 0 0 
Source: Result of interviews conducted by the author, as well as literature and newspaper 
reports reviewed for the purpose of this research. 
 
7.2.2.2  Political Parties 
Democratization experts as well as policy makers are in unison that a good 
relationship exists between the consolidation of democracy and good functioning of 
political parties (Salih 2003, Salih et.al 2007; LaPalombara ed. 1966; Iwu 2008; 
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2009; Adetula 2009; Armstrong 2010; Okowa 2015). Salih et. al (2007) have 
distinguished the operation of different party systems in Africa, and the challenges 
they present for sustained multiparty democracy in Africa.360 I shall build on their 
conclusions to sustain my claim that political parties, as they operate in Africa, lack 
the incentives to exercise supremacy over elected executives and therefore not 
sufficiently capable of exerting pressure to enforce term limits compliance in Africa.  
As Òan organization of people which seeks to achieve goals common to its 
members through the acquisition and exercise of political power,Ó361 political parties 
serve as a link between the government and the populace (Salih et. al 2007). 
Therefore, except where the constitutions prescribe otherwise (for independent 
candidates), it is the duty of political parties to sponsor candidates for elections. 
Independence, transparency, internal democracy and clear ideological difference all 
combine to make political parties function effectively in a fledging democracy, and in 
this manner can exercise some level of supremacy of individual candidates who seek 
to promote their political careers on the platform of given political parties. 
                                                
360 In the Africa regional Report for IDEA, Salih and his co-authors distinguished between One-party, 
Two-party, Dominant-party and Multiparty systems, and how they stand in the consolidation of 
democracy in Africa. Refer to Political Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty 
Democracy (2007), 44-53. 
361 The definition of political party by Wikipedia, free online dictionary.  
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Thus, established democracies run on the wheels of independent and 
functional political parties with clear ideological differences and an enlightened share 
of public support. Such public support has its base in political aims, visions, and 
missions, which have been tested and confirmed over time. As some writers argue, 
strongly functioning political parties are essential for the success of a transition to 
democracy, as well as for its consolidation (Adetula 2009).  
Though leading democratic scholars have emphasized the institutional 
relevance of political parties as one of the driving forces of democratic consolidation, 
this point was elusive as it concerned the enforcement of presidential term limits in 
the cases studied. The case studies failed to identify any strong and sufficient 
pressures emanating from political parties against the removal of presidential term 
limits. 
The reasons for the inability of political parties to checkmate ambitious 
presidents are not difficult to find. Salih et. al (2007) already addressed the 
predicaments of political parties in Africa noting that the democratic content of 
political parties remain fragile because of ethnic and religious cleavages, the context 
of external pressures and development aid conditionality. Further, the majority of 
African governing political parties appear to be still heavily dependent on the direct 
or indirect sponsorship from the government or political god-fathers. Since the party 
in power is hardly autonomous from government influence in the majority of African 
states (Salih et. al 2007), it becomes extremely difficult to demarcate the line between 
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the government and the political party. Confirming SalihÕs view, the various case 
studies observed that the relationship between government and party was blurred that 
the governing parties relied on the state resources to dispense patronage to sustain the 
organization and management of the parties.  
In most African democracies, political parties lack clear differential ideologies and 
objectives (Salih et. al 2007; Armstrong 2010; Posner and Young 2007). They are yet 
untested and inexperienced (Adetula 2009), and did not have the opportunity to 
evolve over time as most political parties did in established democracies (Salih et. al 
2007). As many writers have noted, and as equally confirmed in the case studies, 
majority of political parties function as mere platforms to capture state power in order 
to control and dispense state economy (Okowa 2015; Armstrong 2010; Campbell 
2011; Salih et al 2007; Iwu 2008, 2009; Chabal and Daloz 1999) Collier 2008).  
Thus, rather than be evaluated on account of their ideologies and manifestoes, 
the majority of political parties in Africa distinguish themselves with and yield to 
ethnic, religious and regional cleavages (Okowa 2015; Salih 2003; Salih et.al 2007). 
All these conspire to deny African political parties the independence they desperately 
need to exert pressure on African presidents.  
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At the inception of the democratic transition, many new democracies had no 
experience of multi-party politics.362 The majority of African countries including 
Zambia, Malawi, Tanzania, Gabon, Kenya, and Uganda had become used to an 
entrenched one-party system, while others like Burkina Faso, Ghana, Benin, and 
Nigeria have had multiple experiences with military coups boasting little or no 
democratic institutions.  
These countries regarded military coup as the only means of alternating 
power. Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Gabon, Namibia, and Togo never 
experienced multiparty politics before the 1990s. Some writers have also argued that 
some people in many African states tend to believe more in individual leaders for 
political loyalty than in political parties (Chabal & Daloz 1999). New political parties 
during transitional periods were still in their developing stages at the time of third-
term politics. While many political actors had greater political experience, political 
parties were still new and therefore inadequately equipped to apply significant 
pressure against the removal of presidential term limits. In some countries, especially 
in the cases under study, political parties functioned as Ôpersonal propertiesÕ of either 
incumbent presidents or prominent political leaders. In the three case studies, the 
ruling political parties enjoyed direct funding from the presidency. Such direct 
                                                
362 By 1991 and 1992, when the first post-Cold War African countries were democratizing, only eight 
countries had experienced an organized multi-party election within the period of forty years.  
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funding by party leaders and the presidency sustained executive control and 
prevented political parties from exerting independent pressure on the presidents. 
Furthermore, the negotiation for multi-party democracy in most post-Cold 
War African democracies occurred as a transaction (Linz 1996). In most cases, the 
old political order could not rupture, as most long-serving dictators negotiated their 
way into the new system through ÔreformaÕ (ibid). This entailed the metamorphosis of 
dictators into leaders of the new multiparty system without their complete extrication 
from the old dictatorial order. In a one-party system, the ruling political parties 
usually functioned as appendages of the presidency, lacking in independence and 
internal democracy. The presidents functioned at the same time as party leaders, 
exercising high degrees of control over the parties as the bona fide owners of political 
parties (Chabal and Daloz 1999).  
Unfortunately, the structures of the one-party system did not rupture with the 
advent of multiparty system of the post-Cold War democratic era in Africa.363 
Consequently, after what seemed to be a moderate reform, the old system applied 
within the new multiparty democracy.  Incumbent presidents and a few Ôpolitical or 
wealthy influentialÕ persons became sponsors and owners of political parties with 
little independence, internal democracy, or party ideology. Lack of independence and 
internal democracy resulted in the imposition of candidates by party leaders onto the 
                                                




populace for election into various offices.364 Incumbent presidents and party leaders 
also only allowed those party policy reforms that suited their interests (Adetula 2009; 
Collier 2008; Chabal and Daloz 1999).365  
The ease with which the ruling parties dispensed their constitutions to approve 
third-term bids, confirms the massive control of the incumbent presidents on ruling 
parties. This demonstrates a lack of independence among political parties as a source 
of institutional pressure in new democracies. It also shows that political party 
regulations and the entire organization of most African political parties are still very 
weak and prone to extreme manipulation and usurpation by incumbent presidents 
(Iwu 2009; Egwu 2009; Morrow 2005). Scholars have particularly noted that party 
finances remain confidential and internal democracy undeveloped in most new 
African democracies (Salih et. al 2007; Adetula 2009; Egwu 2009). Lack of 
independence and internal democracy, which appear to be the bane of political parties 
in Africa (Salih et. al 2007; Okowa 2015) render political parties weak and 
propagates poor political ideologies. In the particular incident of the case studies, 
                                                
364 In 2008, Cameroonian President Paul Biya introduced a second parliament, the Senate.. However, 
to date, President Biya himself selects the senators by appointment, not by election. By avoiding 
election and personally appointing the senators himself, he maintains a solid control of his party and 
the parliament. 
365 Refer also to ObasanjoÕs forceful take-over of the ruling party in Nigeria in 2005 and his policy of 
the ÔNew PDPÕ, a strategy used to ease off his Ôpolitical enemiesÕ and prominent party members 
opposed to his third-term amendment bill. 
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these contributed in weakening the capacity of political parties to function, on the one 
hand, as an institutional pressure against the removal of presidential term limits, and 
on the other, as a general catalyst for the consolidation of democracies in Africa. 
However, this study emphasizes the importance of multi-party system and the 
possibility to defect as a political advantage and breakthrough in some new 
democracies. Some scholars view party defection as undemocratic, dishonorable, and 
a form of political fraud (Armstrong 2010; Dulani 2011; Ahamba 2014). In the three 
cases under study, certain correlation exists between elite defection and the outcome 
of presidential term limits compliance. The possibility for defection appears to have 
provided elite dissidents the opportunity to continue to apply pressure from an 
alternative platform. As shall be emphasized in the concluding chapter, this created a 
long-term opportunity for robust opposition politics and led to party alternation in all 
the cases under study.  
Without the possibility to defect, political actors would have been forced to 
remain in political parties where the possibility to compete or apply pressure did not 
exist. For instance, defections from ruling parties were more common in Nigeria, 
Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, and Kenya where presidential term limits compliance were 
either fully enforced or partially induced. Likewise, the possibility for elite defection 
led to the formation of strong opposition, a balanced competition for power, and 
strong alternative political platforms and parties. Consequently, these led to both 
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leadership and party alternations.366 The table below captures the level of party 
defections in some countries that have featured in the present study, demonstrating 
how they affected presidential term limits outcomes in those post-Cold War 
democracies. 
Table 5: Estimated Number of Dissenting Political Elites and Defections and the 
Corresponding Outcome of Presidential Term Limits Debates in Some Selected Cases 
in Africa. 








Nigeria  150 120 5 Fully enforced  
Zambia 111 86 4 Fully enforced  
Malawi 72 58 3 Fully enforced 
                                                
366 The defections that started during the presidential term limits politics in all the case studies led to 
the formation of strong opposition political parties that went on to challenge the dominance of the 
ruling parties. In consequent elections, the merging of some of these opposition parties into strong 
alliances as the All Peoples Congress (APC) in Nigeria, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 
Malawi, and the Patriotic Front (PF) in Zambia were able to wrestle power from the ruling parties, 
causing these democracies to experience party alternations.  
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Ghana 75 28 3 Partially 
induced 
Kenya 68 12 2 Partially 
induced 
Namibia 2 1 1 Successful 
repeal  
Uganda 1 1 0 Successful 
repeal 
Source: Compiled from authorÕs interviews, literature, and newspaper reviews on the case 
studies. 
Before the presidential term limits debates in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi, 
defections were minimal and one-directional because the incumbent presidents 
enjoyed strong political loyalty from party members. Attraction for political positions 
and survival also saw many political actors defecting to the ruling parties after 
winning or losing elections in other smaller parties. However, during the presidential 
term limits debates, internal opposition elites pressured the party system with 
defections. Defections were no longer one-directional into the ruling parties, but this 
time, mainly out of the ruling parties.  
Political parties, especially those ruling, failed to enthrone internal and 
competitive democracy and rule of law. Political elites did not respect pacts and 
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negotiations. This gave rise to internal party dissidence and further compelled 
dissenting elites to ÔruptureÕ the ruling parties by defecting and seeking other 
platforms to sustain democratic competition and activism. By seeking other 
platforms, the dissenting elites created a political space outside the mainstream 
parties to foster elite convergence and activism.  
In Nigeria, Atiku Abubakar defected from the ruling PDP to merge his 
political association, the Turaki Vanguard, with Governor Ahmed TinubuÕs Action 
Congress of Nigeria (ACN). They later formed the All Progress Alliance that 
defeated the ruling PDP in the presidential polls in 2015. Governor Orji Kalu took his 
opposition to form the PeopleÕs Progressive Alliance (PPA) that won many 
governorship and parliamentary seats, especially in the South East of Nigeria.  
In Zambia, the vice president Christon Tembo, Ben Nwila, and the Speaker of 
the parliament combined to form the Reform Party (RP), which became an alternative 
platform where dissenting actors converged. The party was to produce the first party 
alternation in Zambia in 2007.  
In Malawi, the expelled and defected prominent members of the ruling UDF 
formed the New Democratic Coalition (NDC) as a new platform to sustain an 
opposition pressure on President Muluzi. A merger between NDC and the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) also produced the first party alternation in 
Malawi in 2009 (Morrow 2005). This was not the case in Uganda and Namibia, 
  
407 
where elite political resistance was minimal during the presidential term limits 
amendment bill debates, resulting in zero defection.  
As in Uganda and Namibia, political actors were unable to challenge the party 
system to create an alternative platform in countries that had successfully repealed 
presidential term limits. This failure indicates a diminished elite pressure, which may 
have resulted in an easy removal of the presidential term limits by their incumbent 
presidents. Elite resistance and activism against the removal of presidential term 
limits was less than fifteen percent in Namibia and Uganda. This might explain the 
lack of necessity for elite defection or an alternative political space outside the ruling 
party to mount and sustain an effective pressure.  
When the ruling party blocked all avenues of resistance and competition in 
Nigeria, the dissenting elites sought for another platform using various names but 
largely converging in the ACN and PPA to sustain their pressure. In Zambia, the 
dissenting elites converged and formed many pressure groups, but used the RP as an 
effective platform to apply pressure on Chiluba. In Ghana, when Rawlings initially 
insisted on a third term, it resulted in the formation of opposition platform led by 
John Kuffour, the ÔReform Movement,Õ which became strongly instrumental in 
further mobilization of the masses, CSOs, and other political actors against Rawlings. 
In Kenya, the formation of internal opposition camps by a section of the ruling 
KANU became strong sources of opposition against Arap MoiÕs third-term ambition.  
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Thus, the formation of various opposition and pressure groups by dissenting 
political actors in Ghana, Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi afforded the dissenting elites 
an opportunity to expand the party system and to sustain political competition during 
the presidential term limits controversies. It also resulted in partial liberation of the 
multiparty system and created an opportunity for opposition politics. Unfortunately, 
because the political elites consciously chose to play along in those countries where 
presidential term limits were successfully repealed, political competition and 
opposition politics remained low.  
By challenging and resisting executive dominance, some political elites 
succeeded in liberating party institutions in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi. Their 
ability to rupture the existing presidential and executive dominance in the parties 
altered the continued structural dependence of party system on incumbent executives. 
On the other hand, the absence of political dissidents and the failure of the few 
dissenting actors to link with other institutional platforms to pressure and challenge 
executive and incumbent dominance enabled some incumbent presidents to entrench 
state power in many new African democracies. For instance, having successfully 
whittled down elite dissidence, removed or neglected presidential term limits in 
thirteen African democracies, some transitional incumbent presidents succeeded in 
stunting the democratic growth of their countries.367 
                                                
367 While Namibia recorded about two stromg elite oppositions and one defection from the ruling 
SWAPO during the third term debate, Uganda recorded one elite opposition and no defections. Lack of 
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7.2.2.3  The Parliaments 
Throughout the world, the legislature consists of politicians who harbor a 
variety of political objectives (Shepsle 2010). With the exception of the Cameroonian 
senate,368 electoral competition is a prerequisite for the acquisition of political, 
parliamentary positions in all African democracies and elsewhere in the world. MPs 
usually obtain their positions by winning an election (except in Cameroon), with the 
hope to remaining in parliament or possibly advancing their political careers beyond 
the parliament. According to Sheplse, MPs are, as politicians, conscious of those 
people they must please in order to advance their political ambitions (2010). In the 
African context, aware of high campaign costs, many MPS are, for example, eager to 
please those who can supply the resources for the next campaign: Ôgod-fathers,Õ major 
endorsers, small contributors, prominent party officials, volunteer activists, NGOs, 
and many sycophants. 
Yet many politicians choose not to please only campaign contributors and 
voters, but decide to follow a personal agenda. For whatever reasons, the case studies 
show that many politicians come to the legislature with personal objectives. As a 
political actor, the MP is accountable to him- or herself and to the many groups 
                                                                                                                                      
electoral competition, power alternation, absence of open-seat context, and electoral turnover have 
become consistent with countries that lacked the ability to enforce presidential term limits. 
368 The Cameroonian President Paul Biya reserves the personal right to appoint members of senate, 
who supersede members of the lower elected parliament in political importance. 
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among the MPÕs own constituents, campaign contributors, and supporters. Some MPs 
even elect to follow the bidding of those who sent them to parliament, acting as 
personal delegates.369 However, group interests appear to motivate other MPs who 
view themselves as the trustees of fellow citizens.  
Most MPs interviewed appear to be a mixture of the last two categories. A 
parliament in the African setup consists of MPs who seek to please those who control 
their political future, while striving to achieve personal goals. How does the MPÕs 
instrumental objective to secure incentives for their constituents through the pursuit 
of political goals and specific policies, referred to here as Ôinstrumental behaviorÕ 
affects the prospects of term limits in Africa? 
I seek here to analyze how instrumental behavior of MPs affected the outcome 
of the presidential term limits politics in the three case studies.  Many MPs appear to 
have remained loyal to the party because of targeted political interests, while many 
others remained loyal to certain Ôgod-fathersÕ for their protection and political 
support. How did each of these factors, or a combination of them, yield to the 
outcome of presidential amendment bills in the case studies? 
I have noted in the three case studies that most African democracies mistook 
parliamentary docility as a sign of a consolidating democracy. The parliamentary 
                                                
369 This reflects the experience of most MPs in the cases under study. ÔGodfathersÕ nominated or 
sponsored some, while political contractors and big organizations fronted others as their personal link 
to the parliament.  
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majority for a ruling party was also often mistaken to signal governmental 
effectiveness and strength. The false pretense of docility and party majority led 
incumbent presidents and their executives in some African democracies to treat 
parliaments as rubber-stamping machines, expecting easy passage of any pieces of 
legislations presented to the parliament.  
 When parliaments failed to meet these expectations, executives often 
interpreted this as a parliamentary challenge and dismissed the parliamentary 
leaderships. 370  Nigeria probably has the highest record of a president sacking 
ÔdisloyalÕ heads of parliament. Between 1999 and 2005, president Obasanjo caused 
the removal of six heads of parliament for being disloyal to him, three of them 
specifically for questioning and not supporting his third-term ambition (Punch, 
November 7, 2014). President Chiluba declared the seat of MMD MPs and the 
Speaker vacant for having a different opinion towards his third-term amendment bill 
(Sardanis 2014). President Bakili Muluzi threatened and sacked UDF MPs for taking 
a different position over his open term bill (Morrow 2005; Brown 2004). 
In the face of such overbearing domination by incumbent presidents, the 
parliaments remained docile in the three case studies until the altering of 
parliamentary balance of power through elite activism and defections. For instance, in 
2005, the two legislative houses rubber-stamped ObasanjoÕs bill to proscribe the 
                                                
370 Seven heads of the parliament lost their seats in Nigeria between 1999 and 2007, mainly for 
disagreeing with the incumbent president on policy and legislative issues. 
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national umbrella of Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) in Nigerian, approving 
stringent rules that made it difficult for the CSOs to organize protests. One of those 
stringent conditions mandated the CSO to obtain police clearance not later than 
seventy-two hours before embarking on any protests.  
This was equally the case in 1999, when the Zambian legislature rubber-
stamped ChilubaÕs National Order Act (NOA), removing the capacity and 
independence of the courts to grant injunctions against the government. In 2001, the 
parliament supported an executive bill that prohibited streets protests against 
MuluziÕs open-term amendment bill in Malawi. In hindsight, these were all done in 
preparation towards the removal of presidential-term limits, yet the parliaments 
erroneously acted as rubberstamps thinking that the parliament was no place for 
confrontation and opposition. Would it have been possible for the same parliament to 
transform itself into a center of opposition? The parliament could not have mutated in 
six monthsÕ time to exert significant institutional pressure to demand and enforce 
compliance without agential push. 
Like political parties and the judiciary, an independent parliament is a sign of 
thriving democracy. A functional and independent parliament not only reflects the 
existence of a functional democracy, it also signifies a match toward a consolidated 
democratic system. It acts as a balance of power and performs an important oversight 
function that guarantees democratic freedoms and accountability (Salih 2005). With 
political sponsors and presidents sometimes handpicking and presenting loyal 
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candidates for the position of MP, MPs act as surrogates and mostly do the bidding of 
their god-fathers/sponsors to the detriment of common interest of their constituencies. 
Like the regional African parliaments, which Salih et. al (2007) rightly describes as 
legislatures without legislative powers, some African parliaments portray the signs of 
legislatures without legislative power and lack the institutional independence to 
pressure erring incumbent presidents into compliance. 
Further, like many other institutions in new democracies, the parliament in its 
democratic form was never sufficiently tested in many new democracies prior to the 
transition elections of the 1990s. The parliaments that existed in one-party states like 
Zambia, Gabon, Kenya, Malawi, and Uganda could be referred to as ÔquasiÕ 
parliaments. These were at the grip of the presidents who more or less endorsed each 
member of the parliament in reward for political loyalty or outright patronage (Dulani 
2011). Through these protgs, incumbent presidents controlled parliamentary 
proceedings by proxy (Chabal & Daloz 1999). The introduction of multi-party 
democracy did not resolve the monopolization and control of the parliament by 
incumbent presidents, since the old structure hardly ruptured. Thus, the parliament 
remained ÔquasiÕ in the three case studies until elite defection ruptured party loyalty 
and altered parliamentary balance of power.  
Further, the first and second elections in most post-Cold War African 
democracies saw the ruling parties controlling about seventy-five percent of MPs 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997). In isolated cases, the ruling parties, especially in 
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Cameroon, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Uganda still contribute over ninety percent of 
MPs to the parliament. In Nigeria, the ruling party captured eighty-seven of the 
hundred and nine senate seats in 1999, while the other five parties shared the 
remaining thirty-two seats. Such an imbalanced scenario diminishes the capacity of 
the parliament to exert pressure as an independent institution, since the ruling party 
treats parliamentary agendas as a party affair. Further, with the political mentality of 
Ôwinner takes it allÕ in new democracies, ruling parties remotely control the 
parliament. Party leadership, often loyal to the president, exercises more power than 
does the Speaker of the parliament.371 This probably explains why the president was 
able to dismiss MPs who showed signs of political disloyalty so easily from the ruling 
party and declare their seats, as in the Zambian and Malawian cases. 
In the three cases studied, the parliament as an institution lacked sufficient 
institutional capacity to enforce presidential term limits compliance. If parliamentary 
pressures were enough to induce compliance, we would notice a strong, independent 
and radical parliament operating above-moderate levels prior to, during, and after the 
third-term amendment debates. Unfortunately, in all the three cases, the parliament 
operated at a moderate level before the amendment debates, and below-moderate 
                                                
371 Between 1999 and 2011, the chair of the ruling party in Nigeria visited the senate and House of 
Representatives more that forty-five times, mainly to ÔcoerceÕ party members to toe certain lines in 
parliamentary proceedings. In 2011, the MPs decided to break away from party control by electing 
their speaker against the choice of the ruling party. 
  
415 
level during the debates, but rose sharply to above-moderate level towards the end of 
the presidential terms limits politics. Two reasons could explain this phenomenon.   
When opposition elites either defect from government or decide to go into 
elite activism, they often seek linkages with democratic institutions. These linkages 
figure more as official channels of democratic engagement than the law of the street. 
Usually, agents seek linkages with the courts, the parliaments, or civil society 
organizations for the various reasons discussed above.  
I have noted how ruling parties expelled the dissenting elites in all the case studies. 
Having lost out at the party level where the incumbent presidents operated as 
hegemons and tsars, the dissenting political elites galvanized in their various 
parliaments as a neutral ground, thereby turning their parliaments into platforms for 
opposition and activism. The parliaments, which hitherto were docile and amenable, 
became places of resistance, lobby, and politicking Ð namely, centers for political 
activism and competition.  
In all the case studies, and even through Ghana and Kenya, many observers 
discounted the parliaments as weak institutions because of strong presidentialism and 
the overbearing presence of the incumbent president (Iwu 2008, 2009; vonDoepp 
2005; Brown 2005; Morrow 2005). However, during the extended third-term 
disagreements, dissenting elites gained the upper hand through elite size, wealth, and 
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experience372, re-defining the parliaments as a platform and destination for opposition 
and competition. 
The capacity of some political elites to challenge presidential orders using the 
instrumentality of the parliament became a deciding moment for the parliaments to 
achieve induced political maturity, legitimacy, and relative independence. In the 
Nigerian case, the parliament became a desired venue for those political elite 
dissidents who rejected Obasanjo and his third-term bid. Their collective aim was to 
prevent Obasanjo from clinging to power, and the parliament became a favorable 
destination for converging against him.373  
Dynamics interpreted by Posner and Young (2007) as institutional pressures 
in the Nigerian case, may have actually emanated from dissenting and regional 
political elites who used weak parliaments as instrument for struggle. Elite activism 
enabled this penetration into the parliaments by other interest groups. Elite 
convergence in the parliament brought further pressure to bear on the parliaments 
themselves, introducing the process of parliamentary liberation in Nigeria, Zambia, 
and Malawi. The parliament, which had hitherto celebrated its docility, became a 
popular destination for dissenting elites who consequently turned it into a center of 
                                                
372 I shall discuss and analyze this issue in section B of this chapter. 
373 Though the amendment bills to repeal presidential term limits were defeated at the parliament in the 
three main case studies, the scant literature, newspaper reports, and popular media have given no 
credence to the parliaments as an institution for enforcing compliance.  
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opposition, activism, resistance, lobby, and competition for political loyalty. All these 
case studies followed the same pattern.  
7.2.2.4  Civil Society Organizations 
Dulani (2011) has attributed the failure of the attempts to repeal presidential 
term limits in Malawi and Zambia to civil society actions and the opposite outcomes 
in Uganda and Namibia to civil society inaction. Dulani based his hypothesis on the 
argument that the civil society played a significant role in the dismantling of 
dictatorships across Africa in the 1990s, therefore helping to enthrone multi-party 
democracies across the continent. Dulani, however, failed to recognize other local 
and international forces whose pressures converged to dismantle dictatorial regimes 
on the continent. The gains of post-Cold War democratization in Africa were not the 
singular responsibility of civil society action, but the collective result of foreign 
policy regimes, democracy promotion, aid conditionality, and strong elements of 
local internal forces yearning for multi-party democracy in Africa (Villalon 2005; 
Brown 2004; Khembo 2004).374 By singling out democracy movements and the civil 
society (in)action for term limits compliant and repealing outcomes in Africa, Dulani 
fails to appreciate the political changes that have taken place in the last twenty years 
of democratic experiment within the continent.  
                                                
374 In separate interviews with the author, Mark Chona, and Dr. Chissinga emphasized the robust 




For instance, most incumbent presidents that operated the new democracies 
were long serving dictators who metamorphosed into elected presidents under 
transactions, negotiated reforms, and manipulated elections (Linz 1996, Chabal and 
Daloz 1999; Vilalon 2005). The transitional incumbent presidents probably knew the 
potential and actual force of civil society elsewhere in the world. With the help of 
parliamentary bills, they took steps to hinder CSOs systematically before and during 
presidential term limits politics. 375 
Using these strategies, the incumbent presidents in the three case studies 
systematically weakened the potency of CSOs to yield a formidable pressure before 
and during the third-term constitution amendment debates. In the Nigerian case, the 
notorious Labor UnionÕs refusal to join the protests against ObasanjoÕs third-term is 
remarkable.376 The number of CSOs that protested in favor of the removal of 
presidential term limits almost outnumbered the number of CSOs that protested 
                                                
375 In the Nigerian case, President Obasanjo secured a parliamentary bill in 2005 to proscribe the 
national umbrella of CSOs in Nigeria, rendering them vulnerable. Another bill made it mandatory for 
CSOs to obtain police clearance before embarking on any protests. In Malawi, President Muluzi 
banned and criminalized all protests against his open presidential term amendment bill in 2001, while 
Zambian President Chiluba did the same in 2000 by enforcing fresh and more stringent registration 
laws for CSOs 
376 The opposition queried the Labour Union on Nigerian in 2006 for their refusal to participate in 
various protests organized in support of the opposition elites against the third-term amendment bill. 
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against the removal of presidential term limits in the various countries under study.377 
Since civil society action and inaction balanced themselves, DulaniÕs argument 
crediting civil society action for the enforcement of Zambian and Malawian term 
limits compliance appear misleading. 
Secondly, Dulani fails to note that democratic processes are different from 
political processes in self-rule and dictatorial regimes. The channels of resistance in 
democratic systems differ from channels of resistance in dictatorial regimes. In 
democracy, aggrieved political elites seek institutional linkages and legitimacy for 
their resistance. Like institutional linkage, civil society can be turned into a channel 
of resistance by aggrieved and dissenting political elites to disseminate information, 
legitimize, and direct their resistance. In turn, dissenting political elites harness and 
bundle pressures arising from such institutional linkage to solidify their activism and 
resistance. What Dulani identifies as civil society action in his work on Malawi and 
Zambia could have rather been an elite mobilization of civil society to legitimize their 
resistance and activism.  
Moreover, as some writers have rightly noted, CSOs in African democracies lack 
organized funding. They are ill equipped financially to carry out independent actions 
(Khembo 2004). The civil society suffers the same fate as political parties in terms of 
funding and control. As Salih et. al notes:  
                                                
377  Refer to Dulani, Democracy Movements as Bulwarks against Presidential Usurpation of 
Power:  Lessons from the Third!Term Bids in   Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and Zambia, 2011. 
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The private sector in Africa appears too small to support and sustain the 
establishment of strong and vibrant civil society organizations and a non-
political middle class that are autonomous of the state. Interest associations 
are the backbone of civil society everywhere. Unfortunately these appear to be 
subsumed in Africa by the state. In this kind of situation, it is difficult for civil 
society to make demands on the government and on the party or challenge 
party or government policies. Because the relationship between the 
government, party and civil society is so blurred and entangled, CSOs often 
find no moral push to challenge government/party policies where its funding 
often comes from (2007, 21).  
As I have already detailed in various case studies, political elites either 
sponsored or led most CSOs that participated in the protests for or against the 
removal of presidential term limits.  
In the Nigerian case, the opposition elites led by Atiku Abubakar and Orji 
Kalu mobilized and sponsored more than twenty-five CSOs and more than one 
hundred protests.378 They defied police orders and incurred police intimidation and 
assaults (Agbati 2006). In the Zambian case, major CSOs refused to participate in 
opposition organized against the third-term presidential amendment bill. The 
dissenting political elites relied on Mark ChonaÕs OASIS, which was only able to 
mobilize the student union, womenÕs groups, the Church, and the Zambian Bar 
                                                
378 AuthorÕs interview with Orji Kalu, Nigeria, October 2013 
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Association against president Chiluba. 379  Finally, in the Malawian case, the 
criminalization of civil protests by Muluzi caused most CSOs to stay out, forcing 
opposition elites to court partnership with religious institutions and Church 
organizations (Morrow 2006).380 While pro-third-term CSOs freely staged protests in 
favor of the removal of presidential term limits, the anti-third-term CSOs faced 
security intimidations, a situation that could explain the poor show of civil society 
action against the removal of presidential term limits in Malawi (Morrow 2006, 
Brown 2004; Simon 2005).381  
The following table gives a comparative and representative account of CSOs 





                                                
379 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona, chairman of Oasis Lusaka, October 2014 
380 AuthorÕs interview with Tamani Boniface, John Guwa, and Dr. Blessings Chissinga in Malawi, 
October 2014 
381 The former chairman of the PAC, Boniface Tamani, confirmed this fact in an interview with the 
author, Limbe, Malawi, October 2014. 
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Table 6: Representation of CSOs in Presidential Term Limits Debates in the Selected Case 
Studies 






Nigeria  106  26 18 
Zambia 72  12 10 
Malawi 64  10 8 
Source: Dulani 2011, updated by the author using interviews, literature review, and newspaper reports 
undertaken for this study. 
The mobilization for and against the removal of presidential term limits almost 
cancelled each other in the countries mentioned above. However, the scenario in 
Uganda is very striking. Despite the higher number of anti-third-term CSOs, 
MussoveniÕs third-term amendment bill was not preventable. This demonstrates that 
all parties related with the CSOs as vehicles and channels at their disposal. Both 
dissenting political elites and incumbent presidents required civil society linkage to 
disseminate their information and legitimize their positions. This also demonstrates 
that civil society organizations rely on elite mobilization and incentives for civil 
society action because of the paucity of funding and stringent national operation laws 
(Khembo 2004).  In the three case studies, particular political elites lobbied and 
sponsored CSOs to engage in protests and mass actions, using them as avenues to 
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legitimize their activism and resistance.382 By doing so, they succeeded in harnessing 
and bundling pressure from the CSOs to enforce term limits compliance. 
7.2.2.5 Extra-Institutional Pressures. 
The case studies did not record much extra-institutional pressure, except in the 
Malawian case, where dissenting political elites collaborated with Church elites and 
used church structures as vehicle and platform for activism and resistance. The role of 
the Malawian church in the outcome of the debates regarding open-ended and third-
term presidency is threefold.  
Ross (2004) argues that the emphatic stand by some churches, especially the 
Catholic Church, against President Muluzi and his open-term amendment bill 
represents what they see as their custodianship of democratic values. The churches 
are willing  champions of constitutionalism, the rule of law, the Bible, the peopleÕs 
voice, and strong engagement against the politics of patronage.  
However, Peter van Doepp (2005) identifies the scheming of some self-
interested political actors who used the church as a venue to ÔoffloadÕ President 
                                                
382 Orji Kalu disclosed in an interview that over US$500,000 funded CSO protests and media debates 
against ObasanjoÕs third term in Nigeria. Mark Chona also revealed in an interview that most of the 
funds released to the OASIS group by foreign donors against the removal of presidential term limits in 
Zambia was utilized to fund mass protests and lobby civil society groups to join their course. 
  
424 
Muluzi. For them, the church was the only open, Malawian platform through which 
to channel their resistance and activism.383  
Thirdly, the Malawian Church seemed to have substituted weak forces in civil 
society and political parties (VonDoeep 2002; Morrow 2005; Khembo 2004). In the 
Nigerian case, dissenting elites channeled their activism through the courts and civil 
society, making use of extensive Ôcounter-financial inducements.Ó In the Malawian 
case, these channels were inaccessible.  
The Malawian Church, which possessed Ôready-madeÕ structures, was closest 
to the population and provided a social refuge for the populace. The Church offered 
the dissenting elites not only a platform for activism, but also an alternative venue of 
public information. Having secured the trust of the Church through a partnership with 
some Church elites, the dissenting elites played on the religious sentiments of the 
populace by turning the presidential term limits controversy into a religious discourse 
of Christian-Muslim dichotomy.384 Religion and churches are of great importance in 
Malawi, as in many other African new democracies, and still play significant role in 
shaping social and political outcomes.  
The Malawian president and the vice-president, both Muslims, became 
victims of politico-religious sentiments in a society where Islam figured as a minority 
                                                
383 See also Phiri & Ross 1998. 
384 See also the statement of Kate Kainja, the Secretary-General of MCP, page 334. 
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religion.385 Before the presidential term limits debates, religion played less significant 
role in Malawian politics, explaining the lack of opposition to a Muslim-Muslim 
ticket as president and vice-president in 1994 and 1999. Dissenting elites, especially 
from the MCP, capitalized on the existing hegemonic nature of the Christian majority 
to stir religious sentiment and sustain collaboration against President Muluzi. In 
Chapter Six on the Malawian case study, I noted that the ruling UDF had its support 
base among the Yao, a tiny section of the Southern Region. President Muluzi had 
tried in 1999 to boost the political importance of the region by manipulating the 
creation of new constituencies to assign forty-two extra seats to the Southern 
Region.386 He had aimed to boost and increase the political and electoral value of his 
religious and political constituencies, a situation that many Church and political elites 
of Christian extraction regarded as confrontational.387 
The visible presence of the clergy in their clerical robes on voting day in the 
parliament is instructive. Their literal takeover of the visitorsÕ gallery of the 
parliament sent out a clear signal and an appeal to the moral obligation of MPs, 
                                                
385 In an interview with the author, John Guwa (a catholic clergy) was very emphatic in adding that the 
president and his vice had overstayed their welcome and should have been happy for a ten year-office, 
even though they were both Muslims. 




especially of the Christian extraction, to reject the bill.388 Though most MPs had been 
financially induced, 389  the presence of the clergy in large numbers at the 
parliamentary gallery was interpreted by an interviewed MP as Ôsalt on open wound,Õ 
a Ômoral control,Õ and a Ôtouch on conscience.Õ390 A former MP also confirmed in an 
interview that dissenting elements in the MCP, NDA, AFORD, and PAC (with funds 
from DANIDA) had sponsored the presence of the clergy. Their large-scale presence 
in the parliament intended to minimize the effects of executive financial inducement 
during the voting.391  
In the absence of huge resources among dissenting political elites to counter-
balance executive inducement and patronage, especially on the part of MPs, the elite 
dissidents resorted to moral inducement, systematically channeled through the 
Church and executed by clergy and church elites. The presence of the clergy in the 
parliament certainly depleted the potential votes anticipated by regime loyalists. Prior 
                                                
388 AuthorÕs interview with John Guwa and Boniface Tamani 
389 Ibid. 
390 AuthorÕs interview with a member of the parliament (who requested to be kept anonymous) 
391 Boniface Tamani confirmed in an interview with the author that some opposition political actors 
had partially paid the transportation costs to enable the church clergy to be present at the parliament 
(Blantyre, September 2014). 
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to the voting, regime loyalists were almost sure to garner more than two-thirds 
majority of votes to pass the bill. The bill failed by a margin of three votes.392  
According to Boniface Tamani, the intention of the dissenting elites to have 
the clergy present in great numbers during the voting was to sustain moral pressure 
on the MPs.393 Many analysts have argued that without the strategically solid alliance 
between dissenting political elites and Church elites that mobilized a visible presence 
during the parliamentary voting, the open term amendment bill would have passed. 
Two MCP MPs confided in the author that they changed their mind to vote against 
the bill just a few minutes before voting began, owing this to the presence of the 
clergy on the visitorsÕ gallery.394 The PAC had admonished MPs to accept bribes 
from the government, but vote against the bill. Brown Mpinganjira of the National 
Democratic Alliance (NDA), proclaimed the defeat of MuluziÕs open-term bill as a 
Òvictory for democracyÓ and adding, ÒI would like to congratulate those MCP and 
AFFORD MPs who got money from UDF and voted against the bill as directed by 
the ChurchÓ (Daily Times, 7 May 2002). In a victory reception feast organized by the 
Justice and Peace department of the Catholic Bishops Conference of Malawi, an 
                                                
392 AuthorÕs interview with Bonifae Tamani, former chairman of the PAC and Vicar General of the 
Archdiocese of Blantyre, Limbe, Malawi, October 2014.  
393 Ibid. 
394 AuthorÕs separate interviews with two former MPs (who requested to be quoted anonymously, 
Lilongwe, Malawi, October 2014. 
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opposition MCP leader, referring to the political and Church-elite alliance, joyfully 
told the crowd that ÔGod stopped the open-term billÕ (The Nation 29 July 2002).  
 
Conclusion 
Focusing on the assumption that political elites were responsible for enforcing 
presidential term limits compliance in the three cases under study, I have discussed 
the institutional and extra-institutional linkages through which political elites 
manifested their activism. Without dismissing the importance of democratic 
institutions in the process of democratic engineering, I emphasized that most 
institutions in these three cases studies, and elsewhere in post-Cold War African 
democracies, were still fresh and untested at the time of presidential term limits 
politics across Africa. In their preference for weak institutions, most incumbent 
presidents invested energy in entrenchment of power and did little to strengthen the 
institutions to support democracy consolidation. In most new democracies, the 
judiciary became an ancillary of the presidency, while the parliament functioned as a 
rubber-stamping machine for the incumbent presidents. While the civil society in 
most countries was active during the transitional periods because of external funding 
and robust international support for democratization, this was not the case during the 




In the three case studies, the only local forces that could challenge incumbent 
presidents were political elites who resisted the incumbent presidents in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi from entrenching state power. They sustained their activism and 
resistance by mobilizing the parliament, the courts, and the civil society as vehicles 
for opposition, legitimacy, and protection. In the special case of Malawi, the 
dissenting elites mobilized and collaborated with the Church to launch and sustain 
their activism. Political elites bundled together combined pressures produced through 
these institutions to enforce compliance in all three cases. What some writers have 
noted as institutional pressure was actually elite mobilization activism through the 
parliament, the judiciary, the civil society, and the Church. In return, these 
institutions gained some legitimacy and independence through elite mobilization, 
activism, and resistance.  
In the next chapter, I will analyze some factors that seemingly motivated some 
political elites to resist constitutional breach of term limits in the case studies. I will 
focus on those factors occurring in all three case studies and beyond to underwrite 
some generalizations. I will emphasize the undemocratic actions and strategies 
employed by incumbents and dissenting political elites to produce alternative 






Chapter 8: Political Elite Behavior towards Presidential Terms Limits 
 
8 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, I argued that the parliament, judiciary, and civil 
society organizations exerted dependent pressures in the compliance outcome of the 
three case studies. I also detailed how elite activism was responsible in achieving 
both full and partial presidential term limits compliance in the cases referred to in this 
study. I also detailed how the judiciary, parliament, and civil society organizations 
benefitted from political elite mobilization and activism. I defended political elite 
activism for producing and bundling the pressures that enforced term limits 
compliance in these cases.  
In this chapter, I will explore the interactive relationship between incumbent 
presidens, the institutions and elite mobilization, and how elite activism became the 
dynamism that spurred the institutions into action. I shall attempt to show how this 
dynamism impacts on the outcome of term limits politics in the case studies, and 
other cases I shall refer to in this chapter. I shall further discuss the factors that 
motivated political elite actions and inactions in response to attempts by incumbent 
presidents to remove presidential term limits. I will concentrate on providing answers 
to the following questions: Why does a section of political elites choose to play along 
with some incumbent presidents in repealing presidential term limits? Why does a 
section of political elites sometime including party internals choose to oppose 
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attempts by incumbent presidents to repeal presidential term limits? What strategies 
do they employ? Why do attempts to repeal presidential term limits succeed in some 
countries and fail in others?  
A sizeable number of factors appear to motivate some political elites to 
support or oppose the repealing of presidential term limits. I will focus on six factors 
represented in the three case studies and beyond. While the case studies provide 
insights to these questions, I will reference cases where term limits were successfully 
repealed to buttress the main arguments and allow for some generalizations and 
differences in this study.  
 
8.1 Probing the Case Studies  
About 84% of transition incumbent presidents supervised the making of 
transitional constitutions that adopted presidential term limits in post-Cold War 
African democracies. 395  Yet in the three case studies, none of the incumbent 
presidents who sought to repeal presidential term limits supervised the making of the 
transitional constitution as an incumbent president.396 However, thirty-two of the 
thirty-eight post-Cold War transition presidents supervised the adoption of 
presidential term limits in their various countries as incumbent, life/interim 
                                                
395 Refer to Chapter 2.3 on Constitution-Making and Presidential Term Limits in Africa, pp. 78-90 
 
396 Olusegun Obasanjo became president after the dismantling of military regime in Nigeria in 1999, 
while Frederick Chiluba and Bakili Muluzi became presidents after an agreed reform from one-party to 




presidents. The adoption of presidential term limits in these countries seemed 
unhindered.397  
The issue lay instead in the number of years and terms a particular 
government or president should serve before power was allowed to alternate through 
election. The general acceptance of presidential term limits as a genuine democratic 
principle to guide power alternation and replace the age-long bloody contest of power 
suggests a common vision among post-Cold War African democracies. 398 
Constituents had probably not expected incumbent presidents to challenge the 
institution of term limits they helped put into place.  
The general acceptance of presidential term limits indicates that the adoption 
of presidential term limits was never a problem. The framers of the various 
transitional constitutions, however, had failed to envision their actual implementation. 
Furthermore, post-Cold War constitutions that adopted presidential term limits 
probably intended to secure democracy by decoupling governments and the 
presidency from individuals (Morrow 2005), hoping to put an end to the era of 
African Ôbig man politicsÕ (Iwu 2008, 2009 & Villalon 2005). This was difficult to 
achieve when many dictators who metamorphosed into elected presidents quickly 
                                                
397 Presidential term limits in African new democracies were a given, just as elections were accepted as 
a standard system of selecting and changing leadership in a democracy. Constituents in these new 
democracies accepted presidential term limits with much celebration and faith that they would deepen 
democratic experiments in Africa (Dulani 2011, Vencovsky 2007). 
 
398  In Chapter 2, I explained that power mostly alternated in Africa through coup dÕtats, 




moved against presidential term limits after adopting them a few years before.399 
Transition incumbent presidents who metamorphosed from dictators to elected 
presidents were the first to go against the institution of presidential term limits. The 
majority of repealed cases have come from countries where dictators re-assumed 
power through reforma. 
Gnassingbe Eyedema of Togo, Omar Bongo of Gabon, Blaise Compoare of 
Burkina Faso, Yorim Musoveni of Uganda, Paul Biya of Cameroon, and Debby of 
Chad were all reigning dictators or life-presidents prior to their adoption of multi-
party democratic elections in their countries. These supervised the making of new 
democratic constitutions that adopted presidential term limits in their countries. 
Based on the new constitutions, they all contested as incumbent presidents in the 
transitional elections. Consequently, upon serving out their two terms, many of them 
moved quickly to repeal the presidential term limits that came into force under their 
supervision. Presidential term limits came under stress in the late 1990s and early 
2000s in Africa, when most foundational incumbent presidents approached the end of 
their final tenures and had to face the constitutional stipulation of stepping down to 
allow power to alternate, thereby blocking their democracies from experiencing 
election turnovers (Armstrong 2010; Huntington 1996; Beetham 2004).  
                                                
399 The adoption of constitutional term limits were supervised and signed into law by the same 
incumbent presidents who moved to repeal them eight or ten years after. We have seen this take place 





Unlike the African independence constitutions that had favored the 
parliamentarian system, all post-Cold War African democracies adopted 
presidentialism as a system of government. The presidency is referred to as an 
institution, with a specified Ôpro temporeÕ to decouple the presidency from 
individuals. Unfortunately, many transitional incumbent presidents succeeded in 
entrenching state power by personalizing the institution of the presidency within the 
period constitutionally allowed for their tenures. Having successfully personalized 
and entrenched state power, some presidents encouraged debates regarding the 
removal of presidential term limits.400 This trend occupied the preceding decade of 
democratic experiments in Africa. Scholars have failed to agree over the factors that 
motivated incumbent presidents to move against presidential term limits they helped 
adopt. Is it possible that the incumbent presidents already knew at the beginning of 
their presidential terms that they would challenge and remove presidential term 
limits? Did events spur them up along the line to challenge presidential term limits?  
Since 2012, there have been rumors in Rwanda that the incumbent president, 
Paul Kagame is determined to go against the constitutional two-term presidential 
limit.401 Paul Kagame is due to retire in 2017 after two seven-year terms as president, 
the maximum allowed by the Rwandan constitution. 
                                                
400 National Debates for the removal of term limits have been entertained in twenty-eight African 
countries. While twelve of these debates resulted in actual presidential term limits repeal, four failed. 
Twelve others crashed before legislative voting 
401 In 2012, Paul Kagame won the election for his second term. 
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On February 8, 2013, President Kagame confirmed that his party would likely 
move to alter the constitution to accommodate a third term (Great Lake Voice, 19 
January 2015). The confirmation by the president has thrown many analysts, 
journalists, and sections of the population into debates on the likely success or failure 
of a third term for President Paul Kagame. The debates have also extensively 
addressed the merits and demerits of repealing the presidential term limits provision.  
While a section of the debate supports the removal of presidential term limits, 
another section wonders why Paul Kagame would wish to continue in office after 
about twenty-three years as a president. After all, he supervised the making of the 
constitution that approved presidential term limits in 2003. Should the country move 
quickly to abolish the institution of presidential term limits just after its transition 
period? Should people affiliate the presidency to an individual?  
Both sides of the debate demonstrate strong reasons in favor and against the 
removal of presidential term limits in Rwanda. Some hinge their argument on the 
person of Kagame, his economic policies, and popularity, while others see him as a 
strong and charismatic president. Kagame inherited a war-torn country following the 
Rwandan genocide in 1994. Many argue that he has been able to unify the nation by 
building economic and political bridges that have enabled peace to reign in Rwanda 
(Great Lake Voice, January 19, 2015). Many consider the peace project to be still 
fragile and dependent on Kagame. Some consider him necessary in consolidating the  
peace already gained in Rwanda. Paul Kagame and his supporters represent the 
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feelings of all presidents nursing the intention of staying longer in power. The debate 
in Rwanda confirms the fears many seem to have concerning the survival of 
presidential term limits in new democracies. It also offers an opportunity to 
generalize some observations made in the case studies. The debate further suggests 
that the institution of presidency is yet to detach from individuals and personalities. 
Finally, it also confirms that the mere inclusion of term limits in the constitution does 
not guarantee their implementation. Having noted that particular political elites are 
crucial in producing and bundling pressures to challenge non-compliance, I will now 
focus on those factors that appear to motivate incumbents an their supporters to 
embark on removing term limits and the reasons for elite resistance to enforce 
compliance.  
 
8.2 Interactions between Incumbent Presidents and Democratic Institutions  
How have incumbent presidents interacted with various institutions and other 
democratic sectors in the process of repealing presidential term limits in African 
democracies? What types of interaction was that and who determined and set the 
motions for such interactions? Did such interaction promote or diminish the 
consolidation of the democratic process? What strageties do incumbents employ to 
maintain their hold on power? 
The case studies have largely dewelled on the stragegies employed by incumbents to 
maintain their hold on power. Perhaps, the most visble stragegies include the 
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weakening of democratic institutions through patronage, intimidation and outright 
manipulation of the constitution through by proxy. I shall focus on parliamentary and 
judicial institutions in this section to show that presidents have not been inert in their 
interaction with political institutions, as the case studies have shown. 
 One of the consolidating factors of democracy is the so-called independence of 
the different arms of government in a democratic setting. The democratic process is 
further strengthened by a regular interaction between the different arms of 
government and institutions. In a presidential system, functional independence of 
democratic institutions like the parliament, the judiciary and CSOs is essential not 
only in providing oversight functions as prescribed in various constitutions, but also 
necessary to hold an incumbent government accountable, and to prevent a democratic 
regime from operating as a Ôdemocratic dictatorshipÕ (Linz 1996; Villalon et al 2005). 
Various constitutions stipulate and recommend regular interactions between agencies 
and institutions of government to promote coherent and transparent governance. For 
instance, the Nigerian Constitution provides some of such interactions, which include 
Joint Sessions for the presentation of National Budgets, Quartal Legislative Joint 
Sessions and Weekly National Executive Council Meetings.402 Sometimes, National 
Executive Council (NEC) and Caucus Meetings of governing political parties bring 
both the executive and parliamentary members of the party together to deliberate on 
national issues and polices. However, in most cases, the ruling partyÕs NEC 
                                                
402 Refer to the Nigerian I999 Constitution as Amended, 2010. 
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overshadows various opportunities for interaction as required by some national 
constitutions.403 Further, outside the official and recommended interactions, other 
levels of interaction exist between the presidency and institutions of government in 
Africa. As observed in the case studies, some presidents have special advisers on 
parliamentary and judicial matters. The major functions of such advisers include but 
not limited to advising the government on parliamentary or judicial matters, but also 
in maintaining a regular interaction with these institutions to lobby for support for the 
president or government policies. 
However,, the kind of interaction that promotes and sustains institutional 
independence and by extension, support democratic consolidation has not really 
existed across new democracies in Africa. As the author pointed out earlier in this 
study, many incumbent president invested less energy in growing institutional 
independence, and chose to operate with unofficial institutions to boost their power 
base and maintain unilateral monopolization of state power. As observed in the cases 
investigated, some incumbent presidents employed both official and unofficial means 
to sustain such interactions to either expand their presidential powers or coax support 
                                                
403 In the case of Nigeria, the National Executive Council of the ruling party became more powerful 
than the legislative houses in influencing the policy trust of the government during Presidents 
ObasanjoÕs and JonathanÕs regimes in Nigeria. Both Obasnjo and Jonathan created organs in the ruling 
party like PDPÕs GovernorÕs Forum and PDPÓs National Assembly Caucus that became more powerful 
than other democratic instititions. President Muhamadu Buhari has tried to reduce the powers and 
influence of these organs in influencing major government policies in his regime. 
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for their regimes. In some cases, incumbent presidents preferred to operate with 
weakened official, and strong unofficial institutions where their power were seldom 
challenged. President Paul Biya of Cameroon operates with a second parliament 
(senate) whose members he directly appoints using his presidential prerogative This 
self appointed senate is accorded with more powers by the president and oversees the 
functions of the elected MPs. Thus, the interaction between the president and the 
elected MPs goes via the appointed senators who regulate and supervise the elected 
MPs from their regions. By placing the elected MPs directly under the charge of 
appointed senators, whose contributions on national issues must be vetted by the 
senators before approval, Paul Biya maintains an unequal relationship with elected 
MPs and through proxy controls all legislative interventions in Cameroon. Such an 
interaction leaves not doubt that the consolidation of the democratic process, radical 
legislative independence or intervention would continue to be in abeyance.  
It therefore appears that democratic institutions in many African democracies exist 
only op papers (Posner and Young 2005), and only good at doing the bidding of 
incumbent presidents. Prior to the third term controversies in the three cases studied, 
the incumbent presidents got away with every piece of legislation they presented to 
the parliament, even with less coercion and lobbying (Armstrong 2010). As 
Armstrong has reasoned, many Africa parliaments mistook radical parliamentary 
oversight and challenges as affront on democracy democratic consolidation, and 
therefore allowed a one-sided interaction dominated by the presidency (Armstrong 
2010). The feeling of Ônot rocking the boatÕ has created in many African democracies 
  
440 
a sort of interaction between the institutions and the presidency that has remained on 
the behest of the incumbent president who most often dictates the interaction agenda. 
As an ex-MP disclosed to the author in an interview on the Malawian case: ÒIn my 
eight years in the parliament, we never really debated the national budget or really 
screened any ministerial nominee forwarded by the president for parliamentary 
confirmation. What we did was simply a routine rubberstamping of every scrap that 
emanated from the presidency, sometimes to the detriment of national interest. What 
the Parliament now enjoys as independence came only after the defeat of MuluziÕs 
open and third term controversies.Ó404 In 2010, Patrick Obahiagbon, a former member 
of the Nigerian Federal House of Representatives described his colleagues as 
Òpresidential political alleluia boys,Ó because of their readiness to rubberstamp 
executive decisions without independent considerations.405 With particular reference 
to the politics of term limits, the increased interaction between incumbent presidents 
and the democracy institutions was motivated by and centred on efforts to legitimize 
the repealing of term limits in Africa.  
These facilitated the passage of key executive legislations and anti-people 
laws. Opposing views were repressed and sometimes leading to the isolation or 
outright sacking of the culprit. 
                                                
404 AuthorÕs interview with an ex-Malawian MP. November 2014. Lilongwe, Malawi 
405 Interview with Channels Television, March 3, 2010 
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Further, the interaction between the presidency and the parliament was fraught 
with suspicion in most African democracies that further impeded institutional 
independence and growth (Salih 2005). Most of the incumbent presidents ruled as 
dictators without parliaments before metamorphosing as elected presidents. They had 
no option than to operate with parliaments as constituted elements of liberal 
democracy enforced after the Cold War by a combination of local and international 
democratic forces. Some incumbent presidents viewed both the legislative and 
judicial institutions with suspicion and distrust, and therefore did not waste time in 
using executive powers to make these institutions dependent on the executive. For 
instance, the case studies show that major appointments in the judiciary and the 
parliament are directly or indirectly approved and influenced by the presidency.406 
Most incumbent presidents employ such executive privileges in appointing stooges to 
key positions in the legislature and judiciary not only to sustain a consolidated 
personal power,407 but also to maintain a maximum control over these institutions.408 
As such, the interactions between the presidencies, the legislative and judicial 
institutions were not based on the governance logic of equal partners, but rather on 
                                                
406 The three case studies share this common experience 
407 The Nigerian case study details how Obasanjo forced the removal of Chuba Okadigbo as the senate 
president because he feared Okadigbo would not be willing to do his bidding as a senate president.  
408 For mere disloyalty to him, President Obasanjo influence and caused the removal and replacement 
of five legislative heads within eight year for their disloyalty to him. Refer to the Nigerian Case. 
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Ômaster-client basisÕ409. As noted in the Nigerian case, President Obasanjo had in 
2006, interrupted legislative proceedings during the third term debate by summoning 
the senate president and the Speaker of the House of Representatives to the 
Presidential Villa in Aso Rock, Abuja Nigeria. The president who seemingly 
expected his third wish to be rubber-stamped by the parliament appeared to be upset 
with the way the debate was going, and so had to interrupt legislative proceedings for 
more than six hours to instruct legislative heads on how to conduct legislatives 
sessions to suite his third term ambition.  
Further, the interaction between the incumbent presidents and the judiciary in 
some African countries has not been so different as that between the presidency and 
the parliament. In the cases investigated for this study, the constitutions allow the 
president to appoint the heads of the judiciary and other democratic agencies like the 
electoral commissions and state security agencies. The case studies also show that the 
presidents, who are the leader and sometimes, the owner of the party, mostly 
influence the emergence of the party chair. The overbearing privilege enjoyed by 
incumbent presidents potentially and remotely whittles the independence of these 
institutions. With special reference to Nigeria, the presidency uses a system of 
Òreaching outÓ in its interaction with judicial officials. The Ôreaching outÕ could be 
                                                
409 This situation has softly changed after the defeat of third term in some African countries as shown 
in the Nigerian, Malawian and Zambian cases. 
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directly or by proxy. 410  In Nigeria, the political language of Ôreaching outÓ 
characterises and describes the interaction that existed between the executive and 
other institutional arms of the government. For instance, whenever the executive 
wanted any piece of legislation passed or the outcome of a particular court case 
influenced, the president appoints a respected former member of the parliament or 
judiciary to Ôreach outÕ to the MPs or Justices.  
The case studies detailed various levels of interaction between incumbent 
presidents and some institutions. Some scholars (Armstrong 2010; Villalon 2005; 
Morrow 2005; Brown 2004) and this author have documented how various 
incumbent presidents reached out to the parliaments, judiciary, CSOs, international 
donors and the masses in their effort to extend their tenures beyond constitutional 
prescription of two terms411.  
                                                
410 In a system of Ôreaching outÕ, the presidency directly or indirectly organizes events where judicial 
officers are expected be present. Presidential envoys, traditional rulers, pastors, special advisers or 
close associates of the president who have any type of affinity with the concerned officials are 
mandated to approach them to discuss on issues that are particular to president, including terms of 
delivery. In Nigeria, this is beyond lobby, and popularly known as Ôreaching out.Õ It goes also goes 
with monetary implications.  
411 Refer to Chapter 2, 4, 5 and of this thesis on how incumbents presidents used various means to coax 




It has been alleged that, the ruling PDP through the instrumentality of the 
Ministry of Defence led by Musliu Obanikoro rigged the 2014 state elections in Ekiti 
State in its favour by using military personnel to confiscate electoral materials, 
prevent opposition loyalists from casting their votes, intimidated and arrested 
opposition leaders prior to the elections.412 The military personnel involved have 
admitted to be acting with Ôinstruction from above.Õ Yet, the judiciary, right from the 
Federal High Court through to the Supreme Court absolved the party and the 
government personnel involved of any wrong doing, using judicial technicalities as 
excuse to strike out all cases instituted by the opposition APC at the court. The 
Malawian case is not different. I have already detailed how the state police acting on 
executive orders kidnapped and molested opposition leaders and journalists who 
dared to speak out against MuluziÕs third term ambition in Malawi. The security 
agencies and the judiciary never prosecuted these agents for abuse of office because 
of what many scholars have described as institutional complacency (Morrow 2005; 
Brown 2004). 
Another complex interaction between various institutions and the presidency 
appears to be rooted in religious and ethnic politics as practiced in many African 
countries (Salih 2003; 2007). The Malawian case shows how President Muluzi easily 
secured support and injunctions for his execuitive orders from judicial officers with 
Islamic background. Though this appeared to have insignificant impact in the 
                                                
412 Refe to the Report: Military Involvement in the Ekito Gubernatorial Elections 2014 
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outcome of the third term controversy because of the minority percentage of judicial 
officers with Islamic background on the Bench, however, religion and ethnicity was 
decisive in shaping the outcome of the presidential term limits debate in the 
Malawian case.  
In general, this study observed clear and complex levels of interactions 
between incumbent presidents and many democratic institutions like the judiciary, 
political parties, the parliament, CSOs, and sometimes, the international community. 
However, the interaction initially produced a one-sided outcome where both the 
parliament and the judiciary aligned with the presidency in confirming pieces of 
legislation and policies, even when they appeared to be in antagonism with national 
interests. The one-sided and non-confrontational interaction between the incumbent 
presidents and the institutions was initially regarded, celebrated or rather mistaken as 
a sign of consolidating democracy.413  
The foregoing shows that incumbent presidents have not been inept in inter-
institutional interactions in Africa. As many scholars have observed the presidential 
system as practiced in Africa has been overbearing (Posner and Young 2007; Chabal 
and Daloz 1999; Calderisi 2006; Armstrong 2010). The towering tendency of the 
presidency has also been visible in ithe monopolization of interaction with other 
sectors and institutions that often act as rubberstamps on presidential directives. As I 
detailed in Chapters Seven and Nine of this study, a seeming balance of of interaction 
                                                
413 Refer to the 2nd Case Study on Zambia 
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between incumbent presidents and some institutions only occured during and after the 
presidential term limits controversies in the various cases investigated for this study.   
In Nigeria, the level of interaction increased between the presidency and the 
Parliament and the judiciary during the term limits politics. Using direct and indirect 
interventions, President Obasanjo maintained a regular interaction with the Senate 
and Federal House of Representatives. He met with the parliamentary head on twelve 
occasions between at the peak of the controversy in 2005 and 2006. His Special 
Adviser on the national Assembly, Florence Itta Giwa intervened severally in the 
senate while state governors loyal to the president constantly met with MPs 
representing their regions to anchor support for ObasanjoÕs third term. As already 
noted in the Nigerian case, in May 2006, Andy Ubah, a presidential Adviser on 
Domestic Issues attempted to coax the MPs to support the third term agenda by 
offering US$350.000 to MPs to vote in favour of the third term amendment bill. In 
2012, president Jonathan approved the removal of Justice Salami as the president of 
the Appeal Court. Under Justice Salami as the president of the Appeal Court, the 
ruling party lost four consecutive cases to opposition parties; a development the 
ruling party considerd as an affront. Relying on a non consequential report by 
National Judicial Caouncil (NJC), the president ordered the sacking of Justice Salami 
as the president of the Appeal Court. Analysts insist that this was done to create a 
vacancy for a new president of the Appeal Court that would be considerate to the 
presidency and the ruling party. 
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The constitution and Nigerian Fiscal Regulatory Policy allow the president to 
approve supplementary budgets for the parliament and judiciary. The president is also 
bestowed with the privilege of approving promotion for judicial officers. With these 
privilege instruments, incumbent presidents maintain an unbalanced interaction with 
and wield big stick on judicial officers whose loyalty to incumbent governments 
appears to be doubtful. The interaction system between the presidency and other 
democratic institutions follow the same pattern in other case studies. For instance, 
relying on his firm control over the parliament and judiciary occasioned by 
presidential privileges, president Muluzi easily secured the support of MPs to repeal 
the Senate and Local Government Acts 1996 with overwhelming majority in the 
parliament.414 In 2002, Muluzi secured the support of a State High Court to overrule 
another high court that ruled against an executive ban on street protests against his 
third term. In the Zambian case, President Frederick Chiluba utilized the privilege of 
supervising the privatization of State Mining and Communication companies to 
secure support for certain legislations in the parliament (Sardanis 2014). By 
allocating sizable chunk of state mining companies to key MPs in form of patronage 
(sometimes using intimidations), Chiluba easily secured legislations that directly 
targeted key opposition leaders in Zambia.415 
                                                
414 Refer to case Study 3, Malawi 
415 In 1996 the parliament passed an Executive Bill prohibiting individuals with foreign paternity or 
maternity from participating in Zambian politics. Analysts suggest that this bill was targeted at former 
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The case studies reveal that some incumbent presidents have not respected the 
principle of institutional independence in their interaction with other institutions in 
African democracies, especially as it concerns attempts to repeal term limits. A 
review of these interactions shows deep-seated undemocratic means in the entire 
process of repealing term limits in Africa. Further, scholars argue that the process of 
both repealing and defending term limits have relied heavily on undemocratic means 
since the interaction on both sides depended heavily on patronage, intimidation and 
manipulation of the democratic process (Posner and Young 2007; Armstrong 2010; 
Calderisi 2006; Vencovsky 2007).416  
Instead of genuine interaction partners, the institutions (political parties, 
judiciary, parliament and CSOs) appear to be victims of executive manipulation, 
since incumbent presidents through a process of divide and rule and sometimes, 
outright intimidation or a combination of stick and carrot coax these sectors into 
willing tools to support and defend repealing amendments bills. The three case 
studies detail how the incumbent presidents caused the ruling parties to declare 
vacant the parliamentary seats of MPs who either chose not to support the 
amendment bills or defected from the ruling parties. The case studies also remark 
                                                                                                                                      
president Kenneth Kaunda who was a key opposition to president Chiluba in the 1996 presidential 
elections.  
416 Chapter Two of this study devoted a section on this debate by reviewing different opinions 
concerning the democratic rule of and repealing of presidential term limits 
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how the courts initially refused to intervene for these affected MPs until the tide was 
turn against the seating presidents through elite dissidence and activism.  
As has been pointed out, a Ôseeming goodÕ interaction existed between 
president Muluzi and the parliament before the third term controversy in Malawi. 
This seeming good interaction helped the president to consolidate power, extend his 
authority and expand his loyalty in the parliament. A consequence of such interaction 
was the ability of president to amass the parliamentary support needed to repeal the 
act establishing the senate in the Malawian constitution. For many analysts, the 
removal of the senate was to reduce parliamentary strength, which the presidency 
over time maximized to its fullest advantage (Morrow 2005).  
Incumbent presidents drastically compromise the independence of the 
parliament and Judiciary when they influence the appointment of proxies as 
parliamentary and judicial heads. Through proxies, incumbent presidents maintained 
solid control over these institutions and therefore could potentially determine the 
course of judicial and parliamentary procedures. In Nigeria, president Obasanjo saw 
to the removal of parliamentary heads when he sensed that these were not disposed to 
his third term agenda.  He re-shuffled the head of the Judiciary two times before and 
during the third term controversy in Nigeria. Many have interpreted the sudden 
reshuffling of the judicial heads as an attempt to dispose and intimidate the judiciary 
to supporting his third term agenda (Arewa 2014).  
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Again, Obasanjo and Chiluba all Ôreached outÕ to the international community 
for support. Obasanjo met with the US president, and organized a dinner for foreign 
ambassadors in Nigeria in April 2006. This was to psyche the opinion of the 
international community on his third term agenda (Rice 2012). President Chiluba 
boasted of foreign support for his third term agenda. On 29 April 2002, while OASIS 
held a massive rally against his third term, Chiluba was in the United Kingdom to 
drum support for his third term agenda.417  
As the case studies confirm, the interaction between the presidency and 
various institutions have not been genuine enough to support democratic growth.418 
Until the third term controversies, especialy in the cases studied, incumbent 
presidents considered both the parliament and judiciary as unequal partners in the 
democratic process. The presidency decided the faith of party leaders, MPs and 
Judicial officers and saw these institutions as objects of intimidation and 
manipulation. As already pointed out by the author, the members of senate are still 
handpicked and appointed in Cameroon by the president. In Uganda and Cameroon, 
key judicial officers are appointed from the pool of loyal and trusted members of the 
party and movement respectively. In the special case of Uganda, only trusted 
members of the Movement are allowed to head critical institutions and agencies of 
                                                
417  Confirmed in authorÕs interview with Mark Chona, Initiator and Mobilizer of OASIS against 
ChilubaÕs third term.  
418 Refer also to Villalon et al 2005; Armstrong 2010; Venconsky 2007; Posner and young 2007 
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the state in keeping with the vision and mission of the Movement. In disguise and in 
principle, loyalty goes first to the Movement and the leader of the movement. In these 
environments, such a system forecloses any transparent interaction between the 
presidency and other democratic institutions, which leaves little room for institutional 
radicalism. As the Nigerian, Zambian and Malawian cases have shown, the 
interaction between various intsitutions and their confrontation with the incumbent 
presidents raised the cost of repression for the incumbents. In Uganda, Namibia and 
Cameroon, incumbent presidents strictly employ proxy strategy to maintain 
institutional loyalty. The presdents not only enjoy institutional loyalty, but also elite 
support base that cut across various institutions. Without first rupturing partyÕs 
cohesion and presidential loyalty in within the institutions, attempts to recover term 
limits in such environments remains remains low. As long as the president continues 
to enjoy such a support base, interaction between the presidency and the institutions 
shall continue to be one-sided, aimed at providing political incentives to individual 
actors to the detriment of democratic growth and constitutionalism.  
 
8.3 Repealing and defending presidential term limits  
I shall focus here on the strategies employed by some incumbent presidents 
and their loyalists to challenge term limits. In the second part of this section, I shall 
discuss the reasons why particular political elites choose to challenge non-compliance 
by incumbent presidents. I will aim to provide answers to why some political elites 
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choose to challenge non-compliance, while others side with incumbent presidents to 
repeal term limits. The strategies employed and the motivational factors to support or 
challenge non-compliance vary, since political actors make choices choices based on 
a range of perspectives. 
For instance, the reasons being adduced in Rwanda to allow Paul Kagame 
more presidential terms were the same reasons given in the thirty-four countries 
where incumbent presidents have allowed or sponsored debates to repeal presidential 
term limits provisions. Posner and Young (2007), Maltz (2007) enumerate such 
strategies as age and popularity in influencing the repeal of presidential term limits by 
incumbent presidents, while Vancovsky (2007) emphasizes such factors as lust for 
power and economic gains as motivational factors. Iwu (2008) and Collier (2009) 
attribute the tendency to repeal presidential term limits provision to Òa big man 
politician tendencyÓ in African politics referred in political literature as Òbig man 
political culture.Ó Some other scholars attribute the tendency to challenge presidential 
term limits to cultural threat, insisting that presidential term limits go contrary to 
African understanding of leadership (Dulani 2011; Calderisi 2006; Chabla and Daloz 
1999). However, a close examination of the case studies shows that lust for power, 
economic greed, dispensation of patronage to family and cronies, and an attempt to 
escape indictment after office appear to be the main factors motivating incumbent 
presidents and their supporters to repeal term limits. ÒThe presidency offers extensive 
powers and legal immunity to incumbent presidents and by extension to their cronies 
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and families in Africa. Once tasted, many incumbent presidents want to continue to 
enjoy these privileges.Ó419  
However, various arguments rage on why incumbent presidents set out to 
challenge or repeal presidential term limits in Africa. I shall critically discuss some of 
these arguments to see how they pose real questions and challenges to term limits 
compliance in African democracies.  
 
8.3.1 Popularity 
Many inculbent presidents employ popularity as a strategy to maintain their 
hold on power.420 Further, some scholars consider popularity or public opinion as one 
of the important factors influencing incumbent presidents to challenge presidential 
term limits (Posner and Young 2007; Maltz 2007). This argument suggests that 
incumbent presidents who are confident of winning a re-election may have a greater 
incentive to challenge presidential term limits provisions than those incumbent 
presidents who weigh low on the scale of public opinion. But this is not always true. 
By the time he challenged presidential term limits in Nigeria, Obasanjo was most 
popular. Though popular with his economic and anti-corruption policies in Nigeria 
                                                
419 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessings Chissinga. Univeristy of Malawi, Zomba. October 2014 
420 Presidents Obasanjo, Chiluba, Muluzi, Musseveni and Kagame did allude to their popularity for 
wanting to extend their presidential mandates. 
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(Armstrong 2010; Collier 2009), ObasanjoÕs attempt to entrench power diminished 
his popularity. By 2005, ObasanjoÕs name has become synonymous with evil and 
anything ugly (Tinubu, Sun Newspaper), yet he moved against presidential term 
limits. Like Obasanjo, Frederick Chiluba of Zambia and Bakili Muluzi of Malawi lost 
the best part of their reputation in their second terms (Villalon 2005). Paul Biya of 
Cameroon and Abdul Wade of Senegal did not have credible records as presidents, 
though they made references to their non-existent popularity for seeking third term. 
They had strong corruption allegations and presided over dwindling economies. Yet 
they moved to challenge or repeal presidential term limits in their countries using 
fake popularity as a strategy. Thus, popularity as structuralists argue has not 
sufficiently accounted for why incumbent presidents move against presidential term 
limits. Popularity is only employed by incumbents as a strategy to entrench state 
power. 
8.3.2 Age of the president 
Age has also been suggested as a likely factor influencing the tendency by 
incumbent presidents to challenge term limits (Maltz 2007). This is hinged on the 
argument that incumbent presidents who are bellow the age of fifty-five at the 
expiration of their final terms are very likely to challenge presidential term limits to 
remain longer in power. It suggests that any age bellow fifty-five years is grossly 
early to retire as a politician especially in Africa. Though effective during the Cold 
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War era in sustaining life presidency in Africa,421 this factor has however not 
accounted for the various presidential term limits challenges and repeals in post-Cold 
War African democracies. Paul Biya was already eighty-two (82) years in 2008 when 
he challenged and expunged presidential term limits provision in Cameroon. Abdul 
Wade was already 88 years in 2012 when he sought to remove presidential term 
limits in Senegal. Obasanjo was already 73 years in 2006 when he attempted to repeal 
presidential term limits in Nigeria, while Omar Bongo of Gabon and Gnasimgbe 
Eyedema of Togo were above 70 years when they repealed presidential term limits 
provision in their constitutions to remain longer in power. Incumbent presidents only 
employ the age issue as a strategy to hang on to power when it suites their particular 
political conveneience.  
 
8.3.3 Donor influence 
International support has also been suggested as a potential factor that 
motivates incumbent Presidents and their supporters to repeal presidential term limits 
(Posner and Young 2007, Maltz 2007). As a strategy, this hypothesis recognizes the 
role of geo-politics, development aid packages, international alliances and 
partnerships. It argues for instance that incumbent presidents from countries 
                                                
421 About 70% of presidents who assumed power in the Cold War era in Africa was bellow 50 years of 
age. Many of them retained power for over 30 years and even metamorphorsed to become elected 
presidents.   
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depending less on foreign aid relative to their GDP are likely to challenge presidential 
term limits than presidents from countries receiving huge levels of foreign aid relative 
to their GDP. It is believed that donor pressure should be able to act as a compliance 
enforcement agent on presidents who depend on foreign aid for the running of their 
governments. While this argument may be justified in the case of Nigeria that 
scarcely depends on foreign aid relative to its GDP, the same argument cannot 
support the presidential term limits repeals and challenges in Uganda, Namibia, 
Burkina Faso, Zambia and Malawi that hugely depend on foreign aid, sometimes up 
to 65% for their yearly budgets. Incumbent presidents of Zambia and Malawi 
attempted to remove presidential term limits while incumbent presidents in Uganda, 
Burkina Faso and Namibia successfully repealed their presidential term limits despite 
their dependence on foreign aid. They used their capacity to attract international 
assiatnce as a ploy to retain power as president consistently. Chiluba mentioned 
severally that without him, the donor agencies would blacklist Zambia from the list of 
donor-recipient countries (Sardanis 2014).  
On the other hand, international support has sometimes supported the removal 
of presidential term limits and not vice versa. Museveni utilized his international 
contact to pressure local support for his third term. The British government is quoted 
to have declined comments on MuseveniÕs third term, describing it as internal 
problem (Maltz 2007). While Chiluba made reference to an increase in foreign aid as 
a sign of international acceptance and support to his regime, Obasanjo celebrated his 
role in partnering with the US and the international community in the fight against 
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terror (Simon 2005). Despite these international contacts and supports, these 
presidents challenged and repealed term limits in their countries. Like popularity and 
age, international influence does not sufficiently account for why incumbent 
presidents move against presidential term limits. It is used instead as a strategy by 
presidents to entrench state power. 
 
8.3.4 Cultural Legacy 
Cultural legacy is another strategy employed by African incumbent presidents 
to maintain their hold on power. Dulani argues that cultural legacy s a factor and not a 
strategy influences incumbent presidents to challenge presidential term limits (Dulani 
2011). This hypothesis maintains that in traditional societies where hereditary 
leadership is still strong, incumbent presidents are likely to challenge presidential 
term limits to remain longer in power (ibid). Understanding African leadership as 
hereditary, Dulani argues that term limits run contrary to perceived and accepted 
leadership tendencies across the continent. It is his view that in some traditional 
societies, leadership is considered to be hereditary and for life. However, contrary to 
DulaniÕs argument, some traditional African stools are not hereditary and for life 
(Mbiti 1986; Metuh 1982), while some are for life as in most western monarchies. 
Some are also rotatory, but are allowed to rotate only when the occupant is dead or 
impaired (Ekwunife 2002). Thus, in his analysis of presidential term limits politics in 
Africa, Dulani links AfricaÕs late acceptance of presidential term limits in the 1990 
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and the subsequent repeals in some Africa countries to cultural and traditional 
legacies. He argues that the concept of limiting the exercise of executive power runs 
contrary to traditional notions of leadership that is very common across the continent 
and rooted in tradition and culture, maintaining that presidential term limits provision 
contradicts the traditional understanding of leadership in African societies. For him, 
since presidential term limits contradict African traditional notion of hereditary and 
life-long leadership, the tendency to repeal presidential term limits by incumbent 
presidents is a sharp response to cultural and traditional experience of leadership on 
the continent. He justifies his argument with the example of president Bokassa of 
Central African Republic who in the 1980s changed his presidential status into 
Emperor. Kwame Nkruma of Ghana and Banda of Malawi also declared themselves 
life presidents.   
However, the traditional and hereditary nature of African leadership does not 
offer enough argument to explain the attacks on presidential term limits across the 
continent since such attacks does not occur only in Africa. Moreover, some 
incumbent presidents in Africa have willingly chosen to step down at the end of their 
tenure without meddling into the politics of repealing presidential term limits. African 
traditional leadership system operates in the same way as most countries, especially 
in Europe and parts of Asia where traditional monarchic leadership exists as 
hereditary or semi-hereditary, yet separated from democratic politics. DulaniÕs 
argument that cultural legacies may be responsible for the attack on presidential term 
limits is very weak because no incumbent president in Africa has alluded to cultural 
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legacy as pretext to extend his/her tenure. Instead many incumbent presidents in new 
democracies have monopolized state power and resisted power alternation arguing 
that the longer a president stays on power, the more democracy consolidates and 
stabilizes, using other factors to seek support.422  While some incumbent presidents 
may potentially utilize DulaniÕs argument to monopolize state power, it does not fully 
account for the trend to challenge presidential term limits across the continent. 
African traditional leadership is not completely hereditary or uniform across Africa 
(Mbiti 1986).  
In places where traditional African leadership was hereditary and life-long, it 
remained at the level of clans and lineages (Metu 1982). Furthermore, though there 
existed strong pre-colonial and centralized states, Zulu (South Africa), Buganda 
(Uganda), Zanda (Sudan), Ashante (Ghana), Nupe, Bini and Kanem Bornu (Nigeria), 
the rulers of these kingdoms often subjected themselves to a system that checkmated 
authoritarian tendencies.423 Moreover, African traditional leadership was not different 
from other monarchies across the world where traditional leadership system is based 
on heritage. In Belgium, the Netherlands, England and Spain, traditional monarchies 
have remained hereditary and life-long, enjoying no term limits. If DulaniÕs argument 
                                                
422 Incumbent presidents intent on repealing presidential term limits make more reference to their 
popularity, economic policies, international standing and developmental strides.  
423 Refer to Introduction: The Changing Governance Role of African Parliaments, ed M.A. Mohamed 
Salih, (2005) p.4 
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were to be true, all these countries would be operating limitless political regimes. 
Contrary to DulaniÕs argument that African chiefs exuded unfettered power for life, 
the traditional African leadership had a system of checks and balances.424  No 
traditional leadership could operate without a council, where every clan is represented 
through the council of elders, subordinate territorial chiefs and religious officials 
(Salih 2005; Ebelebe 2008). These sophisticated institutionalized system acted as 
Ôrestraints against autocracyÕ (Salih 2005). Traditional leaders who misused or abused 
their offices were mostly banished or exiled by their communities because the 
community was considered supreme over individuals (Ozigbo 1982; Ekwunife 2002). 
Further, contrary to DulaniÕs argument that most African constitutions tried to fuse 
these traditional concepts of leadership into the modern presidency, more than 90% of 
constitutions in Africa only accord customary rights to the traditional stool (Pierre 
Vos 2013). Some incumbent presidents may find it potentially exciting to use cultural 
legacy as a pretext and strategy to go against presidential term limits, but such 
allusion remains weak and unreliable.  
 
 
                                                
424 African traditional leadership system is sparsely hereditary, and partly unelected, but there exist a 




8.4  Factors motivating elite resistance against the removal of term limits 
Some factors I intend to examine include elite size, size economic wealth 
controlled by specific political elites, wealth of experience, vested interests, cultural 
legacy, international connections and political culture. The aim is to expose how 
these factors motivated some political actors to demand strict compliance from some 
post-Cold War African presidents, but also how these factors became strategic in 
creating an opportunity for the convergence of other institutions in demanding 
compliance from incumbent presidents.  
8.4.1 Political Elite Size  
Political elite size in terms of numerical strength in a given democracy plays a 
role in raising the costs of repression for incumbent presidents (Villalon 2005, 
Mesquita 2008).425 This argument holds that political elite size in a given country has 
a huge influence on calculations and choices of the president (Shepsle 2010, 
Mesquito 2008). Mesquita further argues that where the size of political elite is large, 
it is difficult for a leader to survive a coalition against him. MesquitaÕs argument 
hinges on the fact that the cost of buying political support is very expensive for 
leaders facing political pressure from a large size of elite political coalition and 
alliance. Political elite size can raise the costs of repression for an incumbent.  
                                                
425 Field research in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi confirm this claim. A further analysis of the partially 




The interaction between the incumbent president and other institutional actors 
and social forces is often dependent on presidential privileges and the ability of the 
former to dispense patronage. The incumbent president faces great challenges when 
his ability to dispense patronage is depleted and thus lacks the needed funds to sustain 
the support of a large elite group. A successful coalition of a large activist elite is 
more likely to enforce compliance than a dispersed elite coalition. For instance, in 
2006, the size of political elites in Nigeria rose by fifty-eight percent in comparison 
with 1979, and forty-two percent with respect to 1992. The expanded size of political 
actors in 2006 in Nigeria made it difficult for Obasanjo to buy off the large 
opposition camps that cut across various institutions to support his third-term project.  
This is precisely the opposite in Cameroon and Uganda, where elite size was 
kept low for political convenience and control. In 1979, Nigeria had 19 state 
governors, 42 senators, 112 MPs, 18 ministers and 5 political parties. In 2006, it 
increased to 36 state governors, 109 senators, 178 MPs, 42 ministers and 52 political 
parties. In MesquitoÕs calculation, it is more difficult for a president to survive elite 
political pressure in Nigeria than in Uganda or Cameroon. Malawian analysts have 
also attributed the failure of President MuluziÕs third term to his inability to secure 
funds to pay off the large number of opposition elites against him. His inability to 
raise five million Malawian Kwacha to bribe each of the dissenting MPs caused the 
defeat of the amendment bill in Malawi (Morrow 2005, Khembo 2004). The size of 
the opposition group therefore not only motivates some political actors to challenge 
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non-compliance, but also makes it difficult for an incumbent president to guarantee 
political loyalty. 
8.4.2 Wealth of Experience Among main Opposition Leaders 
Experience among political actors plays a major role in challenging non-
compliance and in shaping elite behavior. Levine (1997) offers a somewhat similar 
view in his investigation of the democratic consolidation in Venezuela. Some 
scholars argue that crisis, violence, instability, or a process of political learning and 
internship over a period can culminate in a normative consensus among key political 
actors about formal and informal rules to adopt for the democratic game (Linz 1996; 
Gunther and Higley 1992).  
Learned pattern of behavior and experience all combine to influence political 
choices and calculations (Clark 2005). For countries that have gone through a period 
of crisis and violence, such processes become important in creating a normative and 
informal consensus among key political actors. In most cases these actors fashion 
both formal and informal rules to guide the democratic game after a crisis is defeated 
or has ended (Leftwich 2010). For instance, in countries that have experienced failed 
democratic regimes or a quasi-one-party experience, political elites are likely to use 
formal and informal elite coalition to challenge any process that threatens the survival 
of democracy.  
Political elites with such experience are also more likely to succeed in 
challenging non-compliance than political actors in countries with low level of elite 
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political experience. Having undergone both democratic processes and dictatorships, 
political actors who participated in the dismantling of dictatorships are more likely to 
unite against the usurpation of power by an incumbent president.  
For instance, many political elites have been involved in the struggle to 
establish democracies in Nigeria, Benin, Ghana, Senegal, Mali, Zambia, and Malawi. 
These countries have experienced intervals of dictatorships and sometimes a mixture 
of interrupted or quasi-democracies. They have garnered experience and informed 
judgments on democratic struggles. The third-term agenda probably failed in Ghana, 
Kenya, Zambia, Malawi, and Nigeria were challenged because of the experience 
gained by political actors in past struggles against dictatorial regimes. Individual 
political actors and some political leaders as detailed in the case studies utilized their 
wealth of experience to redefine the political equation and interaction that has 
hitherto existed between incumbent presidents and various institutions. They 
provided alternative platforms for the convergence of other social forces to demand 
compliance. The lack of such convergence of social forces made possible by elite 
dissidence appear to be lacking in Uganda, Cameroon where incumbents easily 
repealed term limits.  
Most dissenting political elites in Nigeria were involved in the dismantling of 
three military dictatorships, while in Zambia the political actors who challenged 
ChilubaÕs third term were involved in dismantling the authoritarian regime of 
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Kenneth Kaunda.426 In these countries, it was not difficult for some political actors to 
resist power entrenchment from incumbent presidents whom they also assisted to 
power. Atiku and Orji assisted Obasanjo to power, while General Christon Tembo, 
Godfrey Miyanda, Nevers Mumba, Ben Nwila, Anderson Madoka, Michael Sata, and 
other former UNIP leaders assisted Chiluba to power.427 In countries like Gabon, 
Uganda, Togo, Cameroon, and Burkina Faso, that have never experienced any 
struggle toward the toppling of dictatorships or the implementation of democracy, the 
scenario was different.  
Elite experience played another major role in the handling of the amendment 
bill controversies in the case studies. Cognate political experience motivated the 
political elites in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi to make political calculations that did 
not compromise the democratic process. Villalon (2005) accepts this as progress in 
the democratic experience of some African countries. For instance, the lack of 
experience among various political actors was responsible for the collapse of 
NigeriaÕs democratic experiment in 1965, 1983, and 1992 (Usman 2013). The case in 
2006 was different as many of the political elites had been active in the struggle 
against military regimes for about twenty years. 
In the Zambian case, Mark Chona, the vice-president, the Speaker of the 
parliament, and several ministers were prominent members of the UNIP under 
Kenneth Kaunda. They coordinated the visible opposition that marshaled strategies 
                                                





for the defeat of Kenneth Kaunda in 1991 when the Zambians yearned for a break 
from one-party system. 428  Chiluba also rode on their political structures and 
popularity for his victory against Kaunda.429 When the struggle against ChilubaÕs 
third term became evident, the same actors who helped him ascend to power became 
the ladder on which his political power came down. Experience in politics gave these 
political actors the upper hand redefining political interaction and spurred them to 
create alternative platforms for convergence to challenge non-compliance by their 
presidents. 
8.4.3 Economic wealth among dissenting elites  
An extensive observation made in the case studies is the impact of Ômoney 
politicsÕ in the development and destruction of democracy in Africa (Iwu 2008, 2009; 
Simon 2005). 430  Democracy as practiced in Africa has become progressively 
expensive since democratic transitions in the 1990s. Though many scholars and local 
democracy activists in various countries have criticized such trends in African 
democracy, the political use and influence of money remains a puzzle in its potential 
to produce both democratic and undemocratic outcomes.  
                                                




430 Professor Falola particularly emphasized that the central position of money in African politics 




On the one hand, the influence of money politics has been responsible for 
poor democratic participation across Africa. On the other hand, money influence has 
enabled the survival of many democracies from slow death. Economic wealth among 
political actors could function as a general means to sustain democracy. In particular, 
this same wealth could work against the removal of presidential term limits 
exemplifying a case of Ôundemocratic actions producing democratic outcomes.Õ  
Villalon (2005) has noted that the size of economic wealth controlled by some 
political actors plays a significant role in the shaping of the future of African 
democracy, especially in the prevention of particular presidents from entrenching 
state power. Though the impact of money on politics is a global phenomenon,431 
some experts have specifically observed that the most popular way of doing politics 
in most African countries is by disbursing extensive patronage (Calderisi 2006; 
Chabal and Doloz 1999).  
The case studies detail how money formed a strategy to woo support for or 
against the amendment bills. Money exchanged hands in the form of slush cash and 
other material incentives, such as offers of key political and government 
appointments to political loyalists. The aim was to buttress an existing support or to 
buy off political opponents.432 Strategies to entice opponents to support executive 
                                                
431 Professor Toyin Falola argues in an interview with the author that monetary influence in politics is 
a global phenomenon. According to Falola, Africa falls under the spotlight due to poverty and 
undeveloped regulations concerning money in politics. 
 
432 AuthorÕs interview with Emeka Duru, former Director of Research and Planning of the PDP in 
Nigeria, Abuja, Nigeria,October 2013. 
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policies, passage of parliamentary bills, and support for other governmentÕs projects 
or agendas also took the form of awarded government contracts or direct 
disbursement of cash (Iwu 2008, Armstrong 2010).  
The removal of presidential term limits is an executive project that requires an 
extensive elite support. In the three cases studied, bribery and patronage were 
common and extensively used as strategies by incumbent presidents to secure 
political elite support for the removal presidential term limits (Dulani 2011, 
Armstrong 2010, Posner and Young 2007). These strategies have been effective in 
securing the support of particular political elites in repealing term limits in Uganda, 
Gabon, Togo, Burkina Faso, and Cameroon (Armstrong 2010), as well as in other 
countries where political elites lacked sufficient financial power to counter money 
influence by incumbent presidents. Patronage and bribery as political strategies might 
have stifled the capacity of political elites to engage in political activism, further 
dissipating their political energy to apply pressures in those countries mentioned 
above. Villalon notes that unfortunately, not all countries in Africa possess the caliber 
of political actors who could resist the attraction of patronage and bribery. Economic 
wealth is increasingly instrumental in mobilizing against incumbent presidents who 
might want to depend on state funds to buy political support for the removal of 
presidential term limits.  
In 2003, the opposition elites raised the stakes for President Muluzi of Malawi 
by demanding Five Million Kwacha for their political support of his third term. Some 
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opposition elites argued that they would be sacrificing their public integrity if they 
accepted a bribe, justifying a price higher than the president could afford. According 
to Kansichi, the chief negotiator between the president and the opposition MPs, the 
inability of the president to secure these funds was Òwhy the third term bill failedÓ 
(Khembo 2004, Morrow 2004, Brown 2004).  
In 2005, legislators who pledged to vote in favor of removing presidential 
term limits were paid cash sums of US$3000 each in Uganda, while US$350,000 
were made available to legislators who would support ObasanjosÕs third term in 
Nigeria in 2006 (Posner and Young (2007), Armstrong 2010, Dulani 2011).433 
Though the sum paid in Uganda was smaller in comparison to Nigeria, the Ugandan 
legislators received the amount without any protest from the opposition political 
elites.  
Despite the amount being considerably higher and more attractive in Nigeria, 
many legislators rejected the inducement and stood against ObasanjoÕs third term 
(Posner & Young 2007).434 Furthermore, three political actors who led the opposition 
against ObasanjoÕs third term agenda mobilized the MPs against ObasanjoÕs third 
                                                
433 Atiku Abubakar, Ibrahim Babangida and Orji Kalu teamed up to raise funds to counter president 
ObasanjoÕs financial inducement to the MPs. Their offer has been confirmed in an interview with Dr. 
Frank Ozoh, the Director of The Electoral Institute of Nigeria, who was the Chief of Staff to the 
Chairman of the Independent Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC) in 2006. 
 
434 Confirmed in authorÕs interview with Dr. Frank Ozoh, former Director of the Electoral Institute of 




term by doubling the monetary offer for MPs to reject ObasanjoÕs third term.435 In 
interviews with some MPs in Nigeria, most MPs stressed the important role of 
counter-inducement by opposition elites as a powerful strategy in crashing 
ObasanjoÕs third term.436  
In further emphasizing the impact of money politics in the Nigerian case, the 
Chairman of Independent National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (INEC), 
Maurice Iwu, made references in his 2008 and 2009 Annual Reports of the Electoral 
Commission to the advantages and disadvantages of the size of economic wealth 
under the control of the Ônouveau richeÕ in Nigerian politics. Iwu insisted, ÒSuch size 
of wealth was both capable of derailing and strengthening Nigerian democracyÓ (Iwu 
2008 and 2009).  
In the Zambian case, the opposition elites did not control such a sizable 
amount of wealth. However, the readiness of some international donors to fund the 
opposition group lent itself to the remarkable instrumentality of Mark Chona, leader 
of the OASIS and former Special Adviser on International Relations to Kenneth 
Kaunda. Chona had used his extensive connections with the international community 
to attract funds from various embassies and donor agencies for stopping ChilubaÕs 
third term.437 Though the funds in question were concealed and disbursed through an 
                                                
435 Ibid. 
 
436 AuthorÕs interview with Senator Ifeanyi Ararume, Abuja, Nigeria, October 2013 
437 Confirmed in an interview with Mark Chona in Lusaka, Zambia, October 2014. 
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embassy in Lusaka, the funds became crucial in financing opposition rallies, securing 
campaign materials, and sometimes bankrolling transport costs for the MPs and 
cabinet ministers.438 
In the Malawian case, some foreign donors directly and indirectly financed 
the opposition group through the Church. The suspension of foreign aid to Malawi by 
the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Sweden, and Denmark crippled 
MuluziÕs strategic capacity to sustain the use of slush cash while reducing the cost of 
activism for the opposition elites. However, the secret channeling of some of the 
suspended funds by DANIDA (Denmark) to the opposition group was more decisive. 
Set up by various Churches and organizations through the Public Affairs Committee 
(PAC), the funds from DANIDA particularly enabled dissenting elites-church 
alliance to mobilize more sectors, fund rallies, pay legal fees, and supply campaign 
materials.439  
Though essentially undemocratic, the channeling and controlling of wealth by 
opposition elites can play a role in shaping the future of democratic experiments in 
new democracies. This can counter the efforts of incumbent presidents who capitalize 
on presidential advantages to remove presidential term limits by using patronage to 
buy political support. The size of wealth controlled by or available to the opposition 
elites in Nigeria, Malawi, and Zambia was instrumental in mobilizing the judiciary, 




439 Boniface Tamani, former chair of the PAC, confirmed in an interview with the author that funds 
from DANIDA were central in sustaining elite pressure against Muluzi. 
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the MPs, and the civil society. It sponsored media debates, conferences, and protests 
against the removal of presidential term limits in those countries. The ability of the 
opposition elites to mobilize forces and funds against the incumbent regimes 
influenced the survival of presidential term limits by penetrating the parliament, the 
judiciary, the CSOs/Church, the Media and the masses. In a democratic setting, these 
social forces raise a suffiencient barrier for incumbents intend on entrenching power 
while the lack of it exposes an incumbent to power entrenchment. The convergence 
of social and institutional forces through elite mobilization as detailed in the case 
studies sufficiently explain the different outcomes in attempts by incumbents to 
repeal term limits in African democracies. 
8.4.4 Political Entrepreneurship and Vested Interest 
Vested interests were crucial in the outcome of presidential term limits 
politics in the studied cases. Vested interests here refer mainly to political ambitions 
and economic interests. Some scholars regard these as somewhat crucial for 
strengthening new democracies (Iwu 2008 & 2009, Villalon 2005). Post-Cold War 
African democracies that lack political elites with political ambitions and the 
commitment to pursue such political ambitions appear to be virile and easily 
conquered, as in the case of Cameroon, Uganda, Togo, Gabon, Burkina Faso, and 
Guinea. Scholars have noted the importance of competition in democracy (Linz 1996; 
Beetham 2004), and political ambitions feed democratic competition. 
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In Chapter One, I discussed the benefits of presidential term limits for 
democratic competition. Democratic competition is dependent on the pursuit of 
political ambition. Accordingly, most stakeholders who assembled in defense of 
presidential term limits did so with a combination of vested interests. Devoid of 
vested interests, political actors may become unmotivated to invest resources that 
promote political competition.  
The case studies demonstrated the interests of some political actors that 
operated the fourth Nigerian democratic republic and the second Zambian and 
Malawian republics. These political actors supported the democratic experiment on 
the basis of their experience and interests on national, regional, ethnic, and, individual 
levels. It appears difficult in some cases to make a clear demarcation between 
personal and vested or common and national interests, especially in the event of third 
term politics since national and vested interests often converged. Nonetheless, politics 
remains a Ôgame of interests.Õ The three case studies are supported by Shepsle 
argument that political actors hardly make decisions or choices based solely on either 
vested or common interests (2010). Sometimes, elements of political 
entrepreneurship combine with vested interests to produce democratic outcomes. 
The mobilization by particular political elites to demand compliance is a form 
of political entrepreneurship. Political entrepreneurship is the ability of political 
actors to tap into a political opportunity by maximizing such an opportunity and 
engaging in political actions for political benefits (Shepsle 2010). It is the assumption 
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of the responsibility and costs of organizing political movements and activism, for the 
potential benefits that accrue from such actions.440 Shepsle argues that political 
actions are rarely indifferent. Some political opposition elites made conscious 
political choices not to support the removal of presidential term limits in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi. It may be difficult to argue that these individual choices were 
devoid of vested interests, since political leaders are known to engage in political 
entrepreneurship if the later promises to help realize a particular interest or ambition.  
Vested interests intermingle with national and common interests since they 
complement each other in politics (Shepsle 2010). For instance, Atiku repeatedly 
emphasized the consolidation of Nigerian democracy as a reason for standing against 
ObasanjoÕs third term.441 Governor Orji Kalu argued emphatically that ObasanjoÕs 
third-term would brew dictatorship in Nigeria, presenting his opposition against 
ObasanjoÕs third term with regard to national interest (Vanguard, 11 March 2014). 
Vice President Christon Tembo and Mark Chona of Zambia made the same allusions, 
as well as by Jaap Sonke and Brown Mpinganjira of Malawi. These stood against 
ChilubaÕs and MuluziÕs third terms, respectively.  
But this was not the whole truth concerning the mobilization of these political 
elites to enforce compliance in those countries. As political entrepreneurs, the 
presidential ambition of Atiku Abubakar, Orji Kalu, and Christon Tembo bore the 
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441 Refer to Chapter 4 (the first case study): AtikuÕs speeches to MPs and CSOs explain why he 




costs of organizing movements to forestall the entrenchment of power by their 
respective incumbent presidents. Their individual hope and ambition to become 
presidents depended on the retention of presidential term limits and the benefits of an 
open-seat contest.  
Further, this desire and interest to acquire representation in the next 
government appeared a significant motivation for some dissenting elites to enforce 
compliance. Clearly, some of the dissenting elites, especially Atiku and Orji Kalu of 
Nigeria, and Christon Tembo of Zambia, nursed visible ambitions to succeed their 
respective presidents. These political actors stood to lose the most politically, if the 
constitutional amendments allowed their incumbent presidents to run for more terms. 
These actors were prepared to deploy any possible strategy to enforce compliance in 
order to realize their political dreams. Indeed, vice-presidents Atiku Abubakar, 
Christon Tembo, and Orji Kalu coordinated the opposition against the removal of 
presidential term limits, and subsequently contested the presidency after successfully 
enforcing compliance in their countries. Their political ambitions partly motivated 
their commitment to mobilize other pressures to enforce compliance on their 
presidents.  
Other political elites who have become political liabilities and enemies of the 
incumbent regimes desired a change at all costs in order to restore their political hope. 
The political future of some former presidents, ex-ministers, and ex-MPs depended 
  
476 
on leadership alternation.442 For instance, former Presidents Ibrahim Babangida and 
Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria and ex-president Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia all 
supported and invested in the elite opposition against the removal of presidential term 
limits.443  
Most ex-power holders wanted to come back to power. Though still nursing 
presidential ambition, some needed time to brush-up their political standing among 
the public after having lost some popularity as former dictators. By joining elite 
activism to demand compliance, they struggled to be on the right side of history and 
used the chance to regain their lost popularity.  Kenneth Kaunda, Ibrahim Babangida, 
and Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria fit this description. 
In the Nigerian case, ethnic interest played a further role in shaping political 
elite strategy to enforce compliance. The ruling party had adopted an elite pact in 
1999 that allowed presidential power to rotate every eight years among the six 
political zones. This was to solve the power-sharing problem and reduce power 
domination by a particular section of the country. Obasanjo had utilized the chance of 
the South West by ruling for two terms. A third term for Obasanjo would have meant 
an unofficial abrogation of the elite pact and a domination of other geopolitical 
                                                
442 Two presidents of the Nigerian Senate, Anyim Pius Anyim and Adolphus Nwagbara, both deposed 
by Obasanjo, joined forces to enforce compliance on him because their future political life depended 
on the ousting of Obasanjo or the defeat of his third-term ambition.(AuthorÕs interview with 
Nwagbara, Abuja, Nigeria, November 2012.) 
 
443 In an authorÕs interview with Mark Chona, the organizer of OASIS (the coalition against the 
removal of term limits in Zambia), Chona remarked that Kenneth Kaunda had been ready to sacrifice 
everything to stop the third-term ambition of Chiluba because of the humiliation that Kaunda had 




groups by the South West. It would have also meant depriving the North of Ôtheir 
turnÕ to produce the next president, according to the internal arrangement of the 
ruling party.  
For the northern regional political elites, opposition to ObasanjoÕs third term 
was a means to enforce the informal pact and understanding that presidential power 
rotates among the regional groups. In this regard, third-term opponents from northern 
Nigeria aligned their desire to enforce compliance with their desire to enforce an elite 
pact made by the ruling party. This contradicts the view that resistance from northern 
elites was purely ethnic resistance aimed at capturing state power.444 However, the 
case studies show that the political interest of the dissenting elites and their 
mobilization of various democratic stakeholders boosted democratic experience in 
Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. Their political interest expanded the democratic process 
and further reaised political consciousness in the polity in comparison with Uganda, 
Cameroon, Togo and Gabon where political interests and challenges have been low. 
 
8.4.5 Strategic Regime Miscalculations 
OÕDonnell and Schmitter (1986) note that regime miscalculations and 
disposition during a period of political liberation often have far-reaching 
consequences. Regime miscalculations are not limited to periods of political 
                                                
444 See for instance Lewis 2009; Campbell 2011; and Armstrong 2010, 
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liberation, however, but also occur during major political crises as part of the process 
of political and democratic growth. In all the cases under study, the respective 
regimes made a number of strategic errors of interpretation and judgment. All three 
incumbent presidents adopted strategies that worked against their regimes, weakened 
the potency of the constitution amendment bills, and galvanized support for the 
opposition elites by inducing sympathy and protection for the dissenting elites.  
In the Malawian case, some internal dissidents met vehement intimidation and 
violence after they indicated their opposition to MuluziÕs amendment bill. Jaap Sonke 
and Kaleso lost their jobs as ministers, while Brown Mpinganjira a chieftain of the 
ruling party, were all forced out of the ruling party for indicating their opposition to 
the amendment bill. MPs that indicated a divergent opinion lost their seats within the 
party with a consequent threat to withdraw their parliamentary seats. MuluziÕs regime 
also went so far as to charge ministers with corruption or the threat of imprisonment, 
as in the case of ex-minister Kaleso.445 The Young Democrats attacked media houses, 
kidnapped and molested journalists who showed sympathy for the opposition view.  
The combination of these attacks and the assault on clerics by regime loyalists 
complicated issues for Muluzi and made the realization of the amendment bill appear 
                                                
445 The former chairman of the PAC, Boniface Tamani, confirmed in an interview with the author that 
MuluziÕs regime administered corruption charges and subsequent imprisonment to those who 
challenged his attempts to amend the Malawian constitution. According to Tamani, Òthe Church and 





remote.446 The news of such human rights abuses were not only received with 
misgivings in Malawi, but were also smuggled out of Malawi to be broadcast both on 
South African Radio and the BBC World Service (Brown 2004). The incidents 
aroused both domestic and international opposition, engendering spontaneous 
protests that surprised both dissidents and the government.447 Foreign donors like the 
United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom, who had been slow to meddle in 
internal Malawian politics, found reasons to suspend their foreign aid to Malawi on 
the basis of human rights abuses.448 The suspension of foreign aid to Malawi not only 
motivated the dissenting elites, but, more significantly, reduced the capacity of 
Muluzi to sponsor the amendment bill project (Morrow 2005).449 
The Zambian case was not different. The persecution of local and foreign 
NGOs who spoke out against the third-term ambition of Chiluba attracted both 
international and local attention. 450  The battering and physical assault of the 
opposition by regime loyalists drew local condemnation and resulted in the 
suspension of foreign aid by donor agencies.451 Mark Chona, coordinator of the 
                                                
446 AuthorÕs interview with Dr. Blessing Chissinga,Univeristy of Malawi, Choba, Kenya, October 
2014. 
 
447 AuthorÕs interview with Jaap Sonke, former Junior Finance Minister in Malawi, Lilongwe, Malawi, 
October 2014. 
 




450 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia.,October 2014. 
 
451 Ibid . 
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OASIS coalition, remarked, ÒWe were able to attract both local and international 
support because President Chiluba had made a number of strategic errors.Ó452  
The courts also weighed in after the regime illegally declared the seats of the 
MPs who opposed ChilubaÕs third term vacant. Perhaps the most singular strategic 
error made by the Chiluba regime was the arrest of former president Kenneth Kaunda 
on trump-up coup charges, ostensibly aimed to reduce the former presidentÕs capacity 
to present a formidable challenge. The international and diplomatic uproar in 
response to the arrest of Kaunda forced Chiluba to quickly revert KaundaÕs detention 
to house arrest.  
This miscalculation also exposed the hypocrisy of President Chiluba as a 
proponent of human rights. President Chiluba had boosted of his human rights 
records, which had apparently attracted initial international support for his regime 
(Sardanis 2014). But after the arrest of Kaunda on trump-up coup charges, most 
donor countries quickly changed their view of Chiluba, who had been hitherto 
referred to as Òthe darling of international communityÓ (ibid.). According to Sardanis, 
Chiluba initially enjoyed considerable international support for his effort in 
liberalizing the Zambian economy. Sardanis argues, however, that the lack of 
international support for ChilubaÕs third term was a direct consequence of human 
rights abuses which became manifest in his second term as president. The strategic 






error further diminished ChilubaÕs popularity and caused massive defection from his 
support base (ibid).453 
The case in Nigeria was not different. ObasanjoÕs regime arrested dissidents 
on corruption charges, declared the seat of the vice-president vacant, and used both 
the police and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) to intimidate 
and assault opponents.454 ObasanjoÕs abuse of human rights did not as such attract 
international attention, but it increased local resistance and created unity among 
various sectors of opposition. For instance, the courts responded to ObasanjoÕs 
impunity and abuse of human rights by providing the opposition with legal support 
and protection.455  
There is no leader without support and loyalty, even the most cruel of 
dictators. However, Shepsle insists that leaders who intend to retain their loyalty and 
support-base should be austere with their use of punishment as a strategy against 
dissenting supporters (2010). According to Shepsle, a mere threat serves a better 
purpose than excessive and outright punishment: intimidation and violence could turn 
a (dis)loyal follower into an alternative leader. Shepsle argues that leaders who use 
                                                
453 Also confirmed in the authorÕs interview with Mark Chona and Swithin Haangala, director of 
Zambezi FM Radio, Lusaka, Zambia, October 2014. 
 
454 AuthorÕs interview with Orji Kalu, Abuja, Nigeria, November 2013 
 
455 AuthorÕs interview Justice Mary Odili, Abuja, Nigeria, October 2013. 
  
482 
outright punishment to force loyalty end up losing their supporters to alternative 
leaders, often chosen or self-appointed from among the victims.  
This appears to be the case in the three case studies where incumbent regimes 
could not manage dissidents and opposition strategically. The opposition elites 
possibly pushed the incumbent regimes into disproportionate punishment of 
dissidents, which attracted international and donor attention, sympathy from the 
masses and courts, and support from the churches as in the Malawian and Zambian 
cases. It further redefined the interaction between the incumbents, the dissenting 
elites and the judiciary, and further transformed the opposition leaders into political 
entrepreneurs and alternative leaders. The combination of attention, support, 
sympathy, and entrepreneurship arising from regime error directly and indirectly 
mobilized support for the dissenting elites and contributed in the compliance outcome 
in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi.  
In Uganda and Namibia, where the removal of presidential term limits was 
swift and successful, there were fewer reports of instances of intimidation and 
violence. Actual implementation of issued threats was not manifest, even when the 
ruling party expelled a few political elites who opposed the amendment bills in 
Uganda and Namibia. Reports show that the regime minimally dismissed government 
officers in reference to the amendment in Uganda and Namibia, except those who 
chose to resign on their own accord. Thus, international and local attention was 
effectively minimal.  
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There was equally little need for judicial sympathy and support, as the 
amendment bill appeared to produce minimal political victims or casualties. It may be 
argued that strong opposition against the removal of presidential term limits was 
absent in Uganda and Namibia, or that the regimes strategically suppressed the 
opposition. The capacity of the regimes to keep the limited opposition that rose 
within the fold gave them the upper hand to checkmate and manage the dissidents and 
opposition without causing a shipwreck of the ruling parties. However, the lack of 
sufficient elite dissidence in Uganda and Namibia suppressed the opportunity to force 
the incumbents into strategic mistakes, expand the democratic process and create an 
alternative platform for the convergence of other social forces to demand compliance, 
as was the case in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi.  
 
8.4.6 Regional and International Influence  
Many scholars have emphasized the impact of international actors on political 
elite behavior. Salih (2005) and Salih et. al (2007) note that party-to-party network 
and regional parliamentary initiatives could increase the prospects of democracy in 
Africa. Unfortunately, these have not been allowed to fully develop because of the 
seeming penchant of African presidents to dominate political parties and parliaments. 
However, a mixed reaction has confronted presidential term limits in Africa. While 
Mugabe went on to his seventh mandate, Nujoma in Namibia secured the first 
constitutional amendment for a third term in Africa. On the other hand, Joachim 
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Chissano of Mozambique did not attempt to prolong his tenure and went on to 
publicly criticize such attempts elsewhere  (Morrow 2005). The example of Thabo 
Mbeki who rejected third-term offers in South Africa, despite calls from within the 
ruling African National Congress (ANC) for a third term, demonstrated that 
constitutionalism could be achieved on the continent.  
In 2004, Mbeki called for the respect of constitutionalism and compliance 
toward presidential term limits by congratulating those who labored to enforce 
compliance in Malawi and Zambia, and by praising the defeated incumbent 
presidents for accepting defeat in line with their constitutions (SACBC 2004). In the 
same year, Kofi Annan, the Secretary General of the United Nations, delivered the 
opening speech at the 2004 African Union (AU) summit addressing the importance 
and respect for presidential term limits. Kofi Annan challenged and questioned the 
morale behind the manipulation and fraudulent amendment of constitutions for the 
sole purpose of allowing presidents to retain power beyond their prescribed terms. He 
called African presidents to order, saying, ÒLet us always remember that constitutions 
are for the long-term benefit of society, and not the short-term goals of the ruler. Let 
us pledge that the days of indefinite one-man or one-party governments are behind 
us.Ó456 
Political appeals are effective when backed by actions. Usually, incumbent 
presidents do not back such appeals. However, such calls as by Annan appeared to 
                                                
456 This Day, 7 July 2004. 
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have motivated some political elites to demand strict compliance in Africa.457 A year 
after Kofi AnnanÕs speech Mussoveni succeeded in removing presidential term limits 
in Uganda. Subsequent attempts failed in Nigeria in 2006 and in Senegal in 2012. Of 
sixteen challenges between 1998 and 2004, nine became successful repeals, while 
two failed. Since 2004, when Annan made his appeal, there have been five challenges 
and two ongoing debates. While three have succeeded, two have failed indicating a 
decrease of about forty percent. The promotion of democracy by the African Union 
and the open support for constitutionalism among African leaders like Kofi Annan 
and Thabo Mbeki, seem to exercise a major influence on some political actors 
seeking to demand and enforce compliance.458  
On economic, geopolitical, and strategic considerations, international actors 
have had a significant influence on elite behavior and choices on democratization 
(Bratton and van de Walle 1997; Maltz 2007; Villalon 2005; Moyo 2009; Smith 
1996; Yilmaz 2009). The argument hinges on the hypothesis that donor contribution, 
development assistance, and democracy promotion as foreign policy can exert 
international pressures on actors in new democracies (Bratton and van de Walle 
1994). Likewise, aid conditionality can trigger both positive and negative results in 
countries that largely depend on external aid (Carothers 1999). The international and 
                                                
457 Vice-president Atiku Abubakar of Nigeria cited Kofi Annan several times in his public statements 
against third-term in Nigeria, indicating the high impact of AnnanÕs statement.  
 
458Atiku Abubakar and Orji Kalu made reference to regional political situations during the controversy 
in Nigeria to legitimize their insistence on term limits compliance. Atiku specifically likened 
Nigeria to a Ôbanana republic,Õ ObasanjoÕs third term succeed, whereas small countries like 




regional communities have also sanctioned some military units for intervening in or 
destabilizing new democracies, as was the case in Mali in 2012. Some elected leaders 
have been discouraged from manipulating democratic rules in their favor either by 
facing the risk of lack of recognition by a section of the international community, or 
by being forced to share powers with the opposition. The electoral manipulations and 
consequences in Kenya in 2007 and in Ivory Coast in 2012 present ready examples.  
Still, the impact of donor agencies and international actors has been impressive in 
motivating some political elites into political activism to demand and enforce 
compliance. 
In the Malawian case, the withdrawal and suspension of development 
assistance by the United States and Danish governments in 2001 and 2002 
strengthened the resolve of dissenting political elites to demand strict compliance 
from President Muluzi.459 The dissenting elites in Malawi were emboldened when in 
2001, the United States Embassy brought pressure on the regime by suspending 
development aid to Malawi for lack of accountability to human rights issues (Morrow 
2005; Brown 2004). Though the United States publicly claimed to respond to the 
increasing lack of financial and political transparency by Muluzi, the suspension and 
large reduction of American development aid to Malawi from January 2001 was 
implemented as a reaction to MalawiÕs regression in the democratic process.460 
                                                
459 AuthorÕs interview with Boniface Tamani, former chair of the PAC, Limbe, Malawi, October 2014 
 
460 Boniface Tamani insists in an interview with the author that the suspension of funds was engineered 
by the opposition elites as a direct response to President MuluziÕs manipulation of democratic 
procedures in pursuit of the amendment bill.  
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Muluzi seemed unperturbed by similar international reactions and continued with his 
third-term agenda. In reality, however, total suspension of donor funding was risky 
for a country that depended hugely on foreign aid. With the suspension of funds to 
Malawi, elite dissidents became increasingly emboldened and encouraged to demand 
compliance from President Muluzi.461 They also capitalized on the shortage of funds 
accruable to the regime to make demands that the regime could not fulfill, leading to 
the crash of the amendment bill in Malawi.  
Arap Moi of Kenya faced the same situation, which the internal opposition 
elites capitalized upon to demand compliance. In the Nigerian case, the statement 
from the United States Department of State on the proposed constitutional 
amendment became a rallying point for the non-loyal political elites. Though the 
reason for opposing the third-term agenda was more strategic than it was democratic 
promotion, American concerns reinforced the resolve of the opposition elites to move 
against ObasanjoÕs third term. Accordingly, Atiku and Kalu alluded to the warning 
from the United States severally in their anti-third term rallies (El Rufai 2012). Some 
political elites, who probably were still sitting on the fence, may have been motivated 
to join the anti-third-term group because of American concerns regarding third term 
constitutional amendment in Nigeria.462 




462 Orji Kalu has alluded in multiple interviews in various news dailies that his contact with President 




International actions, though unintended and undirected, could influence the 
choices and actions of domestic players. I have noted in the case studies how 
international and donor actions became strategic in influencing and shaping elite 
composure to demand compliance. However, other goals may be more important and 
decisive in shaping the interactions of some international actors with many new 
democracies. International actors have not been consistent in pressurizing and 
enforcing compliance on power entrenching regimes. In some instances, international 
actors have actually enabled the efforts of authoritarian leaders seeking to entrench 
their holds on power (Villalon 2005, Bratton and van de Walle 1997). Nonetheless, 
the case studies show that international actions have exercised some influence on elite 
decisions to demand presidential term limits compliance.  
8.4.7 Elite Political Culture 
Elite political culture or Òlearned norms and patterns of behaviorÓ (Villalon 
2005) plays a significant role in the shaping of elite behavior and in influencing the 
actions of political elites. Elite political culture played a role in shaping the behavior 
of the actors that chose to demand compliance in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi. For 
scholars like Levine (1978), Wildasky (1978), Burton, Gunther, and Higgley (1992), 
elite political culture and actions can generate subjective frameworks that shape 
values, filter information, and establish the cognitive repertoire of potential courses of 
action. In the three case studies, these three overlapping issues deserve consideration. 
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In this regard, the way in which key political elites viewed and valued the democratic 
process is very important.  
To some extent the case studies demonstrate that the incumbent presidents did 
not view the democratic institutions as essentially Ògood,Ó463 Presidents Obasanjo, 
Muluzi, and Chiluba consciously chose not to improve on the inherited democratic 
institutions within their presidential tenures. Instead of consolidating democracy, they 
invested considerably in the consolidation of personal power. This was probably the 
case because improvement in democratic institutions would have resulted in limiting 
their own powers. They chose therefore to preside over weak, moribund, and decayed 
institutions while their personal political powers soared and the extension of their 
elected terms appeared increasingly accessible. The maintenance of such personal 
power is dependent on elite support. A rupture among the ruling elites is necessary to 
limit the entrenchment of state power, challenge executive legitimacy, and awaken 
democratic accountability (OÕDonnell et al 1986; Higley and Burton 2006). The 
sustainment of elite docility and amenability supports the entrenchment of power and 
flattens opposition politics.  
Until the third-term debates, there was no significant rupture within the ruling 
political parties in the case studies. This indicates a type of docility as motivating 
factor for incumbent presidents to challenge presidential term limits. While elite 
                                                




docility remained intact in Namibia, Uganda, Gabon, Cameroon, Burkina Faso, and 
Togo after the introduction of presidential term limits debates, the cohesion and 
docility ruptured through elite activism in Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, Malawi, Zambia, 
and Senegal during the presidential term limits debates. All countries witnessed 
cracks in the ruling parties and resulted in defections. While rupture in the ruling 
parties challenged some institutions into action, strengthening and unifying political 
opposition, (Higgley and Burton 2006), elite docility sustained and strengthened the 
entrenchment of power by incumbent regimes in Gabon, Cameroon, Uganda, Togo, 
and until recently, Burkina Faso. 
Conclusion  
In this chapter, I have discussed various levels of interactions that existed 
between the presidents and various institutions as observed in the case studies. Apart 
from Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi where attempts to repeal term limits were repelled, 
I made reference to Uganda, Cameroon, Namibia, Togo, Burkina Faso and Gabon 
where term limits were successfully repealed. I made aditional reference to Rwanda 
and Burundi where debates were on to repeal term limits. Observations in these casse 
show how incumbent presidents dominated and determined the outcome of their 
interactions with various democratic institutions. It also shows that most institutions 
largely remained docile before term limits controversies in these cases. My 
observation shows that through elite dissidence, individual political elites redefined 
incumbent-institutional interaction by providing alternative political and social 
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platforms for the convergence of various social forces and institutions. I went further 
to discussed various strategies mobilized by both incumbent presidents and dissenting 
elites to win the support of various institutions to either repeal term limits or demand 
compliance. These strategies became essential in unbundling and expanding the 
democratic space hitherto monopolized by incumbent presidents. Though the 
strategies employed by dissenting elites proved effective in all the case studies, their 
degrees of effectiveness differed. While elite size, political experience, and money 
politics were more effective in Nigeria, international support and elite cohesion 
became crucial in motivating elite dissidence in Zambia and Malawi. The 
convergence of different pressures through elite dissidence became a deciding factor 
for compliance outcome in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. The lack of this 
convergence due to the absence of elite dissidence was therefore responsible for the 
repealing outcomes as was the case in Uganada, Cameroon and Namibia. My analysis 
of the importance of elite (in)action has not been strictly based on data collected from 
the three case studies of enforced complaince, but also on various other cases where 
presidential term limits were successfully repealed by incumbent African transitional 
presidents.  
I will conclude this study in the next chapter. I will briefly discuss the impact 
of political elite pressure on the technical consolidation of the democratic process 
within these case studies. I will further analyze the fate of presidential term limits in 
African democracies before concluding with remarks concerning the implementation 
of presidential term limits in African democracies. 
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Chapter 9: General Conclusion 
9 Introduction  
The study of democracy has kept the faces of political elites long hidden in 
the analyses of democratization and consolidation processes, particularly in African 
democracies. Political elites are ostensibly neglected because of the tendency to view 
political elites as self-interested, oppressive automatons and extensions of particular 
regimes as discussed in the introduction of this study.464 As a result, there exist a 
tendency to still view political elites collectively as ultimately lacking in the capacity 
for resistance. However, far from being self-interested, oppressive automatons or 
regime extensions acting in blind obedience, political elites are complex social forces 
and structures bound in loyalties and identities that span across various sectors 
(Shepsle 2010), with identities of their own. Theories of social cohesion, insists that 
these multiple levels of loyalty and identity, affect perception of a given political 
crisis and the boundaries within which both the regime and dissenting elites are able 
to act while retaining their interests (Villalon et al 2005).  
The dynamics of presidential term limits politics force a consideration of 
agency and contingency. As observed in the case studies, while the regimes attempted 
to coerce political actors to their own desired end through intimidation and patronage, 
                                                
464 Refer to my definition of ÔPolitical ElitesÕ in the Introduction, where I specifically distanced my use 
of political elites in this study from the work of scholars like Pareto & Finer (1969); Mill (1958; 
Fatton) (1992), Bayart, Chabal and Daloz (1999) 
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the dissenting political elites attempted to rupture executive loyalty through 
dissidence and activism. The combination of elite dissidence and executive 
intimidation appeared to have pushed dissenting elites into defection, which further 
attracted more intimidation and directed violence, with further dissidence, activism 
and intimidation. Elite resistance further forced a form of interaction with the 
institutions, CSOs and the international community for legitimacy and protection, 
even with other institutional and extra-institutional forces, including the judiciary and 
the church. This collaboration and linkage mostly yielded significant pressures that 
political dissident groups bundled to sustain their demand for compliance. Institutions 
consequently experience liberation from executive siege, which widens the 
democratic space. Though the role of loyalty may appear to be a given, the reality is 
more complicated. The strategic interaction of actors and other sectors in a political 
context of presidential term limits politics may play out in a hidden sequence 
In this thesis, I have examined three main cases of failed attempts to repeal 
presidential term limits in Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi. I have explored how elites 
react to the politics of presidential term limits and the outcomes of compliance or 
non-compliance. I have also examined two other cases of partial enforcement (Ghana 
and Kenya) and three extra cases of non-compliance (Cameroon, Uganda, and 
Namibia). Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi served as the main case studies for this 
research, and five extra cases provided necessary comparisons. Empirical and 
scholarly examinations of the cases provided a deeper understanding of how the 
events surrounding the presidential term limit politics unfolded and progressed to a 
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certain outcome. The methodological approach of this study was effective in 
establishing case-specific findings. It determined the usefulness of political elite 
dissidence and activism in the study of presidential term limits and its enforcement in 
new democracies.  
The African democratic experiment has rather been puzzling. Each writer 
seems to have a specific view and understanding of democratic processes in Africa, 
while research into African democracy remains in progress. This thesis cannot make 
any claims regarding the generality of case-specific findings given the partially 
inductive nature of the study (concentration on post-Cold War African democracies).  
However, I offer evidence to support the wider applicability of lessons drawn from 
the new democracies in question. The role of political elites in enforcing term limits 
compliance in African post-Cold War democracies is worthy of analysis since their 
study also informs on broader issues of democracy consolidation. The application of 
this research is timely, because the continent has recorded the worldÕs highest number 
of presidential term limits repeals within a brief twenty years of democratic 
experiment.  
9.1 Synthesis  
In the remaining part of this conclusion, I will develop a synthesis of case-
specific findings to offer a broadly applicable, elite-focused explanation of 
presidential term limits politics and their implementation in new democracies.  
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I will conclude the study, which set out to discuss the role of political elites in 
enforcing presidential term limits in post-Cold War African democracies. I will return 
to the hypothesis and research questions that have guided the study up to this point. 
The aim is to probe the extent to which these have corresponded with case-specific 
findings and observations made in my research. 
I claim that political elites are likely to mobilize to enforce presidential term 
limits compliance when their political interests depend on the survival and expansion 
of the democratic space. I claim also that the process of repealing presidential term 
limits is less likely to succeed without the active involvement, support, and 
connivance of key political elites, both internally and externally. Political elites have 
the capacity to produce and apply pressure (OÕDonnel et al 1986; Higley & Burton 
2006), which can yield term limits compliant outcome. By forming internal pressure 
groups, some political actors rupture political loyalty and cohesion, force incumbent 
regimes to make strategic mistakes, and finally create room for alternative platforms 
and defection that ultimately become essential for mobilizing and bundling pressures 
to enforce compliance. 
The following thesis questions guided my study: In what ways do political 
actors mobilize to demand and enforce presidential term limits compliance, especially 
in new democracies? What factors influence the political choices and behaviors of 
particular political elites to mobilize pressure against the removal of presidential term 
limits? Have transition incumbent presidents in post-Cold War African democracies 
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voluntarily allowed power to alternate without formal or informal pressure to demand 
compliance from them? Could democracies achieve such compliance without the 
involvement of key political elites? The case studies and beyond discovered an active 
and leading role of particular political elites in galvanizing, mobilizing and bundling 
pressures to demand and enforce term limits compliance.  
 
9.2 Assessment of Case-Specific Findings and Outcomes 
I begin the assessment with a review of the broad conclusions established 
during the case studies, focusing on the outcomes of enforced compliance. In this 
study, I have focused on the outcome variables of enforced-compliance, in an abstract 
and dichotomous fashion---without necessarily knowing why some political elites 
reacted as they did towards attempts by incumbent presidents to repeal presidential 
term limits. However, I expected the emergence of further deviations and variables 
during my research.465 Variance did emerge in the outcomes, especially between the 
types and extent of strategies, linkages, alliances, and responses to intimidation by 
dissenting political elites. The outcomes are categorical when considered in the 
context of the processes and mechanisms that led to them. Categorizing and 
                                                
465 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 




classifying these processes offer a deeper understanding beyond the abstract terms 
and figures of particular outcomes.  


















Nigeria  2007 & 
2011 
2015 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes, 
after 
2007 
Zambia 2004 2009, 2014 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes, 
after 
2004 
Malawi 2004 2009 
 2014 
Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes, 
after 
2004 
Ghana 1999, 2009, 
2013 
1999, 2009 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  





Uganda No No  No  Yes  No  No  
Cameroon No  No  No  Yes  No  No  
Gabon  Yes, death 
of the 
president  
No  No  Yes  No  No  
Togo Yes, death 
of the 
president 
No  No  Yes  No  No  
Source: AuthorÕs fieldwork and literature analysis 
The classification of outcomes can help to refine future studies that will focus 
on different kinds of presidential term limits outcomes. For instance, recurring 
repertoires of elite political defections, such as defection by intimidation or defection 
by disguised disloyalty, are particularly suitable for further in-depth studies. Such 
approach supports new trends in the scholarship of democratization, which examines 
the relationship between political elites and external institutions, as well as CSOs and 
the international community (including foreign donors).  
Interaction and linkages between the dissenting elites and various institutions, 
including the Church and other sectors, created a resistance structure. This interaction 
emerges as the most interesting, academically fruitful, and policy-relevant aspect of 
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these cases. A comparison of the effects and the impacts of these interactions and 
other unique features beyond, results in observations that can be used to create a 
general picture of the operation of elite activism in the process of enforcing 
presidential term limits compliance.  
Concealed (dis)loyalty or mistaken assumptions about loyalty were found to 
be particularly important in the examined cases. Elite resistance often reveals 
information about true loyalty and the nature of followership. In the three main case 
studies, loyalty was seen as self-evident prior to the presidential term limits 
controversies. The spate of intimidation by Muluzi on the dissenting elites disclosed 
unrevealed (dis)loyalty and mistaken followership, which prior to the third term 
controversy remained latent. The revelation of hidden and assumed (dis)loyalty leads 
to alterations in executive loyalty and the emergence of alternative leaders. The 
alteration in executive loyalty and emergence of alternative leaders has great 
influence in altering political equations in the parliament, judiciary, civil society, and 
the international community.  
My research has found that the ability and capacity of dissenting elites to 
mobilize the wide spectrum of sectors to produce a bundled pressure is especially 
significant in determining the outcome of presidential term limits politics. In the 
cases examined, the ability of political dissidents to mobilize key sectors formed the 
core of the resistance platform to which the rest of the structure linked. The linkages 
and interactions dominating the process structure exerted significant influence on 
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perceptions of resistance, intimidation, threats, the ensuing external and institutional 
reactions, and the actors in need of protection. These perceptions resulted in 
divergences and secondary goals during the debates.  
 
9.3 Other Findings in the Research  
Since the post-Cold War democratization in Africa began in 1990, only six 
transitional incumbent presidents have voluntarily allowed power to alternate. Four 
out of six alternations that occurred after the transition elections were seemingly 
induced or pressured, indicating that about eight-five percent of all power alternations 
have either been partially or fully enforced. Behind any visible voluntary compliance 
is a certain pressure, sometimes invisible, but always effective in enforcing 
compliance.  
Political elites (as initial moderate pressures on the president) mostly generate 
such pressures in the ruling party internally. In some cases, initial and internal 
moderate elite pressures have had the capacity to produce compliance-outcomes. 
Ghana and Kenya represent cases where the level of internal elite moderate pressures 
was sufficient to achieve compliance-outcome. I have referred to these instances as 
partial enforcement, because the incumbent presidents withdrew from pursuing 
amendment bills after noticing the seriousness of the internal resistance mounted 
against their proposed amendment bills. These cases also show that most transitional 
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incumbent presidents have involuntarily complied with term limits provisions, only 
allowing power to alternate because of pressure.  
On the other hand, the Nigerian, Zambian, and Malawian cases represent full 
pressures. The incumbent presidents strongly overcame the initial moderate resistance 
mounted by internal elites against their intended amendment bills. By securing 
constitution amendments of their parties, the incumbent presidents went on to 
introduce a bill in parliament seeking to alter presidential term limits provision in 
their various constitutions.  
The case studies clearly show that political dissenting elites mobilized and at the 
same time worked in alliance with other sectors in order to achieve a compliance 
outcome, signifying the importance of strategic linkages in demanding and enforcing 
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  The political dissenting elites needed the linkages to create popular attention, 
seek protection, source for funds, and galvanize pressures against the regime.466 The 
instrumentality of the opposition leaders was central in mobilizing these linkages. 
Their contacts, wealth of experience, and economic strength sustained the interaction 
and worked as a counter strategy against the regimes. In most cases, the legitimacy 
and credibility that sustained the linkage and eliteÐinstitution interaction had a 
twofold source: the popularity of leading dissenting figures, as in Nigeria; and the 
sincerity of contracted arrowheads, as in Zambia.   
Could other sectors have achieved the compliance outcome in Nigeria, 
Zambia, and Malawi without the dissenting elites? Could the civil society, for 
instance, have enforced compliance without the support of particular political elites in 
Malawi, Nigeria, or Zambia? This would have been difficult to achieve, because in 
most new democracies, civil society is amorphous with mass action. Mass action is 
nameless, devoid of ideology and focus. Many people participate in protests not out 
of strict support for the political view, but out of spontaneity and for fun (Shaplse 
2010). An entrepreneurial leader is needed to lead a focused, mass action to a desired 
outcome (ibid).  
Many communities overthrow their dictatorial regimes by way of mass 
protests and actions anchored in either international or elite defection (Brown 2004; 
vonDoepp 2005). Political entrepreneurs who bore the costs of mobilizing and of 
                                                
466 AuthorÕs interview with Mark Chona, Lusaka, Zambia, October 2014 
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sustaining group focus guided these protests. I have already given an example of 
Frederick Chiluba of Zambia in 1991, who as leader of the Labor Union, benefited 
from the regional and international pressure on Kenneth Kaunda to yield to 
multiparty democracy. Atiku Abubakar and Alex Ekwueme mobilized a group under 
the Nigerian PDM and G-23 to pressure the military out of power in 1999. Chihana, 
an ex-exile, and Bakili Muluzi capitalized on Church activism, defection, and 
international pressure in 1992 to mobilize the sponsored mass protests that ended the 
regime of Banda in Malawi.  
While such mass involvement from civil society is necessary for democratic 
transition and initial democratization, it does little for the enforcement of term limits 
compliance. The planning and execution of strategies for the removal of term limits 
are remote, elite based, and distanced from the masses and grassroots levels. For 
instance, all the successful repealed cases of term limits were parliamentary induced, 
while three of the failed four cases employed also ended in parliament. Only one 
ended in a referendum where the masses had a chance to participate in the process.  
Moreover, most MPs reserve about eighty-percent of their loyalty to their 
respective parties, and presidents/godfathers, since their political future chiefly 
depends on approval and support from their political Ôgodfathers.Õ ÒOnye fee Eze, eze 
erou ya akaÓ is a cultural political ideology in most African cultures. It translates 
literally to Òif you honor the king, you can become one.Ó Those who intend to grow 
politically honor the power holder and Ôgod-fathers,Õ not the masses.  
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ÒOnye bu igu ka ewu na esoÓ is another adage that defines the political culture 
in African democracies. Literarily, it means, Òhe who dishes out favors controls more 
followership than he who has less to dispense.Ó Mass protests have achieved little in 
enforcing compliance without the support of specific political elites within and 
outside the government. Both Uganda and Namibia possess an array of active civil 
society. The opposition and their protests against the removal of presidential term 
limits in Uganda and Namibia produced little pressure because they lacked support 
from political actors who could change public opinion, influence, or alter political 
loyalty. Furthermore, political actors acting as political entrepreneurs are necessary to 
provide funding, leadership, and the necessary linkages with other political elites, the 
courts, the media, the church, and an array of local and international NGOs, all aimed 
at bundling pressures to enforce compliance. 
 
9.4 Enforced Compliance and its Impact on Democratic Consolidation  
The optimal path and expectation of democratization in post-Cold War 
African democracies was to move from new and nascent democracies toward a 
Ôconsolidated democracyÕ (Haerper 2009). I will briefly note the level of 
consolidation these case studies have so far achieved since the enforcement of 
presidential term limits compliance. I will base assessment of post-enforcement 
consolidation purely on Huntington and BeethamÕs hypothesis of power and party 
alternation, open-seat contestation, robust electoral competition, two electoral 
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turnovers, and mass participation in the electoral and democratic processes. 
According to Huntington and Beetham, one can determine if a particular democratic 
process is consolidating by the identification of the technical qualities mentioned 
above. Schelder adds to this, identifying consolidation as the process through which a 
democratic system has overcome a slow democratic death. For Linz, the democratic 
process must guarantee tenure limitation (pro-tempore), power alternation, rule of 
law, electoral competition and popular participation of the electorate in the 
democratic process.  
However, Freedom House and Polity IV index have outlined what constitutes 
democracy consolidation, differing from the definitions above. For Freedom House 
and Polity IV, a new democracy consolidates when it fulfills the criteria for a liberal 
democracy: rule of law. It boasts a clear separation of powers, a vibrant civil society 
(independent from the state), functional democratic constitutions and associated 
constitutionalism, pluralism of political actors and institutions, full respect of human 
and political rights, and freedom of media and political association. Additional 
criteria include the capacity of a new democracy to fulfill the minimum requirements 
of free, fair, and competitive multi-party elections, as well as the visible consolidation 
of political and legal institutions (Haerper 2009). As Linz (1996) notes, democracy 
can be said to have stabilized when an absolute majority of the citizens support the 
democratic process, as Ôthe only game in townÕ. 
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The above requirements represent the substantive characteristics of a 
consolidated democracy. However, historical research on democratic development 
generally agrees that democracies never achieve substantive consolidation prior to 
technical consolidation, and never in less than twenty years after transition. Most 
post-Cold War democracies are far from achieving substantive consolidation, since 
most of these democracies are still between ten and twenty years of their democratic 
experiment. Other empirical indicators and indices can measure the process of 
democratization and consolidation. Before substantive consolidation, new 
democracies that have experienced several years of authoritative and dictatorial 
regimes first require technical consolidation. I consider technical consolidation as a 
pre-requisite for substantive consolidation. Since the period under investigation falls 
within the first twenty years of democratic experiment in the chosen case studies, I 
focus on technical consolidation in my analysis of the post-enforcement impact on the 
selected case studies.  
  As mentioned above, scholars like Beetham, Huntington, Cheeseman, and 
Linz enumerate factors that constitute technical consolidation: leadership and party 
alternation, open-seat contestation, regular elections, electoral competition, and a 
level playing field for contestants. Though substantive and technical consolidation 
processes seem to overlap in certain areas, many observers of new democracies prefer 
technical consolidation as a faster route, which lays the foundation for substantive 
consolidation (Villalon 2005; Linz 1996; Bratton and van der Walle 1997).  
  
508 
As has been pointed out in Chapter One, presidential term limits controversies 
and the consequent repealing of presidential term limits that resulted in hybridity and 
reversal in some new democracies began eight to ten years after the transition 
experience. Some scholars have already emphasized the importance of this period for 
the technical consolidation of a given democracy (Beetham 2004, Huntington 1996, 
Cheeseman 2011) in terms of electoral turnover, open-seat contests, level playing 
ground and power alternation. Scholars have also argued that the removal of 
presidential term limits during this period immunes a particular democracy from 
accessing the technical qualities as mentioned above.  
Some African countries like Cameroon, Gabon, Uganda, and Togo are a few 
examples of post-Cold War ÔdemocraciesÕ that have scarcely experienced the above 
qualities following the successful removal of presidential term limits within the first 
ten years after their transition. These countries are less likely to achieve substantial 
consolidation in comparison to countries that succeeded in enforcing presidential 
term limits. The latter go on to experience power and party alternation, open-seat 
contest, electoral turnovers, regular and popular elections, robust electoral 
competition, and an apparently level playing field for contestants.  
Power and party alternation for instance have been the bane of many post-
Cold War democracies. In Africa, two-thirds of post-Cold War democracies are yet to 
experience power or party alternations due largely to infringements on presidential 
term limits. New democracies that boost of open-seat contestation, two electoral 
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turnovers, level playing ground and power alternation signify a major match towards 
technical consolidation as Figure V shows. 
The successful power and leadership alternations in the case studies tended to 
resolve the political tension arising from power transitions in most African 
democracies. The successful enforcement of presidential term limits directly provided 
room for an open-seat contest that assured power alternation. Consequently, power 
alternation prepared and laid the foundation for party alternation, as aggrieved 
political elites converged in alternative political platforms that yielded them enough 
force and space to challenge the ruling parties through defection. The decision of 
some political actors to challenge and resist non-compliance thus united previously 
fragmented and self-interested political actors and parties against the incumbent 
dominance. The singular most valuable benefit of resisting and challenging non-
compliance in the cases studied was the manifestation and mobilization of some 
institutions and CSOs around political elites to uphold term limits. The opportunity to 
uphold rule of law and democratic rights was seen as separate from partisan politics 
that frequently limited cooperation among opposition elites in many new 
democracies.  
As detailed in the case studies, elite opposition and resistance against non-
compliance provided sustained legal mechanisms and opportunities that reinforced 
the autonomy and credibility of the judicial system. In Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi, 
the legal system recovered its lost credibility through a sustained pressure on the 
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courts by aggrieved and intimidated elite dissidents. The case studies further showed 
that public opinion often formed and mobilized around efforts to uphold or enforce 
term limits. The political elites provided the opportunity for collective action in 
Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi, especially, in protesting the offenses of the ruling 
regime. Not only that elite resistance presented an opportunity for a collective action, 
it also created a platform for local and international convergence of pressures.  
Political term limits are focal points for political change since they introduce 
the opportunity to challenge the legitimacy of the incumbentÕs right to maintain 
power (Riedl (2015). Apart from the three main case studies, initial term limits 
controversy in Ghana and Kenya demonstrated the same process. It is not yet the 
case, however, in Uganda, Cameroon, Togo, or Gabon, where persistent siege on 
term limits has continued to deny successful power and party alternations. The full 
and partial compliance outcomes in Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, and Kenya 
have respectively necessitated open-seat contest, and consequently, power and 
leadership alternation. When a democracy cannot guarantee an open-seat contest, the 
possibility of alternation remains remote, both at the party and leadership levels.467 A 
particular democracy must have had the opportunity of producing two consecutive 
                                                
467 Cameroon, Niger, Chad, Togo, Gabon, and Uganda represent this paradigm. 
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leaders through the electoral process in order to be Ôtechnically consolidating.Õ468 
Cheeseman and Beetham note that the period between eight and ten years of any 
democratic experiment is particularly crucial. This number of years allows for 
gradual consolidation by presenting the opportunity to experience two electoral 
turnovers by electorally replacing leaders. By removing presidential term limits at 
this period, incumbent presidents deny a particular democracy from technically 
evolving.  They expose such a democracy to SchedlerÕs slow democratic death.  
Table 8: Presidential Term Limits and Impact on the Consolidation Process 














Nigeria  2007 & 
2011 
2015 Yes  Yes  Yes  Moderate 
after 2007 
Zambia 2004, 2009, 2014 Yes  Yes  Yes  Moderate 
after 2004 
Malawi 2004 2009 Yes  Yes  Yes  Moderate 
after 2004 
                                                
468 Beetham and Huntington emphasize two election tests and turnovers as necessary ingredients of 
technical consolidation. Nigeria, Zambia, Malawi, Ghana, and Kenya appear to have have crossed this 




Ghana 1999, 2009, 
2013 
1999, 2009 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  
Kenya 2002, 2012 2002 Yes  Yes  Yes  Moderate  
Uganda Not No  No  Yes  No  No  
Cameroon No No  No  Yes  No  No  
Gabon  Yes, death 
of the 
president  
No  No  Yes  No  No  
Togo Yes, death 
of the 
president 
No  No  Yes  No  No  
Source: authorÕs field research and literature analysis 
What then is the difference between new democracies that have achieved 
technical consolidation and those yet to achieve them? The enforcement or removal 
of presidential term limits represents a big difference. It shows that Zambia, Ghana, 
Kenya, Nigeria, and Malawi have laid the foundation for substantive consolidation 
after achieving a greater level of technical consolidation by demanding and enforcing 
term limits compliance. In the particular case of Nigeria, the enforcement of term 
limits laid the foundation for an improved rule of law. Other reforms there have led to 
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a considerable independence of the parliament, the judiciary, civil society, and the 
electoral commission. In 2007, the immediate president (after the defeat of 
ObasanjoÕs third term) felt pressured to adopt electoral and judicial reforms, as well 
as rule of law as part of his administrationÕs seven-point agenda.  
The rule of law led to the unbundling of the political system while judicial reform 
rescued the judiciary from the grip of the executive. In 2008, the successful year-long 
completion of electoral reform saw to the removal of the Chairman of the electoral 
commission that had supervised the 2007 election, judged to be the worst in Nigerian 
history. The reform commission also recommended independent funding for the 
electoral commission, hitherto funded directly by the presidency.  
Political parties like the ruling PDP, suffered much defection and decimation 
during the presidential term limits politics in Nigeria. The first case study details how 
ÕgodfatherismÕ and alterations in the party ruptured internal party cohesion and 
loyalty. However, after enforcing compliance on Obasanjo, the ruling party and other 
major opposition parties embarked on massive reforms. The assistance of the 
electoral commission, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), 
International Republican Institute (IRI), and financial regulations restored internal 
democracy in the major Nigerian parties. The 2011 general elections became an 
opportunity to test most of the recommendations and reforms put in place after 
enforcing compliance on Obasanjo. The implementation of some of the 
recommendations made by various reform commissions led to the successful outcome 
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of 2011 general elections in Nigeria, accepted as Ôfree and fair.Õ by international and 
local observers, as well as major stakeholders.469  
The most remarkable post-third term development in Nigeria was perhaps the 
formation of a mega political party that confronted and defeated the ruling party in 
2015. A merger of about fifteen political parties and factions, the All Peoples 
Congress (APC), became a political platform where defected members from the 
ruling party converged. With the exit of former vice-president Atiku Abubakar, six 
serving state governors, sixteen former governors and ministers, the new mega 
platform routed the ruling PDP and gave Nigeria the first party alternation in its 
history. This would perhaps not have been possible if President Obasanjo had 
amended the constitution for his third-term project in 2006. The compliance outcome 
in 2006 apparently enabled the Nigerian electorate to grow from moderate to 
conscious stakeholders in the democratic process, while political parties and 
candidates other than the ruling party could go into elections with at least a fifty 
percent chance of victory at the polls.  
The Zambian case reflects a similar development. The voter apathy that 
marked the 2004 general elections has steadily improved within ten years, from 52% 
voter apathy in 2004 to 15% in 2013 (Sardanis 2014). Before the defeat of ChilubaÕs 
third-term bill, abuse of the rule of law and political assassination rated high in 
Zambia (ibid.). With the compliance outcome and subsequent power and party 
                                                
469 Confer EU Election Observation Mission Report for NigeriaÕs 2011 General Elections. 
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alternations, rule of law progressively improved (Sardanis 2014). 470  In 2006, 
President Mwanenesa secured parliamentÕs motion that lifted ChilubaÕs immunity 
and made him stand for trial for abuses perpetrated during his regime (Sardanis 
2014). As an anointed successor of President Chiluba (from the same ruling MMD), 
President MwanenesaÕs decision to present Chiluba for prosecution (even for 
personal reasons) became a boost to the rule of law in Zambia. Furthermore, with the 
introduction of level playing ground, opposition parties were to win the presidency in 
2009 and 2013, putting Zambia on the list of few post-Cold War African democracies 
that have recorded party alternations. The process has not been different in Malawi, 
which has equally witnessed two party alternations and a high level of political 
competition and level playing ground since term limits compliance on President 
Bakili Muluzi in 2003.  
While Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi have made progress in the consolidation 
process, Cameroon and Uganda seem to engender negative consolidation. Though 
they hold regular elections, Cameroon and Uganda make no conscious efforts to 
consolidate on multi-party democracy. In 2012, Cameroon passed a bill into law from 
President Paul Biya that divested the Electoral Commission the right to announce 
presidential election results in Cameroon. Though the commission has the duty to 
conduct elections, Biya transferred the announcement and returning of winners to a 
                                                




department within the presidency. In doing so, he foreclosed any hope of power 
alternation. In Togo and Gabon, the incumbent presidents created rules that allowed 
them to personalize the ruling parties while promoting national laws that force 
opposition parties to be regulated and remain moderate. In Togo and Gabon, the sons 
of incumbent presidents automatically inherited the ruling parties after the death of 
the presidents, and went on to become presidents in respective countries.  
While post-Cold War African pro-tempore democracies appear to have 
witnessed robust technical and moderate substantive progression toward democracy 
consolidation, the opposite is the case in contra-tempore democracies that have 
remained mere electoral democracies. Harpfer (2009) describes democracies that 
have not met the consolidation standards as outlined by Polity IV and Freedom House 
as electoral democracies. As Harpfer argues,   
ÒWhen a political system is holding competitive and multiparty elections, it 
can achieve the status of electoral democracyÉhowever, this concept of 
electoral democracy is restricted to the institutions and process of nation-wide 
elections, and does not account for the democratic character of political 
institutions. While focusing attention on elections, such democracies do not 
consider the democratic performance of actors and institutions or involvement 
of the masses in the decision making processÓ (ibid) 
Mere electoral democracies do not fulfill most of the criteria for substantial or 
technical consolidation, including but not limited to, rule of law, separation of 
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powers, civil society, constitutionalism, pluralism, human and political rights, 
freedom of media and opinion power alternation and open-seat contest. Scholars 
apparently did not foresee the sustained attack on presidential term limits that has 
developed into a trend in post-Cold War African democracies, nor the danger it has 
posed for the consolidation of democracy in Africa. Lacking a guarantee of prior 
technical consolidation, as well as a strategy to enforce presidential term limits 
compliance on some incumbent presidential, most post-Cold War African 
democracies may have settled for electoral and hybrid democracies with little 
prospects for either technical or substantive consolidation.  
However, it sounds cheap to brand all democracies that fail to meet all the 
standards set by Polity IV and Freedom House as mere electoral democracies. I must 
make a distinction between Ôpro temporeÕ and Ôcontra temporeÕ democracies in this 
regard. While pro tempore democracies stand a better chance of gradually fulfilling 
both the technical and substantive requirements on consolidation, contra tempore 
democracies seem only to experience negative consolidation. For instance, in some 
contra tempore democracies as in Cameroon, the electorate is denied the right to elect 
their senators. The president, who in turn exercises absolute control over the MPs, 
personally appoints the senators. This is a direct opposite of the three cases studied 
for this research where the legislatures have begun to enjoy some independence as 
stipulated by the principle of the separation of powers. The appointment of senate 
members may guarantee the continued entrenchment of power by the incumbent 
president at the short term, but may at the long run work against the consolidation of 
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democracy in Cameroon. It may at the short term promote executive loyalty while 
suppressing representative quality of democracy at the long run. Since this type of 
arrangement exists exclusively in a contra-tempore democracy, it is an indication that 
contra-tempore democracies may continuously lack the principles that stimulate 
technical consolidation like open-seat contest, power alternation, electoral 
competition, and turnovers. These shortcomings erase any hope of further attaining 
substantive consolidation since contra-tempore democracies depend on routine 
elections that are chiefly tele-guided and predetermined to confirm the incumbent 
party and president in power. Unlike their pro-tempore counterparts, contra-tempore 
democracies qualify more as HarpferÕs (2009) Ôelectoral democracies,Õ since they 
fulfill only the minimum requirements of technical and substantive consolidation. 
 
9.5 State of Democratic Development in Africa So Far 
While literature on democratic experiments tends to paint a bleak future of the 
general consolidation of post-Cold War African democracies, a sincere analysis of the 
last twenty years of democratic experiment on the continent shows some strengths, 
hopes, and weaknesses. Many of these democracies, including the three case studies 
have made remarkable progress in the technical democratic consolidation process. By 
enforcing presidential term limits compliance, the likes of Nigeria, Zambia, and 
Malawi have met Beetham and HuntingtonÕs two electoral turnover tests. These 
countries have defeated attempts to remove presidential term limits and created 
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opportunities for power/party alternation. Interpreting political development in 
Africa, Villalon (2005) and vonDoepp (2005) argue that presidential term limits is 
less likely to cause democratic regression or reversal in those that succeeded in 
enforcing compliance. The level of political and electoral competition has risen in 
these countries to sustain opposition politics. Competing candidates and parties go 
into elections with the hope of winning them, now that ruling parties have lost at least 
one presidential or parliamentary election. Thus, Nigeria, Zambia, and Malawi have 
avoided power entrenchment and by extension ShedlerÕs slow and quick democratic 
death, by enforcing presidential term limits compliance. They have joined the league 
of consolidating democracies, at least on technical ground. The thirteen African new 
democracies that successfully repealed or neglected presidential term limits have yet 
to experience two-election tests, turnover, or party alternation.  
The greatest weakness and impediment to the consolidation process of 
democracy on the continent remains entrenchment of power by incumbent presidents 
and the challenges this creates for new democracies. With the all-time record of 
thirteen repeals and neglects and four failed attempts, the inability to enforce 
presidential term limits portrays a danger for the consolidation of democracy, at least, 
technically in new democracies. Of the thirteen successful repeals, ten occurred in 
new democracies where long serving dictators metamorphosed into elected presidents 
in the 1990s. With the exception of Rawlings of Ghana and Arap Moi of Kenya, all 
other long serving/life-presidents mutated into elected presidents and succeeded in 
personalizing and entrenching state power. Worse still, two of those tightly seated 
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presidents, Omar Bongo of Gabon and Gnasigbe of Togo, succeeded in letting power 
alternate to their sons after their death. These men positioned their sons ahead of time 
and assigned them key positions above other political actors. In Gabon, Omar Bongo 
appointed his son the defense minister. After his death, his son succeeded him in a 
family-arranged, tele-guided election. In Togo, Gnasimgbe Eyedema appointed his 
son the chief of the army. He usurped presidential power immediately after the death 
of his father, until Nigerian presidency forced him into elections, which he eventually 
won.  
Presently, Yorim Mussoveni has appointed his son the Commander of the 
Internal Brigade of the Ugandan Army. Many analysts see the move as a tactical 
strategy by President Yorim Musseveni to position his son to succeed him after his 
retirement. The Cameroonian case is similar. Paul Biya is currently prepping his son 
for an eventual succession. Many local analysts are of the opinion that Paul Biya is 
hanging on even after eighty-four years to wait for his son to mature. The removal of 
term limits and the inability to enforce compliance make this trend possible in some 
post-Cold War African democracies.  
 
9.6 Integration of Findings into Current Theory and Agendas for Future 
Research 
This thesis has examined one theoretically coherent component of democracy 
consolidation: the role of political elites in enforcing term limits compliance. It is 
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important to piece the components of these theories back together to construct an 
integrated theory. In this section, I will discuss how this thesis fits into practical 
theories of democracy and present an agenda to integrate this thesis further into 
theories of democracy. I will use the development of an integrated, moderate, elite-
based theory of democracy and presidential term limits. I will show how this theory 
can link studies that examine presidential term limits in democracy with studies that 
investigate long-term and short-term strategies for enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance.  
Internal party cohesion and loyalty; internal rupture of executive and party 
loyalty; and the manner in which these connect political elite resistance to other social 
forces are important for understanding and explaining presidential term limits politics 
and outcomes. This study, however, examined institutional and international forces 
only in reference to the actor of primary interest in this thesis: the dissenting political 
elite. A complete model would require the construction of separate interaction models 
of the regime (incumbent presidents) and of institutional and international pressures. I 
would juxtapose these regime and pressure models with the model I developed for the 
study of presidential term limits and its implementation in new democracies. I would 
apply it to examine the connections between the populace and incumbent regimes that 
have successfully repealed presidential term limits without reference to political elites 
as mobilizing factor. I would aim to ascertain to what extent the masses could 
mobilize themselves to enforce compliance. Until then, the model produced in this 
study would appear as follows: 
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Political elite activism             defections                mobilization of other sectors and 
bundling of pressures          applying bundled pressures on incumbent particular 
presidents            compliance outcome. A complete process as outlined above that 
fails to yield a compliance outcome may result in a crisis outcome as in Burkina Faso 
where President CompoareÕs insisting on repealing term limits despite elite resistance 
resulted in a democratic reversal. 
 
9.7  Further Empirical Works 
In this thesis, I have ambitiously re-examined elite theory in politics. I have 
established and begun to test the validity of a model of elite-institutional-cum 
international linkage, which, when expanded in democracy studies, can rescue 
presidential term limits from extinction. Given the institutional-isomorphism of 
democracy institutions in new democracies, the state and government design, and the 
overbearing nature of presidents in new democracies, this model can apply to most 
case studies of states where the removal of presidential term limits stunts democratic 
consolidation. Most importantly, the model can apply to these cases in its entirety to 
contribute to the modelÕs refinement and the examination of other causal pathways 
and outliers. Scholars could conduct these studies comparatively, using the findings 
in this study to structure in-depth ethnographic research of one or more cases and 
further ascertain its veracity.  
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Additionally, this study can also assist scholars of politics and democracy to 
reassess the role of political elites in their own research carefully, even if their 
interests extend to areas beyond the political elite role in enforcing term limits 
compliance. One of the greatest initial challenges I encountered in this study was the 
question of how to approach the loose or improper use of terminologies and concepts 
relating to elite and elite sociology. This phenomenon occurred with scholars with 
interdisciplinary areas of specialization. To avoid such confusion, terms and concepts 
like Ôthe elitesÕ as sociologically used by Pareto and Finer (1969) or Mill (1958) had 
to be differentiated from Ôpolitical elitesÕ and not used interchangeably.  
In another example, some scholars appeared unconcerned with the unfolding 
sequence of events and the changing paradigms within African democratic processes. 
While it is unrealistic to expect journalists to completely restructure their writings to 
benefit scholars and students of political science, I hope that this study will lead the 
broader research community to rethink and reflect more on the contextual issues 
relating to presidential term limits politics and the political elite role in enforcing 
compliance.  
Secondly, the issue and influence of money in politics has received superficial 
attention by some scholars. In my research, I have underscored the importance of 
money and its influence on both the removal of presidential term limits by incumbent 
presidents and its enforcement by political elites. Patronage, financial inducement, 
and counter-inducements characterized the outcomes of presidential term limits 
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politics in the cases studied. Though undemocratic, the processes in the three case 
studies yielded democratic outcomes. Students of African democratic processes may 
need to investigate more how the expansion of wealth among political actors has 
helped to stabilize the democratic process in new and emerging democracies, and can 
continue to do so. 
Conclusion 
I conducted this study on the firm conviction that the trend in the repealing of 
presidential term limits within post-Cold War African democracies is not yet behind 
us. I believe that comprehension of presidential term limits politics is central to the 
safeguarding of presidential term limits as a democratic principle in new 
democracies. In the course of my research, the presidents of Rwanda and the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) introduced debates aimed at repealing 
presidential term limits to allow them stay longer on power, thus adding urgency to 
the issue. The president of Burundi, who lost his bid to remove presidential term 
limits in 2014, pressed on to defy his defeated effort to stand in the presidential 
elections for a third time. African democracy observers appear uncertain regarding 
the trends in the seven countries where transition presidents are yet to conclude their 
second terms in post-Cold War African democracies.  
Thus, the entrenchment of state power through the removal of presidential 
term limits is not yet obsolete in post-Cold War African democracies. The outcome of 
my research indicates that incumbent presidents are vulnerable to term limits 
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compliance if particular political elites consciously choose not to play along and are 
willing to step out to rupture executive loyalty and mobilize other forces to bundle 
pressures to enforce compliance.  
If we are to understand technical democratic consolidation, we must 
understand the inherent role of political elites. Democracy assistance, civil society, 
the judiciary, and the parliament will make an insignificant impact if political elites 
support an incumbent president to repeal presidential term limits.  
Paul Collier (2008) has stressed that most African new democracies, 
especially where democracies were unlikely, may constantly be under threat by 
incumbent presidents. In such new democracies, institutions seldom pose a threat to 
incumbent presidents who seek to entrench power, while the populace may remain 
vulnerable to executive suppression (ibid.). Collier further argues that in the absence 
of military incursion into politics (due to international restrictions), which hitherto 
presented a significant threat to and checkmated incumbent presidents, many 
incumbent presidents seemed to have increased their interest and appetite in 
entrenching state power. Many incumbent transition presidents have systematically 
entrenched power by repealing presidential term limits as soon as they had 
government machinery under their control. Weak institutions, military absence in 
politics, conquered judiciaries, a compromised international community, and an ill 
organized and badly financed civil society and NGOs, put the institution of 
presidential term limits at the mercy of incumbent presidents in the post-Cold War 
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African democratic experiment. Observations from the three case studies in this 
research suggest that the only sector that stands in the way for many incumbent 
presidents from challenging term limits are political elites. Incumbent presidents 
readily succeed in repealing term limits where political elite decide to play along and 
support the removal of presidential term limits, but fail where political elites decide to 
form a barrier to defend presidential term limits. I assume that in the absence of the 
military, political elites become indispensable in resisting the entrenchment of state 
power by incumbent presidents.  
Those political elites willing to pressure incumbent presidents into compliance need 
institutional and international linkage to produce bundled pressures. As discussed in 
Chapter Eight of this study, political experience, economic wealth, entrepreneurship, 
unity of purpose, and a full grasp of the political culture of the dissenting elites are 
required in order to mobilize the kind of bundled pressures required to demand and 
enforce compliance. Since money and patronage have become influential in 
sustaining executive control and loyalty, strategic alliance with local and international 
partners is also necessary to sustain the resistance and activism where economic 
wealth is minimal among political elites. This is, however, not applicable in all cases. 
It is applicable only when and where political elites choose not to play along, but 
instead, opt to form a barrier, resistance, and activism by mobilizing other sectors.  
I have analyzed the various pressures that converged to enforce term limits 
compliance in the various cases investigated in this study. The absence of the 
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convergence these pressures due the lack of elite activism that creates the platform for 
inter-institutional interaction sufficiently account for different outcomes in the 
politics of repealing and enforcing term limits inn African post-Cold War 
democracies. A separate and dissipated institutional pressure is not enough. The 
solution for term limits politics therefore is inter-institutionalism, awakened by elite 
visionary leadership and strong institutional interaction. Mere institutional pressures 
as a solution remains hollow and ineffective without some form of elite push and 
support which involves the forging of a collective attitude of hostility to the kind of 
power entrenchment and monopolization of state power as witnessed in many post-
Cold War democracies in Africa. Inter-institutionalism presupposes a collective 
vision of the democratic process where all democratic institutions and social forces 
converge to expend collective hostility to an incumbent regime that sets out to 
defraud the democratic process by attempting to perpetuate self in power. I dare to 
conclude that such an attitude is the raw material that individual leadership and 
institutions could use to enforce compliance in African post-Cold Democracies. 
This study is intended to help the international community, civil society, 
democracy promoters, democracy activists, and donor agencies to understand the 
politics of presidential term limits in Africa. Specifically, it is intended help these 
actors better comprehend the process of removing term limits by incumbent 
presidents, its impact on democracy consolidation, and the pressures that can 




Adetula V A. ÒInternal Democracy in Party Administration and the implications for 
Effective Monitoring of Party Finances.Ó The Nigerian Electoral Journal 3, No 1, 
(July 2009). 
Adedoja Tokunbo and Epia Oke, ÒAnti-Third Term Lawmakers Meet Civil Society 
Groups,Ó This Day Newspaper, (Abuja Nigeria. April 21, 2006). 
Agbati Reuben ÒThe Pitfalls in President Olusegun ObansanjoÕs Concept Of Loyalty. 
Turaki Vanguard, (Abuja Nigeria. 2006) http://www.google.nl/url 
Agboola J A,  2008. Ò Political Culture in Nigeria.Ó The Nigerian Electoral Journal, 
vol. 2, No. 1. (May 2008). 
Alachenu John, ÒI was offered N250m for ObasanjoÕs third term Ð Wabara,Ó The 
Punch, (November 7, 2014). 
Allen T and Alan T, eds. 2000 Poetry and Development into the 21st Century. , eds. 
(London: Oxford University Press). 
Almond G and Verba, S, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes in Five Nations 
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963).  
Ameh John, et. al, ÒObasanjo is Behind Third Term. He is a joker and a liar- 





Anders G ÒFreedom and InsecurityÓ Civil servants between support networks, the 
free market and civil service reform,Ó in A democracy of Chameleons: Politics and 
Culture in the New Malawi, ed Englund (Blantrye: Christian Literary Association in 
Malawi  CLAIM 2002). 
Annan Kofi, ÒAfricaÕs New Democratic Spirit must Spread and Strengthen.Ó The UN 
Secretary GeneralÕs address to African Union Heads of States Summit, This Day 
Newspaper, SG/SM/94/06-AFR/989, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2004/sgsm9406.doc.htm (Addis Ababa. July 6, 2004) 
Anyaeze R.C, ÒThe Western and Chinese Foreign Aid Policies in Africa: Impact on 
AfricaÕs Industrialization,Ó Masters Thesis, unpublished (Webster University, Leiden 
2011) 
Arewa J.A, ÒJudicial Integrity: Challenges and Agenda for Action,Ó Judicial 
Reform and Transformation in Nigeria, http://nials-
nigeria.org/journals/Arewa-Judicial%20Integrity.pdf  (2014)  
Arinaitwe O, President Paul Kagame Clears Air on Third Term Debate. All Africa, 
The Intendant (Kampala February 28, 2013) 
Armstrong, B   ÒNe Touche Pas Ma Constitution: Pressures and Presidential Term 




Avinash Dixit, Susan Skeath and David H. Reiley Jr. Games of Strategy, 3r ed. (New 
York: Norton 2009), Chapter 12 
Ayo Makinde, ÒAtiku, Striking a Chord With Democrats,Ó   
http://www.gamji.com/article5000/NEWS5869.htm (2006) 
Aziken Emmanuel and Mamah Emeka, ÒNigeria: N50m Bribe Rocks Anti-Third 
Term Camp,Ó The Punch Newspaper. (Nigeria. May 8, 2006). 
Azinge E & Rapu, F E. ÒRoadmap to Judicial Transformation: Through the Lens of 
retired and Serving Jurists of the Supreme.Ó A Court Valedictory Speech (Abuja 
Nigeria 2012). 
Badejo Abiodun, ÒObasanjo Used Government Funds To Finance Third Term 
Agenda Ð Ex-Minister,Ó Daily Post, http://dailypost.ng/2012/04/08/third-term-
agenda-obasanjo-used-govt-funds-to-finance-agenda-ex-minister/ (Daily Post, Lagos 
Nigeria. April 8, 2012). 
Baker (2002); BBC News; Habasonda L.M. ÔPresidentialism and Constitutionalism in 
Africa: ÒThird TermÓ phenomenon/extension of tenure: The Zambian experienceÕ, 
available at <http://www.zesn.org.zw/docs>, accessed on 5 April 2007; Southall, 
Simutanyi and Daniel (2006); VonDoepp (2005). 
Baker, B. (2002) ÔOutstaying oneÕs welcome: the presidential third-term debate in 




Banda J,  ÒThe Constitutional Change Debate of 1993-1995Ó in Democratization in 
Malawi: A Stocktaking, eds. Kim Phiri and KR Ross (Blantyre: CLAIM 1998) 
BBC September 10, 2002. 
Barry B, ÒReview Article: Crisis, Choice, and Change", Part ll', British Journal of 
Political Science 7,99-113 (1977).  
Basham, P. The Effect of a Term Limited Legislature in Michigan: Michigan Society 
of Executives. 1350 Haslett Road | East Lansing, MI | 48823 [p] 517.332.6723 | 
www.msae.org February 2012 
Bayart J.F, The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly, (New York: Longman 
1993). 
Beck L.J, Brokering Democracy in Africa: The Rise of Clientelist Democracy in 
Senegal, (Palgrave Macmillan, 2008) 280 pp. 
Beetham D, ÒConditions for Democratic Consolidation,Ó Review of African Political 
Economy. 6 (1994). 
Brandt M et. al  Constitution Making and Reform- Options for the Process 
(Interpeace 2011).  
Bratton, M. Second Elections in Africa Journal of Democracy Volume 9, Number 3, 




Bratton M. & van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions 
in Comparative Perspective, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994)  
Bratton M and van de Walle N. 1, ÒNeopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions 
in Africa,Ó World Politics, 46, no. 4 (1994) 453-489. 
Browns, S, 2000 ÒMalawi: The Trouble with Democracy,Ó Southern Africa Report 15 
(2000) 19-23 
Brown S, ÒBorn-Again Politicians Hijacked our Revolution: Reassessing MalawiÕs 
Transition Democracy, Canadian Journal of African Studies, vol. 38, no. 3 (2004) 
705-722 
Bunce V, ÒComparative Democratization: Big and Bounded Generalizations,Ó 
Comparative Political Studies 33, nos. 6/7 (2000) 703-734. 
Burton, Michael and John Higley, ÒElite Settlements,Ó American Sociological Review 
52 (1987) 295-302. 
Burton Gunther and Higley, ÒIntroduction: Elite Transformations and Democratic 
Regimes,Ó in Elite and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Europe, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther (Cambridge University Press (1992)  
Calderisi R, The Trouble with Africa: Why Foreign Aid IsnÕt Working (Palgrave 
Macmillan New York and Yale University Press London (2006) 
  
533 
Cammack D, ÒPoor Performing Countries: Malawi 1980-2002,Ó Background Paper 
3, ODI Study on Poor Performing Countries. (London: Overseas Development 
Institute 2004). 
Campbell J, ÒNigeria: Dancing on the Brink.Ó Plymouth: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2011Council on Foreign Relations Books, (G- Reference, Information and 
Interdisciplinary Subjects Series 2011).  
Carothers T, Aiding Democracy Abroad.Ó The Learning Curve. Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace (Washington D.C 1999).  
Case W, ÒCan the Halfway House Stand? Semi-democracy and Elite Theory in Three 
Southeast Asian Countries.Ó Comparative Politics 28, no. 4 (1996) 437-464 
Casper G and Taylor, M, Negotiating Democracy: Transition from Authoritarian 
Rule. Pittsburg University Press (1996).  
Catholic Centre for Social Concern (CCSC) 2002. Blantyre Malawi. 
Catholic Institute for International Relations, ÒMalawi: A Moment of Truth,Ó (CIIR: 
London 1993). 
CCAP 2001 ÒSome Worrisome Trends which undermine the Nurturing of Young 




Centre For Social Concern, ÒInter-religious dialogue Between Religions: Essential 
Steps for Development (Lilongwe: Kachere Books and Centre for Social Concern 
2004). 
Chabal, P and and Daloz, J-P, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press (1999).  
Cheeseman Nic, ÒExplaining African Election Outcomes African: The Remarkable 
Importance of IncumbencyÕ Journal of Democracy (2010).   
Chirwa, W.C 1998 ÒDemocracy, Ethnicity and Regionalism: The Malawian 
Experience, 1992-1996,Ó in Democratization in Malawi: A Stocktaking, eds KM 
Phiri and KM Ross (Blantyre. CLAIM 1998). 
Chirwa W.C, ÒCivil Society in MalawiÕs Democratic Transition,Ó In MalawiÕs 
Second Democratic Elections: Process, problems and Prospects, eds. Martin Ott, 
Kings M. Phiri and Nandini Patel (Blantyre: Christian Literature Association in 
Malawi 2000). 
Chisiza Y, ÒDemocracy Dominoes.Ó Africa Events, (July 1992). 
CIA Fact Book 1995-2000 
Clapham C, Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival 
(Cambridge and New York. Cambridge University Press 1996). 
  
535 
Clapham C, ÒDiscerning the New Africa,Ó Royal Institute of International Affairs 
Vol. 74, Issue 2 (December 2, 2002). 
Clark J, World Apart, Civil Society and the Battle for Ethical Globalization, 
(Earthscan Publications 2003). 
Collier, Paul. ÒDoing Well out of War,Ó The World Bank. Paper prepared for 
Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars (London April 10, 1999). 
Collier P, The Bottom Billion: Why The Poorest Countries Are Failing And What Can 
Be Done About It, (Vintage Books, London 1999).  
Collier P and Hoeffler, A 1998. ÒOn Economic Causes of War.Ó Oxford Economic 
Papers 50 (1998) 563-573.  
Collier P, ÒWars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (Vintage Books, 
London (2009).  
Dahl R. A, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven (Yale University 
Press 1971).  
Dahl R. A, Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control. New Haven: 
Yale University Press 1982).  
Decalo S, The Stable Minority: Civilian Rule in Africa, 1960-1990 (Gainesville and 
London: Florida Academic Press 1998). 
  
536 
De Soya, I, `The Resource Curse: Are Civil Wars Driven by Rapacity Paucity?` in 
Greed and Grievance: Economic Agenda in Civil War. Ed. Marts Berdal and David 
Malone (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 2000) 113-135 
Diamond Larry, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore and 
London: Johns Hopkins University Press 1999).  
Diamond Larry, ÒIntroduction: Roots of Failure, Seeds of Hope,Ó in Democracy in 
Developing Countries, ed. Larry Diamond, Juan Linz, and Seymour Martin Lipset. 
Vol 2: Africa. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 1988) 1-32  
Diamond Larry and Plattner, M. Baltimore and London. John Hopkins University 
Press, 108-126.  
Diamond L, ÒFacing up to the Democratic Recession, in Is Democracy in Decline? 
Journal of Democracy, vol. 26 No. 1 (January 2015). 
DiPalma G, To Craft Democracies: An Essay on Democratic Transitions (Berkeley: 
University Press). 
Dowding K. M. & Kimber, R, ÒThe Meaning and Use of Political Stability", 
European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983) 229-243.  
Dankwart D, ÒTransitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,Ó Comparative 
Politics 2, no. 3 (170) 337-367 
  
537 
Dyson ed. Nigeria: The Birth of AfricaÕs Greatest Country.Ó Vol. 1. (Spectrum 
Books, Ibadan. Nigeria 1998).  
Dulani B, ÒDemocracy Movements as Bulwarks against Presidential Usurpation of 
Power: Lessons from the Third Term Bids in Malawi, Namibia, Uganda and 
Zambia,Ó Wiener Zeitschrift fur kritische Afrikastudien Nr. 20 (2011,11,jg)115-139.  
Dulani B, ÒA Decade of Legislative Ð Executive Squabble in Malawi 1994-2004,Ó in 
African Parliaments Between Governance and Government, ed. Mohammed Salih, 
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2005) 201-224 
Easton D, A Systems Analysis of Political Life. (New York: John Wiley and Sons 
1965)  
Elhauge, Einer "Are Term Limits Undemocratic?," University of Chicago Law 
Review: Vol.  
64: Iss. 1, Article 5. (1997). Available at: 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/uclrev/vol64/iss1/5 
 
El Rufai N A,  Accidental Public Servant (Create Space Independent Publishing. 
Abuja 2012). 




Ersson S. & Lane, J.E, 1983, ÒPolitical Stability in European Democracies,Ó 
European Journal of Political Research 11 (1983) 245-264.  
Englund H, ÒThe dead Hand of Human Rights: Contrasting Christianity in post-
Transition Malawi,Ó Journal of Modern African Studies 38 (4) (2000) 579-603. 
Englund H, ÒDoes Civic Education Disempower? A View from the Grassroots, in 
From Freedom to Empowerment, eds. Immink et al n.p. Forum for Dialogue and 
Peace (2003). 
Eze Chukwuemeka, ÒThe Pitfalls in President Olusegun ObansanjoÕs Concept Of 
Loyalty,Ó Turaki Vanguard. Abuja Nigeria2006.attp://www.google.nl/url 
Fabiyi Sola and Ayotebi Olufemi, ÒWhy I Declined to Run Against Obasanjo Ð 
Atiku,Ó The Punch Newspapers,  (January 31, 2013)  
Fatton, R, Predatory Rule: Sate and Civil Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne 
Rienner 1992).  
Field, G.L and Higley, J, ÒNational Elites and Political Stability,Ó in Research in 
Politics and Society: Studies of Structures of National Elite Groups, ed. Gwen Moore 
(Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press 1985) 1-44  
Flanagan, S. C, 'Models and Methods of Analysis' in Crisis, Choice and Change, eds. 
Almond, G. A., Flanagan, S. C. & Mundt, R. J., (Boston: Little, Brown 1973). 
Fomunyoh, C ÒDemocratization in Fits and StartsÓ. Journal of Democracy, Volume 




Freedom House 2000: Freedom in the World Country Ratings: 1990 through 2002  
Freedom House. 2004. Freedom in the World Country Ratings: 1990 through 2003  
Fukuyama, F et. al. ÒIs Democracy in Decline?Ó Journal of Democracy, Vol 26 
Number 1 (January 2015) 
George, L and Bennett, A ÒCase Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences,Ó BCSIA Studies in International Studies (London and Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2005) 241.  
Greif A, ÒCultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and 
Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies,Ó The Journal of 
Political Economy, Volume 102, Issue 5 (Oct., 1994), 912-950. University of 
Chicago Press. 
Gurr T. R, ÒPersistence and Change in Political Systems, 1800-1971,Ó American 
Political Science Review 68 (1974)1482-1504.  
Gyimah-Boadi, E, ÒInstitutionalizing Credible Elections in Ghana,Ó in The Self 
Restraining State: Power and Accountability in New Democracies, eds. Andreas 




Harbeson, J and Rothchild eds. ÒAfrica in World Politic: Reforming the Political 
Order.Ó The Journal of Modern African Studies. Article in Africa Today 55(4):140-
143 · June 2009   
Hauser, E ÒUgandan Relations with Western Donors in the 1990s: What Impact on 
democratization,?Ó The Journal of Modern African Studies. Vol. 47 No. 4 (1999). 
Higley, J and Burten, M.G, Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, (Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers Inc. Lanham. Boulder. New York. Toronto. Oxford 2006)  
Higley, John and Michael Burton (1989) ÒThe Elite Variable in Democratic 
Transitions and Breakdowns,Ó American Sociological Review 54 (1989) 17-32. 
Higley, John and Richard Gunther (1992) ÒElite Transformation and Democratic 
Regimes,Ó in Elites and Democratic Consolidation in Latin America and Southern 
Europe, eds. John Higley and Richard Gunther, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 1992) 1-38. 
Huntington, S, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 
(Norman OK: University of Oklahoma Press 1991). 
Hurwitz, L, ÒIndex of Political Democratic Stability: A Methodological NoteÓ, 
Comparative Political Studies 4,1, (1971) 41-68.  
Hurwitz L, ÒContemporary Approaches to Political Stability,Ó Comparative Politics 
5, (1973) 449-463.  
  
541 
Hurwitz (2003) Hurwitz, L, ÒIndex of Political Democratic Stability: A 
Methodological NoteÓ, Comparative Political Studies 4,1, (1971) 41-68.  
Ihonvbere, J ÒFrom Movement to Government: The Movement for Democracy and 
the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Zambia.Ó Canadian Journal of African 
Studies. Vol. 29, No. 1, 1995) 
Inglehart Ronald, ÒThe Renaissance of Political Culture,Ó American Political Science 
Review, 82 (1988) 1203-1230. 
Ibeanu, O ÒSecurity and Conflict Transformation in Niger Delta: Security of the 
Nation and its Key Assets, Protection of Leaders and the Elites OR Security of 
Nationals- the other 139 Million Nigerians. National Political Reform Conference, 
(Abuja 2004).  
Ibeanu O, and Robin, L, ÒNigeria: Political Violence, Governance & Corporate 
Responsibility in a Petro-State, in Oil Wars: How Wars over Oil Destabilize 
Faltering Regimes, Eds, M Kaldor, T.I Karl & Y Said (London: Pluto press 2007).  
Inhvbere, J, ÒFrom Movement to Government: The Movement for Multiparty 
Democracy and the Crisis of Democratic Consolidation in Nigeria,Ó Canadian 
Journal of African Studies. Vol. 29, No 1 1995.  
Iriepken Davidson ÒNigeria: U.S. Election - IWU in Stormy Waters,Ó This Day, 
Abuja, (November 13, 2008) 
  
542 
Isenyo Godwin and Olatunji Segun, ÒI gave Obasanjo N100m for 1999 elections Ð
Kalu.Ó The Punch Newspapers.  (May 19, 2013) 
Iwu, M, ÒThe April 2007 Elections in Nigeria: What Went Right.Ó A Lecture under 
the Professional Programme in Election Administration (April 2008).  
Iwu, M, ÒThe Electoral Process and the Imperative of Electoral Reform in Nigeria,Ó 
The Nigerian Electoral Journal, vol. 3, No. 1 (July 2009).  
Jacskson, R and Rosberg, C, Personal Rule and Black Africa: Prophet, Autocrat, 
Tyrant. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1982).  
Jannicke, M, ÒZum Konzept der politischen Systemkrise,Ó Politische 
Vierteljahresschrift 12 (1973) 530-554.  
Jibrin I, ÒLegislation and the Electoral Process: The Third Term Agenda and the 
Future of Nigerian Democracy,Ó Centre for Democracy and Development (Abuja, 
2006). 
Kabemba C, ÒThe Contribution of Donors to the Consolidation of Democracy in 
Malawi,Ó in Elections and democratization in Malawi: An uncertain process. ed. N 
Khembo (Johannesburg, EISA 2005) 
Kamwendo G, ÒUses and Abuses of Language during Election Campaigns,Ó in 
MalawiÕs Second Democratic Elections: Process, Problems and Prospects, eds. M 
Ott, K Phiri and N Patel (Blantyre CLAIM 2000). 
  
543 
Khembo N, ÒThe Constitution, Constitutionalism and Democracy in Malawi: The 
Reign of Parliamentary Oligarchy,Ó in Quest for Peace in Africa, ed. A Nhema, 
(Addis Ababa. International books with OSSREA 2004) 
Khembo N, ÒThe Multi-party Promise Betrayed: The Failure of Neoliberalism in 
Malawi,Ó Africa Development 29, 2 (2004) 80-105. 
Kuenzi M and Lambright G, Party Systems and Democratic Consolidation in AfricaÕs 
Electoral Regimes,Õ Party Politics 11 (4) (2005) 423-446. 
Kwaja Chris, ÒElectoral Democracy on Trial: The Third Term Agenda and the Fate of 
the 2007 Elections in Nigeria.Ó http://www.gamji.com/article5000/NEWS5679.htm 
Global Rights and Partners for Justice. Abuja, Nigeria. 2006. 
Leftwich, A, ÒBeyond Institutions: Rethinking the Role of Leaders, Elites and 
Coalitions in the Institutional Formation of Developmental States and Strategies,Ó 
Forum for Development Studies Vol. 47, Issue 1 (2010) 93-111 
Levine D, ÒVenezuela since 1958: The Consolidation of Democratic Politics,Ó in The 
Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Latin America, eds. Juan Linz and Alfred 
Stepan, (Baltimore and London. John Hopkins University Press 1978) 82-109. 
Levitsky S and Way L, International Linkage and Democratization. Journal of 
Democracy 16, 3 (2005) 20-34 
Levitsky S and Way L, ÒThe Myth of Democratic Recession,Ó in Is Democracy in 
Decline? Journal of Democracy Vol. 26 Number 1 (January 2015) 
  
544 
Lijphart, A, ÒConstitutional Choices for New Democracies,Ó in The Global 
Resurgence of Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner. (Baltimore and 
London. John Hopkins University Press 1996) 
Lijphart A, ÒDouble-Checking the Evidence,Ó in The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, (Baltimore and London. John 
Hopkins University Press 1996). 
Linz J and Stepan, A, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: 
Southern Europe, South America and Post Communist Europe, (Baltimore, MD: John 
Hopkins University Press 1996). 
Linz J, The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes: Crisis, Breakdown and Re-
equilibration, (Baltimore and London. John Hopkins University Press 1978) 
Linz J. ÒThe Perils of PresidentialismÓ in The Global Resurgence of Democracy, eds. 
Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, (Baltimore and London. John Hopkins University 
Press 1996) 108-126 
Linz J, ÒThe Virtues of Parliamentarianism,Ó in The Global Resurgence of 
Democracy, eds. Larry Diamond and Marc Plattner, (Baltimore and London. John 
Hopkins University Press 1996) 154-161 
Linz, J. J, ÒTotalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes,Ó in Greenstein, eds. F. I. & 
Polsby, N. W, Handbook of Political Science. Reading, Mass.: (Addison-Wesley, 
1975) 175-411.  
  
545 
Lipset S.M, ÒSome Social Requisite of Democracy, Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy,Ó American Political Science Review 53 (1) 1959) 69-105) 
Lwanda J.L.C, Promises, Poor Politics and Poverty: Democratic Transition in 
Malawi, (Glasgow: Dudu Nsomba 1996). 
Lungu S, ÒChurch and political Engagement: ÒThe Cases of the Roman Catholic 
Church and JehovahÕs Witnesses 1992-2003,Ó BA Dissertation, Faculty of 
Humanities, University of Malawi, (2004). 
Mainwarring, S and Shugart, S.S, Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America, 
(New York: Cambridge University Press 1997).  
Mainwaring, Scott, ÒDemocratic Survivability in Latin America,Ó in, Democracy and 
its Limits: Lessons from Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, eds. Howard 
Handelman and Mark Tessler, (Indiana: University of Notre Dame, 2000) 11-68. 
Malawian Standard September 25-30, 2002 
Maltz G, ÒThe Case For Presidential Limits,Ó Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, 
Number 1, (January 2007) 128-142. 
Manning C, Ò Conflict Management and Elite Habituation in Post War Democracy: 
The Case of Mozambique,Ó in The Fate of AfricaÕs Democratic Experiment, eds. L. 
Villalon and P.von Doep, (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University press 2005). 
  
546 
Marcus, R, ÒCultivating Democracy on Fragile Ground: Environmental Institutions 
and Non-Elite Perceptions of Democracy in Madagascar and Uganda,Ó PhD 
dissertation, Department of political Science, (University of Florida 2000). 
McFaul, M. ÒThe Fourth Wave of Democracy and Dictatorship,Ó World Politics, 
Vol.54 No.2 (January 2002) 
Mchombo, SA. 1998. ÒDemocratization in Malawi: Its Roots and Prospects, in 
Democratization in Late Twentieth Century Africa: Coping with Uncertainty, eds. 
Jean-Germain Gros, (Westport, Connecticut and London: Greenwood press 1998). 
McCracken, J 1998 ÒDemocracy and Nationalism in Historical Perspective: The case 
of Malawi. African Affairs Vol.97, Number 387 (1998) 231-249. 
McCracken J, Politics and Christianity in Malawi 1875-1940: The Impact of the 
Livingstonia Mission in the Northern Province, (Blantyre: CLAIM 2000) 
Meindhardt H, and Patel, N, MalawiÕs Process of Democratic Transition: An 
Analysis of Political Development between 1990 and 2003, (Lilongwe: Konrad 
Adenuauer Foundation 2003). 
Mesquita B.B, and Smith A, ÒLeader Survival, Revolutions and Nature of 
Government Finance.Ó Wilf Family Department of Politics. New York 2008) 
Moore B, ÒThe Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and PeasantÓ in 
the Making of the Modern World, (Boston: Beacon Press 1996). 
  
547 
Morlino, L ÒLa crisi della democrazia,Ó Rivista Italiana di Scienza Politico 9, 37-70 
1979.  
Morlino L, ÒWhat Crisis of Democracy in Italy?Ó Paper presented at the panel on 
'Crisis and Breakdown of Democracy, ISPP Sixth Annual Scientific Meeting, (St. 
Catherine's College, Oxford, July 19-22, 1983).  
Moyo D, Dead Aid: Why Aid is not working and how there is another way for Africa, 
(Penguin Books, UK 2009). 
Morrow S, 2005 Ò Toxic Mushrooms? The Presidential third-term debate in Malawi.Ó  
Mozaffar S, Scarrit J, and Galaich, G, ÒElectoral Institutions, Ethno-political 
Cleavages and Party Systems in AfricaÕs Emerging Democracies,Ó American 
Political Science Review 97, no. 3 2003) 379-390  
Muhibbu-Din O. Mahmudat, ÒIntra-class Struggle in Nigeria.Ó Journal of Public 
Administration and Policy Research, http://www.academicjournals.org/jpapr vol. 2, 
(7), (December 2010) 88-95 
Murunga R.G  ÒSpontanous or Premeditated? Post-Election Violence in Kenya,Ó 
(Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, Uppsala 2011). 
Newell J, ÒA Moment of Truth: The Church and Political Change in Malawi, 1992, 
Journal of Modern African Studies 33(2) (1995) 243-262. 
  
548 
Ndegwa S, ÒA Decade of Democracy in Africa,Ó African and Asian Studies, ed. 
Stepehen Ndegwa, Vol 36 nr. 1 (Leiden: E.J Brill, 2001) 1-16 
Ngwodo C, ÒThird Term and Matters Arising,Ó Nigerian World (Village Square), 
February 18, 2006. http://nigeriaworld.com/articles/2006/feb/180.html 
Nwabuzor S.U, ÒRotational Presidency and Elective Presidency,Ó Nigerian World, 
June 22, 2006. http://nigeriaworld.com/columnist/nwabuzor/062206.html 
Nwabuzor, S U 2004 Nigerian World. December 2, 2004  
Nzuda M.S, and Ross, K.R, eds. ÒChurch, Law and Political Transition in Malawi 
1992-1994, (Gweru: Mombo press 1995). 
Obi C.I, Conflicts and Politics in Post-Cold War Africa, African and Asian Studies 
(special issue), Guest ed. Cyril Obi, Volume 4, Nos. 1&2, (Brill Publishers, Leiden, 
2005) 
Obi C.I, ÒNo Choice, But Democracy: Prizing the People out of Politics in Africa,Ó 
Claude Ake Memorial Paper (CAMP) Series, (Uppsala: Department of Peace and 
Conflict Research Uppsala University and Nordic Africa Institute, 2008).  
Obi C, ÒResource Control in NigeriaÕs Niger Delta. An Academic Essay on the 
Reasons why oil has not brought wealth to Nigeria's people.Ó The Nordic African 
institute, (Uppsala 2007). 
  
549 
OÕDonnel G, ÒHorizontal Accountability in New Democracies.Ó Journal of 
Democracy, 9.3 (1998) 119-126.  
OÕDonnell G, and Schmitter P, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative 
Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies, (Baltimore and London. John Hopkins 
University Press 1986).  
Oko O, Seeking Justice in Transitional Societies: An Analyses of the Problems and 
Failures of the Judiciary in Nigeria (Cristiana Gasper Ralha Press 2011). 
Okowa Ifeanyi, ÒPolitical Parties in Democracy,Ó The Sun, (September 26, 2015) 
Olaiya T et al,  ÒFactors in Mass Media, Third-Term Agenda and Governance in 
Nigeria.Ó The News Media and Mass Communication, (ISSN 2224-3267 (Paper) 
ISSN 2224-3275 Vol. 10, 2013).  
Olson M, The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, 
Second printing with new preface and appendix (Harvard Economic Studies 1971). 
Onabole Duro  ÒNo Basis For Atiku To Resign.Ó The Sun News Paper, Lagos 
Nigeria, http://sunnewsonline.com/new/   April 14, 2006). 
Onuma C, Electoral Democracy on Trial: The Third Term Agenda and the Fate of 
the 2007 Elections in Nigeria, (2006) 
Ottaway M, AfricaÕs New Leaders: Democracy or State Reconstruction, 
(Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment 1999).  
  
550 
Ozoh; F 2009: ÒStrategizing for General Elections in Nigeria: Emergent Vertical 
Issues.Ó The Nigerian Electoral Journal, vol. 3, No 1. (July 2009).  
Ozor C, ÒMy Bone of Contention with Obasanjo: Orji.Ó Vanguard Newspaper, 
(March 11, 2014). 
Oyewo O, ÒConstitutionalism and the Oversight Functions of Legislature in Nigeria,Ó 
Draft Paper presented at African Network of Constitutional Law Conference on 
Fostering Constitutionalism in Africa, (Kenya, Nairobi. April 2007).  
Public Action Committee, The 2003 Annual Report of PAC of Malawi, (Lilongwe 
2004) 
Partel N, ÒThe 1999 Elections: Challenges and Reforms,Ó in MalawiÕs Second 
Democratic Eections: Process, Problems and Prospects, eds. M. Ott, K. Phiri and N. 
Patel, (Blantyre CLAIM 2000) 
Phiri K, ÒWorrisome Trends: The Voice of the Church in MalawiÕs Third Term 
Debate,Ó in African Affairs, eds. M. Kings K. Phiri and Kenneth Ross, 103, (Royal 
Africa Society 2004) 91-107. 
Phiri K, and Ross K, (eds) Democratisation in Malawi: A Stocktaking, (Blantyre: 
CLAIM 1998) 




Pareto V, and Finer, S.E, Sociological Writings, ed. Vilfredo Pareto, (New York. 
Praeger 1969). 
Plattner, M.F. ÒIs Democracy in Decline,?Ó in Is Democracy in decline? Journal of 
Democracy. Vol. 26 Number 1, (January 2015). 
Posner D, and Young D, ÒThe Institutionalizing of Political Power in Africa,Ó 
Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number 3, (July 2007) 126-140 
Posner D, and Simon D.J, ÒEconomic Conditions and Incumbent Support in AfricaÕs 
New Democracies: Evidence from Zambia. Comparative Political Studies 35, no. 3:  
2002) 313-336  
Power T. J and Gasioroski M.J, 1997. Institutional Design and Democratic 
Consolidation in the Third World,Ó Comparative Political Studies Vol. 30, Number 2 
(1997) 123-155.  
Przeworski et al. (1996) ÒWhat Makes Democracies Endure?,Ó  in Consolidating the 
Third Wave Democracies, eds. Larry Diamond, Marc Plattner, Yin Han Chu, and 
Hung-Mao Tien.   (Baltimore and London. John Hopkins University Press) 295-311 
Przeworski and Limongi, ÒModernization: Theories and Facts,Ó World Politics Vol. 
49, Number 2 (1997) 155-183 
Rakner L, and Svasand L, ÒFrom Dominant to Competitive Party System: The 
Zambian Experience, 1991-2001,Ó Party Politics, Vol.10, Number 1 (2004) 49-68. 
  
552 
Rakner L et al, DemocratizationÕs Third Wave and Challenges of Democratic 
Deepening: Assessing International Democracy Assistance and Lessons Learned, 
(2007). 
Reno W, War Lords and African States. (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 1999) 
Rice C, No Higher Honour: A Memoir of my Years in Washington, (Crown 
Publishers 2012).  
Riedl R.B, ÒAre Efforts to limit Presidential Powers in Africa Working?Ó A Guest 
post, Department of Political Science, North-western University. US 2015). 
Robinson, J. A, 'Crisis', International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, (New 
York: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 3, 1968) 510-518.  
Ross, K 1996, God, People and Power in Malawi: Democratization in Theological 
Perspective in Malawi. Blantyre: CLAIM 1996a) 
Ross, K 1996b ÒThe Transformation of Power in Malawi 1992-1994: The role of 
Christian Churches, in God, People and Power in Malawi: Democratization in 
Theological Perspective, ed. Kenneth Ross, (Blantyre CLAIM 1996b) 
Ross K, ÒWorrisome trends: The voice of the Churches in MalawiÕs Third Term 
Debate,Ó African Affairs Vol. 103 Number 410 (2004) 91-107 




Salih M et al, ÒPolitical Parties in Africa: Challenges for Sustained Multiparty 
Democracy,Ó African Regional Report for International Institute for Democracy and 
Electoral Assistance (2007) 
Salih M, ÒA The Changing Governance Role of African Parliaments,Ó in African 
Parliaments Between Governance and Government, ed. Mohammed Salih (Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005) 3-24 
Salih M, ed. ÒAfrican Political Parties: Evolution, Institutionalization and 
Governance,Ó (Pluto Press, London, 2003)  
Sanders D, Patterns of Political Instability, (London: Macmillan 1981) 
Sardanis A, Zambia: The First Fifty Years. The Reflections of an Eye Witness,  (I.B. 
Tauris & Com. Ltd. London and New York 2014).  
Schatzberg M.G, Political Legitimacy in Middle Africa: Father, Family, Food, ISBN-
13: 978-0253214829 ISBN-10: 0253214823 (2001). 
Schedler A, ÒWhat is Democratic ConsolidationÓ? Journal of Democracy Vol. 9, 
Number 2 (1998) 91-107 
Schedler, A ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Un-free Competition, 
(Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner. 2006) 
Schoeffeleers M and Maille, In Search of Truth and Justice: Confrontation between 
Church and State in Malawi 1960-1994, (Blantyre CLAIM 1999). 
  
554 
Schumpeter, J (1942) Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. Harper and Brother. 
ISBN 0061330086 United States 
Sen A, Development as Freedom, (Oxford University press 1999). 
Shepsle K, Analysing Politics: Rationality, Behaviour, and Institutions,Ó 2010 
Shinn D, ÒPresidential Term Limits for African CountriesÓ, America.gov Blogs: An 
Ambassadorial experience in Africa, 
http://blogs.america.gov/blog/2009/06/29/presidential-term-limits-for-african-
countries/ (posted, June 29, 2009). 
Short P, Banda, (London: Routeledge & Kegan Pual 1974). 
Simon D.J, ÒDemocracy Unrealized: ZambiaÕs Third Republic under Frederick 
Chiluba,Ó In The  Fate of AfricaÕs Democratic Experiments, Elites and Institutions, 
eds. Leonardo A. Villalon and Peter von Doepp (Indiana Univesity Press 2005).  
Simon D.J, ÒCan Democracy Consolidate in Africa amidst Poverty? Economic 
Influences upon Political Participation in Zambia,Ó Journal of Commonwealth and 
Comparative Politics Vol. 40, Number 1(2002) 23-42 
Smith A, ÒDiversionary Foreign Policy in Democracy,Ó International Studies 
Quarterly 40, (Washington University 1996) 133-153. 
Soludo C, ÒNigerian Economy: Can we achieve the Vision 2020?Ó Central Bank of 
Nigeria, January 8, 2007.  
  
555 
Soni Daniel and Levinus Nwabughiogu, ÒImprisonment: How Obasanjo, Ribadu 
framed me up Ð DSP Alamieyeseigha,Ó The Punch, Ed. Soni Daniel July 12, 2014 
Sonyinka W, ÒSaying No to Dictatorship,Ó The Sun Newspaper Lagos, June 8, 2006 
Stepan A, ÒOn the Task of Democratic Opposition,Ó Journal of Democracy Vol. 1, 
Number. 2 (1990) 41-49. 
Southern African Catholic BishopsÕ Conference, ÒPresidential Terms and Good 
Governance,Ó A publication of South African Catholic BishopsÕ Conference 
Parliament Liaison Office, ed. Chance Chagundu, (December 2002). 
The Great Lake Voice. RPF Must Debate KagameÕs Third Term Openly if it is Good, 
January 19, 205. Independent News for the Africa Great lakes Region.  
Ubabukoh Ozioma, ÒObasanjo is NigeriaÕs Worst Leader ÐUzor Kalu,Ó The Punch, 
March 11, 2014 
United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report, (New York. 
UNDP 2000) 
Van Donge J.K, ÒZambia: Kaunda and Chiluba,Ó in Democracy and Political Change 
in sub-Saharan Africa, ed. John A. Wiseman, (London. Routalage, 1995) 193-219 
VonDoepp P, 2002 ÒAre MalawiÕs Clergy Civil Society Activists? The Limiting 
Impact of Creed, Context and Class, in A Democracy of Chameleons. Politics and 
Culture in new Malawi, ed. H. Englund, (Blantyre: CLAIM, 2002) 
  
556 
VonDoepp P, ÒInstitutions, Resources, and Elite Strategies: Making Sense of 
MalawiÕs Democratic Trajectory,Ó in The faith of AfricaÕs Democratic Experiments: 
Elites and Institutions, eds. Leonardo Villalon and P. Von Doepp, (Indiana University 
Press 2005) 
vonDoepp P, ÒThe Survival of MalawiÕs enfeebled Democracy,Ó Current History, 
Vol.100, Issue 646, (2001) 230-232 
Wiseman J, ÒPresidential and Parliamentary Elections in Malawi 1999,Ó Electoral 
Studies Vol. 19, Number 4 (2000) 637-646. 
Usman H.U, Crisis of Leadership in Nigeria: The Reality and the Way Forward, 
(Ahmadu Bello University Press, Zaria. Kaduna. Nigeria 2012). 
van de Walle, N, ÒEconomic Reform and the Consolidation of Democracy in Africa,Ó 
in Democracy in Africa: The Hard Road Ahead, ed. Marina Ottawey, (Boulder Colo.: 
Lynie Rienner, 1997) 15-42  
Van de Walle N, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-
1999. Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions, (New Cambridge University 
Press 2001). 
Van de Walle N, ÒTipping Games: When Do Opposition Parties Coalesce,?Ó in 
Electoral Authoritarianism, ed. Andreas Scheldler, (Lynie Rienner 2006) 105-127 
Van de Walle N, ÒAfricaÕs Range of Regimes.Ó Journal of Democracy Vol. 13, 
Number 2 (2002) 66-80  
  
557 
Vencovsky, D ÒPresidential Term Limits in Africa,Ó Conflict Trends No. 2 (2007) 
Verba S, ÒSequences and Development,Ó in Crises and Sequences in Political 
Development, eds. Binder L et al, (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 
1971) 283-316.  
Villalon L .A et al, The Fate of Africa«s Democratic Experiments: Elites and 
Institutions, eds. Leonardo Villalon and Peter VonDoepp. Indiana University Press, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis 2005). 
Von Doep P, ÒThe Problem of Judicial Control in New African Democracies: Malawi 
and Zambia in Comparative View,Ó Annual Meeting of the African Studies 
Association, (Washington, D.C., December 5-8 2002) 
Wagner Richard, ÒPressure Groups and Political Entrepreneurs,Ó Papers on non-
Market  Decision Making 1 (1966): 161-71 
Welzel, C. and Inglehart, R. (2009) ÒPolitical Culture, Mass Beliefs, and Value 
Change,Ó in Democratization, eds. Christian Haerpfer, Patrick Bernhagen, Ronald 
Inglehart, and Christian Welzel, Oxford: Oxford University Press 2009). 
Widner J.A, ÒPolitical Reform and Anglophone and Francophone African Countries,Ó 
in Economic Change and Political Liberalization in sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press 1994).  
  
558 
Wildasky, ÒSustainability, Local Democracy and the Future: The Swedish Model.Ó 
Springer Science and Business Model, eds. Uno Svedin, Britt Hagerhall Aniansson, 
2002, 2012) 129-164 
Yilmaz, E and Thorleif, P (eds), The International System, Democracy and Values, 
Uppsala 2009 
Zimmermann, E, ÒThe Study of Crises in Liberal Democracies: Pitfalls and 














Appendix 1: Ethic Review Form 
Brussels School of International Studies 
School of Politics and International Relations 
Ethical Review Form 
The University of Kent requires that each School has procedures in place to ensure 
that the ethical implications of research involving human participants have been 
considered and that ethical standards of conduct are achieved. All research proposals 
that involve any human participants should therefore be subjected to an ethical review 
prior to their commencement.  Projects, which involve interviews and surveys of 
staff, students and other groups, are included in this category, alongside scientific 
interventional techniques and the use of non-anonymised primary source data.   
The standardised format is to be used for the review process and it is the 
responsibility of staff to ensure that where appropriate their own research, and that of 
students they supervise, is submitted for ethical scrutiny.  
An ethical review form should be completed and submitted to Amanda Klekowski 
von Koppenfels at ak248@kent.ac.uk.  
The form is in four parts. Part I provides general information about the research 
project. Part II consists of an ethics checklist. Part III asks for more detailed answers 




1.1: Title of Project: Democratic Consolidation: The Dynamic Role of Political Elites 
in Enforcing Presidential Term Limit Compliance in New Democracies. 
1.2: Details of researchers and project organisers 
a) Name of main researcher:  Reginald Chima Anyaeze 
b) Name of others involved and role (e.g. supervisor) including affiliation if not in the 
School of Politics and IR:  Dr. Tugba Basaran (Supervisor) 
Dr. Albena Azmanova (Second Supervisor) 
c) Which relevant research ethics guidelines have you consulted before completing 
this form? (One such set of guidelines is the ESRCÕs Research Ethics Framework, 
http://www.esrc.ac.uk/about-esrc/information/research-ethics.aspx).  
I consulted ESRC before completing the form 
d) For students: please confirm that you have discussed this application with your 
supervisor. 
Yes 
e) For supervisors: What are your comments, if any, on this application? 
f) Expected start date and duration of the research? 
  
561 
The field research in Nigerian took place between September and November 2013, 
while field in Zambia and Malawi took place between September and November 
2014. 
1.3: Research funding 
Are you applying for, or have you received, funding from the following research 
councils and foundations for this research project: the ESRC or other members of 
Research Councils UK; The British Academy; the Leverhulme Trust; the Nuffield 
Foundation; the Rowntree Foundation; CORDIS (European Commission); 
Commonwealth, Chevening, Fullbright or Marshall Scholarships. 
I did not apply 
If you are seeking or receiving funding from different sources than above, please 
name the source(s). Please also discuss if there may be any conflicts of interest or 
possible impact on the independence of your research arising from this source of 
funding. 
Not anticipated 
1.4: Purpose of Project/aims and Objectives  
Provide a brief outline (one/two paragraphs) of the project written in lay-personÕs 
language, assuming that the reader is unfamiliar with the subject. Include how the 
project fits with existing knowledge and what are its intended benefits (e.g. to 
  
562 
conceptual knowledge, specific groups, services etc). Include also a short description 
of methodology.   
My research focuses how presidential term limits could be enforced in new 
democracies, especially in post-Cold War Africa democracies where the removal of 
term limits has achieved global record. The research pays particular attention to the 
role of political elites in galvanizing, mobilizing and bundling pressures through elite 
activism and dissidence to demand and enforce term limits compliance. Since the 
removal of presidential term limits appears to be one of the major setbacks militating 
against the consolidation process of most post-Cold War democracies in Africa, 
highlighting the pressures that could induce compliant outcome has become 
necessary.  
Using Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi as primary case studies, and to some 
extent, Ghana, Kenya, Uganda and Namibia and Cameroon as semi-case studies, I 
argue that presidential term limits shall likely be enforced where individual political 
elites willingly or unwillingly resist power entrenchment by incumbent presidents. 
Elite activism, internal party dissidence and an across-the-board coalition are elite 
actions that rupture party and executive loyalty.  
Consolidation experts have focused on the theories of democracy promotion, 
institutions and civil society in assessing presidential term limits politics and 
outcomes in new democracies. Democratic institutions are still weak in many new 
African democracies since they are mostly untested and seemingly under the control 
  
563 
of incumbent presidents. Thus, considering the fragile nature of these institutions, 
relying solely on the democratic institutions in enforcing presidential term limits 
compliance remains insufficient as evidenced by thirteen successful term limits 
repeals or neglect in Africa. Therefore, without prejudice to other perspectives, no 
individual approach seems sufficient to guarantee presidential term limits compliance 
without taking into consideration the elite political activism that galvanizes, 
mobilizes and bundles other sectoral pressures to demand and enforce compliance.  
Though some scholars query the usefulness of presidential term limits for the 
growth of democracy, this study argues that the benefits of presidential term limits 
are necessary for the development and technical consolidation of new democracies. 
Presidential term limit enables power alternation, ensures electoral competition, 
prevents power entrenchment and creates room for an open-seat contest. These 
benefits ostensibly informed the framers of post-Cold War transition constitutions in 
Africa to adopt presidential term limits.  
Despite the real intention of adopting presidential term limits, the problem of 
enforcement remains both procedural, normative and practical setback in post-Cold 
War African democracies. Through field research and interviews in the selected case 
studies, I shall demonstrate in this study that incumbent presidents fail to repeal 
presidential term limits to extend their tenures only when political elites (internal and 
external) choose not to play along and consciously or forcefully choose to resist 




Part II: Research Ethics Checklist 
Please think carefully through the potential risks to research participants (including 
the researcher) before filling in this checklist. If you are unsure which box to tick for 
any of these questions, and if consulting the ethics guidelines listed above do not 
help, please discuss it with Dr Hammerstad. 
Please answer each question by ticking the appropriate box YES NO 
1. Have you, before filling in this form, read a relevant research 
ethics guideline (e.g. from the ESRC)? 
Yes  
2. Does the study involve participants who are particularly 
vulnerable? (e.g. refugees, prisoners, victims of violence)  
 No 
3. Does the study involve participants who are unable to give 
informed consent? (e.g. children, people with learning disabilities) 
 No 
4. Will the study require the co-operation of a gatekeeper for initial 
access to the groups or individuals to be recruited (e.g. pupils at a 
school, prisoners, refugees in camps) 
 No 
5. Will it be necessary for participants to take part in the study 




observation of people in non-public places) 
6. Will the study involve discussion of sensitive topics (e.g. sexual 
activity, drug use) 
 No 
7. Could the study induce embarrassment, psychological stress or 
anxiety or cause harm or negative consequences? 
Yes  
8. Will the study involve prolonged or repetitive testing?  No 
9. Will financial inducements (other than reasonable expenses and 
compensation for time) be offered to participants? 
 No 
10. Will the study involve recruitment of patients or staff through 
the NHS or Social Services? 
 No 
11. Will the study involve the withholding of information from, or 
deliberate deception of, participants?  
 No 
12. Will the study involve any potential risk to the researcher(s)?  No 
Part III:  Research ethical considerations 
3.1: Conduct of project 
a) Location of the research:  
Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi 
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b) Brief description of participants, including location and number: 
Individual political actors who actively participated in the Presidential Term Limits 
Politics in Nigeria, Zambia and Malawi. About fifteen actors are expected to be 
interviewed in each country. 
 
c) Brief description of controls and number 
d) Brief account of how the Data Protection Act will be complied with  




I shall collect, store and process data only for the purpose of this research. 
Where necessary, data shall be anonymized.  
The data to be collected shall be digitally preserved on a computer with a stricted 
password. 
Audio and videotapes to be taken with recording instruments shall immediately be 
transferred to computer systems for adequate protection. Manual data, like 
transcribed texts shall be stored in a locker and locked with padlocks. 
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I have designated a room specifically for my study and all study materials, including 
laptops, computers, iPad and voice recorder shall be housed in this study room. I shall 
provide security where necessary for all research materials in the study room. I alone 
have access to the computer systems in the study room.  
An extra external hard-drive has been procured to serve as a backup to for the 
research data. 
All data shall be preserved accurately in their originality, and kept up to date. I do not 
intend to keep any data longer than necessary. 
All interviewees shall be informed beforehand about the purpose of the interview. 
The final results of the research shall not be made to identify any individuals without 
consent. 
 
e) Payment of participants (if any): 
Not applicable  
g) Source of funding (if any):  
Self-funding 
h) Brief account of methodology/techniques (a summarised account of measures to be 
used should be included as should examples of any questionnaires etc):  
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¥    I shall use semi-structured interview for all the field research work. 
¥    I shall use qualitative and quantitative research methods for this stud for primary 
and secondary data collection. I shall semi-structured interviews for pro and 
opposition actors involved in the subject matter being investigated, including experts 
and the civil society organizations, not only to note their views, but also to ascertain 
and analyse their contested roles in the outcome of presidential term limits politics in 
the various case studies. 
¥    I have selected three different cases involving a successful enforcement of 
presidential term limits compliance for the research. These are Nigeria, Zambia and 
Malawi. The choice of case studies in this research is made on the basis of similarity. 
The three countries selected operate strong presidentialism, use English as Lingua 
Franca and enjoy the same colonial legacy. This allows for a general cross-case 
comparison. Further, both countries have witnessed both authoritarian regimes, and 
share the same status as post-Cold War African democracies. At transition, they all 
adopted presidential term limits of two terms. The selected cases have all held 
repeated elections since their transition-elections in the 1990s and after the de defeat 
of the repeal attempts, fitting properly into BeethamÕs two election tests and 
HuntingtonÕs two turnover tests. 
i) Brief account of how participants will be selected and any issues that arise relating 
to the selection of participants 
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¥    Participants for the interview shall be selected based on their expected roles 
during the presidential term limits controversy in each of the selected case studies. 
These may include ex-presidents and vice presidents, MPs, Judicial officers, cabinet 
members, ambassadors, church leaders where applicable and academic experts. I 
intend to interview officers who were active during the third term controversies in the 
selected case studies as main actors. Depending on local situation, the list of 
interviewees could be altered. 
 
3.2: Risk, harm and benefit 
This section should address at least the following: 
a) Any risks to the participants (including the researcher(s)): this might include all 
forms of harm, e.g. physical or psychological/emotional. Particular attention should 
be paid to the potential to cause distress and embarrassment. Measures to be taken 
where necessary to ensure the welfare and safety of participants. 
¥    Some questions may be embarrassing to some participants. For instance, cases of 
financial inducement and corruption remain sensitive. Only a few actors expectedly 
may choose to talk about issues of corruption in the public. It is therefore likely to 
cause embarrassment. However, to forestall outright embarrassment, I shall first ask 
the participant if he/she would be willing to entertain questions on such a sensitive 
issue. Any response on the issue shall be respected. Though my research subject 
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covers issues of financial inducement, I do not judge it to be absolutely necessary to 
present such questions unless I receive green light to do so. I have also consulted 
some guidelines on phrasing such questions.  
 
b) Issues relating to confidentiality during the project and in subsequent data analysis, 
presentation, and publication.  
I shall treat all outcomes of the research confidentially. I shall respect the intention of 
the interviewee, whenever the participant requests me to treat his/her contribution as 
anonymous. The same principle shall apply to presentations and publications.  
In both presentation and publication, the intention of the interviewee shall be 
respected.  
c) Anticipated difficulties, particularly those relating to power imbalances between 
researcher and participants, e.g. staff/students or where dependant relationships are 
involved.  
¥    Those to be interviewed for this study were high political figures in Nigeria, 
Zambia and Malawi including academic experts. I assume that power imbalance may 
not be a problem here.   
d) Details of how the project meets the four main ethical principles of research i.e. 
non-maleficence (not causing harm), beneficence (doing good), autonomy (treating 
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people with respect and enabling them to make their own choices), and justice (who 
will be advantaged and disadvantaged by the research).  
The project meets the four ethical principles of research: 
1.    It is not intended to cause any harm because the subject matter being investigated 
is no longer current while most of those selected for interviews do not hold sensitive 
positions any more. However, adequate care shall be taken to prevent any type of 
harm on individual interviewees. 
2.    The project is good intentioned. It is intended to discover how democracy can be 
strengthened in post-Cold War African democracies and elsewhere by designing 
strategies to enforce term limits compliance in new democracies. 
3.    It is not intended to coerce any interviewee. 
4.    The project does not set out to create a situation of advantage or disadvantage.  
Its aim is to discover the connection between the outcomes of presidential limits 
debates in the three case studies and the individual role of some of the interviewees 
and other social forces including political elites. 
e) Details of how the research will take account of cultural issues, including some 
understanding of the need to provide appropriate interpreters etc.  




¥    Further, contacts have been made with local universities to assist in providing 
cover and advice for any cultural issues that may arise.  
¥    Lastly, the researcher shares to some extent the same historical, social and cultural 
background with most of the interviewees. This is not intended to affect my findings 
by pre-empting emotions and concerns. However, adequate care has been taken to 
remain neutral, objective and professional when cultural issues come on board. Thus, 
while respecting cultural issues, objectivity, which is central in social science 
research shall be at all times maintained. 
f) The rationale for the decision to pay, or not to pay, participants and the likely 
impact on participation. It should be noted that all incentives, whether monetary or 
otherwise may represent an unethical inducement to participation.   
Not applicable  
g) Issues relating to information to be provided to participants in advance of, or 
during the research. Are Issues relating to the intended feedback or otherwise of 
research results to participants? 
I have attempted to make contact with some interviewees in advance. I also made 
contacts to give advance notice to other participants. Where participants request for 
feedback after the field research, their request shall be taken into consideration, with 
respect to the view of other participants as recommended by the Guide to 
Professional Ethics in political Science. 
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h) Information about other review procedures to which the research project has 
already been subjected, including management approval where staff are involved as 
subjects. Is further or alternative ethical review required? 
Not applicable  
3.3: Consent 
It is essential that all those who participate in research should do so voluntarily, hence 
at a minimum this section should address: 
All those selected for interview do so voluntarily, based on request. Where a selected 
actor declines to an interview, the decision shall be respected. Also an interviewee 
shall be informed beforehand that he/she can choose to not answer a question, or to 
stop the interview at any time. 
a) Details of how it is intended that informed consent be obtained from the 
participants. Depending on the nature of the research, this can involve the production 
of a written information sheet that includes a mechanism for the participant to 
evidence that their consent has been obtained. Copies of any relevant documentation 
should be included. 
Not foreseen at the moment, but where necessary, it shall be applied. 
I intend to obtain an information sheet from the university, duly signed by my 
supervisor and the director for ethic research. 
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b) Procedures for gaining permission from participants who are unable to give 
informed consent (materials should be attached).  
Not applicable 
c) A special case has to be made for any cases where it is not possible to obtain 
consent.  
Not applicable 
Part IV: Signature 
This part must be signed and dated regardless of whether or not you need to fill in 
Part III. If you send the form by email, you do not need to sign (only date). It is 
enough that it is sent from your University of Kent email address. 
 
Reginald Chima Anyaeze 
 






Appendix 2 Sample Interview questions 
 
Questions used for interviews in Malawi and Zambia  
Mode of research: Semi-Structured Interviews 
Target: Political Elites and elites of various organizations including the church who 
were active during the politics of presidential term limits in Malawi and Zambia 
Necessity: Field research, based on interviews represents the primary source of my 
investigation in this study. It is considered an appropriate ÔStrategyÕ to verify the 
claims being made in this study. 
1. Sample questions for field research in Malawi. 
Ex-Ministers/MPs:  
I am aim to: 
¥ ascertain the level of involvement of the ministers and MPs in enforcing 
presidential term limits compliance in Malawi 2002.  
¥ understand how and why these political elites specifically opposed the 
amendment bill 
¥ ascertain the form of consequences that opposition to incumbent regimes face 
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¥ understand the strategies used in achieving the outcome and the effectiveness 
and otherwise of such strategies 
¥ note the place vested interest in political opposition and how it impacts on 
democracy consolidation, albeit indirectly 
¥ ascertain whether personal connection and sympathy motivated some judicial 
officers to provide protection to the intimidated opposition elites. 
¥ to ascertain if there were any pressures from regime loyalists, individual 
opposition elites, political groups and donors on the ministers and MPs to 
support or oppose the amendment bill. 
 
Samples questions: 
1 What role did the ministers play in limiting the presidential term of president 
Muluzi in 2002 in Malawi?  
2 Many individual political actors including serving ministers and MPs formed 
an alliance to oppose the tenure elongation amendment bill. What could have 
informed their decision to oppose the tenure elongation bill?  
Do you think there was pressure on the ex-ministers and MPs of the ruling party to 
support the amendment bill, and what type of pressure? 
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3 In many new democracies, opposition to an incumbent regime most often 
attracts consequences. Do you think there may have been consequences for those who 
opposed the amendment bill, and if so which?  
4 What were the most important factors in shaping the amendment bill and its 
outcome in Malawi? 
Do you think that elite experience, religion, and ethnicity may have played a role in 
shaping the outcome of the presidential term limits politics in Malawi?  
Money seemed to have played a leading role in shaping the outcome of presidential 
term limits in Nigeria, Uganda and Cameroon. Was money important in in the 
politics of the amendment bill in Malawi, how in particular? 
5 The involvement of the Church seemed to have changed the dynamics of the 
amendment bill. How important was the role of the church as an institution in 
deciding the outcome of the bill? What do you think was the reason why most church 
leaders stood in opposition against the amendment bill? 
Do you think the involvement of the church provided an alternative platform for the 
opposition elites to sustain their resistance against the amendment bill? 
6 Some prominent party members and ministers defected with some MPs to 
form an opposition platform. How did defection affect the general outcome of the 
amendment bill?   
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Do you think defection is a positive factor in resisting power entrenchment in new 
democracies? 
7 Some judicial officers gave some judgments, which did not go down well 
with the regime of Bakili Muluzi, because such judgements favoured the opposition. 
What do you think was the reason for these judgements? Do you think such 
judgments were a boost for the opposition?  
Do you think the ministers and MPs were under any form of pressure from external 
forces like the donor agencies and political contractors to support or oppose the 
amendment bill? 
8 What do you think were the most important strategies employed by the 
oppositions elites: ministers and MPs in enforcing presidential term limits compliance 
on president Muluzi in 2002? 
9 One of the aims of this research is to ascertain the importance of presidential 
term limits compliance for democracy consolidation. Was the enforcement of the 
presidential term limits compliance a benefit for democracy in Malawi, especially on 
the specific components of democracy like institution building, Elections, Rule of law 







I aim to:  
¥ ascertain why different courts gave different judgements during the third term 
politics in Malawi.  
¥ ascertain whether personal connection and sympathy motivated some judicial 
officers to provide protection to the intimidated opposition elites 
¥ enquire if there were any pressures from any quarters: the regime loyalists, 
individuals opposition elites, political groups, government, donors on the 
judicial officers to deliver certain judgements 
 
Sample questions: 
1 In a democratic setting, the Judiciary as one of the arms of government is 
burdened with the duty of interpreting laws, also and especially when it concerns the 
constitution. What type of role did the court play during the constitution amendment 
bill in Malawi in 2001/2002? 
2 Was the court officially invited to give its opinion on the debate or did the 
court get involved based on the invitation of some individual political actors who 
sought the opinion and the judgement of the court on certain individual cases 
concerning the debate?  
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Were there personal contacts between judicial officers and political elites in either 
side of the debate? If so, how strong were such contacts in influencing judicial 
decisions?  
3 There were reports of seeming intimidation of the media, NGOs and church 
leaders to support the amendment bill. Do you think judicial officers faced such 
intimidation, and if so how?   
4 Prior to the tenure elongation debate, and even at the beginning of the 
controversy, the courts granted some favourable judgements to the incumbent regime 
in Malawi. But as the presidential term limits politics heated up, this seemingly 
changed, with opposition elites getting favourable judgements. Has this anything to 
do with pressure or influence arising from the debate? 
5 In 2001, president Muluzi banned all protests concerning the amendment bill. 
What do you think was the motivation behind this ban, and what impact did it have 
on the opposition against Muluzi in general?  
6 In 2002, a High Court Judge, Dustain Mwaunglu, upturned the presidentÕs 
executive ban on protest by describing it as an Ôaffront on the constitutional rights of 
the Malawian people to express themselves on a matter of public interest.Õ How did 
such a judgement affect the prospects and outcome of the tenure elongation bill? 
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7 Do you think the judicial officers were under any form of pressure from 
external forces like the donor agencies and political contractors to give judgements in 
either in support or opposition to the amendment bill? 
8 How has the defeat of the tenure elongation attempt helped to deepen 
democracy in Malawi in terms of: Institution building, Elections, power alternation, 
















Appendix 3: List of interviewees  
 
Nigeria 
Dr. Frank Ozoh Former Coordinator, The Electoral 
Institute of Nigeria (TEI) 
Anonymous  Former Governor of Abia State 
Emeka Duru Former Director of Research and 
Planning of the Peoples Democratic Party 
(PDP) (1999-2005) 
Anonymous Former Senator of the Federal Republic 
of Nigeria 1999-2007 
Dr. Mike Anyaeze Political Leader and  Member of the 
Ruling PDP 
Anonymous Former Chair of the Independent 
National Electoral Commission of 
Nigeria (INEC) 
Prof. Toyin Falola Professor of History, University of Texas 
at Austin. USA 
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Prof. Ojeshile Professor of Philosophy. University of 
Ibadan. Nigeria 
Shaibu Danladi African Scholar and Writer. Prague, 
Czech Republic 
Anonymous Prominent Member and political sponsor 
and God-father in the ruling PDP 
Anonymous Former Chair and Secretary of the Ruling 
Party in Nigeria 
Anonymous Justice of the Appeal Court of Nigeria 
Anonymous Democracy Activist  
Anonymous  Two serving Senators 
Anonymous Two Former Senators  
Anonymous Serving Judicial Officer 
Anonymous  Serving Officer of the Economic and 







Dr. Blessings Chissinga Malawian expert and Director of Studies, 
Social Science Research at University of 
Malawi, Zomba  
Mongr. Boniface Tamani Former Chairman of Public Affairs 
Commission (PAC) 
Father John Guwa A catholic priest and researcher at 
Catholic University of Malawi 
Anonymous  4 Ex-Ministers 
Anonymous 4 Former MPs of the ruling UDF 
Anonymous 3 Former MPs of the opposition: AFORD 
and MCP 
Anonymous 3 Catholic priests 
Anonymous 1 Catholic Bishop 
Anonymous Spokesperson of the Blantyre Synod 
Anonymous 2 Judicial Officers 





Mark Chona Former Special Adviser to president 
Kenneth Kaunda on International Affairs 
Swithin K.M Haagala Managing Director of Zambezi FM 
Radio, Livingstonia. Zambia 
Mayrose Majinge Political Activist 
Fabian Ezenwa Superior, Spiritan Missionaries in Zambia 
Milimo Chona Former United Nations Development 
Programme Officer, Zambia.  
Anonymous 2 Ex-Ministers 
Anonymous 3 Ex-MPs of the opposition UNIP 
Anonymous 4 Ex-MPs of the ruling MMD 
Anonymous 1 Former National Women Leader 
Anonymous 3 Catholic priests 
Anonymous I retired judge of the Appeal Court 
 
 
